mirror of
https://github.com/rn10950/RetroZilla.git
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303 lines
10 KiB
C
303 lines
10 KiB
C
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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
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#include "stubs.h"
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#endif
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#include "blapit.h"
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#include "blapii.h"
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#include "cts.h"
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#include "secerr.h"
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struct CTSContextStr {
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freeblCipherFunc cipher;
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void *context;
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/* iv stores the last ciphertext block of the previous message.
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* Only used by decrypt. */
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unsigned char iv[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
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};
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CTSContext *
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CTS_CreateContext(void *context, freeblCipherFunc cipher,
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const unsigned char *iv, unsigned int blocksize)
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{
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CTSContext *cts;
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if (blocksize > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
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PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
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return NULL;
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}
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cts = PORT_ZNew(CTSContext);
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if (cts == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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PORT_Memcpy(cts->iv, iv, blocksize);
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cts->cipher = cipher;
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cts->context = context;
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return cts;
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}
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void
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CTS_DestroyContext(CTSContext *cts, PRBool freeit)
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{
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if (freeit) {
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PORT_Free(cts);
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}
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}
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/*
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* See addemdum to NIST SP 800-38A
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* Generically handle cipher text stealing. Basically this is doing CBC
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* operations except someone can pass us a partial block.
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*
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* Output Order:
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* CS-1: C1||C2||C3..Cn-1(could be partial)||Cn (NIST)
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* CS-2: pad == 0 C1||C2||C3...Cn-1(is full)||Cn (Schneier)
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* CS-2: pad != 0 C1||C2||C3...Cn||Cn-1(is partial)(Schneier)
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* CS-3: C1||C2||C3...Cn||Cn-1(could be partial) (Kerberos)
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*
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* The characteristics of these three options:
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* - NIST & Schneier (CS-1 & CS-2) are identical to CBC if there are no
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* partial blocks on input.
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* - Scheier and Kerberos (CS-2 and CS-3) have no embedded partial blocks,
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* which make decoding easier.
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* - NIST & Kerberos (CS-1 and CS-3) have consistent block order independent
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* of padding.
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*
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* PKCS #11 did not specify which version to implement, but points to the NIST
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* spec, so this code implements CTS-CS-1 from NIST.
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*
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* To convert the returned buffer to:
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* CS-2 (Schneier): do
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* unsigned char tmp[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
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* pad = *outlen % blocksize;
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* if (pad) {
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* memcpy(tmp, outbuf+*outlen-blocksize, blocksize);
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* memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-pad,outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, pad);
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* memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, tmp, blocksize);
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* }
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* CS-3 (Kerberos): do
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* unsigned char tmp[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
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* pad = *outlen % blocksize;
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* if (pad == 0) {
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* pad = blocksize;
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* }
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* memcpy(tmp, outbuf+*outlen-blocksize, blocksize);
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* memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-pad,outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, pad);
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* memcpy(outbuf+*outlen-blocksize-pad, tmp, blocksize);
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*/
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SECStatus
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CTS_EncryptUpdate(CTSContext *cts, unsigned char *outbuf,
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unsigned int *outlen, unsigned int maxout,
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const unsigned char *inbuf, unsigned int inlen,
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unsigned int blocksize)
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{
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unsigned char lastBlock[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
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unsigned int tmp;
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int fullblocks;
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int written;
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SECStatus rv;
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if (inlen < blocksize) {
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PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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if (maxout < inlen) {
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*outlen = inlen;
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PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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fullblocks = (inlen/blocksize)*blocksize;
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rv = (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, outbuf, outlen, maxout, inbuf,
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fullblocks, blocksize);
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if (rv != SECSuccess) {
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return SECFailure;
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}
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*outlen = fullblocks; /* AES low level doesn't set outlen */
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inbuf += fullblocks;
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inlen -= fullblocks;
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if (inlen == 0) {
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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written = *outlen - (blocksize - inlen);
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outbuf += written;
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maxout -= written;
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/*
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* here's the CTS magic, we pad our final block with zeros,
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* then do a CBC encrypt. CBC will xor our plain text with
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* the previous block (Cn-1), capturing part of that block (Cn-1**) as it
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* xors with the zero pad. We then write this full block, overwritting
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* (Cn-1**) in our buffer. This allows us to have input data == output
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* data since Cn contains enough information to reconver Cn-1** when
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* we decrypt (at the cost of some complexity as you can see in decrypt
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* below */
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PORT_Memcpy(lastBlock, inbuf, inlen);
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PORT_Memset(lastBlock + inlen, 0, blocksize - inlen);
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rv = (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, outbuf, &tmp, maxout, lastBlock,
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blocksize, blocksize);
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PORT_Memset(lastBlock, 0, blocksize);
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if (rv == SECSuccess) {
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*outlen = written + blocksize;
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}
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return rv;
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}
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#define XOR_BLOCK(x,y,count) for(i=0; i < count; i++) x[i] = x[i] ^ y[i]
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/*
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* See addemdum to NIST SP 800-38A
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* Decrypt, Expect CS-1: input. See the comment on the encrypt side
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* to understand what CS-2 and CS-3 mean.
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*
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* To convert the input buffer to CS-1 from ...
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* CS-2 (Schneier): do
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* unsigned char tmp[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
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* pad = inlen % blocksize;
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* if (pad) {
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* memcpy(tmp, inbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad, blocksize);
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* memcpy(inbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad,inbuf+inlen-pad, pad);
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* memcpy(inbuf+inlen-blocksize, tmp, blocksize);
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* }
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* CS-3 (Kerberos): do
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* unsigned char tmp[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
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* pad = inlen % blocksize;
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* if (pad == 0) {
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* pad = blocksize;
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* }
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* memcpy(tmp, inbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad, blocksize);
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* memcpy(inbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad,inbuf+inlen-pad, pad);
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* memcpy(inbuf+inlen-blocksize, tmp, blocksize);
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*/
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SECStatus
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CTS_DecryptUpdate(CTSContext *cts, unsigned char *outbuf,
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unsigned int *outlen, unsigned int maxout,
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const unsigned char *inbuf, unsigned int inlen,
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unsigned int blocksize)
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{
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unsigned char *Pn;
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unsigned char Cn_2[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* block Cn-2 */
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unsigned char Cn_1[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* block Cn-1 */
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unsigned char Cn[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* block Cn */
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unsigned char lastBlock[MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
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const unsigned char *tmp;
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unsigned int tmpLen;
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int fullblocks, pad;
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unsigned int i;
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SECStatus rv;
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if (inlen < blocksize) {
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PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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if (maxout < inlen) {
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*outlen = inlen;
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PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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fullblocks = (inlen/blocksize)*blocksize;
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/* even though we expect the input to be CS-1, CS-2 is easier to parse,
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* so convert to CS-2 immediately. NOTE: this is the same code as in
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* the comment for encrypt. NOTE2: since we can't modify inbuf unless
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* inbuf and outbuf overlap, just copy inbuf to outbuf and modify it there
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*/
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pad = inlen - fullblocks;
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if (pad != 0) {
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if (inbuf != outbuf) {
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memcpy(outbuf, inbuf, inlen);
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/* keep the names so we logically know how we are using the
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* buffers */
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inbuf = outbuf;
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}
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memcpy(lastBlock, inbuf+inlen-blocksize, blocksize);
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/* we know inbuf == outbuf now, inbuf is declared const and can't
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* be the target, so use outbuf for the target here */
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memcpy(outbuf+inlen-pad, inbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad, pad);
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memcpy(outbuf+inlen-blocksize-pad, lastBlock, blocksize);
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}
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/* save the previous to last block so we can undo the misordered
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* chaining */
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tmp = (fullblocks < blocksize*2) ? cts->iv :
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inbuf+fullblocks-blocksize*2;
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PORT_Memcpy(Cn_2, tmp, blocksize);
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PORT_Memcpy(Cn, inbuf+fullblocks-blocksize, blocksize);
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rv = (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, outbuf, outlen, maxout, inbuf,
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fullblocks, blocksize);
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if (rv != SECSuccess) {
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return SECFailure;
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}
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*outlen = fullblocks; /* AES low level doesn't set outlen */
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inbuf += fullblocks;
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inlen -= fullblocks;
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if (inlen == 0) {
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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outbuf += fullblocks;
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maxout -= fullblocks;
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/* recover the stolen text */
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PORT_Memset(lastBlock, 0, blocksize);
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PORT_Memcpy(lastBlock, inbuf, inlen);
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PORT_Memcpy(Cn_1, inbuf, inlen);
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Pn = outbuf-blocksize;
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/* inbuf points to Cn-1* in the input buffer */
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/* NOTE: below there are 2 sections marked "make up for the out of order
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* cbc decryption". You may ask, what is going on here.
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* Short answer: CBC automatically xors the plain text with the previous
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* encrypted block. We are decrypting the last 2 blocks out of order, so
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* we have to 'back out' the decrypt xor and 'add back' the encrypt xor.
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* Long answer: When we encrypted, we encrypted as follows:
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* Pn-2, Pn-1, (Pn || 0), but on decryption we can't
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* decrypt Cn-1 until we decrypt Cn because part of Cn-1 is stored in
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* Cn (see below). So above we decrypted all the full blocks:
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* Cn-2, Cn,
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* to get:
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* Pn-2, Pn, Except that Pn is not yet corect. On encrypt, we
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* xor'd Pn || 0 with Cn-1, but on decrypt we xor'd it with Cn-2
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* To recover Pn, we xor the block with Cn-1* || 0 (in last block) and
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* Cn-2 to get Pn || Cn-1**. Pn can then be written to the output buffer
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* and we can now reunite Cn-1. With the full Cn-1 we can decrypt it,
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* but now decrypt is going to xor the decrypted data with Cn instead of
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* Cn-2. xoring Cn and Cn-2 restores the original Pn-1 and we can now
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* write that oout to the buffer */
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/* make up for the out of order CBC decryption */
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XOR_BLOCK(lastBlock, Cn_2, blocksize);
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XOR_BLOCK(lastBlock, Pn, blocksize);
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/* last buf now has Pn || Cn-1**, copy out Pn */
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PORT_Memcpy(outbuf, lastBlock, inlen);
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*outlen += inlen;
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/* copy Cn-1* into last buf to recover Cn-1 */
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PORT_Memcpy(lastBlock, Cn_1, inlen);
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/* note: because Cn and Cn-1 were out of order, our pointer to Pn also
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* points to where Pn-1 needs to reside. From here on out read Pn in
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* the code as really Pn-1. */
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rv = (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, Pn, &tmpLen, blocksize, lastBlock,
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blocksize, blocksize);
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if (rv != SECSuccess) {
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return SECFailure;
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}
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/* make up for the out of order CBC decryption */
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XOR_BLOCK(Pn, Cn_2, blocksize);
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XOR_BLOCK(Pn, Cn, blocksize);
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/* reset iv to Cn */
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PORT_Memcpy(cts->iv, Cn, blocksize);
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/* This makes Cn the last block for the next decrypt operation, which
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* matches the encrypt. We don't care about the contexts of last block,
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* only the side effect of setting the internal IV */
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(void) (*cts->cipher)(cts->context, lastBlock, &tmpLen, blocksize, Cn,
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blocksize, blocksize);
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/* clear last block. At this point last block contains Pn xor Cn_1 xor
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* Cn_2, both of with an attacker would know, so we need to clear this
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* buffer out */
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PORT_Memset(lastBlock, 0, blocksize);
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/* Cn, Cn_1, and Cn_2 have encrypted data, so no need to clear them */
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return SECSuccess;
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}
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