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ported changes from tenfourfox: 

M1357599, M923089+M1276618+M1278434, M1485864, M1520826, M1558548, #481-X25519, M1586176

with custom changes:
- coreconf+makefiles: set NSS_NO_PKCS11_BYPASS by default (to disable, set NSS_PKCS11_BYPASS) and fix logic
- curve25519_32: use PRuint32 instead of uint32_t
- smime: fix decl on top of block
- ssl3con: more VC6 fixes
This commit is contained in:
Roy Tam 2020-01-08 07:39:56 +08:00
parent 6712ac7edb
commit 1c9b432ff7
35 changed files with 928 additions and 185 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

6
security/nss/coreconf/config.mk
View File

@ -188,3 +188,9 @@ USE_UTIL_DIRECTLY = 1
# Hide old, deprecated, TLS cipher suite names when building NSS
DEFINES += -DSSL_DISABLE_DEPRECATED_CIPHER_SUITE_NAMES
# build with NO_PKCS11_BYPASS by default
ifndef NSS_PKCS11_BYPASS
DEFINES += -DNO_PKCS11_BYPASS
NSS_NO_PKCS11_BYPASS = 1
endif

30
security/nss/lib/certdb/genname.c
View File

@ -1607,8 +1607,36 @@ done:
"\x30\x05\x82\x03" ".nc" \
"\x30\x05\x82\x03" ".tf" \
/* TUBITAK Kamu SM SSL Kok Sertifikasi - Surum 1 */
#define TUBITAK1_SUBJECT_DN \
"\x30\x81\xd2" \
"\x31\x0b\x30\x09\x06\x03\x55\x04\x06\x13\x02" \
/* C */ "TR" \
"\x31\x18\x30\x16\x06\x03\x55\x04\x07\x13\x0f" \
/* L */ "Gebze - Kocaeli" \
"\x31\x42\x30\x40\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0a\x13\x39" \
/* O */ "Turkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Arastirma Kurumu - TUBITAK" \
"\x31\x2d\x30\x2b\x06\x03\x55\x04\x0b\x13\x24" \
/* OU */ "Kamu Sertifikasyon Merkezi - Kamu SM" \
"\x31\x36\x30\x34\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x13\x2d" \
/* CN */ "TUBITAK Kamu SM SSL Kok Sertifikasi - Surum 1"
#define TUBITAK1_NAME_CONSTRAINTS \
"\x30\x65\xa0\x63" \
"\x30\x09\x82\x07" ".gov.tr" \
"\x30\x09\x82\x07" ".k12.tr" \
"\x30\x09\x82\x07" ".pol.tr" \
"\x30\x09\x82\x07" ".mil.tr" \
"\x30\x09\x82\x07" ".tsk.tr" \
"\x30\x09\x82\x07" ".kep.tr" \
"\x30\x09\x82\x07" ".bel.tr" \
"\x30\x09\x82\x07" ".edu.tr" \
"\x30\x09\x82\x07" ".org.tr"
static const SECItem builtInNameConstraints[][2] = {
NAME_CONSTRAINTS_ENTRY(ANSSI)
NAME_CONSTRAINTS_ENTRY(ANSSI),
NAME_CONSTRAINTS_ENTRY(TUBITAK1)
};
SECStatus

6
security/nss/lib/cryptohi/seckey.c
View File

@ -618,6 +618,12 @@ seckey_ExtractPublicKey(const CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *spki)
if (rv == SECSuccess) return pubk;
break;
case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY:
/* A basic sanity check on inputs. */
if (spki->algorithm.parameters.len == 0 || newOs.len == 0) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
break;
}
pubk->keyType = ecKey;
pubk->u.ec.size = 0;

3
security/nss/lib/freebl/dh.c
View File

@ -208,7 +208,8 @@ DH_Derive(SECItem *publicValue,
unsigned int len = 0;
unsigned int nb;
unsigned char *secret = NULL;
if (!publicValue || !prime || !privateValue || !derivedSecret) {
if (!publicValue || !publicValue->len || !prime || !prime->len ||
!privateValue || !privateValue->len || !derivedSecret) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}

13
security/nss/lib/freebl/ec.c
View File

@ -215,7 +215,8 @@ ec_NewKey(ECParams *ecParams, ECPrivateKey **privKey,
#endif
MP_DIGITS(&k) = 0;
if (!ecParams || !privKey || !privKeyBytes || (privKeyLen < 0)) {
if (!ecParams || ecParams->name == ECCurve_noName ||
!privKey || !privKeyBytes || privKeyLen <= 0) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
@ -395,7 +396,7 @@ EC_NewKey(ECParams *ecParams, ECPrivateKey **privKey)
int len;
unsigned char *privKeyBytes = NULL;
if (!ecParams) {
if (!ecParams || ecParams->name == ECCurve_noName || !privKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
@ -437,7 +438,8 @@ EC_ValidatePublicKey(ECParams *ecParams, SECItem *publicValue)
mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
int len;
if (!ecParams || !publicValue) {
if (!ecParams || ecParams->name == ECCurve_noName ||
!publicValue || !publicValue->len) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
@ -537,8 +539,9 @@ ECDH_Derive(SECItem *publicValue,
int i;
#endif
if (!publicValue || !ecParams || !privateValue ||
!derivedSecret) {
if (!publicValue || !publicValue->len ||
!ecParams || ecParams->name == ECCurve_noName ||
!privateValue || !privateValue->len || !derivedSecret) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}

4
security/nss/lib/freebl/ecl/Makefile
View File

@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ LIBOBJS = ecl.o ecl_curve.o ecl_mult.o ecl_gf.o \
ecp_aff.o ecp_jac.o ecp_mont.o \
ec_naf.o ecp_jm.o \
ecp_192.o ecp_224.o ecp_256.o ecp_384.o ecp_521.o \
ecp_256_32.o
ecp_256_32.o \
curve25519_32.o
ifeq ($(ECL_USE_FP),1)
LIBOBJS+= ecp_fp160.o ecp_fp192.o ecp_fp224.o ecp_fp.o
endif
@ -131,6 +132,7 @@ ecp_256.o: ecp_256.c $(LIBHDRS)
ecp_384.o: ecp_384.c $(LIBHDRS)
ecp_521.o: ecp_521.c $(LIBHDRS)
ecp_fp.o: ecp_fp.c $(LIBHDRS)
curve25519_32.o: curve25519_32.c $(LIBHDRS)
ifeq ($(ECL_USE_FP),1)
ecp_fp160.o: ecp_fp160.c ecp_fpinc.c $(LIBHDRS)
ecp_fp192.o: ecp_fp192.c ecp_fpinc.c $(LIBHDRS)

393
security/nss/lib/freebl/ecl/curve25519_32.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,393 @@
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
/*
* Derived from public domain code by Matthew Dempsky and D. J. Bernstein.
*/
#include "ecl-priv.h"
#include "mpi.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include "seccomon.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "prtypes.h"
typedef PRUint32 elem[32];
/*
* Add two field elements.
* out = a + b
*/
static void
add(elem out, const elem a, const elem b)
{
PRUint32 j;
PRUint32 u = 0;
for (j = 0; j < 31; ++j) {
u += a[j] + b[j];
out[j] = u & 0xFF;
u >>= 8;
}
u += a[31] + b[31];
out[31] = u;
}
/*
* Subtract two field elements.
* out = a - b
*/
static void
sub(elem out, const elem a, const elem b)
{
PRUint32 j;
PRUint32 u;
u = 218;
for (j = 0; j < 31; ++j) {
u += a[j] + 0xFF00 - b[j];
out[j] = u & 0xFF;
u >>= 8;
}
u += a[31] - b[31];
out[31] = u;
}
/*
* "Squeeze" an element after multiplication (and square).
*/
static void
squeeze(elem a)
{
PRUint32 j;
PRUint32 u;
u = 0;
for (j = 0; j < 31; ++j) {
u += a[j];
a[j] = u & 0xFF;
u >>= 8;
}
u += a[31];
a[31] = u & 0x7F;
u = 19 * (u >> 7);
for (j = 0; j < 31; ++j) {
u += a[j];
a[j] = u & 0xFF;
u >>= 8;
}
a[31] += u;
}
static const elem minusp = { 19, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 128 };
/*
* Reduce point a by 2^255-19
*/
static void
reduce(elem a)
{
elem aorig;
PRUint32 j;
PRUint32 negative;
for (j = 0; j < 32; ++j) {
aorig[j] = a[j];
}
add(a, a, minusp);
negative = 1 + ~((a[31] >> 7) & 1);
for (j = 0; j < 32; ++j) {
a[j] ^= negative & (aorig[j] ^ a[j]);
}
}
/*
* Multiplication and squeeze
* out = a * b
*/
static void
mult(elem out, const elem a, const elem b)
{
PRUint32 i;
PRUint32 j;
PRUint32 u;
for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
u = 0;
for (j = 0; j <= i; ++j) {
u += a[j] * b[i - j];
}
for (j = i + 1; j < 32; ++j) {
u += 38 * a[j] * b[i + 32 - j];
}
out[i] = u;
}
squeeze(out);
}
/*
* Multiplication
* out = 121665 * a
*/
static void
mult121665(elem out, const elem a)
{
PRUint32 j;
PRUint32 u;
u = 0;
for (j = 0; j < 31; ++j) {
u += 121665 * a[j];
out[j] = u & 0xFF;
u >>= 8;
}
u += 121665 * a[31];
out[31] = u & 0x7F;
u = 19 * (u >> 7);
for (j = 0; j < 31; ++j) {
u += out[j];
out[j] = u & 0xFF;
u >>= 8;
}
u += out[j];
out[j] = u;
}
/*
* Square a and squeeze the result.
* out = a * a
*/
static void
square(elem out, const elem a)
{
PRUint32 i;
PRUint32 j;
PRUint32 u;
for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
u = 0;
for (j = 0; j < i - j; ++j) {
u += a[j] * a[i - j];
}
for (j = i + 1; j < i + 32 - j; ++j) {
u += 38 * a[j] * a[i + 32 - j];
}
u *= 2;
if ((i & 1) == 0) {
u += a[i / 2] * a[i / 2];
u += 38 * a[i / 2 + 16] * a[i / 2 + 16];
}
out[i] = u;
}
squeeze(out);
}
/*
* Constant time swap between r and s depending on b
*/
static void
cswap(PRUint32 p[64], PRUint32 q[64], PRUint32 b)
{
PRUint32 j;
PRUint32 swap = 1 + ~b;
for (j = 0; j < 64; ++j) {
const PRUint32 t = swap & (p[j] ^ q[j]);
p[j] ^= t;
q[j] ^= t;
}
}
/*
* Montgomery ladder
*/
static void
monty(elem x_2_out, elem z_2_out,
const elem point, const elem scalar)
{
PRUint32 x_3[64] = { 0 };
PRUint32 x_2[64] = { 0 };
PRUint32 a0[64];
PRUint32 a1[64];
PRUint32 b0[64];
PRUint32 b1[64];
PRUint32 c1[64];
PRUint32 r[32];
PRUint32 s[32];
PRUint32 t[32];
PRUint32 u[32];
PRUint32 swap = 0;
PRUint32 k_t = 0;
int j;
for (j = 0; j < 32; ++j) {
x_3[j] = point[j];
}
x_3[32] = 1;
x_2[0] = 1;
for (j = 254; j >= 0; --j) {
k_t = (scalar[j >> 3] >> (j & 7)) & 1;
swap ^= k_t;
cswap(x_2, x_3, swap);
swap = k_t;
add(a0, x_2, x_2 + 32);
sub(a0 + 32, x_2, x_2 + 32);
add(a1, x_3, x_3 + 32);
sub(a1 + 32, x_3, x_3 + 32);
square(b0, a0);
square(b0 + 32, a0 + 32);
mult(b1, a1, a0 + 32);
mult(b1 + 32, a1 + 32, a0);
add(c1, b1, b1 + 32);
sub(c1 + 32, b1, b1 + 32);
square(r, c1 + 32);
sub(s, b0, b0 + 32);
mult121665(t, s);
add(u, t, b0);
mult(x_2, b0, b0 + 32);
mult(x_2 + 32, s, u);
square(x_3, c1);
mult(x_3 + 32, r, point);
}
cswap(x_2, x_3, swap);
for (j = 0; j < 32; ++j) {
x_2_out[j] = x_2[j];
}
for (j = 0; j < 32; ++j) {
z_2_out[j] = x_2[j + 32];
}
}
static void
recip(elem out, const elem z)
{
elem z2;
elem z9;
elem z11;
elem z2_5_0;
elem z2_10_0;
elem z2_20_0;
elem z2_50_0;
elem z2_100_0;
elem t0;
elem t1;
int i;
/* 2 */ square(z2, z);
/* 4 */ square(t1, z2);
/* 8 */ square(t0, t1);
/* 9 */ mult(z9, t0, z);
/* 11 */ mult(z11, z9, z2);
/* 22 */ square(t0, z11);
/* 2^5 - 2^0 = 31 */ mult(z2_5_0, t0, z9);
/* 2^6 - 2^1 */ square(t0, z2_5_0);
/* 2^7 - 2^2 */ square(t1, t0);
/* 2^8 - 2^3 */ square(t0, t1);
/* 2^9 - 2^4 */ square(t1, t0);
/* 2^10 - 2^5 */ square(t0, t1);
/* 2^10 - 2^0 */ mult(z2_10_0, t0, z2_5_0);
/* 2^11 - 2^1 */ square(t0, z2_10_0);
/* 2^12 - 2^2 */ square(t1, t0);
/* 2^20 - 2^10 */
for (i = 2; i < 10; i += 2) {
square(t0, t1);
square(t1, t0);
}
/* 2^20 - 2^0 */ mult(z2_20_0, t1, z2_10_0);
/* 2^21 - 2^1 */ square(t0, z2_20_0);
/* 2^22 - 2^2 */ square(t1, t0);
/* 2^40 - 2^20 */
for (i = 2; i < 20; i += 2) {
square(t0, t1);
square(t1, t0);
}
/* 2^40 - 2^0 */ mult(t0, t1, z2_20_0);
/* 2^41 - 2^1 */ square(t1, t0);
/* 2^42 - 2^2 */ square(t0, t1);
/* 2^50 - 2^10 */
for (i = 2; i < 10; i += 2) {
square(t1, t0);
square(t0, t1);
}
/* 2^50 - 2^0 */ mult(z2_50_0, t0, z2_10_0);
/* 2^51 - 2^1 */ square(t0, z2_50_0);
/* 2^52 - 2^2 */ square(t1, t0);
/* 2^100 - 2^50 */
for (i = 2; i < 50; i += 2) {
square(t0, t1);
square(t1, t0);
}
/* 2^100 - 2^0 */ mult(z2_100_0, t1, z2_50_0);
/* 2^101 - 2^1 */ square(t1, z2_100_0);
/* 2^102 - 2^2 */ square(t0, t1);
/* 2^200 - 2^100 */
for (i = 2; i < 100; i += 2) {
square(t1, t0);
square(t0, t1);
}
/* 2^200 - 2^0 */ mult(t1, t0, z2_100_0);
/* 2^201 - 2^1 */ square(t0, t1);
/* 2^202 - 2^2 */ square(t1, t0);
/* 2^250 - 2^50 */
for (i = 2; i < 50; i += 2) {
square(t0, t1);
square(t1, t0);
}
/* 2^250 - 2^0 */ mult(t0, t1, z2_50_0);
/* 2^251 - 2^1 */ square(t1, t0);
/* 2^252 - 2^2 */ square(t0, t1);
/* 2^253 - 2^3 */ square(t1, t0);
/* 2^254 - 2^4 */ square(t0, t1);
/* 2^255 - 2^5 */ square(t1, t0);
/* 2^255 - 21 */ mult(out, t1, z11);
}
/*
* Computes q = Curve25519(p, s)
*/
SECStatus
ec_Curve25519_mul(PRUint8 *q, const PRUint8 *s, const PRUint8 *p)
{
elem point = { 0 };
elem x_2 = { 0 };
elem z_2 = { 0 };
elem X = { 0 };
elem scalar = { 0 };
PRUint32 i;
/* read and mask scalar */
for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
scalar[i] = s[i];
}
scalar[0] &= 0xF8;
scalar[31] &= 0x7F;
scalar[31] |= 64;
/* read and mask point */
for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
point[i] = p[i];
}
point[31] &= 0x7F;
monty(x_2, z_2, point, scalar);
recip(z_2, z_2);
mult(X, x_2, z_2);
reduce(X);
for (i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
q[i] = X[i];
}
return 0;
}

2
security/nss/lib/freebl/manifest.mn
View File

@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
ECL_SRCS = ecl.c ecl_curve.c ecl_mult.c ecl_gf.c \
ecp_aff.c ecp_jac.c ecp_mont.c \
ec_naf.c ecp_jm.c ecp_256.c ecp_384.c ecp_521.c \
ecp_256_32.c
ecp_256_32.c curve25519_32.c
ifdef NSS_ECC_MORE_THAN_SUITE_B
ECL_SRCS += ec2_aff.c ec2_mont.c ec2_proj.c \
ec2_163.c ec2_193.c ec2_233.c \

68
security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.c
View File

@ -2104,7 +2104,10 @@ mp_err s_mp_almost_inverse(const mp_int *a, const mp_int *p, mp_int *c)
}
}
if (res >= 0) {
while (MP_SIGN(c) != MP_ZPOS) {
if (mp_cmp_mag(c, (mp_int *)p) >= 0) {
MP_CHECKOK(mp_div(c, p, NULL, c));
}
if (MP_SIGN(c) != MP_ZPOS) {
MP_CHECKOK( mp_add(c, p, c) );
}
res = k;
@ -4788,38 +4791,61 @@ mp_to_signed_octets(const mp_int *mp, unsigned char *str, mp_size maxlen)
/* }}} */
/* {{{ mp_to_fixlen_octets(mp, str) */
/* output a buffer of big endian octets exactly as long as requested. */
/* output a buffer of big endian octets exactly as long as requested.
constant time on the value of mp. */
mp_err
mp_to_fixlen_octets(const mp_int *mp, unsigned char *str, mp_size length)
{
int ix, pos = 0;
unsigned int bytes;
int ix, jx;
unsigned int bytes;
ARGCHK(mp != NULL && str != NULL && !SIGN(mp), MP_BADARG);
ARGCHK(mp != NULL, MP_BADARG);
ARGCHK(str != NULL, MP_BADARG);
ARGCHK(!SIGN(mp), MP_BADARG);
ARGCHK(length > 0, MP_BADARG);
bytes = mp_unsigned_octet_size(mp);
ARGCHK(bytes <= length, MP_BADARG);
/* Constant time on the value of mp. Don't use mp_unsigned_octet_size. */
bytes = USED(mp) * MP_DIGIT_SIZE;
/* place any needed leading zeros */
for (;length > bytes; --length) {
*str++ = 0;
/* If the output is shorter than the native size of mp, then check that any
* bytes not written have zero values. This check isn't constant time on
* the assumption that timing-sensitive callers can guarantee that mp fits
* in the allocated space. */
ix = USED(mp) - 1;
if (bytes > length) {
unsigned int zeros = bytes - length;
while (zeros >= MP_DIGIT_SIZE) {
ARGCHK(DIGIT(mp, ix) == 0, MP_BADARG);
zeros -= MP_DIGIT_SIZE;
ix--;
}
if (zeros > 0) {
mp_digit d = DIGIT(mp, ix);
mp_digit m = (mp_digit)~0 << ((MP_DIGIT_SIZE - zeros) * CHAR_BIT);
ARGCHK((d & m) == 0, MP_BADARG);
for (jx = MP_DIGIT_SIZE - zeros - 1; jx >= 0; jx--) {
*str++ = d >> (jx * CHAR_BIT);
}
ix--;
}
} else if (bytes < length) {
/* Place any needed leading zeros. */
unsigned int zeros = length - bytes;
memset(str, 0, zeros);
str += zeros;
}
/* Iterate over each digit... */
for(ix = USED(mp) - 1; ix >= 0; ix--) {
mp_digit d = DIGIT(mp, ix);
int jx;
/* Iterate over each whole digit... */
for (; ix >= 0; ix--) {
mp_digit d = DIGIT(mp, ix);
/* Unpack digit bytes, high order first */
for(jx = sizeof(mp_digit) - 1; jx >= 0; jx--) {
unsigned char x = (unsigned char)(d >> (jx * CHAR_BIT));
if (!pos && !x) /* suppress leading zeros */
continue;
str[pos++] = x;
for (jx = MP_DIGIT_SIZE - 1; jx >= 0; jx--) {
*str++ = d >> (jx * CHAR_BIT);
}
}
if (!pos)
str[pos++] = 0;
return MP_OKAY;
} /* end mp_to_fixlen_octets() */
/* }}} */

3
security/nss/lib/freebl/mpi/mpi.h
View File

@ -125,7 +125,8 @@ typedef int mp_sword;
#define MP_WORD_MAX UINT_MAX
#endif
#define MP_DIGIT_BIT (CHAR_BIT*sizeof(mp_digit))
#define MP_DIGIT_SIZE sizeof(mp_digit)
#define MP_DIGIT_BIT (CHAR_BIT * MP_DIGIT_SIZE)
#define MP_WORD_BIT (CHAR_BIT*sizeof(mp_word))
#define MP_RADIX (1+(mp_word)MP_DIGIT_MAX)

76
security/nss/lib/freebl/rsapkcs.c
View File

@ -907,48 +907,56 @@ RSA_DecryptBlock(RSAPrivateKey * key,
const unsigned char * input,
unsigned int inputLen)
{
SECStatus rv;
PRInt8 rv;
unsigned int modulusLen = rsa_modulusLen(&key->modulus);
unsigned int i;
unsigned char * buffer;
unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
unsigned int outLen = 0;
unsigned int copyOutLen = modulusLen - 11;
if (inputLen != modulusLen)
goto failure;
buffer = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(modulusLen + 1);
if (!buffer)
goto failure;
rv = RSA_PrivateKeyOp(key, buffer, input);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
goto loser;
/* XXX(rsleevi): Constant time */
if (buffer[0] != RSA_BLOCK_FIRST_OCTET ||
buffer[1] != (unsigned char)RSA_BlockPublic) {
goto loser;
if (inputLen != modulusLen || modulusLen < 10) {
return SECFailure;
}
*outputLen = 0;
for (i = 2; i < modulusLen; i++) {
if (buffer[i] == RSA_BLOCK_AFTER_PAD_OCTET) {
*outputLen = modulusLen - i - 1;
break;
}
}
if (*outputLen == 0)
goto loser;
if (*outputLen > maxOutputLen)
goto loser;
PORT_Memcpy(output, buffer + modulusLen - *outputLen, *outputLen);
if (copyOutLen > maxOutputLen) {
copyOutLen = maxOutputLen;
}
// Allocate enough space to decrypt + copyOutLen to allow copying outLen later.
buffer = PORT_ZAlloc(modulusLen + 1 + copyOutLen);
if (!buffer) {
return SECFailure;
}
// rv is 0 if everything is going well and 1 if an error occurs.
rv = RSA_PrivateKeyOp(key, buffer, input) != SECSuccess;
rv |= (buffer[0] != RSA_BLOCK_FIRST_OCTET) |
(buffer[1] != (unsigned char)RSA_BlockPublic);
// There have to be at least 8 bytes of padding.
for (i = 2; i < 10; i++) {
rv |= buffer[i] == RSA_BLOCK_AFTER_PAD_OCTET;
}
for (i = 10; i < modulusLen; i++) {
unsigned int newLen = modulusLen - i - 1;
unsigned int c = (buffer[i] == RSA_BLOCK_AFTER_PAD_OCTET) & (outLen == 0);
outLen = constantTimeCondition(c, newLen, outLen);
}
rv |= outLen == 0;
rv |= outLen > maxOutputLen;
// Note that output is set even if SECFailure is returned.
PORT_Memcpy(output, buffer + modulusLen - outLen, copyOutLen);
*outputLen = constantTimeCondition(outLen > maxOutputLen, maxOutputLen,
outLen);
PORT_Free(buffer);
return SECSuccess;
loser:
PORT_Free(buffer);
failure:
return SECFailure;
for (i = 1; i < sizeof(rv) * 8; i <<= 1) {
rv |= rv << i;
}
return (SECStatus)rv;
}
/*

21
security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11akey.c
View File

@ -164,7 +164,6 @@ PK11_ImportPublicKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
keyType = CKK_EC;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VERIFY, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));attrs++;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));attrs++;
signedattr = attrs;
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.data,
pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams.len); attrs++;
@ -195,10 +194,14 @@ PK11_ImportPublicKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
}
templateCount = attrs - theTemplate;
signedcount = attrs - signedattr;
PORT_Assert(templateCount <= (sizeof(theTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)));
for (attrs=signedattr; signedcount; attrs++, signedcount--) {
pk11_SignedToUnsigned(attrs);
if (pubKey->keyType != ecKey) {
PORT_Assert(signedattr);
signedcount = attrs - signedattr;
for (attrs = signedattr; signedcount; attrs++, signedcount--) {
pk11_SignedToUnsigned(attrs);
}
}
rv = PK11_CreateNewObject(slot, CK_INVALID_SESSION, theTemplate,
templateCount, isToken, &objectID);
@ -956,9 +959,13 @@ pk11_loadPrivKeyWithFlags(PK11SlotInfo *slot,SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey,
&cktrue, &ckfalse);
/* Not everyone can handle zero padded key values, give
* them the raw data as unsigned */
for (ap=attrs; extra_count; ap++, extra_count--) {
pk11_SignedToUnsigned(ap);
* them the raw data as unsigned. The exception is EC,
* where the values are encoded or zero-preserving
* per-RFC5915 */
if (privKey->keyType != ecKey) {
for (ap = attrs; extra_count; ap++, extra_count--) {
pk11_SignedToUnsigned(ap);
}
}
/* now Store the puppies */

4
security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cert.c
View File

@ -172,7 +172,9 @@ PK11_IsUserCert(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CERTCertificate *cert,
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
return PR_FALSE;
}
pk11_SignedToUnsigned(&theTemplate);
if (pubKey->keyType != ecKey) {
pk11_SignedToUnsigned(&theTemplate);
}
if (pk11_FindObjectByTemplate(slot,&theTemplate,1) != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
return PR_TRUE;

1
security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pk12.c
View File

@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ PK11_ImportAndReturnPrivateKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECKEYRawPrivateKey *lpk,
PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIVATE, isPrivate ? &cktrue : &ckfalse,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL) ); attrs++;
PORT_Assert(lpk->keyType != ecKey); /* see bug 1558548 if this is needed */
switch (lpk->keyType) {
case rsaKey:
keyType = CKK_RSA;

75
security/nss/lib/smime/cmscinfo.c
View File

@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ NSS_CMSContentInfo_Destroy(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo)
{
SECOidTag kind;
if (cinfo == NULL) {
return;
}
kind = NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetContentTypeTag(cinfo);
switch (kind) {
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
@ -88,7 +92,13 @@ NSSCMSContentInfo *
NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetChildContentInfo(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo)
{
NSSCMSContentInfo * ccinfo = NULL;
SECOidTag tag = NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetContentTypeTag(cinfo);
SECOidTag tag;
if (cinfo == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
tag = NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetContentTypeTag(cinfo);
switch (tag) {
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
if (cinfo->content.signedData != NULL) {
@ -129,6 +139,9 @@ SECStatus
NSS_CMSContentInfo_SetDontStream(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo, PRBool dontStream)
{
SECStatus rv;
if (cinfo == NULL) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = NSS_CMSContentInfo_Private_Init(cinfo);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
@ -146,6 +159,9 @@ SECStatus
NSS_CMSContentInfo_SetContent(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg, NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo, SECOidTag type, void *ptr)
{
SECStatus rv;
if (cinfo == NULL || cmsg == NULL) {
return SECFailure;
}
cinfo->contentTypeTag = SECOID_FindOIDByTag(type);
if (cinfo->contentTypeTag == NULL)
@ -227,9 +243,15 @@ NSS_CMSContentInfo_SetContent_EncryptedData(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg, NSSCMSContentIn
void *
NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetContent(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo)
{
SECOidTag tag = cinfo->contentTypeTag
? cinfo->contentTypeTag->offset
: SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
SECOidTag tag;
if (cinfo == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
tag = cinfo->contentTypeTag
? cinfo->contentTypeTag->offset
: SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
switch (tag) {
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_DATA:
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
@ -255,6 +277,10 @@ NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetInnerContent(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo)
SECOidTag tag;
SECItem *pItem = NULL;
if (cinfo == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
tag = NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetContentTypeTag(cinfo);
if (NSS_CMSType_IsData(tag)) {
pItem = cinfo->content.data;
@ -278,6 +304,10 @@ NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetInnerContent(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo)
SECOidTag
NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetContentTypeTag(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo)
{
if (cinfo == NULL) {
return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
}
if (cinfo->contentTypeTag == NULL)
cinfo->contentTypeTag = SECOID_FindOID(&(cinfo->contentType));
@ -290,6 +320,10 @@ NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetContentTypeTag(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo)
SECItem *
NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetContentTypeOID(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo)
{
if (cinfo == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
if (cinfo->contentTypeTag == NULL)
cinfo->contentTypeTag = SECOID_FindOID(&(cinfo->contentType));
@ -306,6 +340,10 @@ NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetContentTypeOID(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo)
SECOidTag
NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetContentEncAlgTag(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo)
{
if (cinfo == NULL) {
return SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
}
if (cinfo->contentEncAlgTag == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN)
cinfo->contentEncAlgTag = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&(cinfo->contentEncAlg));
@ -318,6 +356,10 @@ NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetContentEncAlgTag(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo)
SECAlgorithmID *
NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetContentEncAlg(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo)
{
if (cinfo == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return &(cinfo->contentEncAlg);
}
@ -326,6 +368,9 @@ NSS_CMSContentInfo_SetContentEncAlg(PLArenaPool *poolp, NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo
SECOidTag bulkalgtag, SECItem *parameters, int keysize)
{
SECStatus rv;
if (cinfo == NULL) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(poolp, &(cinfo->contentEncAlg), bulkalgtag, parameters);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
@ -339,6 +384,9 @@ NSS_CMSContentInfo_SetContentEncAlgID(PLArenaPool *poolp, NSSCMSContentInfo *cin
SECAlgorithmID *algid, int keysize)
{
SECStatus rv;
if (cinfo == NULL) {
return SECFailure;
}
rv = SECOID_CopyAlgorithmID(poolp, &(cinfo->contentEncAlg), algid);
if (rv != SECSuccess)
@ -351,14 +399,23 @@ NSS_CMSContentInfo_SetContentEncAlgID(PLArenaPool *poolp, NSSCMSContentInfo *cin
void
NSS_CMSContentInfo_SetBulkKey(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo, PK11SymKey *bulkkey)
{
cinfo->bulkkey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(bulkkey);
cinfo->keysize = PK11_GetKeyStrength(cinfo->bulkkey, &(cinfo->contentEncAlg));
if (cinfo == NULL) {
return;
}
if (bulkkey == NULL) {
cinfo->bulkkey = NULL;
cinfo->keysize = 0;
} else {
cinfo->bulkkey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(bulkkey);
cinfo->keysize = PK11_GetKeyStrength(cinfo->bulkkey, &(cinfo->contentEncAlg));
}
}
PK11SymKey *
NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetBulkKey(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo)
{
if (cinfo->bulkkey == NULL)
if (cinfo == NULL || cinfo->bulkkey == NULL)
return NULL;
return PK11_ReferenceSymKey(cinfo->bulkkey);
@ -367,5 +424,9 @@ NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetBulkKey(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo)
int
NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetBulkKeySize(NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo)
{
if (cinfo == NULL) {
return 0;
}
return cinfo->keysize;
}

4
security/nss/lib/smime/cmsdigdata.c
View File

@ -56,7 +56,9 @@ void
NSS_CMSDigestedData_Destroy(NSSCMSDigestedData *digd)
{
/* everything's in a pool, so don't worry about the storage */
NSS_CMSContentInfo_Destroy(&(digd->contentInfo));
if (digd != NULL) {
NSS_CMSContentInfo_Destroy(&(digd->contentInfo));
}
return;
}

4
security/nss/lib/smime/cmsencdata.c
View File

@ -86,7 +86,9 @@ void
NSS_CMSEncryptedData_Destroy(NSSCMSEncryptedData *encd)
{
/* everything's in a pool, so don't worry about the storage */
NSS_CMSContentInfo_Destroy(&(encd->contentInfo));
if (encd != NULL) {
NSS_CMSContentInfo_Destroy(&(encd->contentInfo));
}
return;
}

5
security/nss/lib/smime/cmsenvdata.c
View File

@ -144,6 +144,11 @@ NSS_CMSEnvelopedData_Encode_BeforeStart(NSSCMSEnvelopedData *envd)
poolp = envd->cmsg->poolp;
cinfo = &(envd->contentInfo);
if (cinfo == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
goto loser;
}
recipientinfos = envd->recipientInfos;
if (recipientinfos == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);

49
security/nss/lib/smime/cmsmessage.c
View File

@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ NSS_CMSMessage_SetEncodingParams(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg,
NSSCMSGetDecryptKeyCallback decrypt_key_cb, void *decrypt_key_cb_arg,
SECAlgorithmID **detached_digestalgs, SECItem **detached_digests)
{
if (cmsg == NULL) {
return;
}
if (pwfn)
PK11_SetPasswordFunc(pwfn);
cmsg->pwfn_arg = pwfn_arg;
@ -88,6 +92,9 @@ NSS_CMSMessage_SetEncodingParams(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg,
void
NSS_CMSMessage_Destroy(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg)
{
if (cmsg == NULL)
return;
PORT_Assert (cmsg->refCount > 0);
if (cmsg->refCount <= 0) /* oops */
return;
@ -127,6 +134,10 @@ NSS_CMSMessage_Copy(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg)
PLArenaPool *
NSS_CMSMessage_GetArena(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg)
{
if (cmsg == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return cmsg->poolp;
}
@ -136,6 +147,10 @@ NSS_CMSMessage_GetArena(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg)
NSSCMSContentInfo *
NSS_CMSMessage_GetContentInfo(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg)
{
if (cmsg == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
return &(cmsg->contentInfo);
}
@ -147,9 +162,16 @@ NSS_CMSMessage_GetContentInfo(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg)
SECItem *
NSS_CMSMessage_GetContent(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg)
{
NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo;
SECItem *pItem;
if (cmsg == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
/* this is a shortcut */
NSSCMSContentInfo * cinfo = NSS_CMSMessage_GetContentInfo(cmsg);
SECItem * pItem = NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetInnerContent(cinfo);
cinfo = NSS_CMSMessage_GetContentInfo(cmsg);
pItem = NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetInnerContent(cinfo);
return pItem;
}
@ -164,6 +186,10 @@ NSS_CMSMessage_ContentLevelCount(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg)
int count = 0;
NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo;
if (cmsg == NULL) {
return 0;
}
/* walk down the chain of contentinfos */
for (cinfo = &(cmsg->contentInfo); cinfo != NULL; ) {
count++;
@ -183,6 +209,10 @@ NSS_CMSMessage_ContentLevel(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg, int n)
int count = 0;
NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo;
if (cmsg == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
/* walk down the chain of contentinfos */
for (cinfo = &(cmsg->contentInfo); cinfo != NULL && count < n; cinfo = NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetChildContentInfo(cinfo)) {
count++;
@ -199,6 +229,10 @@ NSS_CMSMessage_ContainsCertsOrCrls(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg)
{
NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo;
if (cmsg == NULL) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
/* descend into CMS message */
for (cinfo = &(cmsg->contentInfo); cinfo != NULL; cinfo = NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetChildContentInfo(cinfo)) {
if (!NSS_CMSType_IsData(NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetContentTypeTag(cinfo)))
@ -219,6 +253,10 @@ NSS_CMSMessage_IsEncrypted(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg)
{
NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo;
if (cmsg == NULL) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
/* walk down the chain of contentinfos */
for (cinfo = &(cmsg->contentInfo); cinfo != NULL; cinfo = NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetChildContentInfo(cinfo))
{
@ -249,11 +287,18 @@ NSS_CMSMessage_IsSigned(NSSCMSMessage *cmsg)
{
NSSCMSContentInfo *cinfo;
if (cmsg == NULL) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
/* walk down the chain of contentinfos */
for (cinfo = &(cmsg->contentInfo); cinfo != NULL; cinfo = NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetChildContentInfo(cinfo))
{
switch (NSS_CMSContentInfo_GetContentTypeTag(cinfo)) {
case SEC_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
if (cinfo->content.signedData == NULL) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
if (!NSS_CMSArray_IsEmpty((void **)cinfo->content.signedData->signerInfos))
return PR_TRUE;
break;

2
security/nss/lib/smime/cmsudf.c
View File

@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ NSS_CMSGenericWrapperData_Destroy(SECOidTag type, NSSCMSGenericWrapperData *gd)
{
const nsscmstypeInfo *typeInfo = nss_cmstype_lookup(type);
if (typeInfo && typeInfo->destroy) {
if (typeInfo && typeInfo->destroy && (gd != NULL)) {
(*typeInfo->destroy)(gd);
}

6
security/nss/lib/softoken/legacydb/lgattr.c
View File

@ -960,9 +960,9 @@ lg_FindECPrivateKeyAttribute(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type,
case CKA_UNWRAP:
return LG_CLONE_ATTR(attribute,type,lg_StaticFalseAttr);
case CKA_VALUE:
return lg_CopyPrivAttrSigned(attribute, type,
key->u.ec.privateValue.data,
key->u.ec.privateValue.len, sdbpw);
return lg_CopyPrivAttribute(attribute, type,
key->u.ec.privateValue.data,
key->u.ec.privateValue.len, sdbpw);
case CKA_EC_PARAMS:
return lg_CopyAttributeSigned(attribute, type,
key->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding.data,

5
security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
View File

@ -1159,8 +1159,7 @@ CK_RV NSC_EncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
}
/* encrypt the current padded data */
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedPart,
&padoutlen, context->blockSize, context->padBuf,
context->blockSize);
&padoutlen, maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
}
@ -6973,7 +6972,7 @@ key_and_mac_derive_fail:
rv = ECDH_Derive(&ecPoint, &privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecScalar,
withCofactor, &tmp);
PORT_Free(ecScalar.data);
PORT_ZFree(ecScalar.data, ecScalar.len);
ecScalar.data = NULL;
if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo) {
nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);

4
security/nss/lib/ssl/Makefile
View File

@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ include $(CORE_DEPTH)/coreconf/rules.mk
export:: private_export
ifndef NSS_NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
#ifndef NSS_NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
# indicates dependency on freebl static lib
$(SHARED_LIBRARY): $(CRYPTOLIB)
endif
#endif

5
security/nss/lib/ssl/config.mk
View File

@ -14,13 +14,14 @@ endif
ifdef NSS_NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
DEFINES += -DNO_PKCS11_BYPASS
else
#else
endif
CRYPTOLIB=$(SOFTOKEN_LIB_DIR)/$(LIB_PREFIX)freebl.$(LIB_SUFFIX)
EXTRA_LIBS += \
$(CRYPTOLIB) \
$(NULL)
endif
#endif
ifeq (,$(filter-out WIN%,$(OS_TARGET)))

3
security/nss/lib/ssl/derive.c
View File

@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
#include "sslerr.h"
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
#error not patched for SHA384, see bug 923089
/* make this a macro! */
#ifdef NOT_A_MACRO
static void

279
security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c
View File

@ -38,6 +38,17 @@
#include "zlib.h"
#endif
#ifdef _MSC_VER
#if _MSC_VER < 1900
#define inline
#endif
#if _MSC_VER <= 1200
typedef signed int intptr_t;
typedef unsigned int uintptr_t;
#endif
#endif /* defined(_MSC_VER) */
#ifndef PK11_SETATTRS
#define PK11_SETATTRS(x,id,v,l) (x)->type = (id); \
(x)->pValue=(v); (x)->ulValueLen = (l);
@ -97,6 +108,7 @@ static ssl3CipherSuiteCfg cipherSuites[ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED] = {
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
{ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_TRUE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
{ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_ALLOWED, PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE},
/* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA is out of order to work around
@ -294,6 +306,7 @@ static const ssl3BulkCipherDef bulk_cipher_defs[] = {
{cipher_camellia_256, calg_camellia, 32,32, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0},
{cipher_seed, calg_seed, 16,16, type_block, 16,16, 0, 0},
{cipher_aes_128_gcm, calg_aes_gcm, 16,16, type_aead, 4, 0,16, 8},
{cipher_aes_256_gcm, calg_aes_gcm, 32,32, type_aead, 4, 0,16, 8},
{cipher_camellia_128_gcm, calg_camellia_gcm, 16,16, type_aead, 4, 0,16, 8},
{cipher_missing, calg_null, 0, 0, type_stream, 0, 0, 0, 0},
};
@ -419,8 +432,10 @@ static const ssl3CipherSuiteDef cipher_suite_defs[] =
{TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_dhe_rsa},
{TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_rsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_aes_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, cipher_aes_256_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa}, // XXX: ssl_hash_sha384 hardcoded, see TenFourFox issue 480
{TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_camellia_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_rsa},
{TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256, cipher_camellia_128_gcm, mac_aead, kea_ecdhe_ecdsa},
@ -502,6 +517,7 @@ static const SSLCipher2Mech alg2Mech[] = {
#define mmech_md5_hmac CKM_MD5_HMAC
#define mmech_sha_hmac CKM_SHA_1_HMAC
#define mmech_sha256_hmac CKM_SHA256_HMAC
#define mmech_sha384_hmac CKM_SHA384_HMAC
static const ssl3MACDef mac_defs[] = { /* indexed by SSL3MACAlgorithm */
/* pad_size is only used for SSL 3.0 MAC. See RFC 6101 Sec. 5.2.3.1. */
@ -513,6 +529,7 @@ static const ssl3MACDef mac_defs[] = { /* indexed by SSL3MACAlgorithm */
{hmac_sha, mmech_sha_hmac, 0, SHA1_LENGTH},
{hmac_sha256, mmech_sha256_hmac, 0, SHA256_LENGTH},
{ mac_aead, mmech_invalid, 0, 0 },
{hmac_sha384, mmech_sha384_hmac, 0, SHA384_LENGTH},
};
/* indexed by SSL3BulkCipher */
@ -674,6 +691,7 @@ ssl3_CipherSuiteAllowedForVersionRange(
case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256:
case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256:
case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
@ -2258,6 +2276,7 @@ ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms)
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11 && pwSpec->msItem.len && pwSpec->msItem.data) {
/* Double Bypass succeeded in extracting the master_secret */
#error not patched for SHA384, see bug 923089
const ssl3KEADef * kea_def = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def;
PRBool isTLS = (PRBool)(kea_def->tls_keygen ||
(pwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0));
@ -2392,6 +2411,7 @@ ssl3_ComputeRecordMAC(
case ssl_hmac_sha256: /* used with TLS */
hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA256);
break;
#error does not yet support SHA384, see bug 923089
default:
break;
}
@ -3636,6 +3656,55 @@ ssl3_HandleChangeCipherSpecs(sslSocket *ss, sslBuffer *buf)
return SECSuccess;
}
/* XXX: These are stubs for TenFourFox issue 480, based on bug 923089.
Instead of using the prf_hash field, these simply check the cipher.
If we add a whole lot of new ciphers, we should probably just bite the
bullet and add the hash field, but for now just hard-code them IN BOTH
PLACES.
We get away with this because the code actually just maps ssl_hash_sha256
and _none to SHA-256, and the only other value is SHA-384 for our
exception ciphers. */
inline static CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
ssl3_GetTls12PrfHashMechanism(sslSocket *ss)
{
#if(0)
// For reference
switch (ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash) {
case ssl_hash_sha384:
return CKM_SHA384;
case ssl_hash_sha256:
case ssl_hash_none:
/* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */
return CKM_SHA256;
default:
PORT_Assert(0);
}
return CKM_SHA256;
#else
if (ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite == TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
return CKM_SHA384;
return CKM_SHA256;
#endif
}
inline static SSLHashType
ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(sslSocket *ss) {
#if(0)
// For reference
/* ssl_hash_none is for pre-1.2 suites, which use SHA-256. */
if (ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash == ssl_hash_none) {
return ssl_hash_sha256;
}
return ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash;
#else
if (ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite == TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
return ssl_hash_sha384;
return ssl_hash_sha256;
#endif
}
/* This method completes the derivation of the MS from the PMS.
**
** 1. Derive the MS, if possible, else return an error.
@ -3753,7 +3822,7 @@ ssl3_ComputeMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms,
master_params.RandomInfo.pServerRandom = sr;
master_params.RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen = SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH;
if (isTLS12) {
master_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA256;
master_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetTls12PrfHashMechanism(ss);
master_params_len = sizeof(CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS);
} else {
/* prfHashMechanism is not relevant with this PRF */
@ -3811,8 +3880,8 @@ tls_ComputeExtendedMasterSecretInt(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey *pms,
}
if (pwSpec->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
/* TLS 1.2 */
extended_master_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA256;
/* TLS 1.2+ */
extended_master_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetTls12PrfHashMechanism(ss);
key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
} else {
/* TLS < 1.2 */
@ -3998,7 +4067,7 @@ ssl3_DeriveConnectionKeysPKCS11(sslSocket *ss)
if (isTLS12) {
key_derive = CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
key_material_params.prfHashMechanism = CKM_SHA256;
key_material_params.prfHashMechanism = ssl3_GetTls12PrfHashMechanism(ss);
key_material_params_len = sizeof(CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS);
} else if (isTLS) {
key_derive = CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE;
@ -4076,11 +4145,14 @@ ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss)
if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
/* If we ever support ciphersuites where the PRF hash isn't SHA-256
* then this will need to be updated. */
// We don't build with the bypass enabled, but this is here in case we need to.
#error handling for TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 is incomplete
ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA256);
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
#error see bug 923089
ss->ssl3.hs.sha_clone = (void (*)(void *, void *))SHA256_Clone;
ss->ssl3.hs.hashType = handshake_hash_single;
ss->ssl3.hs.sha_obj->begin(ss->ssl3.hs.sha_cx);
@ -4099,9 +4171,20 @@ ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(sslSocket *ss)
* that the master secret will wind up in ...
*/
if (ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
/* If we ever support ciphersuites where the PRF hash isn't SHA-256
* then this will need to be updated. */
ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(SEC_OID_SHA256);
/* determine the hash from the prf */
const SECOidData *hash_oid =
SECOID_FindOIDByMechanism(ssl3_GetTls12PrfHashMechanism(ss));
/* Get the PKCS #11 mechanism for the Hash from the cipher suite (prf_hash)
* Convert that to the OidTag. We can then use that OidTag to create our
* PK11Context */
PORT_Assert(hash_oid != NULL);
if (hash_oid == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.sha = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hash_oid->offset);
if (ss->ssl3.hs.sha == NULL) {
ssl_MapLowLevelError(SSL_ERROR_SHA_DIGEST_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
@ -4422,6 +4505,12 @@ ssl3_AppendSignatureAndHashAlgorithm(
sslSocket *ss, const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg* sigAndHash)
{
PRUint8 serialized[2];
SECOidTag hashAlg = ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID(sigAndHash->hashAlg);
if (hashAlg == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) {
PORT_Assert(0);
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_HASH_ALGORITHM);
return SECFailure;
}
serialized[0] = (PRUint8)sigAndHash->hashAlg;
serialized[1] = (PRUint8)sigAndHash->sigAlg;
@ -4755,6 +4844,8 @@ ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket * ss,
/* If we ever support ciphersuites where the PRF hash isn't SHA-256
* then this will need to be updated. */
hashes->hashAlg = ssl_hash_sha256;
// We don't build with the bypass enabled, but this is here in case we need to.
#error handling for TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 is incomplete
rv = SECSuccess;
} else if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) {
/* compute them without PKCS11 */
@ -4862,9 +4953,8 @@ ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(sslSocket * ss,
rv = SECFailure;
goto tls12_loser;
}
/* If we ever support ciphersuites where the PRF hash isn't SHA-256
* then this will need to be updated. */
hashes->hashAlg = ssl_hash_sha256;
hashes->hashAlg = ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss);
rv = SECSuccess;
tls12_loser:
@ -6285,7 +6375,26 @@ loser:
/* Once a cipher suite has been selected, make sure that the necessary secondary
* information is properly set. */
static SECStatus
ssl3_SetCipherSuite(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSuite chosenSuite)
{
ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = chosenSuite;
ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(chosenSuite);
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def) {
PORT_Assert(0);
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
// XXX?
ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def = &kea_defs[ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->key_exchange_alg];
ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite;
/* Now we've have a cipher suite, initialize the handshake hashes. */
return ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss);
}
/* Called from ssl3_HandleServerHelloDone(). */
static SECStatus
@ -6526,13 +6635,6 @@ ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version;
isTLS = (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
rv = ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
desc = internal_error;
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto alert_loser;
}
rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshake(
ss, &ss->ssl3.hs.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, &b, &length);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
@ -6581,13 +6683,12 @@ ssl3_HandleServerHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
errCode = SSL_ERROR_NO_CYPHER_OVERLAP;
goto alert_loser;
}
ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = (ssl3CipherSuite)temp;
ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def = ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef((ssl3CipherSuite)temp);
ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite;
PORT_Assert(ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def);
if (!ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def) {
PORT_SetError(errCode = SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
goto loser; /* we don't send alerts for our screw-ups. */
rv = ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, (ssl3CipherSuite)temp);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
desc = internal_error;
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto alert_loser;
}
/* find selected compression method in our list. */
@ -7172,7 +7273,7 @@ done:
/* Destroys the backup handshake hash context if we don't need it. Note that
* this function selects the hash algorithm for client authentication
* signatures; ssl3_SendCertificateVerify uses the presence of the backup hash
* to determine whether to use SHA-1 or SHA-256. */
* to determine whether to use SHA-1, or the PRF hash of the cipher suite. */
static void
ssl3_DestroyBackupHandshakeHashIfNotNeeded(sslSocket *ss,
const SECItem *algorithms)
@ -7181,7 +7282,7 @@ ssl3_DestroyBackupHandshakeHashIfNotNeeded(sslSocket *ss,
SSLSignType sigAlg;
PRBool preferSha1;
PRBool supportsSha1 = PR_FALSE;
PRBool supportsSha256 = PR_FALSE;
PRBool supportsHandshakeHash = PR_FALSE;
PRBool needBackupHash = PR_FALSE;
unsigned int i;
@ -7205,15 +7306,17 @@ ssl3_DestroyBackupHandshakeHashIfNotNeeded(sslSocket *ss,
if (algorithms->data[i+1] == sigAlg) {
if (algorithms->data[i] == ssl_hash_sha1) {
supportsSha1 = PR_TRUE;
} else if (algorithms->data[i] == ssl_hash_sha256) {
supportsSha256 = PR_TRUE;
}
}
} else if (algorithms->data[i] == ssl_hash_sha256 || algorithms->data[i] == ssl_hash_sha384) {
/* XXX: This is wrong, but works. If we implement prf_hash,
we should fix it. See bug 923089. */
supportsHandshakeHash = PR_TRUE;
}
}
}
/* If either the server does not support SHA-256 or the client key prefers
/* If either the server does not support the handshake hash or the client key prefers
* SHA-1, leave the backup hash. */
if (supportsSha1 && (preferSha1 || !supportsSha256)) {
if (supportsSha1 && (preferSha1 || !supportsHandshakeHash)) {
needBackupHash = PR_TRUE;
}
@ -8240,14 +8343,16 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
if (!suite->enabled)
break;
#endif
/* Double check that the cached cipher suite is in the client's list */
/* Double check that the cached cipher suite is in the client's
* list. If it isn't, fall through and start a new session. */
for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) {
PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1];
if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) {
ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite;
ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def =
ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite);
ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite;
if (ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, suite_i) != SECSuccess) {
desc = internal_error;
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto alert_loser;
}
/* Use the cached compression method. */
ss->ssl3.hs.compression = sid->u.ssl3.compression;
@ -8290,10 +8395,11 @@ ssl3_HandleClientHello(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length)
for (i = 0; i + 1 < suites.len; i += 2) {
PRUint16 suite_i = (suites.data[i] << 8) | suites.data[i + 1];
if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) {
ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite;
ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def =
ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite);
ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite;
if (ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, suite_i) != SECSuccess) {
desc = internal_error;
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto alert_loser;
}
goto suite_found;
}
}
@ -8807,13 +8913,6 @@ ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length)
}
ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_version;
rv = ssl3_InitHandshakeHashes(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
desc = internal_error;
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto alert_loser;
}
/* if we get a non-zero SID, just ignore it. */
if (length !=
SSL_HL_CLIENT_HELLO_HBYTES + suite_length + sid_length + rand_length) {
@ -8867,10 +8966,11 @@ ssl3_HandleV2ClientHello(sslSocket *ss, unsigned char *buffer, int length)
for (i = 0; i+2 < suite_length; i += 3) {
PRUint32 suite_i = (suites[i] << 16)|(suites[i+1] << 8)|suites[i+2];
if (suite_i == suite->cipher_suite) {
ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite = suite->cipher_suite;
ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def =
ssl_LookupCipherSuiteDef(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite);
ss->ssl3.hs.preliminaryInfo |= ssl_preinfo_cipher_suite;
if (ssl3_SetCipherSuite(ss, suite_i) != SECSuccess) {
desc = internal_error;
errCode = PORT_GetError();
goto alert_loser;
}
goto suite_found;
}
}
@ -9419,6 +9519,8 @@ ssl3_EncodeCertificateRequestSigAlgs(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *buf,
unsigned maxLen, PRUint32 *len)
{
unsigned int i;
/* We only track a single hash, the one that is the basis for the PRF. */
SSLHashType suiteHashAlg = ssl3_GetSuitePrfHash(ss);
PORT_Assert(maxLen >= ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithmCount * 2);
if (maxLen < ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithmCount * 2) {
@ -9430,9 +9532,9 @@ ssl3_EncodeCertificateRequestSigAlgs(sslSocket *ss, PRUint8 *buf,
for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithmCount; ++i) {
const SSLSignatureAndHashAlg *alg = &ss->ssl3.signatureAlgorithms[i];
/* Note that we don't support a handshake hash with anything other than
* SHA-256, so asking for a signature from clients for something else
* would be inviting disaster. */
if (alg->hashAlg == ssl_hash_sha256) {
* the PRF hash, so asking for a signature from clients for something
* else would be inviting disaster. */
if (alg->hashAlg == suiteHashAlg) {
buf[(*len)++] = (PRUint8)alg->hashAlg;
buf[(*len)++] = (PRUint8)alg->sigAlg;
}
@ -9713,6 +9815,24 @@ ssl3_GenerateRSAPMS(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
return pms;
}
static void
ssl3_CSwapPK11SymKey(PK11SymKey **x, PK11SymKey **y, PRBool c)
{
uintptr_t x_ptr = (uintptr_t)*x;
uintptr_t y_ptr = (uintptr_t)*y;
uintptr_t mask = (uintptr_t)c;
uintptr_t tmp;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 1; i < sizeof(uintptr_t) * 8; i <<= 1) {
mask |= mask << i;
}
tmp = (x_ptr ^ y_ptr) & mask;
x_ptr = x_ptr ^ tmp;
y_ptr = y_ptr ^ tmp;
*x = (PK11SymKey *)x_ptr;
*y = (PK11SymKey *)y_ptr;
}
/* Note: The Bleichenbacher attack on PKCS#1 necessitates that we NEVER
* return any indication of failure of the Client Key Exchange message,
* where that failure is caused by the content of the client's message.
@ -9808,6 +9928,7 @@ ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss,
rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(rsaPmsBuf, sizeof rsaPmsBuf);
}
}
#error not patched for SHA384, see bug 923089
/* have PMS, build MS without PKCS11 */
rv = ssl3_MasterSecretDeriveBypass(pwSpec, cr, sr, &pmsItem, isTLS,
PR_TRUE);
@ -9820,13 +9941,9 @@ ssl3_HandleRSAClientKeyExchange(sslSocket *ss,
} else
#endif
{
PK11SymKey *tmpPms[2] = {NULL, NULL};
PK11SlotInfo *slot;
int useFauxPms = 0;
#define currentPms tmpPms[!useFauxPms]
#define unusedPms tmpPms[useFauxPms]
#define realPms tmpPms[1]
#define fauxPms tmpPms[0]
PK11SymKey *pms = NULL;
PK11SymKey *fauxPms = NULL;
PK11SlotInfo *slot = NULL;
#ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS
double_bypass:
@ -9886,29 +10003,28 @@ double_bypass:
* the unwrap. Rather, it is the mechanism with which the
* unwrapped pms will be used.
*/
realPms = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(serverKey, &enc_pms,
CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE, 0);
pms = PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(serverKey, &enc_pms,
CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKA_DERIVE, 0);
/* Temporarily use the PMS if unwrapping the real PMS fails. */
useFauxPms |= (realPms == NULL);
ssl3_CSwapPK11SymKey(&pms, &fauxPms, pms == NULL);
/* Attempt to derive the MS from the PMS. This is the only way to
* check the version field in the RSA PMS. If this fails, we
* then use the faux PMS in place of the PMS. Note that this
* operation should never fail if we are using the faux PMS
* since it is correctly formatted. */
rv = ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(ss, currentPms, NULL);
/* If we succeeded, then select the true PMS and discard the
* FPMS. Else, select the FPMS and select the true PMS */
useFauxPms |= (rv != SECSuccess);
if (unusedPms) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(unusedPms);
}
rv = ssl3_ComputeMasterSecret(ss, pms, NULL);
/* If we succeeded, then select the true PMS, else select the FPMS. */
ssl3_CSwapPK11SymKey(&pms, &fauxPms, (rv != SECSuccess) & (fauxPms != NULL));
/* This step will derive the MS from the PMS, among other things. */
rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, currentPms);
PK11_FreeSymKey(currentPms);
rv = ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec(ss, pms);
/* Clear both PMS. */
PK11_FreeSymKey(pms);
PK11_FreeSymKey(fauxPms);
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
@ -9916,11 +10032,6 @@ double_bypass:
return SECFailure; /* error code set by ssl3_InitPendingCipherSpec */
}
#undef currentPms
#undef unusedPms
#undef realPms
#undef fauxPms
return SECSuccess;
}
@ -10886,7 +10997,7 @@ done:
}
static SECStatus
ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(sslSocket *ss, ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
PRBool isServer,
const SSL3Hashes * hashes,
TLSFinished * tlsFinished)
@ -10909,7 +11020,7 @@ ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ssl3CipherSpec *spec,
if (spec->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
tls_mac_params.prfMechanism = CKM_TLS_PRF;
} else {
tls_mac_params.prfMechanism = CKM_SHA256;
tls_mac_params.prfMechanism = ssl3_GetTls12PrfHashMechanism(ss);
}
tls_mac_params.ulMacLength = 12;
tls_mac_params.ulServerOrClient = isServer ? 1 : 2;
@ -11111,7 +11222,7 @@ ssl3_SendFinished(sslSocket *ss, PRInt32 flags)
isTLS = (PRBool)(cwSpec->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0);
rv = ssl3_ComputeHandshakeHashes(ss, cwSpec, &hashes, sender);
if (isTLS && rv == SECSuccess) {
rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(cwSpec, isServer, &hashes, &tlsFinished);
rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss, cwSpec, isServer, &hashes, &tlsFinished);
}
ssl_ReleaseSpecReadLock(ss);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
@ -11282,7 +11393,7 @@ ssl3_HandleFinished(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque *b, PRUint32 length,
PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_FINISHED);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss->ssl3.crSpec, !isServer,
rv = ssl3_ComputeTLSFinished(ss, ss->ssl3.crSpec, !isServer,
hashes, &tlsFinished);
if (!isServer)
ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.tFinished[1] = tlsFinished;

2
security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3ecc.c
View File

@ -931,6 +931,7 @@ static const ssl3CipherSuite ecdhe_rsa_suites[] = {
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,
@ -952,6 +953,7 @@ static const ssl3CipherSuite ecSuites[] = {
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA,

1
security/nss/lib/ssl/sslenum.c
View File

@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ const PRUint16 SSL_ImplementedCiphers[] = {
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256,
/* TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA must appear before

6
security/nss/lib/ssl/sslimpl.h
View File

@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ typedef SSLSignType SSL3SignType;
#define hmac_md5 ssl_hmac_md5
#define hmac_sha ssl_hmac_sha
#define hmac_sha256 ssl_hmac_sha256
#define hmac_sha384 ssl_hmac_sha384
#define mac_aead ssl_mac_aead
#define SET_ERROR_CODE /* reminder */
@ -292,7 +293,7 @@ typedef struct {
} ssl3CipherSuiteCfg;
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
#define ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED 66
#define ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED 67
#else
#define ssl_V3_SUITES_IMPLEMENTED 40
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
@ -478,6 +479,7 @@ typedef enum {
cipher_camellia_256,
cipher_seed,
cipher_aes_128_gcm,
cipher_aes_256_gcm,
cipher_camellia_128_gcm,
cipher_missing /* reserved for no such supported cipher */
/* This enum must match ssl3_cipherName[] in ssl3con.c. */
@ -596,7 +598,7 @@ typedef struct {
ssl3KeyMaterial client;
ssl3KeyMaterial server;
SECItem msItem;
unsigned char key_block[NUM_MIXERS * MD5_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_block[NUM_MIXERS * HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
unsigned char raw_master_secret[56];
SECItem srvVirtName; /* for server: name that was negotiated
* with a client. For client - is

2
security/nss/lib/ssl/sslinfo.c
View File

@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ SSL_GetPreliminaryChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd,
#define B_0 0, 0, 0
#define M_AEAD_128 "AEAD", ssl_mac_aead, 128
#define M_SHA384 "SHA384", ssl_hmac_sha384, 384
#define M_SHA256 "SHA256", ssl_hmac_sha256, 256
#define M_SHA "SHA1", ssl_mac_sha, 160
#define M_MD5 "MD5", ssl_mac_md5, 128
@ -216,6 +217,7 @@ static const SSLCipherSuiteInfo suiteInfo[] = {
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
/* ECC cipher suites */
{0,CS(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_AESGCM, B_128, M_AEAD_128, 1, 0, 0, },
{0,CS(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_AESGCM, B_256, M_AEAD_128, 1, 0, 0, },
{0,CS(TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256), S_RSA, K_ECDHE, C_AESGCM, B_128, M_AEAD_128, 1, 0, 0, },
{0,CS(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_AESGCM, B_128, M_AEAD_128, 1, 0, 0, },
{0,CS(TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256), S_ECDSA, K_ECDHE, C_AESGCM, B_128, M_AEAD_128, 1, 0, 0, },

1
security/nss/lib/ssl/sslproto.h
View File

@ -258,6 +258,7 @@
#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02B
#define TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02D
#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02F
#define TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC030
#define TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC031
#define TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC086

3
security/nss/lib/ssl/sslt.h
View File

@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ typedef enum {
ssl_hmac_md5 = 3, /* TLS HMAC version of mac_md5 */
ssl_hmac_sha = 4, /* TLS HMAC version of mac_sha */
ssl_hmac_sha256 = 5,
ssl_mac_aead = 6
ssl_mac_aead = 6,
ssl_hmac_sha384 = 7
} SSLMACAlgorithm;
typedef enum {

11
security/nss/lib/util/quickder.c
View File

@ -870,8 +870,15 @@ static SECStatus DecodeItem(void* dest,
break;
}
case SEC_ASN1_BIT_STRING:
{
case SEC_ASN1_BIT_STRING: {
/* Can't be 8 or more spare bits, or any spare bits
* if there are no octets. */
if (temp.data[0] >= 8 || (temp.data[0] > 0 && temp.len == 1)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DER);
rv = SECFailure;
break;
}
/* change the length in the SECItem to be the number
of bits */
temp.len = (temp.len-1)*8 - (temp.data[0] & 0x7);

12
security/nss/lib/util/secoid.c
View File

@ -466,6 +466,7 @@ CONST_OID aes128_OFB[] = { AES, 3 };
CONST_OID aes128_CFB[] = { AES, 4 };
#endif
CONST_OID aes128_KEY_WRAP[] = { AES, 5 };
CONST_OID aes128_GCM[] = { AES, 6 };
CONST_OID aes192_ECB[] = { AES, 21 };
CONST_OID aes192_CBC[] = { AES, 22 };
@ -474,6 +475,7 @@ CONST_OID aes192_OFB[] = { AES, 23 };
CONST_OID aes192_CFB[] = { AES, 24 };
#endif
CONST_OID aes192_KEY_WRAP[] = { AES, 25 };
CONST_OID aes192_GCM[] = { AES, 26 };
CONST_OID aes256_ECB[] = { AES, 41 };
CONST_OID aes256_CBC[] = { AES, 42 };
@ -482,6 +484,7 @@ CONST_OID aes256_OFB[] = { AES, 43 };
CONST_OID aes256_CFB[] = { AES, 44 };
#endif
CONST_OID aes256_KEY_WRAP[] = { AES, 45 };
CONST_OID aes256_GCM[] = { AES, 46 };
CONST_OID camellia128_CBC[] = { CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT_OID, 2};
CONST_OID camellia192_CBC[] = { CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT_OID, 3};
@ -1639,7 +1642,14 @@ const static SECOidData oids[SEC_OID_TOTAL] = {
"Microsoft Trust List Signing",
CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION ),
OD( x520Name, SEC_OID_AVA_NAME,
"X520 Name", CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION )
"X520 Name", CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION ),
OD( aes128_GCM, SEC_OID_AES_128_GCM,
"AES-128-GCM", CKM_AES_GCM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION ),
OD( aes192_GCM, SEC_OID_AES_192_GCM,
"AES-192-GCM", CKM_AES_GCM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION ),
OD( aes256_GCM, SEC_OID_AES_256_GCM,
"AES-256-GCM", CKM_AES_GCM, INVALID_CERT_EXTENSION )
};
/* PRIVATE EXTENDED SECOID Table

4
security/nss/lib/util/secoidt.h
View File

@ -443,6 +443,10 @@ typedef enum {
/* The 'name' attribute type in X.520 */
SEC_OID_AVA_NAME = 317,
SEC_OID_AES_128_GCM = 318,
SEC_OID_AES_192_GCM = 319,
SEC_OID_AES_256_GCM = 320,
SEC_OID_TOTAL
} SECOidTag;