2018-05-04 16:08:28 +02:00
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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2015-10-21 05:03:22 +02:00
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#ifndef _PKCS11N_H_
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#define _PKCS11N_H_
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/*
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* pkcs11n.h
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*
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* This file contains the NSS-specific type definitions for Cryptoki
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* (PKCS#11).
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*/
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/*
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* NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS
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*
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* Cryptoki reserves the high half of all the number spaces for
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* vendor-defined use. I'd like to keep all of our NSS-
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* specific values together, but not in the oh-so-obvious
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* 0x80000001, 0x80000002, etc. area. So I've picked an offset,
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* and constructed values for the beginnings of our spaces.
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*
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* Note that some "historical" Netscape values don't fall within
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* this range.
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*/
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#define NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS 0x4E534350 /* NSCP */
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/*
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* NSS-defined object classes
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2020-01-07 08:11:52 +01:00
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*
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2015-10-21 05:03:22 +02:00
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*/
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#define CKO_NSS (CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED|NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
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#define CKO_NSS_CRL (CKO_NSS + 1)
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#define CKO_NSS_SMIME (CKO_NSS + 2)
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#define CKO_NSS_TRUST (CKO_NSS + 3)
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#define CKO_NSS_BUILTIN_ROOT_LIST (CKO_NSS + 4)
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#define CKO_NSS_NEWSLOT (CKO_NSS + 5)
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#define CKO_NSS_DELSLOT (CKO_NSS + 6)
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/*
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* NSS-defined key types
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*
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*/
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#define CKK_NSS (CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED|NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
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#define CKK_NSS_PKCS8 (CKK_NSS + 1)
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2018-05-04 16:08:28 +02:00
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#define CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1 (CKK_NSS + 2)
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#define CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2 (CKK_NSS + 3)
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2015-10-21 05:03:22 +02:00
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/*
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* NSS-defined certificate types
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*
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*/
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#define CKC_NSS (CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED|NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
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/* FAKE PKCS #11 defines */
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#define CKA_DIGEST 0x81000000L
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#define CKA_FLAGS_ONLY 0 /* CKA_CLASS */
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/*
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* NSS-defined object attributes
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*
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*/
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#define CKA_NSS (CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED|NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
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#define CKA_NSS_URL (CKA_NSS + 1)
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#define CKA_NSS_EMAIL (CKA_NSS + 2)
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#define CKA_NSS_SMIME_INFO (CKA_NSS + 3)
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#define CKA_NSS_SMIME_TIMESTAMP (CKA_NSS + 4)
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#define CKA_NSS_PKCS8_SALT (CKA_NSS + 5)
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#define CKA_NSS_PASSWORD_CHECK (CKA_NSS + 6)
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#define CKA_NSS_EXPIRES (CKA_NSS + 7)
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#define CKA_NSS_KRL (CKA_NSS + 8)
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#define CKA_NSS_PQG_COUNTER (CKA_NSS + 20)
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#define CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED (CKA_NSS + 21)
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#define CKA_NSS_PQG_H (CKA_NSS + 22)
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#define CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED_BITS (CKA_NSS + 23)
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#define CKA_NSS_MODULE_SPEC (CKA_NSS + 24)
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#define CKA_NSS_OVERRIDE_EXTENSIONS (CKA_NSS + 25)
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2018-05-04 16:08:28 +02:00
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#define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_SIGNERID (CKA_NSS + 26)
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#define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_PEERID (CKA_NSS + 27)
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#define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_GX1 (CKA_NSS + 28)
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#define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_GX2 (CKA_NSS + 29)
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#define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_GX3 (CKA_NSS + 30)
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#define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_GX4 (CKA_NSS + 31)
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#define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_X2 (CKA_NSS + 32)
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#define CKA_NSS_JPAKE_X2S (CKA_NSS + 33)
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2018-05-04 16:16:16 +02:00
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#define CKA_NSS_MOZILLA_CA_POLICY (CKA_NSS + 34)
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2015-10-21 05:03:22 +02:00
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/*
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* Trust attributes:
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*
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* If trust goes standard, these probably will too. So I'll
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* put them all in one place.
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*/
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#define CKA_TRUST (CKA_NSS + 0x2000)
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/* "Usage" key information */
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#define CKA_TRUST_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE (CKA_TRUST + 1)
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#define CKA_TRUST_NON_REPUDIATION (CKA_TRUST + 2)
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#define CKA_TRUST_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT (CKA_TRUST + 3)
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#define CKA_TRUST_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT (CKA_TRUST + 4)
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#define CKA_TRUST_KEY_AGREEMENT (CKA_TRUST + 5)
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#define CKA_TRUST_KEY_CERT_SIGN (CKA_TRUST + 6)
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#define CKA_TRUST_CRL_SIGN (CKA_TRUST + 7)
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/* "Purpose" trust information */
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#define CKA_TRUST_SERVER_AUTH (CKA_TRUST + 8)
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#define CKA_TRUST_CLIENT_AUTH (CKA_TRUST + 9)
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#define CKA_TRUST_CODE_SIGNING (CKA_TRUST + 10)
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#define CKA_TRUST_EMAIL_PROTECTION (CKA_TRUST + 11)
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#define CKA_TRUST_IPSEC_END_SYSTEM (CKA_TRUST + 12)
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#define CKA_TRUST_IPSEC_TUNNEL (CKA_TRUST + 13)
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#define CKA_TRUST_IPSEC_USER (CKA_TRUST + 14)
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#define CKA_TRUST_TIME_STAMPING (CKA_TRUST + 15)
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#define CKA_TRUST_STEP_UP_APPROVED (CKA_TRUST + 16)
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#define CKA_CERT_SHA1_HASH (CKA_TRUST + 100)
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#define CKA_CERT_MD5_HASH (CKA_TRUST + 101)
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/* NSS trust stuff */
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/* HISTORICAL: define used to pass in the database key for DSA private keys */
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#define CKA_NETSCAPE_DB 0xD5A0DB00L
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#define CKA_NETSCAPE_TRUST 0x80000001L
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/* FAKE PKCS #11 defines */
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#define CKM_FAKE_RANDOM 0x80000efeUL
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#define CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM 0xffffffffUL
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/*
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* NSS-defined crypto mechanisms
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*
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*/
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#define CKM_NSS (CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED|NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
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#define CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP (CKM_NSS + 1)
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#define CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD (CKM_NSS + 2)
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2018-05-04 16:08:28 +02:00
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/* HKDF key derivation mechanisms. See CK_NSS_HKDFParams for documentation. */
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#define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA1 (CKM_NSS + 3)
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#define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 4)
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#define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384 (CKM_NSS + 5)
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#define CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512 (CKM_NSS + 6)
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/* J-PAKE round 1 key generation mechanisms.
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*
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* Required template attributes: CKA_PRIME, CKA_SUBPRIME, CKA_BASE,
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* CKA_NSS_JPAKE_SIGNERID
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* Output key type: CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1
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* Output key class: CKO_PRIVATE_KEY
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* Parameter type: CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params
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*
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*/
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#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA1 (CKM_NSS + 7)
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#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 8)
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#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA384 (CKM_NSS + 9)
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#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA512 (CKM_NSS + 10)
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/* J-PAKE round 2 key derivation mechanisms.
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2020-01-07 08:11:52 +01:00
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*
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2018-05-04 16:08:28 +02:00
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* Required template attributes: CKA_NSS_JPAKE_PEERID
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* Input key type: CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1
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* Output key type: CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2
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* Output key class: CKO_PRIVATE_KEY
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* Parameter type: CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params
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*/
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#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA1 (CKM_NSS + 11)
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#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 12)
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#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384 (CKM_NSS + 13)
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#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512 (CKM_NSS + 14)
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2020-01-07 08:11:52 +01:00
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/* J-PAKE final key material derivation mechanisms
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2018-05-04 16:08:28 +02:00
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*
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* Input key type: CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2
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* Output key type: CKK_GENERIC_SECRET
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* Output key class: CKO_SECRET_KEY
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* Parameter type: CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams
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*
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2020-01-07 08:11:52 +01:00
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* You must apply a KDF (e.g. CKM_NSS_HKDF_*) to resultant keying material
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2018-05-04 16:08:28 +02:00
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* to get a key with uniformly distributed bits.
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*/
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#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1 (CKM_NSS + 15)
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#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 16)
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#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384 (CKM_NSS + 17)
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#define CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512 (CKM_NSS + 18)
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/* Constant-time MAC mechanisms:
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*
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* These operations verify a padded, MAC-then-encrypt block of data in
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* constant-time. Because of the order of operations, the padding bytes are not
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* protected by the MAC. However, disclosing the value of the padding bytes
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* gives an attacker the ability to decrypt ciphertexts. Such disclosure can be
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* as subtle as taking slightly less time to perform the MAC when the padding
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* is one byte longer. See https://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
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*
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* CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME: performs an HMAC authentication.
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* CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME: performs an authentication with SSLv3 MAC.
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*
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* Parameter type: CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS
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*/
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#define CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME (CKM_NSS + 19)
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#define CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME (CKM_NSS + 20)
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/* TLS 1.2 mechanisms */
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#define CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 21)
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#define CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 22)
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#define CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 23)
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#define CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256 (CKM_NSS + 24)
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2020-01-07 08:11:52 +01:00
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/* TLS extended master secret derivation */
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#define CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE (CKM_NSS + 25)
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#define CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH (CKM_NSS + 26)
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2015-10-21 05:03:22 +02:00
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/*
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* HISTORICAL:
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* Do not attempt to use these. They are only used by NETSCAPE's internal
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* PKCS #11 interface. Most of these are place holders for other mechanism
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* and will change in the future.
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*/
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#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC 0x80000002UL
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#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC 0x80000003UL
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#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC2_CBC 0x80000004UL
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#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC2_CBC 0x80000005UL
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#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC4 0x80000006UL
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#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC4 0x80000007UL
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#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_FAULTY_3DES_CBC 0x80000008UL
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#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN 0x80000009UL
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#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN 0x8000000aUL
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#define CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN 0x8000000bUL
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#define CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL 0x80000373UL
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2018-05-04 16:08:28 +02:00
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typedef struct CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue {
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CK_BYTE * pGX;
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CK_ULONG ulGXLen;
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CK_BYTE * pGV;
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CK_ULONG ulGVLen;
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CK_BYTE * pR;
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CK_ULONG ulRLen;
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} CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue;
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typedef struct CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params {
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CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue gx1; /* out */
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CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue gx2; /* out */
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} CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params;
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typedef struct CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params {
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CK_BYTE * pSharedKey; /* in */
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CK_ULONG ulSharedKeyLen; /* in */
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CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue gx3; /* in */
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CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue gx4; /* in */
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CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue A; /* out */
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} CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params;
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typedef struct CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams {
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CK_NSS_JPAKEPublicValue B; /* in */
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} CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams;
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/* macAlg: the MAC algorithm to use. This determines the hash function used in
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* the HMAC/SSLv3 MAC calculations.
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* ulBodyTotalLen: the total length of the data, including padding bytes and
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* padding length.
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* pHeader: points to a block of data that contains additional data to
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* authenticate. For TLS this includes the sequence number etc. For SSLv3,
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* this also includes the initial padding bytes.
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*
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* NOTE: the softoken's implementation of CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME and
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* CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME requires that the sum of ulBodyTotalLen
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* and ulHeaderLen be much smaller than 2^32 / 8 bytes because it uses an
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* unsigned int variable to represent the length in bits. This should not
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* be a problem because the SSL/TLS protocol limits the size of an SSL
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* record to something considerably less than 2^32 bytes.
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*/
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typedef struct CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS {
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CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macAlg; /* in */
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CK_ULONG ulBodyTotalLen; /* in */
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CK_BYTE * pHeader; /* in */
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CK_ULONG ulHeaderLen; /* in */
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} CK_NSS_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME_PARAMS;
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2015-10-21 05:03:22 +02:00
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/*
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* NSS-defined return values
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*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define CKR_NSS (CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED|NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CKR_NSS_CERTDB_FAILED (CKR_NSS + 1)
|
|
|
|
#define CKR_NSS_KEYDB_FAILED (CKR_NSS + 2)
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-04 16:08:28 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Mandatory parameter for the CKM_NSS_HKDF_* key deriviation mechanisms.
|
|
|
|
See RFC 5869.
|
2020-01-07 08:11:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2018-05-04 16:08:28 +02:00
|
|
|
bExtract: If set, HKDF-Extract will be applied to the input key. If
|
|
|
|
the optional salt is given, it is used; otherwise, the salt is
|
|
|
|
set to a sequence of zeros equal in length to the HMAC output.
|
|
|
|
If bExpand is not set, then the key template given to
|
|
|
|
C_DeriveKey must indicate an output key size less than or equal
|
|
|
|
to the output size of the HMAC.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bExpand: If set, HKDF-Expand will be applied to the input key (if
|
|
|
|
bExtract is not set) or to the result of HKDF-Extract (if
|
|
|
|
bExtract is set). Any info given in the optional pInfo field will
|
|
|
|
be included in the calculation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The size of the output key must be specified in the template passed to
|
|
|
|
C_DeriveKey.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
typedef struct CK_NSS_HKDFParams {
|
|
|
|
CK_BBOOL bExtract;
|
|
|
|
CK_BYTE_PTR pSalt;
|
|
|
|
CK_ULONG ulSaltLen;
|
|
|
|
CK_BBOOL bExpand;
|
|
|
|
CK_BYTE_PTR pInfo;
|
|
|
|
CK_ULONG ulInfoLen;
|
|
|
|
} CK_NSS_HKDFParams;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-07 08:11:52 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Parameter for the TLS extended master secret key derivation mechanisms:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* * CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE
|
|
|
|
* * CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For the TLS 1.2 PRF, the prfHashMechanism parameter determines the hash
|
|
|
|
* function used. For earlier versions of the PRF, set the prfHashMechanism
|
|
|
|
* value to CKM_TLS_PRF.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The session hash input is expected to be the output of the same hash
|
|
|
|
* function as the PRF uses (as required by draft-ietf-tls-session-hash). So
|
|
|
|
* the ulSessionHashLen member must be equal the output length of the hash
|
|
|
|
* function specified by the prfHashMechanism member (or, for pre-TLS 1.2 PRF,
|
|
|
|
* the length of concatenated MD5 and SHA-1 digests).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
typedef struct CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
|
|
|
|
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE prfHashMechanism;
|
|
|
|
CK_BYTE_PTR pSessionHash;
|
|
|
|
CK_ULONG ulSessionHashLen;
|
|
|
|
CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion;
|
|
|
|
} CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-21 05:03:22 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Trust info
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This isn't part of the Cryptoki standard (yet), so I'm putting
|
|
|
|
* all the definitions here. Some of this would move to nssckt.h
|
|
|
|
* if trust info were made part of the standard. In view of this
|
|
|
|
* possibility, I'm putting my (NSS) values in the NSS
|
|
|
|
* vendor space, like everything else.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
typedef CK_ULONG CK_TRUST;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The following trust types are defined: */
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_VENDOR_DEFINED 0x80000000
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_NSS (CKT_VENDOR_DEFINED|NSSCK_VENDOR_NSS)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If trust goes standard, these'll probably drop out of vendor space. */
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_NSS_TRUSTED (CKT_NSS + 1)
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR (CKT_NSS + 2)
|
2018-05-04 16:08:28 +02:00
|
|
|
#define CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST (CKT_NSS + 3)
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED (CKT_NSS + 10)
|
2015-10-21 05:03:22 +02:00
|
|
|
#define CKT_NSS_TRUST_UNKNOWN (CKT_NSS + 5) /* default */
|
|
|
|
|
2020-01-07 08:11:52 +01:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2015-10-21 05:03:22 +02:00
|
|
|
* These may well remain NSS-specific; I'm only using them
|
|
|
|
* to cache resolution data.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_NSS_VALID_DELEGATOR (CKT_NSS + 11)
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-04 16:08:28 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* old definitions. They still exist, but the plain meaning of the
|
|
|
|
* labels have never been accurate to what was really implemented.
|
|
|
|
* The new labels correctly reflect what the values effectively mean.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#if defined(__GNUC__) && (__GNUC__ > 3)
|
|
|
|
/* make GCC warn when we use these #defines */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This is really painful because GCC doesn't allow us to mark random
|
|
|
|
* #defines as deprecated. We can only mark the following:
|
|
|
|
* functions, variables, and types.
|
|
|
|
* const variables will create extra storage for everyone including this
|
|
|
|
* header file, so it's undesirable.
|
|
|
|
* functions could be inlined to prevent storage creation, but will fail
|
|
|
|
* when constant values are expected (like switch statements).
|
|
|
|
* enum types do not seem to pay attention to the deprecated attribute.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* That leaves typedefs. We declare new types that we then deprecate, then
|
|
|
|
* cast the resulting value to the deprecated type in the #define, thus
|
|
|
|
* producting the warning when the #define is used.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#if (__GNUC__ == 4) && (__GNUC_MINOR__ < 5)
|
|
|
|
/* The mac doesn't like the friendlier deprecate messages. I'm assuming this
|
|
|
|
* is a gcc version issue rather than mac or ppc specific */
|
|
|
|
typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED __attribute__((deprecated));
|
|
|
|
typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_VALID __attribute__ ((deprecated));
|
|
|
|
typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY __attribute__((deprecated));
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
/* when possible, get a full deprecation warning. This works on gcc 4.5
|
|
|
|
* it may work on earlier versions of gcc */
|
|
|
|
typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED __attribute__((deprecated
|
|
|
|
("CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED really means CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST")));
|
|
|
|
typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_VALID __attribute__ ((deprecated
|
|
|
|
("CKT_NSS_VALID really means CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED")));
|
|
|
|
typedef CK_TRUST __CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY __attribute__((deprecated
|
|
|
|
("CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY really functions as CKT_NSS_TRUST_UNKNOWN")));
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED ((__CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED)CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST)
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_NSS_VALID ((__CKT_NSS_VALID) CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED)
|
|
|
|
/* keep the old value for compatibility reasons*/
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY ((__CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY)(CKT_NSS +4))
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
#ifdef _WIN32
|
|
|
|
/* This magic gets the windows compiler to give us a deprecation
|
|
|
|
* warning */
|
|
|
|
#pragma deprecated(CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED, CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY, CKT_NSS_VALID)
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED really means CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST */
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY_TRUST
|
|
|
|
/* CKT_NSS_VALID really means CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED */
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_NSS_VALID CKT_NSS_NOT_TRUSTED
|
|
|
|
/* CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY was always treated as CKT_NSS_TRUST_UNKNOWN */
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY (CKT_NSS + 4) /*really means trust unknown*/
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-21 05:03:22 +02:00
|
|
|
/* don't leave old programs in a lurch just yet, give them the old NETSCAPE
|
|
|
|
* synonym */
|
|
|
|
#define CKO_NETSCAPE_CRL CKO_NSS_CRL
|
|
|
|
#define CKO_NETSCAPE_SMIME CKO_NSS_SMIME
|
|
|
|
#define CKO_NETSCAPE_TRUST CKO_NSS_TRUST
|
|
|
|
#define CKO_NETSCAPE_BUILTIN_ROOT_LIST CKO_NSS_BUILTIN_ROOT_LIST
|
|
|
|
#define CKO_NETSCAPE_NEWSLOT CKO_NSS_NEWSLOT
|
|
|
|
#define CKO_NETSCAPE_DELSLOT CKO_NSS_DELSLOT
|
|
|
|
#define CKK_NETSCAPE_PKCS8 CKK_NSS_PKCS8
|
|
|
|
#define CKA_NETSCAPE_URL CKA_NSS_URL
|
|
|
|
#define CKA_NETSCAPE_EMAIL CKA_NSS_EMAIL
|
|
|
|
#define CKA_NETSCAPE_SMIME_INFO CKA_NSS_SMIME_INFO
|
|
|
|
#define CKA_NETSCAPE_SMIME_TIMESTAMP CKA_NSS_SMIME_TIMESTAMP
|
|
|
|
#define CKA_NETSCAPE_PKCS8_SALT CKA_NSS_PKCS8_SALT
|
|
|
|
#define CKA_NETSCAPE_PASSWORD_CHECK CKA_NSS_PASSWORD_CHECK
|
|
|
|
#define CKA_NETSCAPE_EXPIRES CKA_NSS_EXPIRES
|
|
|
|
#define CKA_NETSCAPE_KRL CKA_NSS_KRL
|
|
|
|
#define CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_COUNTER CKA_NSS_PQG_COUNTER
|
|
|
|
#define CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED
|
|
|
|
#define CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_H CKA_NSS_PQG_H
|
|
|
|
#define CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS CKA_NSS_PQG_SEED_BITS
|
|
|
|
#define CKA_NETSCAPE_MODULE_SPEC CKA_NSS_MODULE_SPEC
|
|
|
|
#define CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP
|
|
|
|
#define CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD CKM_NSS_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD
|
|
|
|
#define CKR_NETSCAPE_CERTDB_FAILED CKR_NSS_CERTDB_FAILED
|
|
|
|
#define CKR_NETSCAPE_KEYDB_FAILED CKR_NSS_KEYDB_FAILED
|
2018-05-04 16:08:28 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2015-10-21 05:03:22 +02:00
|
|
|
#define CKT_NETSCAPE_TRUSTED CKT_NSS_TRUSTED
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_NETSCAPE_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR CKT_NSS_TRUSTED_DELEGATOR
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_NETSCAPE_UNTRUSTED CKT_NSS_UNTRUSTED
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_NETSCAPE_MUST_VERIFY CKT_NSS_MUST_VERIFY
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_NETSCAPE_TRUST_UNKNOWN CKT_NSS_TRUST_UNKNOWN
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_NETSCAPE_VALID CKT_NSS_VALID
|
|
|
|
#define CKT_NETSCAPE_VALID_DELEGATOR CKT_NSS_VALID_DELEGATOR
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* These are not really PKCS #11 values specifically. They are the 'loadable'
|
|
|
|
* module spec NSS uses. The are available for others to use as well, but not
|
|
|
|
* part of the formal PKCS #11 spec.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The function 'FIND' returns an array of PKCS #11 initialization strings
|
|
|
|
* The function 'ADD' takes a PKCS #11 initialization string and stores it.
|
|
|
|
* The function 'DEL' takes a 'name= library=' value and deletes the associated
|
|
|
|
* string.
|
|
|
|
* The function 'RELEASE' frees the array returned by 'FIND'
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define SECMOD_MODULE_DB_FUNCTION_FIND 0
|
|
|
|
#define SECMOD_MODULE_DB_FUNCTION_ADD 1
|
|
|
|
#define SECMOD_MODULE_DB_FUNCTION_DEL 2
|
2020-01-07 08:11:52 +01:00
|
|
|
#define SECMOD_MODULE_DB_FUNCTION_RELEASE 3
|
2015-10-21 05:03:22 +02:00
|
|
|
typedef char ** (PR_CALLBACK *SECMODModuleDBFunc)(unsigned long function,
|
|
|
|
char *parameters, void *moduleSpec);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* softoken slot ID's */
|
|
|
|
#define SFTK_MIN_USER_SLOT_ID 4
|
|
|
|
#define SFTK_MAX_USER_SLOT_ID 100
|
|
|
|
#define SFTK_MIN_FIPS_USER_SLOT_ID 101
|
|
|
|
#define SFTK_MAX_FIPS_USER_SLOT_ID 127
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* _PKCS11N_H_ */
|