/* * SSL3 Protocol * * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ /* TLS extension code moved here from ssl3ecc.c */ #include "nssrenam.h" #include "nss.h" #include "ssl.h" #include "sslproto.h" #include "sslimpl.h" #include "pk11pub.h" #ifdef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS #include "blapit.h" #else #include "blapi.h" #endif #include "prinit.h" static unsigned char key_name[SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN]; static PK11SymKey *session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11 = NULL; static PK11SymKey *session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11 = NULL; #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS static unsigned char session_ticket_enc_key[AES_256_KEY_LENGTH]; static unsigned char session_ticket_mac_key[SHA256_LENGTH]; static PRBool session_ticket_keys_initialized = PR_FALSE; #endif static PRCallOnceType generate_session_keys_once; /* forward static function declarations */ static SECStatus ssl3_ParseEncryptedSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *data, EncryptedSessionTicket *enc_session_ticket); static SECStatus ssl3_AppendToItem(SECItem *item, const unsigned char *buf, PRUint32 bytes); static SECStatus ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(SECItem *item, PRUint32 num, PRInt32 lenSize); static SECStatus ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey **aes_key, PK11SymKey **mac_key); #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS static SECStatus ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(const unsigned char **aes_key, PRUint32 *aes_key_length, const unsigned char **mac_key, PRUint32 *mac_key_length); #endif static PRInt32 ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes); static SECStatus ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data); static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data); static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data); static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data); static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes); static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes); static PRInt32 ssl3_SendUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes); static SECStatus ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data); static PRInt32 ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes); static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data); static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data); static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes); static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes); static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data); /* * Write bytes. Using this function means the SECItem structure * cannot be freed. The caller is expected to call this function * on a shallow copy of the structure. */ static SECStatus ssl3_AppendToItem(SECItem *item, const unsigned char *buf, PRUint32 bytes) { if (bytes > item->len) return SECFailure; PORT_Memcpy(item->data, buf, bytes); item->data += bytes; item->len -= bytes; return SECSuccess; } /* * Write a number in network byte order. Using this function means the * SECItem structure cannot be freed. The caller is expected to call * this function on a shallow copy of the structure. */ static SECStatus ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(SECItem *item, PRUint32 num, PRInt32 lenSize) { SECStatus rv; PRUint8 b[4]; PRUint8 * p = b; switch (lenSize) { case 4: *p++ = (PRUint8) (num >> 24); case 3: *p++ = (PRUint8) (num >> 16); case 2: *p++ = (PRUint8) (num >> 8); case 1: *p = (PRUint8) num; } rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(item, &b[0], lenSize); return rv; } static SECStatus ssl3_SessionTicketShutdown(void* appData, void* nssData) { if (session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11) { PK11_FreeSymKey(session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11); session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11 = NULL; } if (session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11) { PK11_FreeSymKey(session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11); session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11 = NULL; } PORT_Memset(&generate_session_keys_once, 0, sizeof(generate_session_keys_once)); return SECSuccess; } static PRStatus ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(void *data) { SECStatus rv; sslSocket *ss = (sslSocket *)data; SECKEYPrivateKey *svrPrivKey = ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].SERVERKEY; SECKEYPublicKey *svrPubKey = ss->serverCerts[kt_rsa].serverKeyPair->pubKey; if (svrPrivKey == NULL || svrPubKey == NULL) { SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Pub or priv key(s) is NULL.", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); goto loser; } /* Get a copy of the session keys from shared memory. */ PORT_Memcpy(key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX, sizeof(SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX)); if (!ssl_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(svrPrivKey, svrPubKey, ss->pkcs11PinArg, &key_name[SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX_LEN], &session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11, &session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11)) return PR_FAILURE; rv = NSS_RegisterShutdown(ssl3_SessionTicketShutdown, NULL); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; return PR_SUCCESS; loser: ssl3_SessionTicketShutdown(NULL, NULL); return PR_FAILURE; } static SECStatus ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(sslSocket *ss, PK11SymKey **aes_key, PK11SymKey **mac_key) { if (PR_CallOnceWithArg(&generate_session_keys_once, ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeysPKCS11, ss) != PR_SUCCESS) return SECFailure; if (session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11 == NULL || session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11 == NULL) return SECFailure; *aes_key = session_ticket_enc_key_pkcs11; *mac_key = session_ticket_mac_key_pkcs11; return SECSuccess; } #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS static PRStatus ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeys(void) { PORT_Memcpy(key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX, sizeof(SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX)); if (!ssl_GetSessionTicketKeys(&key_name[SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_PREFIX_LEN], session_ticket_enc_key, session_ticket_mac_key)) return PR_FAILURE; session_ticket_keys_initialized = PR_TRUE; return PR_SUCCESS; } static SECStatus ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(const unsigned char **aes_key, PRUint32 *aes_key_length, const unsigned char **mac_key, PRUint32 *mac_key_length) { if (PR_CallOnce(&generate_session_keys_once, ssl3_GenerateSessionTicketKeys) != PR_SUCCESS) return SECFailure; if (!session_ticket_keys_initialized) return SECFailure; *aes_key = session_ticket_enc_key; *aes_key_length = sizeof(session_ticket_enc_key); *mac_key = session_ticket_mac_key; *mac_key_length = sizeof(session_ticket_mac_key); return SECSuccess; } #endif /* Table of handlers for received TLS hello extensions, one per extension. * In the second generation, this table will be dynamic, and functions * will be registered here. */ /* This table is used by the server, to handle client hello extensions. */ static const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler clientHelloHandlers[] = { { ssl_server_name_xtn, &ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn }, #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC { ssl_elliptic_curves_xtn, &ssl3_HandleSupportedCurvesXtn }, { ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn, &ssl3_HandleSupportedPointFormatsXtn }, #endif { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleSessionTicketXtn }, { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn }, { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn }, { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, &ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn }, { ssl_cert_status_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn }, { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, &ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn }, { -1, NULL } }; /* These two tables are used by the client, to handle server hello * extensions. */ static const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler serverHelloHandlersTLS[] = { { ssl_server_name_xtn, &ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn }, /* TODO: add a handler for ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn */ { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleSessionTicketXtn }, { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn }, { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn }, { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn }, { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, &ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn }, { ssl_cert_status_xtn, &ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn }, { -1, NULL } }; static const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler serverHelloHandlersSSL3[] = { { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn }, { -1, NULL } }; /* Tables of functions to format TLS hello extensions, one function per * extension. * These static tables are for the formatting of client hello extensions. * The server's table of hello senders is dynamic, in the socket struct, * and sender functions are registered there. */ static const ssl3HelloExtensionSender clientHelloSendersTLS[SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS] = { { ssl_server_name_xtn, &ssl3_SendServerNameXtn }, { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn }, #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC { ssl_elliptic_curves_xtn, &ssl3_SendSupportedCurvesXtn }, { ssl_ec_point_formats_xtn, &ssl3_SendSupportedPointFormatsXtn }, #endif { ssl_session_ticket_xtn, &ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn }, { ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn }, { ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn }, { ssl_use_srtp_xtn, &ssl3_SendUseSRTPXtn }, { ssl_cert_status_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn }, { ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, &ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn } /* any extra entries will appear as { 0, NULL } */ }; static const ssl3HelloExtensionSender clientHelloSendersSSL3[SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS] = { { ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, &ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn } /* any extra entries will appear as { 0, NULL } */ }; static PRBool arrayContainsExtension(const PRUint16 *array, PRUint32 len, PRUint16 ex_type) { int i; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { if (ex_type == array[i]) return PR_TRUE; } return PR_FALSE; } PRBool ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type) { TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; return arrayContainsExtension(xtnData->negotiated, xtnData->numNegotiated, ex_type); } static PRBool ssl3_ClientExtensionAdvertised(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type) { TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; return arrayContainsExtension(xtnData->advertised, xtnData->numAdvertised, ex_type); } /* Format an SNI extension, using the name from the socket's URL, * unless that name is a dotted decimal string. * Used by client and server. */ PRInt32 ssl3_SendServerNameXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes) { SECStatus rv; if (!ss) return 0; if (!ss->sec.isServer) { PRUint32 len; PRNetAddr netAddr; /* must have a hostname */ if (!ss->url || !ss->url[0]) return 0; /* must not be an IPv4 or IPv6 address */ if (PR_SUCCESS == PR_StringToNetAddr(ss->url, &netAddr)) { /* is an IP address (v4 or v6) */ return 0; } len = PORT_Strlen(ss->url); if (append && maxBytes >= len + 9) { /* extension_type */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; /* length of extension_data */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len + 5, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; /* length of server_name_list */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len + 3, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; /* Name Type (sni_host_name) */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, "\0", 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; /* HostName (length and value) */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, (PRUint8 *)ss->url, len, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; if (!ss->sec.isServer) { TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = ssl_server_name_xtn; } } return len + 9; } /* Server side */ if (append && maxBytes >= 4) { rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; /* length of extension_data */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; } return 4; } /* handle an incoming SNI extension, by ignoring it. */ SECStatus ssl3_HandleServerNameXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) { SECItem *names = NULL; PRUint32 listCount = 0, namesPos = 0, i; TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; SECItem ldata; PRInt32 listLenBytes = 0; if (!ss->sec.isServer) { /* Verify extension_data is empty. */ if (data->data || data->len || !ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_server_name_xtn)) { /* malformed or was not initiated by the client.*/ return SECFailure; } return SECSuccess; } /* Server side - consume client data and register server sender. */ /* do not parse the data if don't have user extension handling function. */ if (!ss->sniSocketConfig) { return SECSuccess; } /* length of server_name_list */ listLenBytes = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &data->data, &data->len); if (listLenBytes == 0 || listLenBytes != data->len) { return SECFailure; } ldata = *data; /* Calculate the size of the array.*/ while (listLenBytes > 0) { SECItem litem; SECStatus rv; PRInt32 type; /* Name Type (sni_host_name) */ type = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &ldata.data, &ldata.len); if (!ldata.len) { return SECFailure; } rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &litem, 2, &ldata.data, &ldata.len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return SECFailure; } /* Adjust total length for cunsumed item, item len and type.*/ listLenBytes -= litem.len + 3; if (listLenBytes > 0 && !ldata.len) { return SECFailure; } listCount += 1; } if (!listCount) { return SECFailure; } names = PORT_ZNewArray(SECItem, listCount); if (!names) { return SECFailure; } for (i = 0;i < listCount;i++) { int j; PRInt32 type; SECStatus rv; PRBool nametypePresent = PR_FALSE; /* Name Type (sni_host_name) */ type = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &data->data, &data->len); /* Check if we have such type in the list */ for (j = 0;j < listCount && names[j].data;j++) { if (names[j].type == type) { nametypePresent = PR_TRUE; break; } } /* HostName (length and value) */ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &names[namesPos], 2, &data->data, &data->len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; } if (nametypePresent == PR_FALSE) { namesPos += 1; } } /* Free old and set the new data. */ if (xtnData->sniNameArr) { PORT_Free(ss->xtnData.sniNameArr); } xtnData->sniNameArr = names; xtnData->sniNameArrSize = namesPos; xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_server_name_xtn; return SECSuccess; loser: PORT_Free(names); return SECFailure; } /* Called by both clients and servers. * Clients sends a filled in session ticket if one is available, and otherwise * sends an empty ticket. Servers always send empty tickets. */ PRInt32 ssl3_SendSessionTicketXtn( sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes) { PRInt32 extension_length; NewSessionTicket *session_ticket = NULL; sslSessionID *sid = ss->sec.ci.sid; /* Ignore the SessionTicket extension if processing is disabled. */ if (!ss->opt.enableSessionTickets) return 0; /* Empty extension length = extension_type (2-bytes) + * length(extension_data) (2-bytes) */ extension_length = 4; /* If we are a client then send a session ticket if one is availble. * Servers that support the extension and are willing to negotiate the * the extension always respond with an empty extension. */ if (!ss->sec.isServer) { /* The caller must be holding sid->u.ssl3.lock for reading. We cannot * just acquire and release the lock within this function because the * caller will call this function twice, and we need the inputs to be * consistent between the two calls. Note that currently the caller * will only be holding the lock when we are the client and when we're * attempting to resume an existing session. */ session_ticket = &sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket; if (session_ticket->ticket.data) { if (ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified) { extension_length += session_ticket->ticket.len; } else if (!append && (session_ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint == 0 || (session_ticket->ticket_lifetime_hint + session_ticket->received_timestamp > ssl_Time()))) { extension_length += session_ticket->ticket.len; ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified = PR_TRUE; } } } if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) { SECStatus rv; /* extension_type */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_session_ticket_xtn, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; if (session_ticket && session_ticket->ticket.data && ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified) { rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, session_ticket->ticket.data, session_ticket->ticket.len, 2); ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified = PR_FALSE; ss->xtnData.sentSessionTicketInClientHello = PR_TRUE; } else { rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); } if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; if (!ss->sec.isServer) { TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = ssl_session_ticket_xtn; } } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) { PORT_Assert(0); return 0; } return extension_length; loser: ss->xtnData.ticketTimestampVerified = PR_FALSE; return -1; } /* handle an incoming Next Protocol Negotiation extension. */ static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) { if (ss->firstHsDone || data->len != 0) { /* Clients MUST send an empty NPN extension, if any. */ PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID); return SECFailure; } ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; /* TODO: server side NPN support would require calling * ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender here in order to echo the * extension back to the client. */ return SECSuccess; } /* ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego checks that the given block of data is valid: none * of the lengths may be 0 and the sum of the lengths must equal the length of * the block. */ SECStatus ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(const unsigned char* data, unsigned int length) { unsigned int offset = 0; while (offset < length) { unsigned int newOffset = offset + 1 + (unsigned int) data[offset]; /* Reject embedded nulls to protect against buggy applications that * store protocol identifiers in null-terminated strings. */ if (newOffset > length || data[offset] == 0) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID); return SECFailure; } offset = newOffset; } if (offset > length) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID); return SECFailure; } return SECSuccess; } static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) { SECStatus rv; unsigned char resultBuffer[255]; SECItem result = { siBuffer, resultBuffer, 0 }; PORT_Assert(!ss->firstHsDone); if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn)) { /* If the server negotiated ALPN then it has already told us what * protocol to use, so it doesn't make sense for us to try to negotiate * a different one by sending the NPN handshake message. However, if * we've negotiated NPN then we're required to send the NPN handshake * message. Thus, these two extensions cannot both be negotiated on the * same connection. */ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } rv = ssl3_ValidateNextProtoNego(data->data, data->len); if (rv != SECSuccess) return rv; /* ss->nextProtoCallback cannot normally be NULL if we negotiated the * extension. However, It is possible that an application erroneously * cleared the callback between the time we sent the ClientHello and now. */ PORT_Assert(ss->nextProtoCallback != NULL); if (!ss->nextProtoCallback) { /* XXX Use a better error code. This is an application error, not an * NSS bug. */ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } rv = ss->nextProtoCallback(ss->nextProtoArg, ss->fd, data->data, data->len, result.data, &result.len, sizeof resultBuffer); if (rv != SECSuccess) return rv; /* If the callback wrote more than allowed to |result| it has corrupted our * stack. */ if (result.len > sizeof resultBuffer) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN); return SECFailure; } ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.nextProto, PR_FALSE); return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.nextProto, &result); } static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleAppProtoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) { const unsigned char* d = data->data; PRUint16 name_list_len; SECItem protocol_name; if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn)) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } /* The extension data from the server has the following format: * uint16 name_list_len; * uint8 len; * uint8 protocol_name[len]; */ if (data->len < 4 || data->len > 2 + 1 + 255) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID); return SECFailure; } name_list_len = ((PRUint16) d[0]) << 8 | ((PRUint16) d[1]); if (name_list_len != data->len - 2 || d[2] != data->len - 3) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_NEXT_PROTOCOL_DATA_INVALID); return SECFailure; } protocol_name.data = data->data + 3; protocol_name.len = data->len - 3; SECITEM_FreeItem(&ss->ssl3.nextProto, PR_FALSE); ss->ssl3.nextProtoState = SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED; ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; return SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ss->ssl3.nextProto, &protocol_name); } static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendNextProtoNegoXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes) { PRInt32 extension_length; /* Renegotiations do not send this extension. */ if (!ss->opt.enableNPN || !ss->nextProtoCallback || ss->firstHsDone) { return 0; } extension_length = 4; if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) { SECStatus rv; rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] = ssl_next_proto_nego_xtn; } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) { return 0; } return extension_length; loser: return -1; } static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendAppProtoXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes) { PRInt32 extension_length; unsigned char *alpn_protos = NULL; /* Renegotiations do not send this extension. */ if (!ss->opt.enableALPN || !ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data || ss->firstHsDone) { return 0; } extension_length = 2 /* extension type */ + 2 /* extension length */ + 2 /* protocol name list length */ + ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len; if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) { /* NPN requires that the client's fallback protocol is first in the * list. However, ALPN sends protocols in preference order. So we * allocate a buffer and move the first protocol to the end of the * list. */ SECStatus rv; const unsigned int len = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.len; alpn_protos = PORT_Alloc(len); if (alpn_protos == NULL) { return SECFailure; } if (len > 0) { /* Each protocol string is prefixed with a single byte length. */ unsigned int i = ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[0] + 1; if (i <= len) { memcpy(alpn_protos, &ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data[i], len - i); memcpy(alpn_protos + len - i, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, i); } else { /* This seems to be invalid data so we'll send as-is. */ memcpy(alpn_protos, ss->opt.nextProtoNego.data, len); } } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; } rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, alpn_protos, len, 2); PORT_Free(alpn_protos); alpn_protos = NULL; if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; } ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] = ssl_app_layer_protocol_xtn; } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) { return 0; } return extension_length; loser: if (alpn_protos) { PORT_Free(alpn_protos); } return -1; } static SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) { /* The echoed extension must be empty. */ if (data->len != 0) return SECFailure; /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; return SECSuccess; } static PRInt32 ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn( sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes) { PRInt32 extension_length; SECStatus rv; int i; PRBool haveStatus = PR_FALSE; for (i = kt_null; i < kt_kea_size; i++) { /* TODO: This is a temporary workaround. * The correct code needs to see if we have an OCSP response for * the server certificate being used, rather than if we have any * OCSP response. See also ssl3_SendCertificateStatus. */ if (ss->certStatusArray[i] && ss->certStatusArray[i]->len) { haveStatus = PR_TRUE; break; } } if (!haveStatus) return 0; extension_length = 2 + 2; if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) { /* extension_type */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; /* length of extension_data */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; } return extension_length; } /* ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn builds the status_request extension on the * client side. See RFC 4366 section 3.6. */ static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes) { PRInt32 extension_length; if (!ss->opt.enableOCSPStapling) return 0; /* extension_type (2-bytes) + * length(extension_data) (2-bytes) + * status_type (1) + * responder_id_list length (2) + * request_extensions length (2) */ extension_length = 9; if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) { SECStatus rv; TLSExtensionData *xtnData; /* extension_type */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_cert_status_xtn, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 1 /* status_type ocsp */, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; /* A zero length responder_id_list means that the responders are * implicitly known to the server. */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; /* A zero length request_extensions means that there are no extensions. * Specifically, we don't set the id-pkix-ocsp-nonce extension. This * means that the server can replay a cached OCSP response to us. */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 0, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; xtnData = &ss->xtnData; xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = ssl_cert_status_xtn; } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) { PORT_Assert(0); return 0; } return extension_length; } /* * NewSessionTicket * Called from ssl3_HandleFinished */ SECStatus ssl3_SendNewSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss) { int i; SECStatus rv; NewSessionTicket ticket; SECItem plaintext; SECItem plaintext_item = {0, NULL, 0}; SECItem ciphertext = {0, NULL, 0}; PRUint32 ciphertext_length; PRBool ms_is_wrapped; unsigned char wrapped_ms[SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH]; SECItem ms_item = {0, NULL, 0}; SSL3KEAType effectiveExchKeyType = ssl_kea_null; PRUint32 padding_length; PRUint32 message_length; PRUint32 cert_length; PRUint8 length_buf[4]; PRUint32 now; PK11SymKey *aes_key_pkcs11; PK11SymKey *mac_key_pkcs11; #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS const unsigned char *aes_key; const unsigned char *mac_key; PRUint32 aes_key_length; PRUint32 mac_key_length; PRUint64 aes_ctx_buf[MAX_CIPHER_CONTEXT_LLONGS]; AESContext *aes_ctx; const SECHashObject *hashObj = NULL; PRUint64 hmac_ctx_buf[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS]; HMACContext *hmac_ctx; #endif CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipherMech = CKM_AES_CBC; PK11Context *aes_ctx_pkcs11; CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macMech = CKM_SHA256_HMAC; PK11Context *hmac_ctx_pkcs11; unsigned char computed_mac[TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH]; unsigned int computed_mac_length; unsigned char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; SECItem ivItem; SECItem *srvName = NULL; PRUint32 srvNameLen = 0; CK_MECHANISM_TYPE msWrapMech = 0; /* dummy default value, * must be >= 0 */ SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: send session_ticket handshake", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveXmitBufLock(ss)); PORT_Assert( ss->opt.noLocks || ssl_HaveSSL3HandshakeLock(ss)); ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint = TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_LIFETIME_HINT; cert_length = (ss->opt.requestCertificate && ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert) ? 3 + ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len : 0; /* Get IV and encryption keys */ ivItem.data = iv; ivItem.len = sizeof(iv); rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(iv, sizeof(iv)); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(&aes_key, &aes_key_length, &mac_key, &mac_key_length); } else #endif { rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(ss, &aes_key_pkcs11, &mac_key_pkcs11); } if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; if (ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.len && ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.data) { /* The master secret is available unwrapped. */ ms_item.data = ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.data; ms_item.len = ss->ssl3.pwSpec->msItem.len; ms_is_wrapped = PR_FALSE; } else { /* Extract the master secret wrapped. */ sslSessionID sid; PORT_Memset(&sid, 0, sizeof(sslSessionID)); if (ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->kea == kea_ecdhe_rsa) { effectiveExchKeyType = kt_rsa; } else { effectiveExchKeyType = ss->ssl3.hs.kea_def->exchKeyType; } rv = ssl3_CacheWrappedMasterSecret(ss, &sid, ss->ssl3.pwSpec, effectiveExchKeyType); if (rv == SECSuccess) { if (sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len > sizeof(wrapped_ms)) goto loser; memcpy(wrapped_ms, sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len); ms_item.data = wrapped_ms; ms_item.len = sid.u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len; msWrapMech = sid.u.ssl3.masterWrapMech; } else { /* TODO: else send an empty ticket. */ goto loser; } ms_is_wrapped = PR_TRUE; } /* Prep to send negotiated name */ srvName = &ss->ssl3.pwSpec->srvVirtName; if (srvName->data && srvName->len) { srvNameLen = 2 + srvName->len; /* len bytes + name len */ } ciphertext_length = sizeof(PRUint16) /* ticket_version */ + sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion) /* ssl_version */ + sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite) /* ciphersuite */ + 1 /* compression */ + 10 /* cipher spec parameters */ + 1 /* SessionTicket.ms_is_wrapped */ + 1 /* effectiveExchKeyType */ + 4 /* msWrapMech */ + 2 /* master_secret.length */ + ms_item.len /* master_secret */ + 1 /* client_auth_type */ + cert_length /* cert */ + 1 /* server name type */ + srvNameLen /* name len + length field */ + sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint); padding_length = AES_BLOCK_SIZE - (ciphertext_length % AES_BLOCK_SIZE); ciphertext_length += padding_length; message_length = sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint) /* ticket_lifetime_hint */ + 2 /* length field for NewSessionTicket.ticket */ + SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN /* key_name */ + AES_BLOCK_SIZE /* iv */ + 2 /* length field for NewSessionTicket.ticket.encrypted_state */ + ciphertext_length /* encrypted_state */ + TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH; /* mac */ if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &plaintext_item, ciphertext_length) == NULL) goto loser; plaintext = plaintext_item; /* ticket_version */ rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_VERSION, sizeof(PRUint16)); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; /* ssl_version */ rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->version, sizeof(SSL3ProtocolVersion)); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; /* ciphersuite */ rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite, sizeof(ssl3CipherSuite)); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; /* compression */ rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->ssl3.hs.compression, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; /* cipher spec parameters */ rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.authAlgorithm, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.authKeyBits, 4); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.keaType, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.keaKeyBits, 4); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; /* master_secret */ rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ms_is_wrapped, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, effectiveExchKeyType, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, msWrapMech, 4); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ms_item.len, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext, ms_item.data, ms_item.len); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; /* client_identity */ if (ss->opt.requestCertificate && ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert) { rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, CLIENT_AUTH_CERTIFICATE, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len, 3); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext, ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.data, ss->sec.ci.sid->peerCert->derCert.len); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; } else { rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, 0, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; } /* timestamp */ now = ssl_Time(); rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, now, sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint)); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; if (srvNameLen) { /* Name Type (sni_host_name) */ rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, srvName->type, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; /* HostName (length and value) */ rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, srvName->len, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendToItem(&plaintext, srvName->data, srvName->len); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; } else { /* No Name */ rv = ssl3_AppendNumberToItem(&plaintext, (char)TLS_STE_NO_SERVER_NAME, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; } PORT_Assert(plaintext.len == padding_length); for (i = 0; i < padding_length; i++) plaintext.data[i] = (unsigned char)padding_length; if (SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &ciphertext, ciphertext_length) == NULL) { rv = SECFailure; goto loser; } /* Generate encrypted portion of ticket. */ #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { aes_ctx = (AESContext *)aes_ctx_buf; rv = AES_InitContext(aes_ctx, aes_key, aes_key_length, iv, NSS_AES_CBC, 1, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = AES_Encrypt(aes_ctx, ciphertext.data, &ciphertext.len, ciphertext.len, plaintext_item.data, plaintext_item.len); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; } else #endif { aes_ctx_pkcs11 = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipherMech, CKA_ENCRYPT, aes_key_pkcs11, &ivItem); if (!aes_ctx_pkcs11) goto loser; rv = PK11_CipherOp(aes_ctx_pkcs11, ciphertext.data, (int *)&ciphertext.len, ciphertext.len, plaintext_item.data, plaintext_item.len); PK11_Finalize(aes_ctx_pkcs11); PK11_DestroyContext(aes_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; } /* Convert ciphertext length to network order. */ length_buf[0] = (ciphertext.len >> 8) & 0xff; length_buf[1] = (ciphertext.len ) & 0xff; /* Compute MAC. */ #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { hmac_ctx = (HMACContext *)hmac_ctx_buf; hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA256); if (HMAC_Init(hmac_ctx, hashObj, mac_key, mac_key_length, PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess) goto loser; HMAC_Begin(hmac_ctx); HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN); HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, iv, sizeof(iv)); HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, (unsigned char *)length_buf, 2); HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, ciphertext.data, ciphertext.len); HMAC_Finish(hmac_ctx, computed_mac, &computed_mac_length, sizeof(computed_mac)); } else #endif { SECItem macParam; macParam.data = NULL; macParam.len = 0; hmac_ctx_pkcs11 = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(macMech, CKA_SIGN, mac_key_pkcs11, &macParam); if (!hmac_ctx_pkcs11) goto loser; rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hmac_ctx_pkcs11); rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN); rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, iv, sizeof(iv)); rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, (unsigned char *)length_buf, 2); rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, ciphertext.data, ciphertext.len); rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, computed_mac, &computed_mac_length, sizeof(computed_mac)); PK11_DestroyContext(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; } /* Serialize the handshake message. */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeHeader(ss, new_session_ticket, message_length); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint, sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint)); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, message_length - sizeof(ticket.ticket_lifetime_hint) - 2, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, iv, sizeof(iv)); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ciphertext.data, ciphertext.len, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, computed_mac, computed_mac_length); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; loser: if (plaintext_item.data) SECITEM_FreeItem(&plaintext_item, PR_FALSE); if (ciphertext.data) SECITEM_FreeItem(&ciphertext, PR_FALSE); return rv; } /* When a client receives a SessionTicket extension a NewSessionTicket * message is expected during the handshake. */ SECStatus ssl3_ClientHandleSessionTicketXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) { if (data->len != 0) return SECFailure; /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; return SECSuccess; } SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleSessionTicketXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) { SECStatus rv; SECItem *decrypted_state = NULL; SessionTicket *parsed_session_ticket = NULL; sslSessionID *sid = NULL; SSL3Statistics *ssl3stats; /* Ignore the SessionTicket extension if processing is disabled. */ if (!ss->opt.enableSessionTickets) return SECSuccess; /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; /* Parse the received ticket sent in by the client. We are * lenient about some parse errors, falling back to a fullshake * instead of terminating the current connection. */ if (data->len == 0) { ss->xtnData.emptySessionTicket = PR_TRUE; } else { int i; SECItem extension_data; EncryptedSessionTicket enc_session_ticket; unsigned char computed_mac[TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH]; unsigned int computed_mac_length; #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS const SECHashObject *hashObj; const unsigned char *aes_key; const unsigned char *mac_key; PRUint32 aes_key_length; PRUint32 mac_key_length; PRUint64 hmac_ctx_buf[MAX_MAC_CONTEXT_LLONGS]; HMACContext *hmac_ctx; PRUint64 aes_ctx_buf[MAX_CIPHER_CONTEXT_LLONGS]; AESContext *aes_ctx; #endif PK11SymKey *aes_key_pkcs11; PK11SymKey *mac_key_pkcs11; PK11Context *hmac_ctx_pkcs11; CK_MECHANISM_TYPE macMech = CKM_SHA256_HMAC; PK11Context *aes_ctx_pkcs11; CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipherMech = CKM_AES_CBC; unsigned char * padding; PRUint32 padding_length; unsigned char *buffer; unsigned int buffer_len; PRInt32 temp; SECItem cert_item; PRInt8 nameType = TLS_STE_NO_SERVER_NAME; /* Turn off stateless session resumption if the client sends a * SessionTicket extension, even if the extension turns out to be * malformed (ss->sec.ci.sid is non-NULL when doing session * renegotiation.) */ if (ss->sec.ci.sid != NULL) { if (ss->sec.uncache) ss->sec.uncache(ss->sec.ci.sid); ssl_FreeSID(ss->sec.ci.sid); ss->sec.ci.sid = NULL; } extension_data.data = data->data; /* Keep a copy for future use. */ extension_data.len = data->len; if (ssl3_ParseEncryptedSessionTicket(ss, data, &enc_session_ticket) != SECSuccess) return SECFailure; /* Get session ticket keys. */ #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeys(&aes_key, &aes_key_length, &mac_key, &mac_key_length); } else #endif { rv = ssl3_GetSessionTicketKeysPKCS11(ss, &aes_key_pkcs11, &mac_key_pkcs11); } if (rv != SECSuccess) { SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to get/generate session ticket keys.", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); goto loser; } /* If the ticket sent by the client was generated under a key different * from the one we have, bypass ticket processing. */ if (PORT_Memcmp(enc_session_ticket.key_name, key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN) != 0) { SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Session ticket key_name sent mismatch.", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); goto no_ticket; } /* Verify the MAC on the ticket. MAC verification may also * fail if the MAC key has been recently refreshed. */ #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { hmac_ctx = (HMACContext *)hmac_ctx_buf; hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(HASH_AlgSHA256); if (HMAC_Init(hmac_ctx, hashObj, mac_key, sizeof(session_ticket_mac_key), PR_FALSE) != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket; HMAC_Begin(hmac_ctx); HMAC_Update(hmac_ctx, extension_data.data, extension_data.len - TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH); if (HMAC_Finish(hmac_ctx, computed_mac, &computed_mac_length, sizeof(computed_mac)) != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket; } else #endif { SECItem macParam; macParam.data = NULL; macParam.len = 0; hmac_ctx_pkcs11 = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(macMech, CKA_SIGN, mac_key_pkcs11, &macParam); if (!hmac_ctx_pkcs11) { SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to create HMAC context: %d.", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd, PORT_GetError())); goto no_ticket; } else { SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Successfully created HMAC context.", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); } rv = PK11_DigestBegin(hmac_ctx_pkcs11); rv = PK11_DigestOp(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, extension_data.data, extension_data.len - TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH); if (rv != SECSuccess) { PK11_DestroyContext(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE); goto no_ticket; } rv = PK11_DigestFinal(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, computed_mac, &computed_mac_length, sizeof(computed_mac)); PK11_DestroyContext(hmac_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket; } if (NSS_SecureMemcmp(computed_mac, enc_session_ticket.mac, computed_mac_length) != 0) { SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Session ticket MAC mismatch.", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); goto no_ticket; } /* We ignore key_name for now. * This is ok as MAC verification succeeded. */ /* Decrypt the ticket. */ /* Plaintext is shorter than the ciphertext due to padding. */ decrypted_state = SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, NULL, enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.len); #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11) { aes_ctx = (AESContext *)aes_ctx_buf; rv = AES_InitContext(aes_ctx, aes_key, sizeof(session_ticket_enc_key), enc_session_ticket.iv, NSS_AES_CBC, 0,AES_BLOCK_SIZE); if (rv != SECSuccess) { SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to create AES context.", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); goto no_ticket; } rv = AES_Decrypt(aes_ctx, decrypted_state->data, &decrypted_state->len, decrypted_state->len, enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.data, enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.len); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket; } else #endif { SECItem ivItem; ivItem.data = enc_session_ticket.iv; ivItem.len = AES_BLOCK_SIZE; aes_ctx_pkcs11 = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipherMech, CKA_DECRYPT, aes_key_pkcs11, &ivItem); if (!aes_ctx_pkcs11) { SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Unable to create AES context.", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); goto no_ticket; } rv = PK11_CipherOp(aes_ctx_pkcs11, decrypted_state->data, (int *)&decrypted_state->len, decrypted_state->len, enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.data, enc_session_ticket.encrypted_state.len); PK11_Finalize(aes_ctx_pkcs11); PK11_DestroyContext(aes_ctx_pkcs11, PR_TRUE); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket; } /* Check padding. */ padding_length = (PRUint32)decrypted_state->data[decrypted_state->len - 1]; if (padding_length == 0 || padding_length > AES_BLOCK_SIZE) goto no_ticket; padding = &decrypted_state->data[decrypted_state->len - padding_length]; for (i = 0; i < padding_length; i++, padding++) { if (padding_length != (PRUint32)*padding) goto no_ticket; } /* Deserialize session state. */ buffer = decrypted_state->data; buffer_len = decrypted_state->len; parsed_session_ticket = PORT_ZAlloc(sizeof(SessionTicket)); if (parsed_session_ticket == NULL) { rv = SECFailure; goto loser; } /* Read ticket_version (which is ignored for now.) */ temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len); if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; parsed_session_ticket->ticket_version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp; /* Read SSLVersion. */ temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len); if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; parsed_session_ticket->ssl_version = (SSL3ProtocolVersion)temp; /* Read cipher_suite. */ temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len); if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; parsed_session_ticket->cipher_suite = (ssl3CipherSuite)temp; /* Read compression_method. */ temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len); if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; parsed_session_ticket->compression_method = (SSLCompressionMethod)temp; /* Read cipher spec parameters. */ temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len); if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; parsed_session_ticket->authAlgorithm = (SSLSignType)temp; temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len); if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; parsed_session_ticket->authKeyBits = (PRUint32)temp; temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len); if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; parsed_session_ticket->keaType = (SSLKEAType)temp; temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len); if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; parsed_session_ticket->keaKeyBits = (PRUint32)temp; /* Read wrapped master_secret. */ temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len); if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; parsed_session_ticket->ms_is_wrapped = (PRBool)temp; temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len); if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; parsed_session_ticket->exchKeyType = (SSL3KEAType)temp; temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len); if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; parsed_session_ticket->msWrapMech = (CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)temp; temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len); if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; parsed_session_ticket->ms_length = (PRUint16)temp; if (parsed_session_ticket->ms_length == 0 || /* sanity check MS. */ parsed_session_ticket->ms_length > sizeof(parsed_session_ticket->master_secret)) goto no_ticket; /* Allow for the wrapped master secret to be longer. */ if (buffer_len < parsed_session_ticket->ms_length) goto no_ticket; PORT_Memcpy(parsed_session_ticket->master_secret, buffer, parsed_session_ticket->ms_length); buffer += parsed_session_ticket->ms_length; buffer_len -= parsed_session_ticket->ms_length; /* Read client_identity */ temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len); if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; parsed_session_ticket->client_identity.client_auth_type = (ClientAuthenticationType)temp; switch(parsed_session_ticket->client_identity.client_auth_type) { case CLIENT_AUTH_ANONYMOUS: break; case CLIENT_AUTH_CERTIFICATE: rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &cert_item, 3, &buffer, &buffer_len); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket; rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert, &cert_item); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket; break; default: goto no_ticket; } /* Read timestamp. */ temp = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 4, &buffer, &buffer_len); if (temp < 0) goto no_ticket; parsed_session_ticket->timestamp = (PRUint32)temp; /* Read server name */ nameType = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 1, &buffer, &buffer_len); if (nameType != TLS_STE_NO_SERVER_NAME) { SECItem name_item; rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &name_item, 2, &buffer, &buffer_len); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket; rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &parsed_session_ticket->srvName, &name_item); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto no_ticket; parsed_session_ticket->srvName.type = nameType; } /* Done parsing. Check that all bytes have been consumed. */ if (buffer_len != padding_length) goto no_ticket; /* Use the ticket if it has not expired, otherwise free the allocated * memory since the ticket is of no use. */ if (parsed_session_ticket->timestamp != 0 && parsed_session_ticket->timestamp + TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_LIFETIME_HINT > ssl_Time()) { sid = ssl3_NewSessionID(ss, PR_TRUE); if (sid == NULL) { rv = SECFailure; goto loser; } /* Copy over parameters. */ sid->version = parsed_session_ticket->ssl_version; sid->u.ssl3.cipherSuite = parsed_session_ticket->cipher_suite; sid->u.ssl3.compression = parsed_session_ticket->compression_method; sid->authAlgorithm = parsed_session_ticket->authAlgorithm; sid->authKeyBits = parsed_session_ticket->authKeyBits; sid->keaType = parsed_session_ticket->keaType; sid->keaKeyBits = parsed_session_ticket->keaKeyBits; /* Copy master secret. */ #ifndef NO_PKCS11_BYPASS if (ss->opt.bypassPKCS11 && parsed_session_ticket->ms_is_wrapped) goto no_ticket; #endif if (parsed_session_ticket->ms_length > sizeof(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret)) goto no_ticket; PORT_Memcpy(sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret, parsed_session_ticket->master_secret, parsed_session_ticket->ms_length); sid->u.ssl3.keys.wrapped_master_secret_len = parsed_session_ticket->ms_length; sid->u.ssl3.exchKeyType = parsed_session_ticket->exchKeyType; sid->u.ssl3.masterWrapMech = parsed_session_ticket->msWrapMech; sid->u.ssl3.keys.msIsWrapped = parsed_session_ticket->ms_is_wrapped; sid->u.ssl3.masterValid = PR_TRUE; sid->u.ssl3.keys.resumable = PR_TRUE; /* Copy over client cert from session ticket if there is one. */ if (parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert.data != NULL) { if (sid->peerCert != NULL) CERT_DestroyCertificate(sid->peerCert); sid->peerCert = CERT_NewTempCertificate(ss->dbHandle, &parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert, NULL, PR_FALSE, PR_TRUE); if (sid->peerCert == NULL) { rv = SECFailure; goto loser; } } if (parsed_session_ticket->srvName.data != NULL) { sid->u.ssl3.srvName = parsed_session_ticket->srvName; } ss->statelessResume = PR_TRUE; ss->sec.ci.sid = sid; } } if (0) { no_ticket: SSL_DBG(("%d: SSL[%d]: Session ticket parsing failed.", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd)); ssl3stats = SSL_GetStatistics(); SSL_AtomicIncrementLong(& ssl3stats->hch_sid_ticket_parse_failures ); } rv = SECSuccess; loser: /* ss->sec.ci.sid == sid if it did NOT come here via goto statement * in that case do not free sid */ if (sid && (ss->sec.ci.sid != sid)) { ssl_FreeSID(sid); sid = NULL; } if (decrypted_state != NULL) { SECITEM_FreeItem(decrypted_state, PR_TRUE); decrypted_state = NULL; } if (parsed_session_ticket != NULL) { if (parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert.data) { SECITEM_FreeItem(&parsed_session_ticket->peer_cert, PR_FALSE); } PORT_ZFree(parsed_session_ticket, sizeof(SessionTicket)); } return rv; } /* * Read bytes. Using this function means the SECItem structure * cannot be freed. The caller is expected to call this function * on a shallow copy of the structure. */ static SECStatus ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(SECItem *item, unsigned char **buf, PRUint32 bytes) { if (bytes > item->len) return SECFailure; *buf = item->data; item->data += bytes; item->len -= bytes; return SECSuccess; } static SECStatus ssl3_ParseEncryptedSessionTicket(sslSocket *ss, SECItem *data, EncryptedSessionTicket *enc_session_ticket) { if (ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(data, &enc_session_ticket->key_name, SESS_TICKET_KEY_NAME_LEN) != SECSuccess) return SECFailure; if (ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(data, &enc_session_ticket->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != SECSuccess) return SECFailure; if (ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &enc_session_ticket->encrypted_state, 2, &data->data, &data->len) != SECSuccess) return SECFailure; if (ssl3_ConsumeFromItem(data, &enc_session_ticket->mac, TLS_EX_SESS_TICKET_MAC_LENGTH) != SECSuccess) return SECFailure; if (data->len != 0) /* Make sure that we have consumed all bytes. */ return SECFailure; return SECSuccess; } /* go through hello extensions in buffer "b". * For each one, find the extension handler in the table, and * if present, invoke that handler. * Servers ignore any extensions with unknown extension types. * Clients reject any extensions with unadvertised extension types. */ SECStatus ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions(sslSocket *ss, SSL3Opaque **b, PRUint32 *length) { const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler * handlers; if (ss->sec.isServer) { handlers = clientHelloHandlers; } else if (ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0) { handlers = serverHelloHandlersTLS; } else { handlers = serverHelloHandlersSSL3; } while (*length) { const ssl3HelloExtensionHandler * handler; SECStatus rv; PRInt32 extension_type; SECItem extension_data; /* Get the extension's type field */ extension_type = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, b, length); if (extension_type < 0) /* failure to decode extension_type */ return SECFailure; /* alert already sent */ /* get the data for this extension, so we can pass it or skip it. */ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &extension_data, 2, b, length); if (rv != SECSuccess) return rv; /* Check whether the server sent an extension which was not advertised * in the ClientHello. */ if (!ss->sec.isServer && !ssl3_ClientExtensionAdvertised(ss, extension_type)) return SECFailure; /* TODO: send unsupported_extension alert */ /* Check whether an extension has been sent multiple times. */ if (ssl3_ExtensionNegotiated(ss, extension_type)) return SECFailure; /* find extension_type in table of Hello Extension Handlers */ for (handler = handlers; handler->ex_type >= 0; handler++) { /* if found, call this handler */ if (handler->ex_type == extension_type) { rv = (*handler->ex_handler)(ss, (PRUint16)extension_type, &extension_data); /* Ignore this result */ /* Treat all bad extensions as unrecognized types. */ break; } } } return SECSuccess; } /* Add a callback function to the table of senders of server hello extensions. */ SECStatus ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, ssl3HelloExtensionSenderFunc cb) { int i; ssl3HelloExtensionSender *sender = &ss->xtnData.serverSenders[0]; for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS; ++i, ++sender) { if (!sender->ex_sender) { sender->ex_type = ex_type; sender->ex_sender = cb; return SECSuccess; } /* detect duplicate senders */ PORT_Assert(sender->ex_type != ex_type); if (sender->ex_type == ex_type) { /* duplicate */ break; } } PORT_Assert(i < SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS); /* table needs to grow */ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE); return SECFailure; } /* call each of the extension senders and return the accumulated length */ PRInt32 ssl3_CallHelloExtensionSenders(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes, const ssl3HelloExtensionSender *sender) { PRInt32 total_exten_len = 0; int i; if (!sender) { sender = ss->version > SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_3_0 ? &clientHelloSendersTLS[0] : &clientHelloSendersSSL3[0]; } for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_EXTENSIONS; ++i, ++sender) { if (sender->ex_sender) { PRInt32 extLen = (*sender->ex_sender)(ss, append, maxBytes); if (extLen < 0) return -1; maxBytes -= extLen; total_exten_len += extLen; } } return total_exten_len; } /* Extension format: * Extension number: 2 bytes * Extension length: 2 bytes * Verify Data Length: 1 byte * Verify Data (TLS): 12 bytes (client) or 24 bytes (server) * Verify Data (SSL): 36 bytes (client) or 72 bytes (server) */ static PRInt32 ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn( sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes) { PRInt32 len, needed; /* In draft-ietf-tls-renegotiation-03, it is NOT RECOMMENDED to send * both the SCSV and the empty RI, so when we send SCSV in * the initial handshake, we don't also send RI. */ if (!ss || ss->ssl3.hs.sendingSCSV) return 0; len = !ss->firstHsDone ? 0 : (ss->sec.isServer ? ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes * 2 : ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes); needed = 5 + len; if (append && maxBytes >= needed) { SECStatus rv; /* extension_type */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; /* length of extension_data */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, len + 1, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; /* verify_Data from previous Finished message(s) */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.data, len, 1); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; if (!ss->sec.isServer) { TLSExtensionData *xtnData = &ss->xtnData; xtnData->advertised[xtnData->numAdvertised++] = ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn; } } return needed; } static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleStatusRequestXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) { SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; /* remember that we got this extension. */ ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer); /* prepare to send back the appropriate response */ rv = ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, ex_type, ssl3_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn); return rv; } /* This function runs in both the client and server. */ static SECStatus ssl3_HandleRenegotiationInfoXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) { SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; PRUint32 len = 0; if (ss->firstHsDone) { len = ss->sec.isServer ? ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes : ss->ssl3.hs.finishedBytes * 2; } if (data->len != 1 + len || data->data[0] != len || (len && NSS_SecureMemcmp(ss->ssl3.hs.finishedMsgs.data, data->data + 1, len))) { /* Can we do this here? Or, must we arrange for the caller to do it? */ (void)SSL3_SendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure); PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_BAD_HANDSHAKE_HASH_VALUE); return SECFailure; } /* remember that we got this extension and it was correct. */ ss->peerRequestedProtection = 1; ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; if (ss->sec.isServer) { /* prepare to send back the appropriate response */ rv = ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, ex_type, ssl3_SendRenegotiationInfoXtn); } return rv; } static PRInt32 ssl3_SendUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket *ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes) { PRUint32 ext_data_len; PRInt16 i; SECStatus rv; if (!ss) return 0; if (!ss->sec.isServer) { /* Client side */ if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || !ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount) return 0; /* Not relevant */ ext_data_len = 2 + 2 * ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount + 1; if (append && maxBytes >= 4 + ext_data_len) { /* Extension type */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_use_srtp_xtn, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; /* Length of extension data */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ext_data_len, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; /* Length of the SRTP cipher list */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 2 * ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; /* The SRTP ciphers */ for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) { rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i], 2); } /* Empty MKI value */ ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, NULL, 0, 1); ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] = ssl_use_srtp_xtn; } return 4 + ext_data_len; } /* Server side */ if (append && maxBytes >= 9) { /* Extension type */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_use_srtp_xtn, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; /* Length of extension data */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 5, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; /* Length of the SRTP cipher list */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, 2, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; /* The selected cipher */ rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherSuite, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) return -1; /* Empty MKI value */ ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, NULL, 0, 1); } return 9; } static SECStatus ssl3_HandleUseSRTPXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) { SECStatus rv; SECItem ciphers = {siBuffer, NULL, 0}; PRUint16 i; unsigned int j; PRUint16 cipher = 0; PRBool found = PR_FALSE; SECItem litem; if (!ss->sec.isServer) { /* Client side */ if (!data->data || !data->len) { /* malformed */ return SECFailure; } /* Get the cipher list */ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ciphers, 2, &data->data, &data->len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return SECFailure; } /* Now check that the number of ciphers listed is 1 (len = 2) */ if (ciphers.len != 2) { return SECFailure; } /* Get the selected cipher */ cipher = (ciphers.data[0] << 8) | ciphers.data[1]; /* Now check that this is one of the ciphers we offered */ for (i = 0; i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) { if (cipher == ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i]) { found = PR_TRUE; break; } } if (!found) { return SECFailure; } /* Get the srtp_mki value */ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &litem, 1, &data->data, &data->len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return SECFailure; } /* We didn't offer an MKI, so this must be 0 length */ /* XXX RFC 5764 Section 4.1.3 says: * If the client detects a nonzero-length MKI in the server's * response that is different than the one the client offered, * then the client MUST abort the handshake and SHOULD send an * invalid_parameter alert. * * Due to a limitation of the ssl3_HandleHelloExtensions function, * returning SECFailure here won't abort the handshake. It will * merely cause the use_srtp extension to be not negotiated. We * should fix this. See NSS bug 753136. */ if (litem.len != 0) { return SECFailure; } if (data->len != 0) { /* malformed */ return SECFailure; } /* OK, this looks fine. */ ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ssl_use_srtp_xtn; ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherSuite = cipher; return SECSuccess; } /* Server side */ if (!IS_DTLS(ss) || !ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount) { /* Ignore the extension if we aren't doing DTLS or no DTLS-SRTP * preferences have been set. */ return SECSuccess; } if (!data->data || data->len < 5) { /* malformed */ return SECFailure; } /* Get the cipher list */ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &ciphers, 2, &data->data, &data->len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return SECFailure; } /* Check that the list is even length */ if (ciphers.len % 2) { return SECFailure; } /* Walk through the offered list and pick the most preferred of our * ciphers, if any */ for (i = 0; !found && i < ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherCount; i++) { for (j = 0; j + 1 < ciphers.len; j += 2) { cipher = (ciphers.data[j] << 8) | ciphers.data[j + 1]; if (cipher == ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCiphers[i]) { found = PR_TRUE; break; } } } /* Get the srtp_mki value */ rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &litem, 1, &data->data, &data->len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return SECFailure; } if (data->len != 0) { return SECFailure; /* Malformed */ } /* Now figure out what to do */ if (!found) { /* No matching ciphers */ return SECSuccess; } /* OK, we have a valid cipher and we've selected it */ ss->ssl3.dtlsSRTPCipherSuite = cipher; ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ssl_use_srtp_xtn; return ssl3_RegisterServerHelloExtensionSender(ss, ssl_use_srtp_xtn, ssl3_SendUseSRTPXtn); } /* ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn handles the signature_algorithms extension * from a client. * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ static SECStatus ssl3_ServerHandleSigAlgsXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRUint16 ex_type, SECItem *data) { SECStatus rv; SECItem algorithms; const unsigned char *b; unsigned int numAlgorithms, i; /* Ignore this extension if we aren't doing TLS 1.2 or greater. */ if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { return SECSuccess; } /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */ ss->xtnData.negotiated[ss->xtnData.numNegotiated++] = ex_type; rv = ssl3_ConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &algorithms, 2, &data->data, &data->len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return SECFailure; } /* Trailing data, empty value, or odd-length value is invalid. */ if (data->len != 0 || algorithms.len == 0 || (algorithms.len & 1) != 0) { PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO); return SECFailure; } numAlgorithms = algorithms.len/2; /* We don't care to process excessive numbers of algorithms. */ if (numAlgorithms > 512) { numAlgorithms = 512; } ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash = PORT_NewArray(SSL3SignatureAndHashAlgorithm, numAlgorithms); if (!ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash) { return SECFailure; } ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash = 0; b = algorithms.data; for (i = 0; i < numAlgorithms; i++) { unsigned char tls_hash = *(b++); unsigned char tls_sig = *(b++); SECOidTag hash = ssl3_TLSHashAlgorithmToOID(tls_hash); if (hash == SEC_OID_UNKNOWN) { /* We ignore formats that we don't understand. */ continue; } /* tls_sig support will be checked later in * ssl3_PickSignatureHashAlgorithm. */ ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash[i].hashAlg = hash; ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash[i].sigAlg = tls_sig; ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash++; } if (!ss->ssl3.hs.numClientSigAndHash) { /* We didn't understand any of the client's requested signature * formats. We'll use the defaults. */ PORT_Free(ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash); ss->ssl3.hs.clientSigAndHash = NULL; } return SECSuccess; } /* ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn sends the signature_algorithm extension for TLS * 1.2 ClientHellos. */ static PRInt32 ssl3_ClientSendSigAlgsXtn(sslSocket * ss, PRBool append, PRUint32 maxBytes) { static const unsigned char signatureAlgorithms[] = { /* This block is the contents of our signature_algorithms extension, in * wire format. See * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1 */ tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_rsa, tls_hash_sha384, tls_sig_rsa, tls_hash_sha1, tls_sig_rsa, #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_ecdsa, tls_hash_sha384, tls_sig_ecdsa, tls_hash_sha1, tls_sig_ecdsa, #endif tls_hash_sha256, tls_sig_dsa, tls_hash_sha1, tls_sig_dsa, }; PRInt32 extension_length; if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) { return 0; } extension_length = 2 /* extension type */ + 2 /* extension length */ + 2 /* supported_signature_algorithms length */ + sizeof(signatureAlgorithms); if (append && maxBytes >= extension_length) { SECStatus rv; rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, extension_length - 4, 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; rv = ssl3_AppendHandshakeVariable(ss, signatureAlgorithms, sizeof(signatureAlgorithms), 2); if (rv != SECSuccess) goto loser; ss->xtnData.advertised[ss->xtnData.numAdvertised++] = ssl_signature_algorithms_xtn; } else if (maxBytes < extension_length) { PORT_Assert(0); return 0; } return extension_length; loser: return -1; } unsigned int ssl3_CalculatePaddingExtensionLength(unsigned int clientHelloLength) { unsigned int recordLength = 1 /* handshake message type */ + 3 /* handshake message length */ + clientHelloLength; unsigned int extensionLength; if (recordLength < 256 || recordLength >= 512) { return 0; } extensionLength = 512 - recordLength; /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. */ if (extensionLength < 4) { extensionLength = 4; } return extensionLength; } /* ssl3_AppendPaddingExtension possibly adds an extension which ensures that a * ClientHello record is either < 256 bytes or is >= 512 bytes. This ensures * that we don't trigger bugs in F5 products. */ PRInt32 ssl3_AppendPaddingExtension(sslSocket *ss, unsigned int extensionLen, PRUint32 maxBytes) { unsigned int paddingLen = extensionLen - 4; static unsigned char padding[256]; if (extensionLen == 0) { return 0; } if (extensionLen < 4 || extensionLen > maxBytes || paddingLen > sizeof(padding)) { PORT_Assert(0); return -1; } if (SECSuccess != ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, ssl_padding_xtn, 2)) return -1; if (SECSuccess != ssl3_AppendHandshakeNumber(ss, paddingLen, 2)) return -1; if (SECSuccess != ssl3_AppendHandshake(ss, padding, paddingLen)) return -1; return extensionLen; }