mirror of
https://github.com/rn10950/RetroZilla.git
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566 lines
19 KiB
C
566 lines
19 KiB
C
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/* ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK *****
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* Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1
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*
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* The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
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* 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
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* the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
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* http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
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*
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* Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
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* WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
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* for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
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* License.
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*
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* The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
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*
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* The Initial Developer of the Original Code is
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* Netscape Communications Corporation.
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* Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 1994-2000
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* the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Contributor(s):
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*
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* Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of
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* either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or
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* the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"),
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* in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead
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* of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only
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* under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to
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* use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your
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* decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice
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* and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete
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* the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under
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* the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL.
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*
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* ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */
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/*
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* CMS public key crypto
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*
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* $Id: cmspubkey.c,v 1.7 2004/04/25 15:03:16 gerv%gerv.net Exp $
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*/
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#include "cmslocal.h"
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#include "cert.h"
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#include "key.h"
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#include "secasn1.h"
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#include "secitem.h"
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#include "secoid.h"
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#include "pk11func.h"
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#include "secerr.h"
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/* ====== RSA ======================================================================= */
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/*
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* NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_RSA - wrap a symmetric key with RSA
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*
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* this function takes a symmetric key and encrypts it using an RSA public key
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* according to PKCS#1 and RFC2633 (S/MIME)
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*/
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SECStatus
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NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_RSA(PLArenaPool *poolp, CERTCertificate *cert,
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PK11SymKey *bulkkey,
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SECItem *encKey)
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{
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SECStatus rv;
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SECKEYPublicKey *publickey;
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publickey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
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if (publickey == NULL)
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return SECFailure;
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rv = NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_RSAPubKey(poolp, publickey, bulkkey, encKey);
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SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publickey);
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return rv;
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}
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SECStatus
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NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_RSAPubKey(PLArenaPool *poolp,
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SECKEYPublicKey *publickey,
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PK11SymKey *bulkkey, SECItem *encKey)
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{
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SECStatus rv;
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int data_len;
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KeyType keyType;
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void *mark = NULL;
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mark = PORT_ArenaMark(poolp);
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if (!mark)
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goto loser;
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/* sanity check */
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keyType = SECKEY_GetPublicKeyType(publickey);
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PORT_Assert(keyType == rsaKey);
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if (keyType != rsaKey) {
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goto loser;
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}
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/* allocate memory for the encrypted key */
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data_len = SECKEY_PublicKeyStrength(publickey); /* block size (assumed to be > keylen) */
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encKey->data = (unsigned char*)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, data_len);
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encKey->len = data_len;
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if (encKey->data == NULL)
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goto loser;
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/* encrypt the key now */
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rv = PK11_PubWrapSymKey(PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION),
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publickey, bulkkey, encKey);
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if (rv != SECSuccess)
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goto loser;
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PORT_ArenaUnmark(poolp, mark);
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return SECSuccess;
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loser:
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if (mark) {
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PORT_ArenaRelease(poolp, mark);
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}
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return SECFailure;
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}
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/*
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* NSS_CMSUtil_DecryptSymKey_RSA - unwrap a RSA-wrapped symmetric key
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*
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* this function takes an RSA-wrapped symmetric key and unwraps it, returning a symmetric
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* key handle. Please note that the actual unwrapped key data may not be allowed to leave
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* a hardware token...
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*/
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PK11SymKey *
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NSS_CMSUtil_DecryptSymKey_RSA(SECKEYPrivateKey *privkey, SECItem *encKey, SECOidTag bulkalgtag)
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{
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/* that's easy */
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CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target;
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PORT_Assert(bulkalgtag != SEC_OID_UNKNOWN);
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target = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(bulkalgtag);
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if (bulkalgtag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN || target == CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
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PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
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return NULL;
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}
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return PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(privkey, encKey, target, CKA_DECRYPT, 0);
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}
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/* ====== MISSI (Fortezza) ========================================================== */
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extern const SEC_ASN1Template NSS_SMIMEKEAParamTemplateAllParams[];
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SECStatus
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NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_MISSI(PLArenaPool *poolp, CERTCertificate *cert, PK11SymKey *bulkkey,
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SECOidTag symalgtag, SECItem *encKey, SECItem **pparams, void *pwfn_arg)
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{
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SECOidTag certalgtag; /* the certificate's encryption algorithm */
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SECOidTag encalgtag; /* the algorithm used for key exchange/agreement */
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SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
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SECItem *params = NULL;
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SECStatus err;
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PK11SymKey *tek;
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CERTCertificate *ourCert;
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SECKEYPublicKey *ourPubKey, *publickey = NULL;
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SECKEYPrivateKey *ourPrivKey = NULL;
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NSSCMSKEATemplateSelector whichKEA = NSSCMSKEAInvalid;
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NSSCMSSMIMEKEAParameters keaParams;
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PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
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extern const SEC_ASN1Template *nss_cms_get_kea_template(NSSCMSKEATemplateSelector whichTemplate);
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/* Clear keaParams, since cleanup code checks the lengths */
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(void) memset(&keaParams, 0, sizeof(keaParams));
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certalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm));
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PORT_Assert(certalgtag == SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA_DSS_OLD ||
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certalgtag == SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA_DSS ||
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certalgtag == SEC_OID_MISSI_KEA);
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#define SMIME_FORTEZZA_RA_LENGTH 128
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#define SMIME_FORTEZZA_IV_LENGTH 24
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#define SMIME_FORTEZZA_MAX_KEY_SIZE 256
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/* We really want to show our KEA tag as the key exchange algorithm tag. */
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encalgtag = SEC_OID_NETSCAPE_SMIME_KEA;
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/* Get the public key of the recipient. */
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publickey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
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if (publickey == NULL) goto loser;
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/* Find our own cert, and extract its keys. */
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ourCert = PK11_FindBestKEAMatch(cert, pwfn_arg);
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if (ourCert == NULL) goto loser;
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arena = PORT_NewArena(1024);
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if (arena == NULL)
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goto loser;
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ourPubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ourCert);
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if (ourPubKey == NULL) {
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CERT_DestroyCertificate(ourCert);
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goto loser;
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}
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/* While we're here, copy the public key into the outgoing
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* KEA parameters. */
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SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &(keaParams.originatorKEAKey), &(ourPubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey));
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SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ourPubKey);
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ourPubKey = NULL;
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/* Extract our private key in order to derive the KEA key. */
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ourPrivKey = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(ourCert, pwfn_arg);
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CERT_DestroyCertificate(ourCert); /* we're done with this */
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if (!ourPrivKey)
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goto loser;
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/* Prepare raItem with 128 bytes (filled with zeros). */
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keaParams.originatorRA.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena,SMIME_FORTEZZA_RA_LENGTH);
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keaParams.originatorRA.len = SMIME_FORTEZZA_RA_LENGTH;
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/* Generate the TEK (token exchange key) which we use
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* to wrap the bulk encryption key. (keaparams.originatorRA) will be
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* filled with a random seed which we need to send to
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* the recipient. (user keying material in RFC2630/DSA speak) */
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tek = PK11_PubDerive(ourPrivKey, publickey, PR_TRUE,
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&keaParams.originatorRA, NULL,
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CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP,
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CKA_WRAP, 0, pwfn_arg);
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SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publickey);
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SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ourPrivKey);
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publickey = NULL;
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ourPrivKey = NULL;
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if (!tek)
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goto loser;
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/* allocate space for the wrapped key data */
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encKey->data = (unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, SMIME_FORTEZZA_MAX_KEY_SIZE);
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encKey->len = SMIME_FORTEZZA_MAX_KEY_SIZE;
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if (encKey->data == NULL) {
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PK11_FreeSymKey(tek);
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goto loser;
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}
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/* Wrap the bulk key. What we do with the resulting data
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depends on whether we're using Skipjack to wrap the key. */
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switch (PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(symalgtag)) {
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case CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64:
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case CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64:
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case CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64:
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case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64:
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case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32:
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case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16:
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case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8:
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/* SKIPJACK, we use the wrap mechanism because we can do it on the hardware */
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err = PK11_WrapSymKey(CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, NULL, tek, bulkkey, encKey);
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whichKEA = NSSCMSKEAUsesSkipjack;
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break;
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default:
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/* Not SKIPJACK, we encrypt the raw key data */
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keaParams.nonSkipjackIV.data =
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(unsigned char *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, SMIME_FORTEZZA_IV_LENGTH);
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keaParams.nonSkipjackIV.len = SMIME_FORTEZZA_IV_LENGTH;
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err = PK11_WrapSymKey(CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, &keaParams.nonSkipjackIV, tek, bulkkey, encKey);
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if (err != SECSuccess)
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goto loser;
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if (encKey->len != PK11_GetKeyLength(bulkkey)) {
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/* The size of the encrypted key is not the same as
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that of the original bulk key, presumably due to
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padding. Encode and store the real size of the
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bulk key. */
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if (SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(arena, &keaParams.bulkKeySize, PK11_GetKeyLength(bulkkey)) == NULL)
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err = (SECStatus)PORT_GetError();
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else
|
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|
/* use full template for encoding */
|
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whichKEA = NSSCMSKEAUsesNonSkipjackWithPaddedEncKey;
|
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}
|
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else
|
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/* enc key length == bulk key length */
|
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whichKEA = NSSCMSKEAUsesNonSkipjack;
|
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break;
|
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}
|
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|
|
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PK11_FreeSymKey(tek);
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|
|
||
|
if (err != SECSuccess)
|
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goto loser;
|
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|
|
||
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PORT_Assert(whichKEA != NSSCMSKEAInvalid);
|
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|
|
||
|
/* Encode the KEA parameters into the recipient info. */
|
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params = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(poolp, NULL, &keaParams, nss_cms_get_kea_template(whichKEA));
|
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if (params == NULL)
|
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goto loser;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* pass back the algorithm params */
|
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*pparams = params;
|
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|
|
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rv = SECSuccess;
|
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|
|
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loser:
|
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if (arena)
|
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PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
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if (publickey)
|
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SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publickey);
|
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|
if (ourPrivKey)
|
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SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ourPrivKey);
|
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return rv;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
PK11SymKey *
|
||
|
NSS_CMSUtil_DecryptSymKey_MISSI(SECKEYPrivateKey *privkey, SECItem *encKey, SECAlgorithmID *keyEncAlg, SECOidTag bulkalgtag, void *pwfn_arg)
|
||
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{
|
||
|
/* fortezza: do a key exchange */
|
||
|
SECStatus err;
|
||
|
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulkType;
|
||
|
PK11SymKey *tek;
|
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|
SECKEYPublicKey *originatorPubKey;
|
||
|
NSSCMSSMIMEKEAParameters keaParams;
|
||
|
PK11SymKey *bulkkey;
|
||
|
int bulkLength;
|
||
|
|
||
|
(void) memset(&keaParams, 0, sizeof(keaParams));
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* NOTE: this uses the SMIME v2 recipientinfo for compatibility.
|
||
|
All additional KEA parameters are DER-encoded in the encryption algorithm parameters */
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Decode the KEA algorithm parameters. */
|
||
|
err = SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(NULL, &keaParams, NSS_SMIMEKEAParamTemplateAllParams,
|
||
|
&(keyEncAlg->parameters));
|
||
|
if (err != SECSuccess)
|
||
|
goto loser;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* get originator's public key */
|
||
|
originatorPubKey = PK11_MakeKEAPubKey(keaParams.originatorKEAKey.data,
|
||
|
keaParams.originatorKEAKey.len);
|
||
|
if (originatorPubKey == NULL)
|
||
|
goto loser;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Generate the TEK (token exchange key) which we use to unwrap the bulk encryption key.
|
||
|
The Derive function generates a shared secret and combines it with the originatorRA
|
||
|
data to come up with an unique session key */
|
||
|
tek = PK11_PubDerive(privkey, originatorPubKey, PR_FALSE,
|
||
|
&keaParams.originatorRA, NULL,
|
||
|
CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP,
|
||
|
CKA_WRAP, 0, pwfn_arg);
|
||
|
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(originatorPubKey); /* not needed anymore */
|
||
|
if (tek == NULL)
|
||
|
goto loser;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Now that we have the TEK, unwrap the bulk key
|
||
|
with which to decrypt the message. We have to
|
||
|
do one of two different things depending on
|
||
|
whether Skipjack was used for *bulk* encryption
|
||
|
of the message. */
|
||
|
bulkType = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(bulkalgtag);
|
||
|
switch (bulkType) {
|
||
|
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64:
|
||
|
case CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64:
|
||
|
case CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64:
|
||
|
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64:
|
||
|
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32:
|
||
|
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16:
|
||
|
case CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8:
|
||
|
/* Skipjack is being used as the bulk encryption algorithm.*/
|
||
|
/* Unwrap the bulk key. */
|
||
|
bulkkey = PK11_UnwrapSymKey(tek, CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, NULL,
|
||
|
encKey, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, CKA_DECRYPT, 0);
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
/* Skipjack was not used for bulk encryption of this
|
||
|
message. Use Skipjack CBC64, with the nonSkipjackIV
|
||
|
part of the KEA key parameters, to decrypt
|
||
|
the bulk key. If the optional parameter bulkKeySize is present,
|
||
|
bulk key size is different than the encrypted key size */
|
||
|
if (keaParams.bulkKeySize.len > 0) {
|
||
|
err = SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(NULL, &bulkLength,
|
||
|
SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_IntegerTemplate),
|
||
|
&keaParams.bulkKeySize);
|
||
|
if (err != SECSuccess)
|
||
|
goto loser;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
bulkkey = PK11_UnwrapSymKey(tek, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, &keaParams.nonSkipjackIV,
|
||
|
encKey, bulkType, CKA_DECRYPT, bulkLength);
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
return bulkkey;
|
||
|
loser:
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* ====== ESDH (Ephemeral-Static Diffie-Hellman) ==================================== */
|
||
|
|
||
|
SECStatus
|
||
|
NSS_CMSUtil_EncryptSymKey_ESDH(PLArenaPool *poolp, CERTCertificate *cert, PK11SymKey *key,
|
||
|
SECItem *encKey, SECItem **ukm, SECAlgorithmID *keyEncAlg,
|
||
|
SECItem *pubKey)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
#if 0 /* not yet done */
|
||
|
SECOidTag certalgtag; /* the certificate's encryption algorithm */
|
||
|
SECOidTag encalgtag; /* the algorithm used for key exchange/agreement */
|
||
|
SECStatus rv;
|
||
|
SECItem *params = NULL;
|
||
|
int data_len;
|
||
|
SECStatus err;
|
||
|
PK11SymKey *tek;
|
||
|
CERTCertificate *ourCert;
|
||
|
SECKEYPublicKey *ourPubKey;
|
||
|
NSSCMSKEATemplateSelector whichKEA = NSSCMSKEAInvalid;
|
||
|
|
||
|
certalgtag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo.algorithm));
|
||
|
PORT_Assert(certalgtag == SEC_OID_X942_DIFFIE_HELMAN_KEY);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* We really want to show our KEA tag as the key exchange algorithm tag. */
|
||
|
encalgtag = SEC_OID_CMS_EPHEMERAL_STATIC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Get the public key of the recipient. */
|
||
|
publickey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
|
||
|
if (publickey == NULL) goto loser;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* XXXX generate a DH key pair on a PKCS11 module (XXX which parameters?) */
|
||
|
/* XXXX */ourCert = PK11_FindBestKEAMatch(cert, wincx);
|
||
|
if (ourCert == NULL) goto loser;
|
||
|
|
||
|
arena = PORT_NewArena(1024);
|
||
|
if (arena == NULL) goto loser;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* While we're here, extract the key pair's public key data and copy it into */
|
||
|
/* the outgoing parameters. */
|
||
|
/* XXXX */ourPubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(ourCert);
|
||
|
if (ourPubKey == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
goto loser;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, pubKey, /* XXX */&(ourPubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey));
|
||
|
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(ourPubKey); /* we only need the private key from now on */
|
||
|
ourPubKey = NULL;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Extract our private key in order to derive the KEA key. */
|
||
|
ourPrivKey = PK11_FindKeyByAnyCert(ourCert,wincx);
|
||
|
CERT_DestroyCertificate(ourCert); /* we're done with this */
|
||
|
if (!ourPrivKey) goto loser;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* If ukm desired, prepare it - allocate enough space (filled with zeros). */
|
||
|
if (ukm) {
|
||
|
ukm->data = (unsigned char*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,/* XXXX */);
|
||
|
ukm->len = /* XXXX */;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Generate the KEK (key exchange key) according to RFC2631 which we use
|
||
|
* to wrap the bulk encryption key. */
|
||
|
kek = PK11_PubDerive(ourPrivKey, publickey, PR_TRUE,
|
||
|
ukm, NULL,
|
||
|
/* XXXX */CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE, /* XXXX */CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP,
|
||
|
CKA_WRAP, 0, wincx);
|
||
|
|
||
|
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publickey);
|
||
|
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ourPrivKey);
|
||
|
publickey = NULL;
|
||
|
ourPrivKey = NULL;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (!kek)
|
||
|
goto loser;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* allocate space for the encrypted CEK (bulk key) */
|
||
|
encKey->data = (unsigned char*)PORT_ArenaAlloc(poolp, SMIME_FORTEZZA_MAX_KEY_SIZE);
|
||
|
encKey->len = SMIME_FORTEZZA_MAX_KEY_SIZE;
|
||
|
|
||
|
if (encKey->data == NULL)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
PK11_FreeSymKey(kek);
|
||
|
goto loser;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Wrap the bulk key using CMSRC2WRAP or CMS3DESWRAP, depending on the */
|
||
|
/* bulk encryption algorithm */
|
||
|
switch (/* XXXX */PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(enccinfo->encalg))
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
case /* XXXX */CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8:
|
||
|
err = PK11_WrapSymKey(/* XXXX */CKM_CMS3DES_WRAP, NULL, kek, bulkkey, encKey);
|
||
|
whichKEA = NSSCMSKEAUsesSkipjack;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
case /* XXXX */CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8:
|
||
|
err = PK11_WrapSymKey(/* XXXX */CKM_CMSRC2_WRAP, NULL, kek, bulkkey, encKey);
|
||
|
whichKEA = NSSCMSKEAUsesSkipjack;
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
default:
|
||
|
/* XXXX what do we do here? Neither RC2 nor 3DES... */
|
||
|
err = SECFailure;
|
||
|
/* set error */
|
||
|
break;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
PK11_FreeSymKey(kek); /* we do not need the KEK anymore */
|
||
|
if (err != SECSuccess)
|
||
|
goto loser;
|
||
|
|
||
|
PORT_Assert(whichKEA != NSSCMSKEAInvalid);
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* see RFC2630 12.3.1.1 "keyEncryptionAlgorithm must be ..." */
|
||
|
/* params is the DER encoded key wrap algorithm (with parameters!) (XXX) */
|
||
|
params = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, NULL, &keaParams, sec_pkcs7_get_kea_template(whichKEA));
|
||
|
if (params == NULL)
|
||
|
goto loser;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* now set keyEncAlg */
|
||
|
rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(poolp, keyEncAlg, SEC_OID_CMS_EPHEMERAL_STATIC_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, params);
|
||
|
if (rv != SECSuccess)
|
||
|
goto loser;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* XXXXXXX this is not right yet */
|
||
|
loser:
|
||
|
if (arena) {
|
||
|
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (publickey) {
|
||
|
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(publickey);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
if (ourPrivKey) {
|
||
|
SECKEY_DestroyPrivateKey(ourPrivKey);
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
return SECFailure;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|
||
|
PK11SymKey *
|
||
|
NSS_CMSUtil_DecryptSymKey_ESDH(SECKEYPrivateKey *privkey, SECItem *encKey, SECAlgorithmID *keyEncAlg, SECOidTag bulkalgtag, void *pwfn_arg)
|
||
|
{
|
||
|
#if 0 /* not yet done */
|
||
|
SECStatus err;
|
||
|
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE bulkType;
|
||
|
PK11SymKey *tek;
|
||
|
SECKEYPublicKey *originatorPubKey;
|
||
|
NSSCMSSMIMEKEAParameters keaParams;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* XXXX get originator's public key */
|
||
|
originatorPubKey = PK11_MakeKEAPubKey(keaParams.originatorKEAKey.data,
|
||
|
keaParams.originatorKEAKey.len);
|
||
|
if (originatorPubKey == NULL)
|
||
|
goto loser;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Generate the TEK (token exchange key) which we use to unwrap the bulk encryption key.
|
||
|
The Derive function generates a shared secret and combines it with the originatorRA
|
||
|
data to come up with an unique session key */
|
||
|
tek = PK11_PubDerive(privkey, originatorPubKey, PR_FALSE,
|
||
|
&keaParams.originatorRA, NULL,
|
||
|
CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP,
|
||
|
CKA_WRAP, 0, pwfn_arg);
|
||
|
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(originatorPubKey); /* not needed anymore */
|
||
|
if (tek == NULL)
|
||
|
goto loser;
|
||
|
|
||
|
/* Now that we have the TEK, unwrap the bulk key
|
||
|
with which to decrypt the message. */
|
||
|
/* Skipjack is being used as the bulk encryption algorithm.*/
|
||
|
/* Unwrap the bulk key. */
|
||
|
bulkkey = PK11_UnwrapSymKey(tek, CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP, NULL,
|
||
|
encKey, CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64, CKA_DECRYPT, 0);
|
||
|
|
||
|
return bulkkey;
|
||
|
|
||
|
loser:
|
||
|
#endif
|
||
|
return NULL;
|
||
|
}
|
||
|
|