/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ /* * This file implements PKCS 11 on top of our existing security modules * * For more information about PKCS 11 See PKCS 11 Token Inteface Standard. * This implementation has two slots: * slot 1 is our generic crypto support. It does not require login. * It supports Public Key ops, and all they bulk ciphers and hashes. * It can also support Private Key ops for imported Private keys. It does * not have any token storage. * slot 2 is our private key support. It requires a login before use. It * can store Private Keys and Certs as token objects. Currently only private * keys and their associated Certificates are saved on the token. * * In this implementation, session objects are only visible to the session * that created or generated them. */ #include "seccomon.h" #include "secitem.h" #include "secport.h" #include "blapi.h" #include "pkcs11.h" #include "pkcs11i.h" #include "pkcs1sig.h" #include "lowkeyi.h" #include "secder.h" #include "secdig.h" #include "lowpbe.h" /* We do PBE below */ #include "pkcs11t.h" #include "secoid.h" #include "alghmac.h" #include "softoken.h" #include "secasn1.h" #include "secerr.h" #include "prprf.h" #define __PASTE(x,y) x##y /* * we renamed all our internal functions, get the correct * definitions for them... */ #undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO #undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST #define CK_EXTERN extern #define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(func) \ CK_RV __PASTE(NS,func) #define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1 #include "pkcs11f.h" typedef struct { PRUint8 client_version[2]; PRUint8 random[46]; } SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret; static void sftk_Null(void *data, PRBool freeit) { return; } #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC #ifdef EC_DEBUG #define SEC_PRINT(str1, str2, num, sitem) \ printf("pkcs11c.c:%s:%s (keytype=%d) [len=%d]\n", \ str1, str2, num, sitem->len); \ for (i = 0; i < sitem->len; i++) { \ printf("%02x:", sitem->data[i]); \ } \ printf("\n") #else #undef EC_DEBUG #define SEC_PRINT(a, b, c, d) #endif #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ /* * free routines.... Free local type allocated data, and convert * other free routines to the destroy signature. */ static void sftk_FreePrivKey(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, PRBool freeit) { nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(key); } static void sftk_Space(void *data, PRBool freeit) { PORT_Free(data); } /* * map all the SEC_ERROR_xxx error codes that may be returned by freebl * functions to CKR_xxx. return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR by default for backward * compatibility. */ static CK_RV sftk_MapCryptError(int error) { switch (error) { case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS: case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA: /* MP_RANGE gets mapped to this */ return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; case SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN: return CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE; case SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN: return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE: return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY: return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE: return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY: return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; case SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY: /* an EC public key that fails validation */ return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; /* the closest error code */ case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM: return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; /* EC functions set this error if NSS_DISABLE_ECC is defined */ case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG: return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE: return CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID; /* key pair generation failed after max number of attempts */ case SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM: return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; } return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; } /* used by Decrypt and UnwrapKey (indirectly) */ static CK_RV sftk_MapDecryptError(int error) { switch (error) { case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA: return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID; default: return sftk_MapCryptError(error); } } /* * return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID instead of CKR_DEVICE_ERROR by default for * backward compatibilty. */ static CK_RV sftk_MapVerifyError(int error) { CK_RV crv = sftk_MapCryptError(error); if (crv == CKR_DEVICE_ERROR) crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; return crv; } /* * turn a CDMF key into a des key. CDMF is an old IBM scheme to export DES by * Deprecating a full des key to 40 bit key strenth. */ static CK_RV sftk_cdmf2des(unsigned char *cdmfkey, unsigned char *deskey) { unsigned char key1[8] = { 0xc4, 0x08, 0xb0, 0x54, 0x0b, 0xa1, 0xe0, 0xae }; unsigned char key2[8] = { 0xef, 0x2c, 0x04, 0x1c, 0xe6, 0x38, 0x2f, 0xe6 }; unsigned char enc_src[8]; unsigned char enc_dest[8]; unsigned int leng,i; DESContext *descx; SECStatus rv; /* zero the parity bits */ for (i=0; i < 8; i++) { enc_src[i] = cdmfkey[i] & 0xfe; } /* encrypt with key 1 */ descx = DES_CreateContext(key1, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE); if (descx == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, enc_dest, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8); DES_DestroyContext(descx,PR_TRUE); if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); /* xor source with des, zero the parity bits and deprecate the key*/ for (i=0; i < 8; i++) { if (i & 1) { enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0xfe; } else { enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0x0e; } } /* encrypt with key 2 */ descx = DES_CreateContext(key2, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE); if (descx == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, deskey, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8); DES_DestroyContext(descx,PR_TRUE); if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); /* set the corret parity on our new des key */ sftk_FormatDESKey(deskey, 8); return CKR_OK; } /* NSC_DestroyObject destroys an object. */ CK_RV NSC_DestroyObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject) { SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession); SFTKSession *session; SFTKObject *object; SFTKFreeStatus status; CHECK_FORK(); if (slot == NULL) { return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; } /* * This whole block just makes sure we really can destroy the * requested object. */ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) { return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; } object = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hObject,session); if (object == NULL) { sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID; } /* don't destroy a private object if we aren't logged in */ if ((!slot->isLoggedIn) && (slot->needLogin) && (sftk_isTrue(object,CKA_PRIVATE))) { sftk_FreeSession(session); sftk_FreeObject(object); return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN; } /* don't destroy a token object if we aren't in a rw session */ if (((session->info.flags & CKF_RW_SESSION) == 0) && (sftk_isTrue(object,CKA_TOKEN))) { sftk_FreeSession(session); sftk_FreeObject(object); return CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY; } sftk_DeleteObject(session,object); sftk_FreeSession(session); /* * get some indication if the object is destroyed. Note: this is not * 100%. Someone may have an object reference outstanding (though that * should not be the case by here. Also note that the object is "half" * destroyed. Our internal representation is destroyed, but it may still * be in the data base. */ status = sftk_FreeObject(object); return (status != SFTK_DestroyFailure) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; } /* ************** Crypto Functions: Utilities ************************ */ /* * Utility function for converting PSS/OAEP parameter types into * HASH_HashTypes. Note: Only SHA family functions are defined in RFC 3447. */ static HASH_HashType GetHashTypeFromMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech) { switch (mech) { case CKM_SHA_1: case CKG_MGF1_SHA1: return HASH_AlgSHA1; case CKM_SHA224: case CKG_MGF1_SHA224: return HASH_AlgSHA224; case CKM_SHA256: case CKG_MGF1_SHA256: return HASH_AlgSHA256; case CKM_SHA384: case CKG_MGF1_SHA384: return HASH_AlgSHA384; case CKM_SHA512: case CKG_MGF1_SHA512: return HASH_AlgSHA512; default: return HASH_AlgNULL; } } /* * Returns true if "params" contains a valid set of PSS parameters */ static PRBool sftk_ValidatePssParams(const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params) { if (!params) { return PR_FALSE; } if (GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL || GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) { return PR_FALSE; } return PR_TRUE; } /* * Returns true if "params" contains a valid set of OAEP parameters */ static PRBool sftk_ValidateOaepParams(const CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS *params) { if (!params) { return PR_FALSE; } /* The requirements of ulSourceLen/pSourceData come from PKCS #11, which * state: * If the parameter is empty, pSourceData must be NULL and * ulSourceDataLen must be zero. */ if (params->source != CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED || (GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL) || (GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) || (params->ulSourceDataLen == 0 && params->pSourceData != NULL) || (params->ulSourceDataLen != 0 && params->pSourceData == NULL)) { return PR_FALSE; } return PR_TRUE; } /* * return a context based on the SFTKContext type. */ SFTKSessionContext * sftk_ReturnContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type) { switch (type) { case SFTK_ENCRYPT: case SFTK_DECRYPT: return session->enc_context; case SFTK_HASH: return session->hash_context; case SFTK_SIGN: case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER: case SFTK_VERIFY: case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER: return session->hash_context; } return NULL; } /* * change a context based on the SFTKContext type. */ void sftk_SetContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type, SFTKSessionContext *context) { switch (type) { case SFTK_ENCRYPT: case SFTK_DECRYPT: session->enc_context = context; break; case SFTK_HASH: session->hash_context = context; break; case SFTK_SIGN: case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER: case SFTK_VERIFY: case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER: session->hash_context = context; break; } return; } /* * code to grab the context. Needed by every C_XXXUpdate, C_XXXFinal, * and C_XXX function. The function takes a session handle, the context type, * and wether or not the session needs to be multipart. It returns the context, * and optionally returns the session pointer (if sessionPtr != NULL) if session * pointer is returned, the caller is responsible for freeing it. */ static CK_RV sftk_GetContext(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle,SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr, SFTKContextType type, PRBool needMulti, SFTKSession **sessionPtr) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(handle); if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session,type); /* make sure the context is valid */ if((context==NULL)||(context->type!=type)||(needMulti&&!(context->multi))){ sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED; } *contextPtr = context; if (sessionPtr != NULL) { *sessionPtr = session; } else { sftk_FreeSession(session); } return CKR_OK; } /** Terminate operation (in the PKCS#11 spec sense). * Intuitive name for FreeContext/SetNullContext pair. */ static void sftk_TerminateOp( SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType ctype, SFTKSessionContext *context ) { sftk_FreeContext( context ); sftk_SetContextByType( session, ctype, NULL ); } /* ************** Crypto Functions: Encrypt ************************ */ /* * All the NSC_InitXXX functions have a set of common checks and processing they * all need to do at the beginning. This is done here. */ static CK_RV sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session,SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr, SFTKContextType ctype,SFTKObject **keyPtr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_KEY_TYPE *keyTypePtr, CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubKeyType, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation) { SFTKObject *key = NULL; SFTKAttribute *att; SFTKSessionContext *context; /* We can only init if there is not current context active */ if (sftk_ReturnContextByType(session,ctype) != NULL) { return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE; } /* find the key */ if (keyPtr) { key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session); if (key == NULL) { return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; } /* make sure it's a valid key for this operation */ if (((key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) && (key->objclass != pubKeyType)) || !sftk_isTrue(key,operation)) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; } /* get the key type */ att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE); if (att == NULL) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; } PORT_Assert(att->attrib.ulValueLen == sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)) { sftk_FreeAttribute(att); sftk_FreeObject(key); return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; } PORT_Memcpy(keyTypePtr, att->attrib.pValue, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); sftk_FreeAttribute(att); *keyPtr = key; } /* allocate the context structure */ context = (SFTKSessionContext *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSessionContext)); if (context == NULL) { if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key); return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } context->type = ctype; context->multi = PR_TRUE; context->rsa = PR_FALSE; context->cipherInfo = NULL; context->hashInfo = NULL; context->doPad = PR_FALSE; context->padDataLength = 0; context->key = key; context->blockSize = 0; context->maxLen = 0; *contextPtr = context; return CKR_OK; } static int sftk_aes_mode(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism) { switch (mechanism) { case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD: case CKM_AES_CBC: return NSS_AES_CBC; case CKM_AES_ECB: return NSS_AES; case CKM_AES_CTS: return NSS_AES_CTS; case CKM_AES_CTR: return NSS_AES_CTR; case CKM_AES_GCM: return NSS_AES_GCM; } return -1; } static SECStatus sftk_RSAEncryptRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen) { SECStatus rv = SECFailure; PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey); if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); return SECFailure; } rv = RSA_EncryptRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen); if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; } return rv; } static SECStatus sftk_RSADecryptRaw(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen) { SECStatus rv = SECFailure; PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey); if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); return SECFailure; } rv = RSA_DecryptRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen); if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; } return rv; } static SECStatus sftk_RSAEncrypt(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen) { SECStatus rv = SECFailure; PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey); if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); return SECFailure; } rv = RSA_EncryptBlock(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen); if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; } return rv; } static SECStatus sftk_RSADecrypt(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen) { SECStatus rv = SECFailure; PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey); if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); return SECFailure; } rv = RSA_DecryptBlock(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen); if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; } return rv; } static SECStatus sftk_RSAEncryptOAEP(SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo *info, unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen) { HASH_HashType hashAlg; HASH_HashType maskHashAlg; PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey); if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); return SECFailure; } hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->hashAlg); maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->mgf); return RSA_EncryptOAEP(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg, (const unsigned char*)info->params->pSourceData, info->params->ulSourceDataLen, NULL, 0, output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen); } static SECStatus sftk_RSADecryptOAEP(SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo *info, unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen) { SECStatus rv = SECFailure; HASH_HashType hashAlg; HASH_HashType maskHashAlg; PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey); if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); return SECFailure; } hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->hashAlg); maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->mgf); rv = RSA_DecryptOAEP(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg, (const unsigned char*)info->params->pSourceData, info->params->ulSourceDataLen, output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen); if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; } return rv; } /** NSC_CryptInit initializes an encryption/Decryption operation. * * Always called by NSC_EncryptInit, NSC_DecryptInit, NSC_WrapKey,NSC_UnwrapKey. * Called by NSC_SignInit, NSC_VerifyInit (via sftk_InitCBCMac) only for block * ciphers MAC'ing. */ static CK_RV sftk_CryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE mechUsage, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage, SFTKContextType contextType, PRBool isEncrypt) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKObject *key; SFTKSessionContext *context; SFTKAttribute *att; CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *rc2_param; #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *rc5_param; SECItem rc5Key; #endif CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; unsigned effectiveKeyLength; unsigned char newdeskey[24]; PRBool useNewKey=PR_FALSE; int t; crv = sftk_MechAllowsOperation(pMechanism->mechanism, mechUsage ); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,contextType,&key,hKey,&key_type, isEncrypt ?CKO_PUBLIC_KEY:CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, keyUsage); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } context->doPad = PR_FALSE; switch(pMechanism->mechanism) { case CKM_RSA_PKCS: case CKM_RSA_X_509: if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } context->multi = PR_FALSE; context->rsa = PR_TRUE; if (isEncrypt) { NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); if (pubKey == NULL) { crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; break; } context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(pubKey); context->cipherInfo = (void *)pubKey; context->update = (SFTKCipher) (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509 ? sftk_RSAEncryptRaw : sftk_RSAEncrypt); } else { NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); if (privKey == NULL) { crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; break; } context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey); context->cipherInfo = (void *)privKey; context->update = (SFTKCipher) (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509 ? sftk_RSADecryptRaw : sftk_RSADecrypt); } context->destroy = sftk_Null; break; case CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP: if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS) || !sftk_ValidateOaepParams((CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS*)pMechanism->pParameter)) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } context->multi = PR_FALSE; context->rsa = PR_TRUE; if (isEncrypt) { SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo *info = PORT_New(SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo); if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } info->params = pMechanism->pParameter; info->key = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv); if (info->key == NULL) { PORT_Free(info); crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; break; } context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSAEncryptOAEP; context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(info->key); context->cipherInfo = info; } else { SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo *info = PORT_New(SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo); if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } info->params = pMechanism->pParameter; info->key = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv); if (info->key == NULL) { PORT_Free(info); crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; break; } context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSADecryptOAEP; context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(info->key); context->cipherInfo = info; } context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space; break; case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD: context->doPad = PR_TRUE; /* fall thru */ case CKM_RC2_ECB: case CKM_RC2_CBC: context->blockSize = 8; if (key_type != CKK_RC2) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); if (att == NULL) { crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; break; } rc2_param = (CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; effectiveKeyLength = (rc2_param->ulEffectiveBits+7)/8; context->cipherInfo = RC2_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen, rc2_param->iv, pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC2_ECB ? NSS_RC2 : NSS_RC2_CBC,effectiveKeyLength); sftk_FreeAttribute(att); if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC2_Encrypt : RC2_Decrypt); context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC2_DestroyContext; break; #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 case CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD: context->doPad = PR_TRUE; /* fall thru */ case CKM_RC5_ECB: case CKM_RC5_CBC: if (key_type != CKK_RC5) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); if (att == NULL) { crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; break; } rc5_param = (CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; context->blockSize = rc5_param->ulWordsize*2; rc5Key.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue; rc5Key.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen; context->cipherInfo = RC5_CreateContext(&rc5Key,rc5_param->ulRounds, rc5_param->ulWordsize,rc5_param->pIv, pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC5_ECB ? NSS_RC5 : NSS_RC5_CBC); sftk_FreeAttribute(att); if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC5_Encrypt : RC5_Decrypt); context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC5_DestroyContext; break; #endif case CKM_RC4: if (key_type != CKK_RC4) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); if (att == NULL) { crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; break; } context->cipherInfo = RC4_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen); sftk_FreeAttribute(att); if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; /* WRONG !!! */ break; } context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC4_Encrypt : RC4_Decrypt); context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC4_DestroyContext; break; case CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD: context->doPad = PR_TRUE; /* fall thru */ case CKM_CDMF_ECB: case CKM_CDMF_CBC: if (key_type != CKK_CDMF) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } t = (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_CDMF_ECB) ? NSS_DES : NSS_DES_CBC; if (crv != CKR_OK) break; goto finish_des; case CKM_DES_ECB: if (key_type != CKK_DES) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } t = NSS_DES; goto finish_des; case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD: context->doPad = PR_TRUE; /* fall thru */ case CKM_DES_CBC: if (key_type != CKK_DES) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } t = NSS_DES_CBC; goto finish_des; case CKM_DES3_ECB: if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } t = NSS_DES_EDE3; goto finish_des; case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD: context->doPad = PR_TRUE; /* fall thru */ case CKM_DES3_CBC: if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } t = NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC; finish_des: context->blockSize = 8; att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); if (att == NULL) { crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; break; } if (key_type == CKK_DES2 && (t == NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC || t == NSS_DES_EDE3)) { /* extend DES2 key to DES3 key. */ memcpy(newdeskey, att->attrib.pValue, 16); memcpy(newdeskey + 16, newdeskey, 8); useNewKey=PR_TRUE; } else if (key_type == CKK_CDMF) { crv = sftk_cdmf2des((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,newdeskey); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeAttribute(att); break; } useNewKey=PR_TRUE; } context->cipherInfo = DES_CreateContext( useNewKey ? newdeskey : (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,t, isEncrypt); if (useNewKey) memset(newdeskey, 0, sizeof newdeskey); sftk_FreeAttribute(att); if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? DES_Encrypt : DES_Decrypt); context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) DES_DestroyContext; break; case CKM_SEED_CBC_PAD: context->doPad = PR_TRUE; /* fall thru */ case CKM_SEED_CBC: if (!pMechanism->pParameter || pMechanism->ulParameterLen != 16) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } /* fall thru */ case CKM_SEED_ECB: context->blockSize = 16; if (key_type != CKK_SEED) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); if (att == NULL) { crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; break; } context->cipherInfo = SEED_CreateContext( (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter, pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_SEED_ECB ? NSS_SEED : NSS_SEED_CBC, isEncrypt); sftk_FreeAttribute(att); if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? SEED_Encrypt : SEED_Decrypt); context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) SEED_DestroyContext; break; case CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD: context->doPad = PR_TRUE; /* fall thru */ case CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC: if (!pMechanism->pParameter || pMechanism->ulParameterLen != 16) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } /* fall thru */ case CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB: context->blockSize = 16; if (key_type != CKK_CAMELLIA) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); if (att == NULL) { crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; break; } context->cipherInfo = Camellia_CreateContext( (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter, pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB ? NSS_CAMELLIA : NSS_CAMELLIA_CBC, isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen); sftk_FreeAttribute(att); if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? Camellia_Encrypt : Camellia_Decrypt); context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) Camellia_DestroyContext; break; case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD: context->doPad = PR_TRUE; /* fall thru */ case CKM_AES_ECB: case CKM_AES_CBC: context->blockSize = 16; case CKM_AES_CTS: case CKM_AES_CTR: case CKM_AES_GCM: if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_GCM) { context->multi = PR_FALSE; } if (key_type != CKK_AES) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); if (att == NULL) { crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; break; } context->cipherInfo = AES_CreateContext( (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter, sftk_aes_mode(pMechanism->mechanism), isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen, 16); sftk_FreeAttribute(att); if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? AES_Encrypt : AES_Decrypt); context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) AES_DestroyContext; break; case CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD: context->doPad = PR_TRUE; /* fall thru */ case CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP: context->multi = PR_FALSE; context->blockSize = 8; if (key_type != CKK_AES) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); if (att == NULL) { crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; break; } context->cipherInfo = AESKeyWrap_CreateContext( (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, (unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter, isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen); sftk_FreeAttribute(att); if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? AESKeyWrap_Encrypt : AESKeyWrap_Decrypt); context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) AESKeyWrap_DestroyContext; break; default: crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeContext(context); sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } sftk_SetContextByType(session, contextType, context); sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OK; } /* NSC_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */ CK_RV NSC_EncryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) { CHECK_FORK(); return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_ENCRYPT, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE); } /* NSC_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption operation. */ CK_RV NSC_EncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen) { SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int outlen,i; unsigned int padoutlen = 0; unsigned int maxout = *pulEncryptedPartLen; CK_RV crv; SECStatus rv; CHECK_FORK(); /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_TRUE,NULL); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (!pEncryptedPart) { if (context->doPad) { CK_ULONG totalDataAvailable = ulPartLen + context->padDataLength; CK_ULONG blocksToSend = totalDataAvailable/context->blockSize; *pulEncryptedPartLen = blocksToSend * context->blockSize; return CKR_OK; } *pulEncryptedPartLen = ulPartLen; return CKR_OK; } /* do padding */ if (context->doPad) { /* deal with previous buffered data */ if (context->padDataLength != 0) { /* fill in the padded to a full block size */ for (i=context->padDataLength; (ulPartLen != 0) && i < context->blockSize; i++) { context->padBuf[i] = *pPart++; ulPartLen--; context->padDataLength++; } /* not enough data to encrypt yet? then return */ if (context->padDataLength != context->blockSize) { *pulEncryptedPartLen = 0; return CKR_OK; } /* encrypt the current padded data */ rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedPart, &padoutlen, context->blockSize, context->padBuf, context->blockSize); if (rv != SECSuccess) { return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); } pEncryptedPart += padoutlen; maxout -= padoutlen; } /* save the residual */ context->padDataLength = ulPartLen % context->blockSize; if (context->padDataLength) { PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf, &pPart[ulPartLen-context->padDataLength], context->padDataLength); ulPartLen -= context->padDataLength; } /* if we've exhausted our new buffer, we're done */ if (ulPartLen == 0) { *pulEncryptedPartLen = padoutlen; return CKR_OK; } } /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */ rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pEncryptedPart, &outlen, maxout, pPart, ulPartLen); *pulEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG) (outlen + padoutlen); return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); } /* NSC_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption operation. */ CK_RV NSC_EncryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int outlen,i; unsigned int maxout = *pulLastEncryptedPartLen; CK_RV crv; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; PRBool contextFinished = PR_TRUE; CHECK_FORK(); /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_TRUE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = 0; if (!pLastEncryptedPart) { /* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */ if (context->blockSize > 0 && context->doPad) { *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = context->blockSize; contextFinished = PR_FALSE; /* still have padding to go */ } goto finish; } /* do padding */ if (context->doPad) { unsigned char padbyte = (unsigned char) (context->blockSize - context->padDataLength); /* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/ for (i=context->padDataLength; i < context->blockSize; i++) { context->padBuf[i] = padbyte; } rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pLastEncryptedPart, &outlen, maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize); if (rv == SECSuccess) *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; } finish: if (contextFinished) sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, context ); sftk_FreeSession(session); return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); } /* NSC_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */ CK_RV NSC_Encrypt (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int outlen; unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulEncryptedDataLen; CK_RV crv; CK_RV crv2; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; SECItem pText; pText.type = siBuffer; pText.data = pData; pText.len = ulDataLen; CHECK_FORK(); /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (!pEncryptedData) { *pulEncryptedDataLen = context->rsa ? context->maxLen : ulDataLen + 2 * context->blockSize; goto finish; } if (context->doPad) { if (context->multi) { CK_ULONG finalLen; /* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final * code deal with it */ sftk_FreeSession(session); crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen, pEncryptedData, pulEncryptedDataLen); if (crv != CKR_OK) *pulEncryptedDataLen = 0; maxoutlen -= *pulEncryptedDataLen; pEncryptedData += *pulEncryptedDataLen; finalLen = maxoutlen; crv2 = NSC_EncryptFinal(hSession, pEncryptedData, &finalLen); if (crv2 == CKR_OK) *pulEncryptedDataLen += finalLen; return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv; } /* doPad without multi means that padding must be done on the first ** and only update. There will be no final. */ PORT_Assert(context->blockSize > 1); if (context->blockSize > 1) { CK_ULONG remainder = ulDataLen % context->blockSize; CK_ULONG padding = context->blockSize - remainder; pText.len += padding; pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len); if (pText.data) { memcpy(pText.data, pData, ulDataLen); memset(pText.data + ulDataLen, padding, padding); } else { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; goto fail; } } } /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size is big enough. */ rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedData, &outlen, maxoutlen, pText.data, pText.len); crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); *pulEncryptedDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; if (pText.data != pData) PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len); fail: sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, context ); finish: sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } /* ************** Crypto Functions: Decrypt ************************ */ /* NSC_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DecryptInit( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) { CHECK_FORK(); return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_DECRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT, SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE); } /* NSC_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DecryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen) { SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int padoutlen = 0; unsigned int outlen; unsigned int maxout = *pulPartLen; CK_RV crv; SECStatus rv; CHECK_FORK(); /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_TRUE,NULL); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; /* this can only happen on an NSS programming error */ PORT_Assert((context->padDataLength == 0) || context->padDataLength == context->blockSize); if (context->doPad) { /* Check the data length for block ciphers. If we are padding, * then we must be using a block cipher. In the non-padding case * the error will be returned by the underlying decryption * function when we do the actual decrypt. We need to do the * check here to avoid returning a negative length to the caller * or reading before the beginning of the pEncryptedPart buffer. */ if ((ulEncryptedPartLen == 0) || (ulEncryptedPartLen % context->blockSize) != 0) { return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE; } } if (!pPart) { if (context->doPad) { *pulPartLen = ulEncryptedPartLen + context->padDataLength - context->blockSize; return CKR_OK; } /* for stream ciphers there is are no constraints on ulEncryptedPartLen. * for block ciphers, it must be a multiple of blockSize. The error is * detected when this function is called again do decrypt the output. */ *pulPartLen = ulEncryptedPartLen; return CKR_OK; } if (context->doPad) { /* first decrypt our saved buffer */ if (context->padDataLength != 0) { rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, &padoutlen, maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize); if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError()); pPart += padoutlen; maxout -= padoutlen; } /* now save the final block for the next decrypt or the final */ PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf,&pEncryptedPart[ulEncryptedPartLen - context->blockSize], context->blockSize); context->padDataLength = context->blockSize; ulEncryptedPartLen -= context->padDataLength; } /* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */ rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pPart, &outlen, maxout, pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen); *pulPartLen = (CK_ULONG) (outlen + padoutlen); return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError()); } /* NSC_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DecryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int outlen; unsigned int maxout = *pulLastPartLen; CK_RV crv; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; CHECK_FORK(); /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_TRUE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; *pulLastPartLen = 0; if (!pLastPart) { /* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */ if (context->padDataLength > 0) { *pulLastPartLen = context->padDataLength; } goto finish; } if (context->doPad) { /* decrypt our saved buffer */ if (context->padDataLength != 0) { /* this assumes that pLastPart is big enough to hold the *whole* * buffer!!! */ rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pLastPart, &outlen, maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize); if (rv != SECSuccess) { crv = sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError()); } else { unsigned int padSize = (unsigned int) pLastPart[context->blockSize-1]; if ((padSize > context->blockSize) || (padSize == 0)) { crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID; } else { unsigned int i; unsigned int badPadding = 0; /* used as a boolean */ for (i = 0; i < padSize; i++) { badPadding |= (unsigned int) pLastPart[context->blockSize-1-i] ^ padSize; } if (badPadding) { crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID; } else { *pulLastPartLen = outlen - padSize; } } } } } sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_DECRYPT, context ); finish: sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } /* NSC_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */ CK_RV NSC_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int outlen; unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen; CK_RV crv; CK_RV crv2; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; CHECK_FORK(); /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_FALSE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (!pData) { *pulDataLen = ulEncryptedDataLen + context->blockSize; goto finish; } if (context->doPad && context->multi) { CK_ULONG finalLen; /* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final * code deal with it */ sftk_FreeSession(session); crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData,ulEncryptedDataLen, pData, pulDataLen); if (crv != CKR_OK) *pulDataLen = 0; maxoutlen -= *pulDataLen; pData += *pulDataLen; finalLen = maxoutlen; crv2 = NSC_DecryptFinal(hSession, pData, &finalLen); if (crv2 == CKR_OK) *pulDataLen += finalLen; return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv; } rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen, pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen); /* XXX need to do MUCH better error mapping than this. */ crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError()); if (rv == SECSuccess && context->doPad) { unsigned int padding = pData[outlen - 1]; if (padding > context->blockSize || !padding) { crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID; } else { unsigned int i; unsigned int badPadding = 0; /* used as a boolean */ for (i = 0; i < padding; i++) { badPadding |= (unsigned int) pData[outlen - 1 - i] ^ padding; } if (badPadding) { crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID; } else { outlen -= padding; } } } *pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_DECRYPT, context ); finish: sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } /* ************** Crypto Functions: Digest (HASH) ************************ */ /* NSC_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DigestInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; CHECK_FORK(); session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_HASH,NULL,0,NULL, 0, 0); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } #define INIT_MECH(mech,mmm) \ case mech: { \ mmm ## Context * mmm ## _ctx = mmm ## _NewContext(); \ context->cipherInfo = (void *)mmm ## _ctx; \ context->cipherInfoLen = mmm ## _FlattenSize(mmm ## _ctx); \ context->currentMech = mech; \ context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) mmm ## _Update; \ context->end = (SFTKEnd) mmm ## _End; \ context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) mmm ## _DestroyContext; \ context->maxLen = mmm ## _LENGTH; \ if (mmm ## _ctx) \ mmm ## _Begin(mmm ## _ctx); \ else \ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \ break; \ } switch(pMechanism->mechanism) { INIT_MECH(CKM_MD2, MD2) INIT_MECH(CKM_MD5, MD5) INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA_1, SHA1) INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA224, SHA224) INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA256, SHA256) INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA384, SHA384) INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA512, SHA512) default: crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeContext(context); sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_HASH, context); sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OK; } /* NSC_Digest digests data in a single part. */ CK_RV NSC_Digest(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int digestLen; unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen; CK_RV crv; CHECK_FORK(); /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_HASH,PR_FALSE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (pDigest == NULL) { *pulDigestLen = context->maxLen; goto finish; } /* do it: */ (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pData, ulDataLen); /* NOTE: this assumes buf size is bigenough for the algorithm */ (*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen,maxout); *pulDigestLen = digestLen; sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_HASH, context ); finish: sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OK; } /* NSC_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen) { SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_RV crv; CHECK_FORK(); /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_HASH,PR_TRUE,NULL); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; /* do it: */ (*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, ulPartLen); return CKR_OK; } /* NSC_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DigestFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen; unsigned int digestLen; CK_RV crv; CHECK_FORK(); /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (pDigest != NULL) { (*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen, maxout); *pulDigestLen = digestLen; sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_HASH, context ); } else { *pulDigestLen = context->maxLen; } sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OK; } /* * these helper functions are used by Generic Macing and Signing functions * that use hashes as part of their operations. */ #define DOSUB(mmm) \ static CK_RV \ sftk_doSub ## mmm(SFTKSessionContext *context) { \ mmm ## Context * mmm ## _ctx = mmm ## _NewContext(); \ context->hashInfo = (void *) mmm ## _ctx; \ context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) mmm ## _Update; \ context->end = (SFTKEnd) mmm ## _End; \ context->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy) mmm ## _DestroyContext; \ if (!context->hashInfo) { \ return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \ } \ mmm ## _Begin( mmm ## _ctx ); \ return CKR_OK; \ } DOSUB(MD2) DOSUB(MD5) DOSUB(SHA1) DOSUB(SHA224) DOSUB(SHA256) DOSUB(SHA384) DOSUB(SHA512) static SECStatus sftk_SignCopy( CK_ULONG *copyLen, void *out, unsigned int *outLength, unsigned int maxLength, const unsigned char *hashResult, unsigned int hashResultLength) { unsigned int toCopy = *copyLen; if (toCopy > maxLength) { toCopy = maxLength; } if (toCopy > hashResultLength) { toCopy = hashResultLength; } memcpy(out, hashResult, toCopy); if (outLength) { *outLength = toCopy; } return SECSuccess; } /* Verify is just a compare for HMAC */ static SECStatus sftk_HMACCmp(CK_ULONG *copyLen,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int sigLen, unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) { return (PORT_Memcmp(sig,hash,*copyLen) == 0) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure ; } /* * common HMAC initalization routine */ static CK_RV sftk_doHMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *context,HASH_HashType hash, SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size) { SFTKAttribute *keyval; HMACContext *HMACcontext; CK_ULONG *intpointer; const SECHashObject *hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hash); PRBool isFIPS = (key->slot->slotID == FIPS_SLOT_ID); /* required by FIPS 198 Section 4 */ if (isFIPS && (mac_size < 4 || mac_size < hashObj->length/2)) { return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); if (keyval == NULL) return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; HMACcontext = HMAC_Create(hashObj, (const unsigned char*)keyval->attrib.pValue, keyval->attrib.ulValueLen, isFIPS); context->hashInfo = HMACcontext; context->multi = PR_TRUE; sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval); if (context->hashInfo == NULL) { if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS) { return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; } return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) HMAC_Update; context->end = (SFTKEnd) HMAC_Finish; context->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy) HMAC_Destroy; intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG); if (intpointer == NULL) { return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } *intpointer = mac_size; context->cipherInfo = intpointer; context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space; context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SignCopy; context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_HMACCmp; context->maxLen = hashObj->length; HMAC_Begin(HMACcontext); return CKR_OK; } /* * SSL Macing support. SSL Macs are inited, then update with the base * hashing algorithm, then finalized in sign and verify */ /* * FROM SSL: * 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported. * We probably should have one copy of this table. We still need this table * in ssl to 'sign' the handshake hashes. */ static unsigned char ssl_pad_1 [60] = { 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36 }; static unsigned char ssl_pad_2 [60] = { 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c }; static SECStatus sftk_SSLMACSign(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) { unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; unsigned int out; info->begin(info->hashContext); info->update(info->hashContext,info->key,info->keySize); info->update(info->hashContext,ssl_pad_2,info->padSize); info->update(info->hashContext,hash,hashLen); info->end(info->hashContext,tmpBuf,&out,SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH); PORT_Memcpy(sig,tmpBuf,info->macSize); *sigLen = info->macSize; return SECSuccess; } static SECStatus sftk_SSLMACVerify(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int sigLen, unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) { unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; unsigned int out; info->begin(info->hashContext); info->update(info->hashContext,info->key,info->keySize); info->update(info->hashContext,ssl_pad_2,info->padSize); info->update(info->hashContext,hash,hashLen); info->end(info->hashContext,tmpBuf,&out,SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH); return (PORT_Memcmp(sig,tmpBuf,info->macSize) == 0) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure; } /* * common HMAC initalization routine */ static CK_RV sftk_doSSLMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *context,SECOidTag oid, SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size) { SFTKAttribute *keyval; SFTKBegin begin; int padSize; SFTKSSLMACInfo *sslmacinfo; CK_RV crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; if (oid == SEC_OID_SHA1) { crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; begin = (SFTKBegin) SHA1_Begin; padSize = 40; } else { crv = sftk_doSubMD5(context); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; begin = (SFTKBegin) MD5_Begin; padSize = 48; } context->multi = PR_TRUE; keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); if (keyval == NULL) return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo,keyval->attrib.pValue, keyval->attrib.ulValueLen); context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo,ssl_pad_1,padSize); sslmacinfo = (SFTKSSLMACInfo *) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSSLMACInfo)); if (sslmacinfo == NULL) { sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval); return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } sslmacinfo->macSize = mac_size; sslmacinfo->hashContext = context->hashInfo; PORT_Memcpy(sslmacinfo->key,keyval->attrib.pValue, keyval->attrib.ulValueLen); sslmacinfo->keySize = keyval->attrib.ulValueLen; sslmacinfo->begin = begin; sslmacinfo->end = context->end; sslmacinfo->update = context->hashUpdate; sslmacinfo->padSize = padSize; sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval); context->cipherInfo = (void *) sslmacinfo; context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space; context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SSLMACSign; context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_SSLMACVerify; context->maxLen = mac_size; return CKR_OK; } /* ************** Crypto Functions: Sign ************************ */ /** * Check if We're using CBCMacing and initialize the session context if we are. * @param contextType SFTK_SIGN or SFTK_VERIFY * @param keyUsage check whether key allows this usage */ static CK_RV sftk_InitCBCMac(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage, SFTKContextType contextType) { CK_MECHANISM cbc_mechanism; CK_ULONG mac_bytes = SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE; CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS rc2_params; #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS rc5_params; CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *rc5_mac; #endif unsigned char ivBlock[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE]; SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_RV crv; unsigned int blockSize; switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL: mac_bytes = ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength; /* fall through */ case CKM_RC2_MAC: /* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the * CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS */ rc2_params.ulEffectiveBits = ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter)->ulEffectiveBits; PORT_Memset(rc2_params.iv,0,sizeof(rc2_params.iv)); cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC2_CBC; cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc2_params; cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc2_params); blockSize = 8; break; #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 case CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL: mac_bytes = ((CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength; /* fall through */ case CKM_RC5_MAC: /* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the * CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS */ rc5_mac = (CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; rc5_params.ulWordsize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize; rc5_params.ulRounds = rc5_mac->ulRounds; rc5_params.pIv = ivBlock; if( (blockSize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize*2) > SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE ) return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; rc5_params.ulIvLen = blockSize; PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC5_CBC; cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc5_params; cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc5_params); break; #endif /* add cast and idea later */ case CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL: mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; /* fall through */ case CKM_DES_MAC: blockSize = 8; PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES_CBC; cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; break; case CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL: mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; /* fall through */ case CKM_DES3_MAC: blockSize = 8; PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES3_CBC; cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; break; case CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL: mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; /* fall through */ case CKM_CDMF_MAC: blockSize = 8; PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CDMF_CBC; cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; break; case CKM_SEED_MAC_GENERAL: mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; /* fall through */ case CKM_SEED_MAC: blockSize = 16; PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_SEED_CBC; cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; break; case CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL: mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; /* fall through */ case CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC: blockSize = 16; PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC; cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; break; case CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL: mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter; /* fall through */ case CKM_AES_MAC: blockSize = 16; PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize); cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_AES_CBC; cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock; cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize; break; default: return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED; } /* if MAC size is externally supplied, it should be checked. */ if (mac_bytes == SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE) mac_bytes = blockSize >> 1; else { if( mac_bytes > blockSize ) return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; } crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, &cbc_mechanism, hKey, CKA_ENCRYPT, /* CBC mech is able to ENCRYPT, not SIGN/VERIFY */ keyUsage, contextType, PR_TRUE ); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,contextType,PR_TRUE,NULL); /* this shouldn't happen! */ PORT_Assert(crv == CKR_OK); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; context->blockSize = blockSize; context->macSize = mac_bytes; return CKR_OK; } /* * encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing... */ static SECStatus sftk_RSAHashSign(SFTKHashSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) { PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey); if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); return SECFailure; } return RSA_HashSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, maxLen, hash, hashLen); } /* XXX Old template; want to expunge it eventually. */ static DERTemplate SECAlgorithmIDTemplate[] = { { DER_SEQUENCE, 0, NULL, sizeof(SECAlgorithmID) }, { DER_OBJECT_ID, offsetof(SECAlgorithmID,algorithm), }, { DER_OPTIONAL | DER_ANY, offsetof(SECAlgorithmID,parameters), }, { 0, } }; /* * XXX OLD Template. Once all uses have been switched over to new one, * remove this. */ static DERTemplate SGNDigestInfoTemplate[] = { { DER_SEQUENCE, 0, NULL, sizeof(SGNDigestInfo) }, { DER_INLINE, offsetof(SGNDigestInfo,digestAlgorithm), SECAlgorithmIDTemplate, }, { DER_OCTET_STRING, offsetof(SGNDigestInfo,digest), }, { 0, } }; /* * encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing... */ SECStatus RSA_HashSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) { SECStatus rv = SECFailure; SECItem digder; PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL; digder.data = NULL; arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); if (!arena) { goto loser; } /* Construct digest info */ di = SGN_CreateDigestInfo(hashOid, hash, hashLen); if (!di) { goto loser; } /* Der encode the digest as a DigestInfo */ rv = DER_Encode(arena, &digder, SGNDigestInfoTemplate, di); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; } /* ** Encrypt signature after constructing appropriate PKCS#1 signature ** block */ rv = RSA_Sign(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, maxLen, digder.data, digder.len); if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; } loser: SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di); if (arena != NULL) { PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); } return rv; } static SECStatus sftk_RSASign(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen) { SECStatus rv = SECFailure; PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey); if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); return SECFailure; } rv = RSA_Sign(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxOutputLen, input, inputLen); if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; } return rv; } static SECStatus sftk_RSASignRaw(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output, unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen) { SECStatus rv = SECFailure; PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey); if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); return SECFailure; } rv = RSA_SignRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxOutputLen, input, inputLen); if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; } return rv; } static SECStatus sftk_RSASignPSS(SFTKHashSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen, const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen) { SECStatus rv = SECFailure; HASH_HashType hashAlg; HASH_HashType maskHashAlg; CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params = (CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)info->params; PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey); if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); return SECFailure; } hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg); maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf); rv = RSA_SignPSS(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg, NULL, params->sLen, sig, sigLen, maxLen, hash, hashLen); if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; } return rv; } static SECStatus nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen, void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen) { SECItem signature, digest; NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx; signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf; signature.len = sigLen; digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf; digest.len = dataLen; return DSA_VerifyDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest); } static SECStatus nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen, void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen) { SECItem signature, digest; SECStatus rv; NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)ctx; signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf; signature.len = maxSigLen; digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf; digest.len = dataLen; rv = DSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest); if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; } *sigLen = signature.len; return rv; } #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC static SECStatus nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen, void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen) { SECItem signature, digest; NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx; signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf; signature.len = sigLen; digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf; digest.len = dataLen; return ECDSA_VerifyDigest(&(key->u.ec), &signature, &digest); } static SECStatus nsc_ECDSASignStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen, void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen) { SECItem signature, digest; SECStatus rv; NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)ctx; signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf; signature.len = maxSigLen; digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf; digest.len = dataLen; rv = ECDSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.ec), &signature, &digest); if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; } *sigLen = signature.len; return rv; } #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ /* NSC_SignInit setups up the signing operations. There are three basic * types of signing: * (1) the tradition single part, where "Raw RSA" or "Raw DSA" is applied * to data in a single Sign operation (which often looks a lot like an * encrypt, with data coming in and data going out). * (2) Hash based signing, where we continually hash the data, then apply * some sort of signature to the end. * (3) Block Encryption CBC MAC's, where the Data is encrypted with a key, * and only the final block is part of the mac. * * For case number 3, we initialize a context much like the Encryption Context * (in fact we share code). We detect case 3 in C_SignUpdate, C_Sign, and * C_Final by the following method... if it's not multi-part, and it's doesn't * have a hash context, it must be a block Encryption CBC MAC. * * For case number 2, we initialize a hash structure, as well as make it * multi-part. Updates are simple calls to the hash update function. Final * calls the hashend, then passes the result to the 'update' function (which * operates as a final signature function). In some hash based MAC'ing (as * opposed to hash base signatures), the update function is can be simply a * copy (as is the case with HMAC). */ CK_RV NSC_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKObject *key; SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey; SFTKHashSignInfo *info = NULL; CHECK_FORK(); /* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/ crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_SIGN, SFTK_SIGN); if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) return crv; /* we're not using a block cipher mac */ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_SIGN,&key,hKey,&key_type, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,CKA_SIGN); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } context->multi = PR_FALSE; #define INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(mmm) \ case CKM_ ## mmm ## _RSA_PKCS: \ context->multi = PR_TRUE; \ crv = sftk_doSub ## mmm (context); \ if (crv != CKR_OK) break; \ context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSAHashSign; \ info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo); \ if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } \ info->hashOid = SEC_OID_ ## mmm ; \ goto finish_rsa; switch(pMechanism->mechanism) { INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD5) INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD2) INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA1) INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA224) INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA256) INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA384) INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA512) case CKM_RSA_PKCS: context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSASign; goto finish_rsa; case CKM_RSA_X_509: context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSASignRaw; finish_rsa: if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } context->rsa = PR_TRUE; privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); if (privKey == NULL) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } /* OK, info is allocated only if we're doing hash and sign mechanism. * It's necessary to be able to set the correct OID in the final * signature. */ if (info) { info->key = privKey; context->cipherInfo = info; context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space; } else { context->cipherInfo = privKey; context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null; } context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey); break; case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS: if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } context->rsa = PR_TRUE; if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS) || !sftk_ValidatePssParams((const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS*)pMechanism->pParameter)) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo); if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } info->params = pMechanism->pParameter; info->key = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); if (info->key == NULL) { PORT_Free(info); break; } context->cipherInfo = info; context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space; context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSASignPSS; context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(info->key); break; case CKM_DSA_SHA1: context->multi = PR_TRUE; crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; /* fall through */ case CKM_DSA: if (key_type != CKK_DSA) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_DSA,&crv); if (privKey == NULL) { break; } context->cipherInfo = privKey; context->update = (SFTKCipher) nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub; context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ? (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Null:(SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey; context->maxLen = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN; break; #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1: context->multi = PR_TRUE; crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; /* fall through */ case CKM_ECDSA: if (key_type != CKK_EC) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_EC,&crv); if (privKey == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } context->cipherInfo = privKey; context->update = (SFTKCipher) nsc_ECDSASignStub; context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ? (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Null:(SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey; context->maxLen = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2; break; #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ #define INIT_HMAC_MECH(mmm) \ case CKM_ ## mmm ## _HMAC_GENERAL: \ crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg ## mmm ,key, \ *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); \ break; \ case CKM_ ## mmm ## _HMAC: \ crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg ## mmm ,key, mmm ## _LENGTH); \ break; INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2) INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5) INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA224) INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256) INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384) INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512) case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL: crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key, *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); break; case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC: crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH); break; case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC: crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key, *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); break; case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC: crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key, *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); break; case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL: crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgNULL, 0); break; case CKM_TLS_MAC: { CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS *tls12_mac_params; HASH_HashType tlsPrfHash; const char *label; if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS)) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } tls12_mac_params = (CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; if (tls12_mac_params->prfMechanism == CKM_TLS_PRF) { /* The TLS 1.0 and 1.1 PRF */ tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgNULL; if (tls12_mac_params->ulMacLength != 12) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } } else { /* The hash function for the TLS 1.2 PRF */ tlsPrfHash = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_mac_params->prfMechanism); if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL || tls12_mac_params->ulMacLength < 12) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } } if (tls12_mac_params->ulServerOrClient == 1) { label = "server finished"; } else if (tls12_mac_params->ulServerOrClient == 2) { label = "client finished"; } else { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, tlsPrfHash, tls12_mac_params->ulMacLength); if (crv == CKR_OK) { context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo, label, 15); } break; } case CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256: crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgSHA256, 0); break; case CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME: { sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx = sftk_HMACConstantTime_New(pMechanism,key); CK_ULONG *intpointer; if (ctx == NULL) { crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; break; } intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG); if (intpointer == NULL) { PORT_Free(ctx); crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } *intpointer = ctx->hash->length; context->cipherInfo = intpointer; context->hashInfo = ctx; context->currentMech = pMechanism->mechanism; context->hashUpdate = sftk_HMACConstantTime_Update; context->hashdestroy = sftk_MACConstantTime_DestroyContext; context->end = sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash; context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SignCopy; context->destroy = sftk_Space; context->maxLen = 64; context->multi = PR_TRUE; break; } case CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME: { sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx = sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_New(pMechanism,key); CK_ULONG *intpointer; if (ctx == NULL) { crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; break; } intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG); if (intpointer == NULL) { PORT_Free(ctx); crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } *intpointer = ctx->hash->length; context->cipherInfo = intpointer; context->hashInfo = ctx; context->currentMech = pMechanism->mechanism; context->hashUpdate = sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_Update; context->hashdestroy = sftk_MACConstantTime_DestroyContext; context->end = sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash; context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SignCopy; context->destroy = sftk_Space; context->maxLen = 64; context->multi = PR_TRUE; break; } default: crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { if (info) PORT_Free(info); sftk_FreeContext(context); sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_SIGN, context); sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OK; } /** MAC one block of data by block cipher */ static CK_RV sftk_MACBlock( SFTKSessionContext *ctx, void *blk ) { unsigned int outlen; return ( SECSuccess == (ctx->update)( ctx->cipherInfo, ctx->macBuf, &outlen, SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, blk, ctx->blockSize )) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); } /** MAC last (incomplete) block of data by block cipher * * Call once, then terminate MACing operation. */ static CK_RV sftk_MACFinal( SFTKSessionContext *ctx ) { unsigned int padLen = ctx->padDataLength; /* pad and proceed the residual */ if( padLen ) { /* shd clr ctx->padLen to make sftk_MACFinal idempotent */ PORT_Memset( ctx->padBuf + padLen, 0, ctx->blockSize - padLen ); return sftk_MACBlock( ctx, ctx->padBuf ); } else return CKR_OK; } /** The common implementation for {Sign,Verify}Update. (S/V only vary in their * setup and final operations). * * A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11] */ static CK_RV sftk_MACUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen,SFTKContextType type) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_RV crv; /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,type, PR_TRUE, &session ); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (context->hashInfo) { (*context->hashUpdate)(context->hashInfo, pPart, ulPartLen); } else { /* must be block cipher MACing */ unsigned int blkSize = context->blockSize; unsigned char *residual = /* free room in context->padBuf */ context->padBuf + context->padDataLength; unsigned int minInput = /* min input for MACing at least one block */ blkSize - context->padDataLength; /* not enough data even for one block */ if( ulPartLen < minInput ) { PORT_Memcpy( residual, pPart, ulPartLen ); context->padDataLength += ulPartLen; goto cleanup; } /* MACing residual */ if( context->padDataLength ) { PORT_Memcpy( residual, pPart, minInput ); ulPartLen -= minInput; pPart += minInput; if( CKR_OK != (crv = sftk_MACBlock( context, context->padBuf )) ) goto terminate; } /* MACing full blocks */ while( ulPartLen >= blkSize ) { if( CKR_OK != (crv = sftk_MACBlock( context, pPart )) ) goto terminate; ulPartLen -= blkSize; pPart += blkSize; } /* save the residual */ if( (context->padDataLength = ulPartLen) ) PORT_Memcpy( context->padBuf, pPart, ulPartLen ); } /* blk cipher MACing */ goto cleanup; terminate: sftk_TerminateOp( session, type, context ); cleanup: sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } /* NSC_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation, * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature * * A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11] */ CK_RV NSC_SignUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen) { CHECK_FORK(); return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_SIGN); } /* NSC_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation, * returning the signature. */ CK_RV NSC_SignFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int outlen; unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen; CK_RV crv; CHECK_FORK(); /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_SIGN,PR_TRUE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (context->hashInfo) { unsigned int digestLen; unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; if( !pSignature ) { outlen = context->maxLen; goto finish; } (*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf)); if( SECSuccess != (context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature, &outlen, maxoutlen, tmpbuf, digestLen)) crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); /* CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL here isn't continuable, let operation terminate. * Keeping "too small" CK_RV intact is a standard violation, but allows * application read EXACT signature length */ } else { /* must be block cipher MACing */ outlen = context->macSize; /* null or "too small" buf doesn't terminate operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]*/ if( !pSignature || maxoutlen < outlen ) { if( pSignature ) crv = CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; goto finish; } if( CKR_OK == (crv = sftk_MACFinal( context )) ) PORT_Memcpy(pSignature, context->macBuf, outlen ); } sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_SIGN, context ); finish: *pulSignatureLen = outlen; sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } /* NSC_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single part, * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */ CK_RV NSC_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG ulDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_RV crv; CHECK_FORK(); /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_SIGN,PR_FALSE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (!pSignature) { /* see also how C_SignUpdate implements this */ *pulSignatureLen = (!context->multi || context->hashInfo) ? context->maxLen : context->macSize; /* must be block cipher MACing */ goto finish; } /* multi part Signing are completely implemented by SignUpdate and * sign Final */ if (context->multi) { /* SignFinal can't follow failed SignUpdate */ if( CKR_OK == (crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession,pData,ulDataLen) )) crv = NSC_SignFinal(hSession, pSignature, pulSignatureLen); } else { /* single-part PKC signature (e.g. CKM_ECDSA) */ unsigned int outlen; unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen; if( SECSuccess != (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature, &outlen, maxoutlen, pData, ulDataLen)) crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); *pulSignatureLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; /* "too small" here is certainly continuable */ if( crv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ) sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_SIGN, context); } /* single-part */ finish: sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } /* ************** Crypto Functions: Sign Recover ************************ */ /* NSC_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, * where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature. * E.g. encryption with the user's private key */ CK_RV NSC_SignRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) { CHECK_FORK(); switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { case CKM_RSA_PKCS: case CKM_RSA_X_509: return NSC_SignInit(hSession,pMechanism,hKey); default: break; } return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; } /* NSC_SignRecover signs data in a single operation * where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature. * E.g. encryption with the user's private key */ CK_RV NSC_SignRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen) { CHECK_FORK(); return NSC_Sign(hSession,pData,ulDataLen,pSignature,pulSignatureLen); } /* ************** Crypto Functions: verify ************************ */ /* Handle RSA Signature formatting */ static SECStatus sftk_hashCheckSign(SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info, const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest, unsigned int digestLen) { PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey); if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); return SECFailure; } return RSA_HashCheckSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen); } SECStatus RSA_HashCheckSign(SECOidTag digestOid, NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digestData, unsigned int digestLen) { unsigned char *pkcs1DigestInfoData; SECItem pkcs1DigestInfo; SECItem digest; unsigned int bufferSize; SECStatus rv; /* pkcs1DigestInfo.data must be less than key->u.rsa.modulus.len */ bufferSize = key->u.rsa.modulus.len; pkcs1DigestInfoData = PORT_ZAlloc(bufferSize); if (!pkcs1DigestInfoData) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY); return SECFailure; } pkcs1DigestInfo.data = pkcs1DigestInfoData; pkcs1DigestInfo.len = bufferSize; /* decrypt the block */ rv = RSA_CheckSignRecover(&key->u.rsa, pkcs1DigestInfo.data, &pkcs1DigestInfo.len, pkcs1DigestInfo.len, sig, sigLen); if (rv != SECSuccess) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE); } else { digest.data = (PRUint8*) digestData; digest.len = digestLen; rv = _SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo( digestOid, &digest, &pkcs1DigestInfo, PR_TRUE /*XXX: unsafeAllowMissingParameters*/); } PORT_Free(pkcs1DigestInfoData); return rv; } static SECStatus sftk_RSACheckSign(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest, unsigned int digestLen) { PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey); if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); return SECFailure; } return RSA_CheckSign(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen); } static SECStatus sftk_RSACheckSignRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest, unsigned int digestLen) { PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey); if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); return SECFailure; } return RSA_CheckSignRaw(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen); } static SECStatus sftk_RSACheckSignPSS(SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info, const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest, unsigned int digestLen) { HASH_HashType hashAlg; HASH_HashType maskHashAlg; CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params = (CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)info->params; PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey); if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); return SECFailure; } hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg); maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf); return RSA_CheckSignPSS(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg, params->sLen, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen); } /* NSC_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, * where the signature is an appendix to the data, * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA) */ CK_RV NSC_VerifyInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKObject *key; SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey; SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info = NULL; CHECK_FORK(); /* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/ crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_VERIFY, SFTK_VERIFY); if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) return crv; session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,&key,hKey,&key_type, CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } context->multi = PR_FALSE; #define INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(mmm) \ case CKM_ ## mmm ## _RSA_PKCS: \ context->multi = PR_TRUE; \ crv = sftk_doSub ## mmm (context); \ if (crv != CKR_OK) break; \ context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_hashCheckSign; \ info = PORT_New(SFTKHashVerifyInfo); \ if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } \ info->hashOid = SEC_OID_ ## mmm ; \ goto finish_rsa; switch(pMechanism->mechanism) { INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD5) INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD2) INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA1) INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA224) INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA256) INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA384) INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA512) case CKM_RSA_PKCS: context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_RSACheckSign; goto finish_rsa; case CKM_RSA_X_509: context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_RSACheckSignRaw; finish_rsa: if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { if (info) PORT_Free(info); crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } context->rsa = PR_TRUE; pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); if (pubKey == NULL) { if (info) PORT_Free(info); crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } if (info) { info->key = pubKey; context->cipherInfo = info; context->destroy = sftk_Space; } else { context->cipherInfo = pubKey; context->destroy = sftk_Null; } break; case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS: if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } context->rsa = PR_TRUE; if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS) || !sftk_ValidatePssParams((const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS*)pMechanism->pParameter)) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } info = PORT_New(SFTKHashVerifyInfo); if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } info->params = pMechanism->pParameter; info->key = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); if (info->key == NULL) { PORT_Free(info); break; } context->cipherInfo = info; context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space; context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_RSACheckSignPSS; break; case CKM_DSA_SHA1: context->multi = PR_TRUE; crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; /* fall through */ case CKM_DSA: if (key_type != CKK_DSA) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_DSA,&crv); if (pubKey == NULL) { break; } context->cipherInfo = pubKey; context->verify = (SFTKVerify) nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub; context->destroy = sftk_Null; break; #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1: context->multi = PR_TRUE; crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; /* fall through */ case CKM_ECDSA: if (key_type != CKK_EC) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_EC,&crv); if (pubKey == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } context->cipherInfo = pubKey; context->verify = (SFTKVerify) nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub; context->destroy = sftk_Null; break; #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2) INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5) INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA224) INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256) INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384) INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512) case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL: crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key, *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); break; case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC: crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH); break; case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC: crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key, *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); break; case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC: crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key, *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); break; case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL: crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgNULL, 0); break; case CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256: crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgSHA256, 0); break; default: crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { if (info) PORT_Free(info); sftk_FreeContext(context); sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY, context); sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OK; } /* NSC_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation, * where the signature is an appendix to the data, * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */ CK_RV NSC_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_RV crv; CHECK_FORK(); /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,PR_FALSE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; /* multi part Verifying are completely implemented by VerifyUpdate and * VerifyFinal */ if (context->multi) { /* VerifyFinal can't follow failed VerifyUpdate */ if( CKR_OK == (crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen))) crv = NSC_VerifyFinal(hSession, pSignature, ulSignatureLen); } else { if (SECSuccess != (*context->verify)(context->cipherInfo,pSignature, ulSignatureLen, pData, ulDataLen)) crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_VERIFY, context ); } sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } /* NSC_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification operation, * where the signature is an appendix to the data, * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature * * A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11] */ CK_RV NSC_VerifyUpdate( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen) { CHECK_FORK(); return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_VERIFY); } /* NSC_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification operation, * checking the signature. */ CK_RV NSC_VerifyFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_RV crv; CHECK_FORK(); if (!pSignature) return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,PR_TRUE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (context->hashInfo) { unsigned int digestLen; unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH]; (*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf)); if( SECSuccess != (context->verify)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature, ulSignatureLen, tmpbuf, digestLen)) crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); } else if (ulSignatureLen != context->macSize) { /* must be block cipher MACing */ crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE; } else if (CKR_OK == (crv = sftk_MACFinal(context))) { if (PORT_Memcmp(pSignature, context->macBuf, ulSignatureLen)) crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; } sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_VERIFY, context ); sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } /* ************** Crypto Functions: Verify Recover ************************ */ static SECStatus sftk_RSACheckSignRecover(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *data, unsigned int *dataLen, unsigned int maxDataLen, const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen) { PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey); if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); return SECFailure; } return RSA_CheckSignRecover(&key->u.rsa, data, dataLen, maxDataLen, sig, sigLen); } static SECStatus sftk_RSACheckSignRecoverRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *data, unsigned int *dataLen, unsigned int maxDataLen, const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen) { PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey); if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) { PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); return SECFailure; } return RSA_CheckSignRecoverRaw(&key->u.rsa, data, dataLen, maxDataLen, sig, sigLen); } /* NSC_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification operation, * where the data is recovered from the signature. * E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */ CK_RV NSC_VerifyRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKObject *key; SFTKSessionContext *context; CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey; CHECK_FORK(); session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, &key,hKey,&key_type,CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } context->multi = PR_TRUE; switch(pMechanism->mechanism) { case CKM_RSA_PKCS: case CKM_RSA_X_509: if (key_type != CKK_RSA) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } context->multi = PR_FALSE; context->rsa = PR_TRUE; pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv); if (pubKey == NULL) { break; } context->cipherInfo = pubKey; context->update = (SFTKCipher) (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509 ? sftk_RSACheckSignRecoverRaw : sftk_RSACheckSignRecover); context->destroy = sftk_Null; break; default: crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(context); sftk_FreeSession(session); return crv; } sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, context); sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OK; } /* NSC_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part operation, * where the data is recovered from the signature. * E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */ CK_RV NSC_VerifyRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKSessionContext *context; unsigned int outlen; unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen; CK_RV crv; SECStatus rv; CHECK_FORK(); /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, PR_FALSE,&session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; if (pData == NULL) { /* to return the actual size, we need to do the decrypt, just return * the max size, which is the size of the input signature. */ *pulDataLen = ulSignatureLen; rv = SECSuccess; goto finish; } rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen, pSignature, ulSignatureLen); *pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen; sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, context); finish: sftk_FreeSession(session); return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapVerifyError(PORT_GetError()); } /* **************************** Random Functions: ************************ */ /* NSC_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's random number * generator. */ CK_RV NSC_SeedRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed, CK_ULONG ulSeedLen) { SECStatus rv; CHECK_FORK(); rv = RNG_RandomUpdate(pSeed, ulSeedLen); return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); } /* NSC_GenerateRandom generates random data. */ CK_RV NSC_GenerateRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomData, CK_ULONG ulRandomLen) { SECStatus rv; CHECK_FORK(); rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(pRandomData, ulRandomLen); /* * This may fail with SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM, which means the RNG isn't * seeded with enough entropy. */ return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); } /* **************************** Key Functions: ************************ */ /* * generate a password based encryption key. This code uses * PKCS5 to do the work. */ static CK_RV nsc_pbe_key_gen(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pkcs5_pbe, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, void *buf, CK_ULONG *key_length, PRBool faulty3DES) { SECItem *pbe_key = NULL, iv, pwitem; CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL; CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkd2_params = NULL; *key_length = 0; iv.data = NULL; iv.len = 0; if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2) { pbkd2_params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbkd2_params->pPassword; /* was this a typo in the PKCS #11 spec? */ pwitem.len = *pbkd2_params->ulPasswordLen; } else { pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pPassword; pwitem.len = pbe_params->ulPasswordLen; } pbe_key = nsspkcs5_ComputeKeyAndIV(pkcs5_pbe, &pwitem, &iv, faulty3DES); if (pbe_key == NULL) { return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } PORT_Memcpy(buf, pbe_key->data, pbe_key->len); *key_length = pbe_key->len; SECITEM_ZfreeItem(pbe_key, PR_TRUE); pbe_key = NULL; if (iv.data) { if (pbe_params && pbe_params->pInitVector != NULL) { PORT_Memcpy(pbe_params->pInitVector, iv.data, iv.len); } PORT_Free(iv.data); } return CKR_OK; } /* * this is coded for "full" support. These selections will be limitted to * the official subset by freebl. */ static unsigned int sftk_GetSubPrimeFromPrime(unsigned int primeBits) { if (primeBits <= 1024) { return 160; } else if (primeBits <= 2048) { return 224; } else if (primeBits <= 3072) { return 256; } else if (primeBits <= 7680) { return 384; } else { return 512; } } static CK_RV nsc_parameter_gen(CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, SFTKObject *key) { SFTKAttribute *attribute; CK_ULONG counter; unsigned int seedBits = 0; unsigned int subprimeBits = 0; unsigned int primeBits; unsigned int j = 8; /* default to 1024 bits */ CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; PQGParams *params = NULL; PQGVerify *vfy = NULL; SECStatus rv; attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_PRIME_BITS); if (attribute == NULL) { return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; } primeBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue; sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); if (primeBits < 1024) { j = PQG_PBITS_TO_INDEX(primeBits); if (j == (unsigned int)-1) { return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; } } attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS); if (attribute != NULL) { seedBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue; sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); } attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS); if (attribute != NULL) { subprimeBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue; sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); } sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_PRIME_BITS); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS); /* use the old PQG interface if we have old input data */ if ((primeBits < 1024) || ((primeBits == 1024) && (subprimeBits == 0))) { if (seedBits == 0) { rv = PQG_ParamGen(j, ¶ms, &vfy); } else { rv = PQG_ParamGenSeedLen(j,seedBits/8, ¶ms, &vfy); } } else { if (subprimeBits == 0) { subprimeBits = sftk_GetSubPrimeFromPrime(primeBits); } if (seedBits == 0) { seedBits = primeBits; } rv = PQG_ParamGenV2(primeBits, subprimeBits, seedBits/8, ¶ms, &vfy); } if (rv != SECSuccess) { if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; } return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_PRIME, params->prime.data, params->prime.len); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_SUBPRIME, params->subPrime.data, params->subPrime.len); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_BASE, params->base.data, params->base.len); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; counter = vfy->counter; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_COUNTER, &counter, sizeof(counter)); crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED, vfy->seed.data, vfy->seed.len); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_H, vfy->h.data, vfy->h.len); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; loser: PQG_DestroyParams(params); if (vfy) { PQG_DestroyVerify(vfy); } return crv; } static CK_RV nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism, CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type, CK_ULONG *key_length) { CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; switch (mechanism) { case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN: *key_type = CKK_RC2; if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; break; #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN: *key_type = CKK_RC5; if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; break; #endif case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN: *key_type = CKK_RC4; if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; break; case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN: *key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; break; case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN: *key_type = CKK_CDMF; *key_length = 8; break; case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN: *key_type = CKK_DES; *key_length = 8; break; case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN: *key_type = CKK_DES2; *key_length = 16; break; case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN: *key_type = CKK_DES3; *key_length = 24; break; case CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN: *key_type = CKK_SEED; *key_length = 16; break; case CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN: *key_type = CKK_CAMELLIA; if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; break; case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN: *key_type = CKK_AES; if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; break; default: PORT_Assert(0); crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; break; } return crv; } CK_RV nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe) { SECItem salt; CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL; NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params; PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; SECStatus rv; *pbe = NULL; arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE); if (arena == NULL) { return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } params = (NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *) PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter)); if (params == NULL) { PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE); return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } params->poolp = arena; params->ivLen = 0; params->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PKCS12_V2; params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; params->encAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1; /* any invalid value */ params->is2KeyDES = PR_FALSE; params->keyID = pbeBitGenIntegrityKey; pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; params->iter = pbe_params->ulIteration; salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt; salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen; rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena,¶ms->salt,&salt); if (rv != SECSuccess) { PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE); return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN: case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC: params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; params->keyLen = 20; break; case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN: params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD5; params->keyLen = 16; break; case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN: params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD2; params->keyLen = 16; break; default: PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE); return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; } *pbe = params; return CKR_OK; } /* maybe this should be table driven? */ static CK_RV nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe, CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type, CK_ULONG *key_length) { CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; SECOidData *oid; CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL; NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params = NULL; CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkd2_params = NULL; SECItem salt; CK_ULONG iteration = 0; *pbe = NULL; oid = SECOID_FindOIDByMechanism(pMechanism->mechanism); if (oid == NULL) { return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; } if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2) { pbkd2_params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; if (pbkd2_params->saltSource != CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED) { return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; } salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbkd2_params->pSaltSourceData; salt.len = (unsigned int)pbkd2_params->ulSaltSourceDataLen; iteration = pbkd2_params->iterations; } else { pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt; salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen; iteration = pbe_params->ulIteration; } params=nsspkcs5_NewParam(oid->offset, &salt, iteration); if (params == NULL) { return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; } switch (params->encAlg) { case SEC_OID_DES_CBC: *key_type = CKK_DES; *key_length = params->keyLen; break; case SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC: *key_type = params->is2KeyDES ? CKK_DES2 : CKK_DES3; *key_length = params->keyLen; break; case SEC_OID_RC2_CBC: *key_type = CKK_RC2; *key_length = params->keyLen; break; case SEC_OID_RC4: *key_type = CKK_RC4; *key_length = params->keyLen; break; case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2: /* sigh, PKCS #11 currently only defines SHA1 for the KDF hash type. * we do the check here because this where we would handle multiple * hash types in the future */ if (pbkd2_params == NULL || pbkd2_params->prf != CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } /* key type must already be set */ if (*key_type == CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; break; } /* PBKDF2 needs to calculate the key length from the other parameters */ if (*key_length == 0) { *key_length = sftk_MapKeySize(*key_type); } if (*key_length == 0) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; break; } params->keyLen = *key_length; break; default: crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(params); break; } if (crv == CKR_OK) { *pbe = params; } return crv; } /* NSC_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key object. */ CK_RV NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,CK_ULONG ulCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) { SFTKObject *key; SFTKSession *session; PRBool checkWeak = PR_FALSE; CK_ULONG key_length = 0; CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE; CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; int i; SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession); unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_LEN]; enum {nsc_pbe, nsc_ssl, nsc_bulk, nsc_param, nsc_jpake} key_gen_type; NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param; SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *rsa_pms; CK_VERSION *version; /* in very old versions of NSS, there were implementation errors with key * generation methods. We want to beable to read these, but not * produce them any more. The affected algorithm was 3DES. */ PRBool faultyPBE3DES = PR_FALSE; HASH_HashType hashType = HASH_AlgNULL; CHECK_FORK(); if (!slot) { return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; } /* * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of */ key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */ if (key == NULL) { return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } /* * load the template values into the object */ for (i=0; i < (int) ulCount; i++) { if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) { key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue; continue; } /* some algorithms need keytype specified */ if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) { key_type = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue; continue; } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i])); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } /* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_CLASS); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE); /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */ key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */ switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN: case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN: case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN: case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN: checkWeak = PR_TRUE; /* fall through */ case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN: case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN: case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN: case CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN: case CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN: case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN: #if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5 case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN: #endif crv = nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(pMechanism->mechanism,&key_type,&key_length); break; case CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN: key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; key_length = 48; key_gen_type = nsc_ssl; break; case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC: case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN: case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN: case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN: key_gen_type = nsc_pbe; key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; crv = nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(pMechanism, &pbe_param); break; case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_FAULTY_3DES_CBC: faultyPBE3DES = PR_TRUE; /* fall through */ case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC: case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC2_CBC: case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC: case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC2_CBC: case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC4: case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC4: case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC: case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC: case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC: case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC: case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128: case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40: case CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC: case CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC: case CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2: key_gen_type = nsc_pbe; crv = nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(pMechanism,&pbe_param, &key_type, &key_length); break; case CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN: key_gen_type = nsc_param; key_type = CKK_DSA; objclass = CKO_KG_PARAMETERS; crv = CKR_OK; break; case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA1: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; goto jpake1; case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto jpake1; case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto jpake1; case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto jpake1; jpake1: key_gen_type = nsc_jpake; key_type = CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1; objclass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL || pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params)) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } if (sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_TOKEN)) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; break; } crv = CKR_OK; break; default: crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; break; } /* make sure we aren't going to overflow the buffer */ if (sizeof(buf) < key_length) { /* someone is getting pretty optimistic about how big their key can * be... */ crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } /* if there was no error, * key_type *MUST* be set in the switch statement above */ PORT_Assert( key_type != CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE ); /* * now to the actual key gen. */ switch (key_gen_type) { case nsc_pbe: crv = nsc_pbe_key_gen(pbe_param, pMechanism, buf, &key_length, faultyPBE3DES); nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(pbe_param); break; case nsc_ssl: rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *)buf; version = (CK_VERSION *)pMechanism->pParameter; rsa_pms->client_version[0] = version->major; rsa_pms->client_version[1] = version->minor; crv = NSC_GenerateRandom(0,&rsa_pms->random[0], sizeof(rsa_pms->random)); break; case nsc_bulk: /* get the key, check for weak keys and repeat if found */ do { crv = NSC_GenerateRandom(0, buf, key_length); } while (crv == CKR_OK && checkWeak && sftk_IsWeakKey(buf,key_type)); break; case nsc_param: /* generate parameters */ *buf = 0; crv = nsc_parameter_gen(key_type,key); break; case nsc_jpake: crv = jpake_Round1(hashType, (CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params *) pMechanism->pParameter, key); break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } /* Add the class, key_type, and value */ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_CLASS,&objclass,sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS)); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } if (key_length != 0) { crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } } /* get the session */ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; } /* * handle the base object stuff */ crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session); sftk_FreeSession(session); if (sftk_isTrue(key,CKA_SENSITIVE)) { sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); } if (!sftk_isTrue(key,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) { sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); } *phKey = key->handle; sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } #define PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA1_LENGTH /* 160-bits */ #define PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH 20 /* 160-bits */ /* * FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check utilized to validate key pair. * * This function returns * CKR_OK if pairwise consistency check passed * CKR_GENERAL_ERROR if pairwise consistency check failed * other error codes if paiswise consistency check could not be * performed, for example, CKR_HOST_MEMORY. */ static CK_RV sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, SFTKObject *publicKey, SFTKObject *privateKey, CK_KEY_TYPE keyType) { /* * Key type Mechanism type * -------------------------------- * For encrypt/decrypt: CKK_RSA => CKM_RSA_PKCS * others => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM * * For sign/verify: CKK_RSA => CKM_RSA_PKCS * CKK_DSA => CKM_DSA * CKK_EC => CKM_ECDSA * others => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM * * None of these mechanisms has a parameter. */ CK_MECHANISM mech = {0, NULL, 0}; CK_ULONG modulusLen = 0; CK_ULONG subPrimeLen = 0; PRBool isEncryptable = PR_FALSE; PRBool canSignVerify = PR_FALSE; PRBool isDerivable = PR_FALSE; CK_RV crv; /* Variables used for Encrypt/Decrypt functions. */ unsigned char *known_message = (unsigned char *)"Known Crypto Message"; unsigned char plaintext[PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH]; CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted; unsigned char *ciphertext; unsigned char *text_compared; CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted; CK_ULONG bytes_compared; CK_ULONG pairwise_digest_length = PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH; /* Variables used for Signature/Verification functions. */ /* Must be at least 256 bits for DSA2 digest */ unsigned char *known_digest = (unsigned char *) "Mozilla Rules the World through NSS!"; unsigned char *signature; CK_ULONG signature_length; if (keyType == CKK_RSA) { SFTKAttribute *attribute; /* Get modulus length of private key. */ attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(privateKey, CKA_MODULUS); if (attribute == NULL) { return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; } modulusLen = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen; if (*(unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue == 0) { modulusLen--; } sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); } else if (keyType == CKK_DSA) { SFTKAttribute *attribute; /* Get subprime length of private key. */ attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(privateKey, CKA_SUBPRIME); if (attribute == NULL) { return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; } subPrimeLen = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen; if (subPrimeLen > 1 && *(unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue == 0) { subPrimeLen--; } sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); } /**************************************************/ /* Pairwise Consistency Check of Encrypt/Decrypt. */ /**************************************************/ isEncryptable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DECRYPT); /* * If the decryption attribute is set, attempt to encrypt * with the public key and decrypt with the private key. */ if (isEncryptable) { if (keyType != CKK_RSA) { return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; } bytes_encrypted = modulusLen; mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; /* Allocate space for ciphertext. */ ciphertext = (unsigned char *) PORT_ZAlloc(bytes_encrypted); if (ciphertext == NULL) { return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } /* Prepare for encryption using the public key. */ crv = NSC_EncryptInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle); if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(ciphertext); return crv; } /* Encrypt using the public key. */ crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, known_message, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH, ciphertext, &bytes_encrypted); if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(ciphertext); return crv; } /* Always use the smaller of these two values . . . */ bytes_compared = PR_MIN(bytes_encrypted, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH); /* * If there was a failure, the plaintext * goes at the end, therefore . . . */ text_compared = ciphertext + bytes_encrypted - bytes_compared; /* * Check to ensure that ciphertext does * NOT EQUAL known input message text * per FIPS PUB 140-2 directive. */ if (PORT_Memcmp(text_compared, known_message, bytes_compared) == 0) { /* Set error to Invalid PRIVATE Key. */ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY); PORT_Free(ciphertext); return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; } /* Prepare for decryption using the private key. */ crv = NSC_DecryptInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle); if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(ciphertext); return crv; } memset(plaintext, 0, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH); /* * Initialize bytes decrypted to be the * expected PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH. */ bytes_decrypted = PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH; /* * Decrypt using the private key. * NOTE: No need to reset the * value of bytes_encrypted. */ crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession, ciphertext, bytes_encrypted, plaintext, &bytes_decrypted); /* Finished with ciphertext; free it. */ PORT_Free(ciphertext); if (crv != CKR_OK) { return crv; } /* * Check to ensure that the output plaintext * does EQUAL known input message text. */ if ((bytes_decrypted != PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) || (PORT_Memcmp(plaintext, known_message, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) != 0)) { /* Set error to Bad PUBLIC Key. */ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; } } /**********************************************/ /* Pairwise Consistency Check of Sign/Verify. */ /**********************************************/ canSignVerify = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_SIGN); if (canSignVerify) { /* Determine length of signature. */ switch (keyType) { case CKK_RSA: signature_length = modulusLen; mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS; break; case CKK_DSA: signature_length = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN; pairwise_digest_length = subPrimeLen; mech.mechanism = CKM_DSA; break; #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC case CKK_EC: signature_length = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2; mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA; break; #endif default: return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; } /* Allocate space for signature data. */ signature = (unsigned char *) PORT_ZAlloc(signature_length); if (signature == NULL) { return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } /* Sign the known hash using the private key. */ crv = NSC_SignInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle); if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(signature); return crv; } crv = NSC_Sign(hSession, known_digest, pairwise_digest_length, signature, &signature_length); if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(signature); return crv; } /* Verify the known hash using the public key. */ crv = NSC_VerifyInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle); if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(signature); return crv; } crv = NSC_Verify(hSession, known_digest, pairwise_digest_length, signature, signature_length); /* Free signature data. */ PORT_Free(signature); if ((crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE) || (crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID)) { return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { return crv; } } /**********************************************/ /* Pairwise Consistency Check for Derivation */ /**********************************************/ isDerivable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DERIVE); if (isDerivable) { /* * We are not doing consistency check for Diffie-Hellman Key - * otherwise it would be here * This is also true for Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman keys * NOTE: EC keys are currently subjected to pairwise * consistency check for signing/verification. */ /* * FIPS 140-2 had the following pairwise consistency test for * public and private keys used for key agreement: * If the keys are used to perform key agreement, then the * cryptographic module shall create a second, compatible * key pair. The cryptographic module shall perform both * sides of the key agreement algorithm and shall compare * the resulting shared values. If the shared values are * not equal, the test shall fail. * This test was removed in Change Notice 3. */ } return CKR_OK; } /* NSC_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair, * creating new key objects. */ CK_RV NSC_GenerateKeyPair (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate, CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate, CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey) { SFTKObject * publicKey,*privateKey; SFTKSession * session; CK_KEY_TYPE key_type; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; SECStatus rv; CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; CK_OBJECT_CLASS privClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; int i; SFTKSlot * slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession); unsigned int bitSize; /* RSA */ int public_modulus_bits = 0; SECItem pubExp; RSAPrivateKey * rsaPriv; /* DSA */ PQGParams pqgParam; DHParams dhParam; DSAPrivateKey * dsaPriv; /* Diffie Hellman */ DHPrivateKey * dhPriv; #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC /* Elliptic Curve Cryptography */ SECItem ecEncodedParams; /* DER Encoded parameters */ ECPrivateKey * ecPriv; ECParams * ecParams; #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ CHECK_FORK(); if (!slot) { return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; } /* * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of */ publicKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */ if (publicKey == NULL) { return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } /* * load the template values into the publicKey */ for (i=0; i < (int) ulPublicKeyAttributeCount; i++) { if (pPublicKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_MODULUS_BITS) { public_modulus_bits = *(CK_ULONG *)pPublicKeyTemplate[i].pValue; continue; } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, sftk_attr_expand(&pPublicKeyTemplate[i])); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } privateKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */ if (privateKey == NULL) { sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } /* * now load the private key template */ for (i=0; i < (int) ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount; i++) { if (pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_BITS) { continue; } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, sftk_attr_expand(&pPrivateKeyTemplate[i])); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_CLASS); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_CLASS); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE); /* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */ switch (pMechanism->mechanism) { case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN: /* format the keys */ sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_MODULUS); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_MODULUS); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_1); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_2); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_1); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_2); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_COEFFICIENT); key_type = CKK_RSA; if (public_modulus_bits == 0) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; break; } if (public_modulus_bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) { crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; break; } if (public_modulus_bits % 2 != 0) { crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; break; } /* extract the exponent */ crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pubExp,publicKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pubExp.data, pubExp.len); if (bitSize < 2) { crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID; break; } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, sftk_item_expand(&pubExp)); if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(pubExp.data); break; } rsaPriv = RSA_NewKey(public_modulus_bits, &pubExp); PORT_Free(pubExp.data); if (rsaPriv == NULL) { if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; } crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); break; } /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the public key */ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_MODULUS, sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB, sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_MODULUS, sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->privateExponent)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_1, sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime1)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_2, sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime2)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_1, sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent1)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_2, sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent2)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_COEFFICIENT, sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->coefficient)); kpg_done: /* Should zeroize the contents first, since this func doesn't. */ PORT_FreeArena(rsaPriv->arena, PR_TRUE); break; case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN: sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_SUBPRIME); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE); key_type = CKK_DSA; /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to the private key */ crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.prime,publicKey,CKA_PRIME); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.subPrime,publicKey, CKA_SUBPRIME); if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); break; } crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.base,publicKey,CKA_BASE); if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); break; } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME, sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.prime)); if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); break; } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_SUBPRIME, sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.subPrime)); if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); break; } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE, sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.base)); if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); break; } /* * these are checked by DSA_NewKey */ bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.subPrime.data, pqgParam.subPrime.len); if ((bitSize < DSA_MIN_Q_BITS) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_Q_BITS)) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); break; } bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.prime.data,pqgParam.prime.len); if ((bitSize < DSA_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); break; } bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.base.data,pqgParam.base.len); if ((bitSize < 2) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); break; } /* Generate the key */ rv = DSA_NewKey(&pqgParam, &dsaPriv); PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data); PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data); PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data); if (rv != SECSuccess) { if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; } crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); break; } /* store the generated key into the attributes */ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE, sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done; /* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB, sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE, sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->privateValue)); dsagn_done: /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */ PORT_FreeArena(dsaPriv->params.arena, PR_TRUE); break; case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN: sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); key_type = CKK_DH; /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */ crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.prime, publicKey, CKA_PRIME); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.base, publicKey, CKA_BASE); if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); break; } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME, sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.prime)); if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); break; } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_BASE, sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.base)); if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); break; } bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.prime.data,dhParam.prime.len); if ((bitSize < DH_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); break; } bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.base.data,dhParam.base.len); if ((bitSize < 1) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); break; } rv = DH_NewKey(&dhParam, &dhPriv); PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data); PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data); if (rv != SECSuccess) { if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; } crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); break; } crv=sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE, sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB, sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done; crv=sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE, sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->privateValue)); dhgn_done: /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */ PORT_FreeArena(dhPriv->arena, PR_TRUE); break; #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN: sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EC_PARAMS); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE); sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); key_type = CKK_EC; /* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */ crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &ecEncodedParams, publicKey, CKA_EC_PARAMS); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EC_PARAMS, sftk_item_expand(&ecEncodedParams)); if (crv != CKR_OK) { PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data); break; } /* Decode ec params before calling EC_NewKey */ rv = EC_DecodeParams(&ecEncodedParams, &ecParams); PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data); if (rv != SECSuccess) { crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); break; } rv = EC_NewKey(ecParams, &ecPriv); PORT_FreeArena(ecParams->arena, PR_TRUE); if (rv != SECSuccess) { if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) { sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE; } crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); break; } if (getenv("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT")) { crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT, sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue)); } else { SECItem *pubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &ecPriv->publicValue, SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate)); if (!pubValue) { crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; goto ecgn_done; } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT, sftk_item_expand(pubValue)); SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue, PR_TRUE); } if (crv != CKR_OK) goto ecgn_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE, sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->privateValue)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto ecgn_done; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB, sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue)); ecgn_done: /* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */ PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE); break; #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ default: crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); return crv; } /* Add the class, key_type The loop lets us check errors blow out * on errors and clean up at the bottom */ session = NULL; /* make pedtantic happy... session cannot leave the*/ /* loop below NULL unless an error is set... */ do { crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_CLASS,&privClass, sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS)); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_CLASS,&pubClass, sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS)); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; } while (0); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); return crv; } /* * handle the base object cleanup for the public Key */ crv = sftk_handleObject(privateKey,session); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeSession(session); sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); return crv; } /* * handle the base object cleanup for the private Key * If we have any problems, we destroy the public Key we've * created and linked. */ crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey,session); sftk_FreeSession(session); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,privateKey->handle); sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); return crv; } if (sftk_isTrue(privateKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) { sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); } if (sftk_isTrue(publicKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) { sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); } if (!sftk_isTrue(privateKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) { sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); } if (!sftk_isTrue(publicKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) { sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE, &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); } /* Perform FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check. */ crv = sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(hSession, publicKey, privateKey, key_type); if (crv != CKR_OK) { NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,publicKey->handle); sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,privateKey->handle); sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); if (sftk_audit_enabled) { char msg[128]; PR_snprintf(msg,sizeof msg, "C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession=0x%08lX, " "pMechanism->mechanism=0x%08lX)=0x%08lX " "self-test: pair-wise consistency test failed", (PRUint32)hSession,(PRUint32)pMechanism->mechanism, (PRUint32)crv); sftk_LogAuditMessage(NSS_AUDIT_ERROR, NSS_AUDIT_SELF_TEST, msg); } return crv; } *phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle; *phPublicKey = publicKey->handle; sftk_FreeObject(publicKey); sftk_FreeObject(privateKey); return CKR_OK; } static SECItem *sftk_PackagePrivateKey(SFTKObject *key, CK_RV *crvp) { NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lk = NULL; NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL; SFTKAttribute *attribute = NULL; PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; SECOidTag algorithm = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN; void *dummy, *param = NULL; SECStatus rv = SECSuccess; SECItem *encodedKey = NULL; #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC #ifdef EC_DEBUG SECItem *fordebug; #endif int savelen; #endif if(!key) { *crvp = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; /* really can't happen */ return NULL; } attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE); if(!attribute) { *crvp = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; return NULL; } lk = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)attribute->attrib.pValue, crvp); sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); if(!lk) { return NULL; } arena = PORT_NewArena(2048); /* XXX different size? */ if(!arena) { *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; rv = SECFailure; goto loser; } pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo)); if(!pki) { *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; rv = SECFailure; goto loser; } pki->arena = arena; param = NULL; switch(lk->keyType) { case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey: prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lk); dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk, nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate); algorithm = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION; break; case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey: prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lk); dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk, nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate); prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lk->u.dsa.params); param = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &(lk->u.dsa.params), nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate); algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE; break; #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC case NSSLOWKEYECKey: prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lk); /* Public value is encoded as a bit string so adjust length * to be in bits before ASN encoding and readjust * immediately after. * * Since the SECG specification recommends not including the * parameters as part of ECPrivateKey, we zero out the curveOID * length before encoding and restore it later. */ lk->u.ec.publicValue.len <<= 3; savelen = lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len; lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = 0; dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk, nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate); lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = savelen; lk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3; #ifdef EC_DEBUG fordebug = &pki->privateKey; SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKey", lk->keyType, fordebug); #endif param = SECITEM_DupItem(&lk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding); algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY; break; #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: default: dummy = NULL; break; } if(!dummy || ((lk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYDSAKey) && !param)) { *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */ rv = SECFailure; goto loser; } rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &pki->algorithm, algorithm, (SECItem*)param); if(rv != SECSuccess) { *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */ rv = SECFailure; goto loser; } dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(arena, &pki->version, NSSLOWKEY_PRIVATE_KEY_INFO_VERSION); if(!dummy) { *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */ rv = SECFailure; goto loser; } encodedKey = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, pki, nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate); *crvp = encodedKey ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; #ifdef EC_DEBUG fordebug = encodedKey; SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKeyInfo", lk->keyType, fordebug); #endif loser: if(arena) { PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE); } if(lk && (lk != key->objectInfo)) { nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lk); } if(param) { SECITEM_ZfreeItem((SECItem*)param, PR_TRUE); } if(rv != SECSuccess) { return NULL; } return encodedKey; } /* it doesn't matter yet, since we colapse error conditions in the * level above, but we really should map those few key error differences */ static CK_RV sftk_mapWrap(CK_RV crv) { switch (crv) { case CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID: crv = CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID; break; } return crv; } /* NSC_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */ CK_RV NSC_WrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen) { SFTKSession *session; SFTKAttribute *attribute; SFTKObject *key; CK_RV crv; CHECK_FORK(); session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) { return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; } key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session); sftk_FreeSession(session); if (key == NULL) { return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; } switch(key->objclass) { case CKO_SECRET_KEY: { SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL; SECItem pText; attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); if (attribute == NULL) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey, CKA_WRAP, CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); break; } pText.type = siBuffer; pText.data = (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue; pText.len = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen; /* Find out if this is a block cipher. */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL); if (crv != CKR_OK || !context) break; if (context->blockSize > 1) { unsigned int remainder = pText.len % context->blockSize; if (!context->doPad && remainder) { /* When wrapping secret keys with unpadded block ciphers, ** the keys are zero padded, if necessary, to fill out ** a full block. */ pText.len += context->blockSize - remainder; pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len); if (pText.data) memcpy(pText.data, attribute->attrib.pValue, attribute->attrib.ulValueLen); else { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } } } crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, (CK_BYTE_PTR)pText.data, pText.len, pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen); /* always force a finalize, both on errors and when * we are just getting the size */ if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) { CK_RV lcrv ; lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context, SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL); sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL); if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) { sftk_FreeContext(context); } } if (pText.data != (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue) PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len); sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute); break; } case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY: { SECItem *bpki = sftk_PackagePrivateKey(key, &crv); SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL; if(!bpki) { break; } crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey, CKA_WRAP, CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE); if(crv != CKR_OK) { SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE); crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, bpki->data, bpki->len, pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen); /* always force a finalize */ if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) { CK_RV lcrv ; lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context, SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL); sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL); if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) { sftk_FreeContext(context); } } SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE); break; } default: crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } sftk_FreeObject(key); return sftk_mapWrap(crv); } /* * import a pprivate key info into the desired slot */ static SECStatus sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(SFTKObject *key, SECItem *bpki) { CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RSA; SECStatus rv = SECFailure; const SEC_ASN1Template *keyTemplate, *paramTemplate; void *paramDest = NULL; PLArenaPool *arena; NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lpk = NULL; NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL; CK_RV crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; arena = PORT_NewArena(2048); if(!arena) { return SECFailure; } pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo)); if(!pki) { PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); return SECFailure; } if(SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(arena, pki, nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate, bpki) != SECSuccess) { PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE); return SECFailure; } lpk = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey)); if(lpk == NULL) { goto loser; } lpk->arena = arena; switch(SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&pki->algorithm)) { case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION: keyTemplate = nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate; paramTemplate = NULL; paramDest = NULL; lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYRSAKey; prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk); break; case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE: keyTemplate = nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate; paramTemplate = nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate; paramDest = &(lpk->u.dsa.params); lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYDSAKey; prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lpk); prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lpk->u.dsa.params); break; /* case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: */ #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY: keyTemplate = nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate; paramTemplate = NULL; paramDest = &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding); lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYECKey; prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk); prepare_low_ecparams_for_asn1(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams); break; #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ default: keyTemplate = NULL; paramTemplate = NULL; paramDest = NULL; break; } if(!keyTemplate) { goto loser; } /* decode the private key and any algorithm parameters */ rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, lpk, keyTemplate, &pki->privateKey); #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC if (lpk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYECKey) { /* convert length in bits to length in bytes */ lpk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3; rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding), &(pki->algorithm.parameters)); if(rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; } } #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ if(rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; } if(paramDest && paramTemplate) { rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, paramDest, paramTemplate, &(pki->algorithm.parameters)); if(rv != SECSuccess) { goto loser; } } rv = SECFailure; switch (lpk->keyType) { case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey: keyType = CKK_RSA; if(sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) { sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB); } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_UNWRAP, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DECRYPT, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_MODULUS, sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.modulus)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.publicExponent)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.privateExponent)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_1, sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime1)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_2, sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime2)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_1, sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent1)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_2, sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent2)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_COEFFICIENT, sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.coefficient)); break; case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey: keyType = CKK_DSA; crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK : CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME, sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.prime)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SUBPRIME, sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.subPrime)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_BASE, sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.base)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE, sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.privateValue)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; break; #ifdef notdef case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: template = dhTemplate; templateCount = sizeof(dhTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE); keyType = CKK_DH; break; #endif /* what about fortezza??? */ #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC case NSSLOWKEYECKey: keyType = CKK_EC; crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK : CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EC_PARAMS, sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE, sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.privateValue)); if(crv != CKR_OK) break; /* XXX Do we need to decode the EC Params here ?? */ break; #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ default: crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } loser: if(lpk) { nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lpk); } if(crv != CKR_OK) { return SECFailure; } return SECSuccess; } /* NSC_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new key object. */ CK_RV NSC_UnwrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) { SFTKObject *key = NULL; SFTKSession *session; CK_ULONG key_length = 0; unsigned char * buf = NULL; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; int i; CK_ULONG bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen; SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession); SECItem bpki; CK_OBJECT_CLASS target_type = CKO_SECRET_KEY; CHECK_FORK(); if (!slot) { return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; } /* * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of */ key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */ if (key == NULL) { return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } /* * load the template values into the object */ for (i=0; i < (int) ulAttributeCount; i++) { if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) { key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue; continue; } if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_CLASS) { target_type = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *)pTemplate[i].pValue; } crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i])); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; } if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession,pMechanism,hUnwrappingKey,CKA_UNWRAP, CKA_UNWRAP, SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return sftk_mapWrap(crv); } /* allocate the buffer to decrypt into * this assumes the unwrapped key is never larger than the * wrapped key. For all the mechanisms we support this is true */ buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc( ulWrappedKeyLen); bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen; crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession, pWrappedKey, ulWrappedKeyLen, buf, &bsize); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); PORT_Free(buf); return sftk_mapWrap(crv); } switch(target_type) { case CKO_SECRET_KEY: if (!sftk_hasAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE)) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; break; } if (key_length == 0 || key_length > bsize) { key_length = bsize; } if (key_length > MAX_KEY_LEN) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; break; } /* add the value */ crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length); break; case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY: bpki.data = (unsigned char *)buf; bpki.len = bsize; crv = CKR_OK; if(sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(key, &bpki) != SECSuccess) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; } break; default: crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; break; } PORT_ZFree(buf, bsize); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } /* get the session */ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; } /* * handle the base object stuff */ crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session); *phKey = key->handle; sftk_FreeSession(session); sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } /* * The SSL key gen mechanism create's lots of keys. This function handles the * details of each of these key creation. */ static CK_RV sftk_buildSSLKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, SFTKObject *baseKey, PRBool isMacKey, unsigned char *keyBlock, unsigned int keySize, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *keyHandle) { SFTKObject *key; SFTKSession *session; CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE; CK_RV crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; /* * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of */ *keyHandle = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; key = sftk_NewObject(baseKey->slot); if (key == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key)->wasDerived = PR_TRUE; crv = sftk_CopyObject(key,baseKey); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; if (isMacKey) { crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ENCRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DECRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_WRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_UNWRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; } crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,keyBlock,keySize); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser; /* get the session */ crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) { goto loser; } crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session); sftk_FreeSession(session); *keyHandle = key->handle; loser: if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } /* * if there is an error, we need to free the keys we already created in SSL * This is the routine that will do it.. */ static void sftk_freeSSLKeys(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT *returnedMaterial ) { if (returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { NSC_DestroyObject(session,returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret); } if (returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret); } if (returnedMaterial->hClientKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hClientKey); } if (returnedMaterial->hServerKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) { NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerKey); } } /* * when deriving from sensitive and extractable keys, we need to preserve some * of the semantics in the derived key. This helper routine maintains these * semantics. */ static CK_RV sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(SFTKObject *baseKey,SFTKObject *destKey) { PRBool hasSensitive; PRBool sensitive = PR_FALSE; PRBool hasExtractable; PRBool extractable = PR_TRUE; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; SFTKAttribute *att; hasSensitive = PR_FALSE; att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey,CKA_SENSITIVE); if (att) { hasSensitive = PR_TRUE; sensitive = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue; sftk_FreeAttribute(att); } hasExtractable = PR_FALSE; att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE); if (att) { hasExtractable = PR_TRUE; extractable = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue; sftk_FreeAttribute(att); } /* don't make a key more accessible */ if (sftk_isTrue(baseKey,CKA_SENSITIVE) && hasSensitive && (sensitive == PR_FALSE)) { return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; } if (!sftk_isTrue(baseKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE) && hasExtractable && (extractable == PR_TRUE)) { return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; } /* inherit parent's sensitivity */ if (!hasSensitive) { att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey,CKA_SENSITIVE); if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib)); sftk_FreeAttribute(att); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; } if (!hasExtractable) { att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE); if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib)); sftk_FreeAttribute(att); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; } /* we should inherit the parent's always extractable/ never sensitive info, * but handleObject always forces this attributes, so we would need to do * something special. */ return CKR_OK; } /* * make known fixed PKCS #11 key types to their sizes in bytes */ unsigned long sftk_MapKeySize(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType) { switch (keyType) { case CKK_CDMF: return 8; case CKK_DES: return 8; case CKK_DES2: return 16; case CKK_DES3: return 24; /* IDEA and CAST need to be added */ default: break; } return 0; } #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC /* Inputs: * key_len: Length of derived key to be generated. * SharedSecret: a shared secret that is the output of a key agreement primitive. * SharedInfo: (Optional) some data shared by the entities computing the secret key. * SharedInfoLen: the length in octets of SharedInfo * Hash: The hash function to be used in the KDF * HashLen: the length in octets of the output of Hash * Output: * key: Pointer to a buffer containing derived key, if return value is SECSuccess. */ static CK_RV sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(CK_BYTE **key, CK_ULONG key_len, SECItem *SharedSecret, CK_BYTE_PTR SharedInfo, CK_ULONG SharedInfoLen, SECStatus Hash(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, PRUint32), CK_ULONG HashLen) { unsigned char *buffer = NULL, *output_buffer = NULL; PRUint32 buffer_len, max_counter, i; SECStatus rv; CK_RV crv; /* Check that key_len isn't too long. The maximum key length could be * greatly increased if the code below did not limit the 4-byte counter * to a maximum value of 255. */ if (key_len > 254 * HashLen) return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; if (SharedInfo == NULL) SharedInfoLen = 0; buffer_len = SharedSecret->len + 4 + SharedInfoLen; buffer = (CK_BYTE *)PORT_Alloc(buffer_len); if (buffer == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; goto loser; } max_counter = key_len/HashLen; if (key_len > max_counter * HashLen) max_counter++; output_buffer = (CK_BYTE *)PORT_Alloc(max_counter * HashLen); if (output_buffer == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; goto loser; } /* Populate buffer with SharedSecret || Counter || [SharedInfo] * where Counter is 0x00000001 */ PORT_Memcpy(buffer, SharedSecret->data, SharedSecret->len); buffer[SharedSecret->len] = 0; buffer[SharedSecret->len + 1] = 0; buffer[SharedSecret->len + 2] = 0; buffer[SharedSecret->len + 3] = 1; if (SharedInfo) { PORT_Memcpy(&buffer[SharedSecret->len + 4], SharedInfo, SharedInfoLen); } for(i=0; i < max_counter; i++) { rv = Hash(&output_buffer[i * HashLen], buffer, buffer_len); if (rv != SECSuccess) { /* 'Hash' should not fail. */ crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; goto loser; } /* Increment counter (assumes max_counter < 255) */ buffer[SharedSecret->len + 3]++; } PORT_ZFree(buffer, buffer_len); if (key_len < max_counter * HashLen) { PORT_Memset(output_buffer + key_len, 0, max_counter * HashLen - key_len); } *key = output_buffer; return CKR_OK; loser: if (buffer) { PORT_ZFree(buffer, buffer_len); } if (output_buffer) { PORT_ZFree(output_buffer, max_counter * HashLen); } return crv; } static CK_RV sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(CK_BYTE **key, CK_ULONG key_len, SECItem *SharedSecret, CK_BYTE_PTR SharedInfo, CK_ULONG SharedInfoLen, CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf) { if (kdf == CKD_SHA1_KDF) return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo, SharedInfoLen, SHA1_HashBuf, SHA1_LENGTH); else if (kdf == CKD_SHA224_KDF) return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo, SharedInfoLen, SHA224_HashBuf, SHA224_LENGTH); else if (kdf == CKD_SHA256_KDF) return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo, SharedInfoLen, SHA256_HashBuf, SHA256_LENGTH); else if (kdf == CKD_SHA384_KDF) return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo, SharedInfoLen, SHA384_HashBuf, SHA384_LENGTH); else if (kdf == CKD_SHA512_KDF) return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo, SharedInfoLen, SHA512_HashBuf, SHA512_LENGTH); else return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; } #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ /* * SSL Key generation given pre master secret */ #define NUM_MIXERS 9 static const char * const mixers[NUM_MIXERS] = { "A", "BB", "CCC", "DDDD", "EEEEE", "FFFFFF", "GGGGGGG", "HHHHHHHH", "IIIIIIIII" }; #define SSL3_PMS_LENGTH 48 #define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH 48 #define SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH 32 /* NSC_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key object. */ CK_RV NSC_DeriveKey( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey) { SFTKSession * session; SFTKSlot * slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession); SFTKObject * key; SFTKObject * sourceKey; SFTKAttribute * att = NULL; SFTKAttribute * att2 = NULL; unsigned char * buf; SHA1Context * sha; MD5Context * md5; MD2Context * md2; CK_ULONG macSize; CK_ULONG tmpKeySize; CK_ULONG IVSize; CK_ULONG keySize = 0; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; CK_OBJECT_CLASS classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY; CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *stringPtr; CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = pMechanism->mechanism; PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE; PRBool isDH = PR_FALSE; HASH_HashType tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgNULL; SECStatus rv; int i; unsigned int outLen; unsigned char sha_out[SHA1_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_block[NUM_MIXERS * MD5_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_block2[MD5_LENGTH]; PRBool isFIPS; HASH_HashType hashType; PRBool extractValue = PR_TRUE; CHECK_FORK(); if (!slot) { return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; } /* * now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of */ if (phKey) *phKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */ if (key == NULL) { return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } isFIPS = (slot->slotID == FIPS_SLOT_ID); /* * load the template values into the object */ for (i=0; i < (int) ulAttributeCount; i++) { crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i])); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) { keyType = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)pTemplate[i].pValue; } if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) { keySize = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue; } } if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } if (keySize == 0) { keySize = sftk_MapKeySize(keyType); } switch (mechanism) { case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA1: /* fall through */ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256: /* fall through */ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384: /* fall through */ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512: extractValue = PR_FALSE; classType = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; break; case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1: /* fall through */ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256: /* fall through */ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384: /* fall through */ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512: extractValue = PR_FALSE; /* fall through */ default: classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY; } crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_CLASS,&classType,sizeof(classType)); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } /* look up the base key we're deriving with */ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; } sourceKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hBaseKey,session); sftk_FreeSession(session); if (sourceKey == NULL) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; } if (extractValue) { /* get the value of the base key */ att = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_VALUE); if (att == NULL) { sftk_FreeObject(key); sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey); return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; } } switch (mechanism) { /* * generate the master secret */ case CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE: case CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH: case CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256: case CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256: case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE: case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH: case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE: case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH: { CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *ssl3_master; SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret * rsa_pms; unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2]; if ((mechanism == CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE) || (mechanism == CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) { CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *tls12_master = (CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter; tlsPrfHash = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_master->prfHashMechanism); if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } } else if ((mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256) || (mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256)) { tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgSHA256; } if ((mechanism != CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE) && (mechanism != CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) { isTLS = PR_TRUE; } if ((mechanism == CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH) || (mechanism == CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH) || (mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256) || (mechanism == CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) { isDH = PR_TRUE; } /* first do the consistency checks */ if (!isDH && (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_PMS_LENGTH)) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE); if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) { if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; break; } sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); if (keyType != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) { crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; break; } if ((keySize != 0) && (keySize != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) { crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; break; } /* finally do the key gen */ ssl3_master = (CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter; PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata, ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); if (ssl3_master->pVersion) { SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key); rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *) att->attrib.pValue; /* don't leak more key material then necessary for SSL to work */ if ((sessKey == NULL) || sessKey->wasDerived) { ssl3_master->pVersion->major = 0xff; ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = 0xff; } else { ssl3_master->pVersion->major = rsa_pms->client_version[0]; ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = rsa_pms->client_version[1]; } } if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } if (isTLS) { SECStatus status; SECItem crsr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; SECItem pms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; crsr.data = crsrdata; crsr.len = sizeof crsrdata; master.data = key_block; master.len = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH; pms.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue; pms.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen; if (tlsPrfHash != HASH_AlgNULL) { status = TLS_P_hash(tlsPrfHash, &pms, "master secret", &crsr, &master, isFIPS); } else { status = TLS_PRF(&pms, "master secret", &crsr, &master, isFIPS); } if (status != SECSuccess) { crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; break; } } else { /* now allocate the hash contexts */ md5 = MD5_NewContext(); if (md5 == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } sha = SHA1_NewContext(); if (sha == NULL) { PORT_Free(md5); crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { SHA1_Begin(sha); SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i])); SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen); SHA1_Update(sha, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata); SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH); PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH); MD5_Begin(md5); MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen); MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen); MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i*MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH); } PORT_Free(md5); PORT_Free(sha); } /* store the results */ crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType)); if (isTLS) { /* TLS's master secret is used to "sign" finished msgs with PRF. */ /* XXX This seems like a hack. But SFTK_Derive only accepts * one "operation" argument. */ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; /* While we're here, we might as well force this, too. */ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; } break; } /* Extended master key derivation [draft-ietf-tls-session-hash] */ case CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE: case CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH: { CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *ems_params; SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *rsa_pms; SECStatus status; SECItem pms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; SECItem seed = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; ems_params = (CK_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS*) pMechanism->pParameter; /* First do the consistency checks */ if ((mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_EXTENDED_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE) && (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_PMS_LENGTH)) { crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; break; } att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE); if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) { if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; break; } sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); if (keyType != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) { crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; break; } if ((keySize != 0) && (keySize != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) { crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; break; } /* Do the key derivation */ pms.data = (unsigned char*) att->attrib.pValue; pms.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen; seed.data = ems_params->pSessionHash; seed.len = ems_params->ulSessionHashLen; master.data = key_block; master.len = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH; if (ems_params-> prfHashMechanism == CKM_TLS_PRF) { /* * In this case, the session hash is the concatenation of SHA-1 * and MD5, so it should be 36 bytes long. */ if (seed.len != MD5_LENGTH + SHA1_LENGTH) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; break; } status = TLS_PRF(&pms, "extended master secret", &seed, &master, isFIPS); } else { const SECHashObject *hashObj; tlsPrfHash = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(ems_params->prfHashMechanism); if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(tlsPrfHash); if (seed.len != hashObj->length) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; break; } status = TLS_P_hash(tlsPrfHash, &pms, "extended master secret", &seed, &master, isFIPS); } /* Reflect the version if required */ if (ems_params->pVersion) { SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key); rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *) att->attrib.pValue; /* don't leak more key material than necessary for SSL to work */ if ((sessKey == NULL) || sessKey->wasDerived) { ems_params->pVersion->major = 0xff; ems_params->pVersion->minor = 0xff; } else { ems_params->pVersion->major = rsa_pms->client_version[0]; ems_params->pVersion->minor = rsa_pms->client_version[1]; } } /* Store the results */ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, key_block, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH); break; } case CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE: case CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256: case CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE: case CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE: { CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *ssl3_keys; CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT * ssl3_keys_out; CK_ULONG effKeySize; unsigned int block_needed; unsigned char srcrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2]; unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2]; if (mechanism == CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE) { CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *tls12_keys = (CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter; tlsPrfHash = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_keys->prfHashMechanism); if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } } else if (mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256) { tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgSHA256; } if (mechanism != CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE) { isTLS = PR_TRUE; } crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH) { crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; break; } att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE); if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) { if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED; break; } sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); md5 = MD5_NewContext(); if (md5 == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } sha = SHA1_NewContext(); if (sha == NULL) { PORT_Free(md5); crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } ssl3_keys = (CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter; PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata, ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata, ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH, ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH); /* * clear out our returned keys so we can recover on failure */ ssl3_keys_out = ssl3_keys->pReturnedKeyMaterial; ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; /* * How much key material do we need? */ macSize = ssl3_keys->ulMacSizeInBits/8; effKeySize = ssl3_keys->ulKeySizeInBits/8; IVSize = ssl3_keys->ulIVSizeInBits/8; if (keySize == 0) { effKeySize = keySize; } block_needed = 2 * (macSize + effKeySize + ((!ssl3_keys->bIsExport) * IVSize)); PORT_Assert(block_needed <= sizeof key_block); if (block_needed > sizeof key_block) block_needed = sizeof key_block; /* * generate the key material: This looks amazingly similar to the * PMS code, and is clearly crying out for a function to provide it. */ if (isTLS) { SECStatus status; SECItem srcr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; SECItem keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; srcr.data = srcrdata; srcr.len = sizeof srcrdata; keyblk.data = key_block; keyblk.len = block_needed; master.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue; master.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen; if (tlsPrfHash != HASH_AlgNULL) { status = TLS_P_hash(tlsPrfHash, &master, "key expansion", &srcr, &keyblk, isFIPS); } else { status = TLS_PRF(&master, "key expansion", &srcr, &keyblk, isFIPS); } if (status != SECSuccess) { goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; } } else { unsigned int block_bytes = 0; /* key_block = * MD5(master_secret + SHA('A' + master_secret + * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) + * MD5(master_secret + SHA('BB' + master_secret + * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) + * MD5(master_secret + SHA('CCC' + master_secret + * ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) + * [...]; */ for (i = 0; i < NUM_MIXERS && block_bytes < block_needed; i++) { SHA1_Begin(sha); SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i])); SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen); SHA1_Update(sha, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata); SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH); PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH); MD5_Begin(md5); MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen); MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen); MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i*MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH); block_bytes += outLen; } } /* * Put the key material where it goes. */ i = 0; /* now shows how much consumed */ /* * The key_block is partitioned as follows: * client_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size] */ crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret); if (crv != CKR_OK) goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; i += macSize; /* * server_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size] */ crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret); if (crv != CKR_OK) { goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; } i += macSize; if (keySize) { if (!ssl3_keys->bIsExport) { /* ** Generate Domestic write keys and IVs. ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] */ crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i], keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey); if (crv != CKR_OK) { goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; } i += keySize; /* ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] */ crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i], keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey); if (crv != CKR_OK) { goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; } i += keySize; /* ** client_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size] */ if (IVSize > 0) { PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, &key_block[i], IVSize); i += IVSize; } /* ** server_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size] */ if (IVSize > 0) { PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, &key_block[i], IVSize); i += IVSize; } PORT_Assert(i <= sizeof key_block); } else if (!isTLS) { /* ** Generate SSL3 Export write keys and IVs. ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] ** final_client_write_key = MD5(client_write_key + ** ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random); */ MD5_Begin(md5); MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize); MD5_Update(md5, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata); MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); i += effKeySize; crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2, keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey); if (crv != CKR_OK) { goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; } /* ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] ** final_server_write_key = MD5(server_write_key + ** ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random); */ MD5_Begin(md5); MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize); MD5_Update(md5, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata); MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); i += effKeySize; crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2, keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey); if (crv != CKR_OK) { goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; } /* ** client_write_IV = ** MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random); */ MD5_Begin(md5); MD5_Update(md5, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata); MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, key_block2, IVSize); /* ** server_write_IV = ** MD5(ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random); */ MD5_Begin(md5); MD5_Update(md5, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata); MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH); PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, key_block2, IVSize); } else { /* ** Generate TLS 1.0 Export write keys and IVs. */ SECStatus status; SECItem secret = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; SECItem crsr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; SECItem keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 }; /* ** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] ** final_client_write_key = PRF(client_write_key, ** "client write key", ** client_random + server_random); */ secret.data = &key_block[i]; secret.len = effKeySize; i += effKeySize; crsr.data = crsrdata; crsr.len = sizeof crsrdata; keyblk.data = key_block2; keyblk.len = sizeof key_block2; status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "client write key", &crsr, &keyblk, isFIPS); if (status != SECSuccess) { goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; } crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2, keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey); if (crv != CKR_OK) { goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; } /* ** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material] ** final_server_write_key = PRF(server_write_key, ** "server write key", ** client_random + server_random); */ secret.data = &key_block[i]; secret.len = effKeySize; i += effKeySize; keyblk.data = key_block2; keyblk.len = sizeof key_block2; status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "server write key", &crsr, &keyblk, isFIPS); if (status != SECSuccess) { goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; } crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2, keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey); if (crv != CKR_OK) { goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; } /* ** iv_block = PRF("", "IV block", ** client_random + server_random); ** client_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size] ** server_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size] */ if (IVSize) { secret.data = NULL; secret.len = 0; keyblk.data = &key_block[i]; keyblk.len = 2 * IVSize; status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "IV block", &crsr, &keyblk, isFIPS); if (status != SECSuccess) { goto key_and_mac_derive_fail; } PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, keyblk.data, IVSize); PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, keyblk.data + IVSize, IVSize); } } } crv = CKR_OK; if (0) { key_and_mac_derive_fail: if (crv == CKR_OK) crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; sftk_freeSSLKeys(hSession, ssl3_keys_out); } MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE); SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE); sftk_FreeObject(key); key = NULL; break; } case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY: { SFTKObject *newKey; crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) { crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; break; } newKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(*(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *) pMechanism->pParameter,session); sftk_FreeSession(session); if ( newKey == NULL) { crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; break; } if (sftk_isTrue(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) { crv = sftk_forceAttribute(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE,&cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL)); if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(newKey); break; } } att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(newKey,CKA_VALUE); if (att2 == NULL) { sftk_FreeObject(newKey); crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; break; } tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+att2->attrib.ulValueLen; if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize; if (keySize > tmpKeySize) { sftk_FreeObject(newKey); sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; break; } buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize); if (buf == NULL) { sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); sftk_FreeObject(newKey); crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen); PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen, att2->attrib.pValue,att2->attrib.ulValueLen); crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize); sftk_FreeAttribute(att2); sftk_FreeObject(newKey); break; } case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA: crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *) pMechanism->pParameter; tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen; if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize; if (keySize > tmpKeySize) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; break; } buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize); if (buf == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen); PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->pData, stringPtr->ulLen); crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize); break; case CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE: crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter; tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen; if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize; if (keySize > tmpKeySize) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; break; } buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize); if (buf == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } PORT_Memcpy(buf,stringPtr->pData,stringPtr->ulLen); PORT_Memcpy(buf+stringPtr->ulLen,att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen); crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize); break; case CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA: crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter; tmpKeySize = PR_MIN(att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->ulLen); if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize; if (keySize > tmpKeySize) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; break; } buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize); if (buf == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,keySize); for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) { buf[i] ^= stringPtr->pData[i]; } crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize); break; case CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY: { /* the following assumes 8 bits per byte */ CK_ULONG extract = *(CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter; CK_ULONG shift = extract & 0x7; /* extract mod 8 the fast way */ CK_ULONG offset = extract >> 3; /* extract div 8 the fast way */ crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; if (keySize == 0) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE; break; } /* make sure we have enough bits in the original key */ if (att->attrib.ulValueLen < (offset + keySize + ((shift != 0)? 1 :0)) ) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize); if (buf == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } /* copy the bits we need into the new key */ for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) { unsigned char *value = ((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue)+offset+i; if (shift) { buf[i] = (value[0] << (shift)) | (value[1] >> (8 - shift)); } else { buf[i] = value[0]; } } crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize); PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize); break; } case CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION: if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD2_LENGTH; if (keySize > MD2_LENGTH) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; break; } /* now allocate the hash contexts */ md2 = MD2_NewContext(); if (md2 == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } MD2_Begin(md2); MD2_Update(md2,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen); MD2_End(md2,key_block,&outLen,MD2_LENGTH); MD2_DestroyContext(md2, PR_TRUE); crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize); break; case CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION: if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD5_LENGTH; if (keySize > MD5_LENGTH) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; break; } MD5_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen); crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize); break; case CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION: if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA1_LENGTH; if (keySize > SHA1_LENGTH) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; break; } SHA1_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen); crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize); break; case CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION: if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA224_LENGTH; if (keySize > SHA224_LENGTH) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; break; } SHA224_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen); crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize); break; case CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION: if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA256_LENGTH; if (keySize > SHA256_LENGTH) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; break; } SHA256_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen); crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize); break; case CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION: if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA384_LENGTH; if (keySize > SHA384_LENGTH) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; break; } SHA384_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen); crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize); break; case CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION: if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA512_LENGTH; if (keySize > SHA512_LENGTH) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; break; } SHA512_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen); crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize); break; case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE: { SECItem derived, dhPublic; SECItem dhPrime, dhValue; /* sourceKey - values for the local existing low key */ /* get prime and value attributes */ crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime, sourceKey, CKA_PRIME); if (crv != SECSuccess) break; crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhValue, sourceKey, CKA_VALUE); if (crv != SECSuccess) { PORT_Free(dhPrime.data); break; } dhPublic.data = pMechanism->pParameter; dhPublic.len = pMechanism->ulParameterLen; /* calculate private value - oct */ rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize); PORT_Free(dhPrime.data); PORT_Free(dhValue.data); if (rv == SECSuccess) { sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len); PORT_ZFree(derived.data, derived.len); } else crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } #ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE: case CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE: { SECItem ecScalar, ecPoint; SECItem tmp; PRBool withCofactor = PR_FALSE; unsigned char *secret; unsigned char *keyData = NULL; unsigned int secretlen, curveLen, pubKeyLen; CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *mechParams; NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey; PLArenaPool *arena = NULL; /* Check mechanism parameters */ mechParams = (CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter; if ((pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS)) || ((mechParams->kdf == CKD_NULL) && ((mechParams->ulSharedDataLen != 0) || (mechParams->pSharedData != NULL)))) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(sourceKey, CKK_EC, &crv); if (privKey == NULL) { break; } /* Now we are working with a non-NULL private key */ SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ecScalar, &privKey->u.ec.privateValue); ecPoint.data = mechParams->pPublicData; ecPoint.len = mechParams->ulPublicDataLen; curveLen = (privKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.size +7)/8; pubKeyLen = (2*curveLen) + 1; /* if the len is too small, can't be a valid point */ if (ecPoint.len < pubKeyLen) { goto ec_loser; } /* if the len is too large, must be an encoded point (length is * equal case just falls through */ if (ecPoint.len > pubKeyLen) { SECItem newPoint; arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE); if (arena == NULL) { goto ec_loser; } rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &newPoint, SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate), &ecPoint); if (rv != SECSuccess) { goto ec_loser; } ecPoint = newPoint; } if (mechanism == CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE) { withCofactor = PR_TRUE; } else { /* When not using cofactor derivation, one should * validate the public key to avoid small subgroup * attacks. */ if (EC_ValidatePublicKey(&privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecPoint) != SECSuccess) { goto ec_loser; } } rv = ECDH_Derive(&ecPoint, &privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecScalar, withCofactor, &tmp); PORT_Free(ecScalar.data); ecScalar.data = NULL; if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo) { nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); privKey=NULL; } if (arena) { PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_FALSE); arena=NULL; } if (rv != SECSuccess) { crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError()); break; } /* * apply the kdf function. */ if (mechParams->kdf == CKD_NULL) { /* * tmp is the raw data created by ECDH_Derive, * secret and secretlen are the values we will * eventually pass as our generated key. */ secret = tmp.data; secretlen = tmp.len; } else { secretlen = keySize; crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize, &tmp, mechParams->pSharedData, mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf); PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len); if (crv != CKR_OK) { break; } tmp.data = secret; tmp.len = secretlen; } /* * if keySize is supplied, then we are generating a key of a specific * length. This is done by taking the least significant 'keySize' * bytes from the unsigned value calculated by ECDH. Note: this may * mean padding temp with extra leading zeros from what ECDH_Derive * already returned (which itself may contain leading zeros). */ if (keySize) { if (secretlen < keySize) { keyData = PORT_ZAlloc(keySize); if (!keyData) { PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len); crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize-secretlen],secret,secretlen); secret = keyData; } else { secret += (secretlen - keySize); } secretlen = keySize; } sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen); PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len); if (keyData) { PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize); } break; ec_loser: crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD; PORT_Free(ecScalar.data); if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo) nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey); if (arena) { PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE); } break; } #endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */ /* See RFC 5869 and CK_NSS_HKDFParams for documentation. */ case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA1: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; goto hkdf; case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto hkdf; case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto hkdf; case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto hkdf; hkdf: { const CK_NSS_HKDFParams * params = (const CK_NSS_HKDFParams *) pMechanism->pParameter; const SECHashObject * rawHash; unsigned hashLen; CK_BYTE buf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX]; CK_BYTE * prk; /* psuedo-random key */ CK_ULONG prkLen; CK_BYTE * okm; /* output keying material */ rawHash = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hashType); if (rawHash == NULL || rawHash->length > sizeof buf) { crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED; break; } hashLen = rawHash->length; if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_HKDFParams) || !params || (!params->bExpand && !params->bExtract) || (params->bExtract && params->ulSaltLen > 0 && !params->pSalt) || (params->bExpand && params->ulInfoLen > 0 && !params->pInfo)) { crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; break; } if (keySize == 0 || keySize > sizeof key_block || (!params->bExpand && keySize > hashLen) || (params->bExpand && keySize > 255 * hashLen)) { crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; break; } crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; /* HKDF-Extract(salt, base key value) */ if (params->bExtract) { CK_BYTE * salt; CK_ULONG saltLen; HMACContext * hmac; unsigned int bufLen; salt = params->pSalt; saltLen = params->ulSaltLen; if (salt == NULL) { saltLen = hashLen; salt = buf; memset(salt, 0, saltLen); } hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, salt, saltLen, isFIPS); if (!hmac) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } HMAC_Begin(hmac); HMAC_Update(hmac, (const unsigned char*) att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen); HMAC_Finish(hmac, buf, &bufLen, sizeof(buf)); HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE); PORT_Assert(bufLen == rawHash->length); prk = buf; prkLen = bufLen; } else { /* PRK = base key value */ prk = (CK_BYTE*) att->attrib.pValue; prkLen = att->attrib.ulValueLen; } /* HKDF-Expand */ if (!params->bExpand) { okm = prk; } else { /* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01) * T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n * key material = T(1) | ... | T(n) */ HMACContext * hmac; CK_BYTE i; unsigned iterations = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, hashLen) / hashLen; hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, prk, prkLen, isFIPS); if (hmac == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } for (i = 1; i <= iterations; ++i) { unsigned len; HMAC_Begin(hmac); if (i > 1) { HMAC_Update(hmac, key_block + ((i-2) * hashLen), hashLen); } if (params->ulInfoLen != 0) { HMAC_Update(hmac, params->pInfo, params->ulInfoLen); } HMAC_Update(hmac, &i, 1); HMAC_Finish(hmac, key_block + ((i-1) * hashLen), &len, hashLen); PORT_Assert(len == hashLen); } HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE); okm = key_block; } /* key material = prk */ crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, okm, keySize); break; } /* end of CKM_NSS_HKDF_* */ case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA1: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; goto jpake2; case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto jpake2; case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto jpake2; case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto jpake2; jpake2: if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL || pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params)) crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_TOKEN)) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT; if (crv == CKR_OK) crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key); if (crv == CKR_OK) crv = jpake_Round2(hashType, (CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params *) pMechanism->pParameter, sourceKey, key); break; case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; goto jpakeFinal; case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto jpakeFinal; case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto jpakeFinal; case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto jpakeFinal; jpakeFinal: if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL || pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams)) crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID; /* We purposely do not do the derive sensitivity check; we want to be able to derive non-sensitive keys while allowing the ROUND1 and ROUND2 keys to be sensitive (which they always are, since they are in the CKO_PRIVATE_KEY class). The caller must include CKA_SENSITIVE in the template in order for the resultant keyblock key to be sensitive. */ if (crv == CKR_OK) crv = jpake_Final(hashType, (CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams *) pMechanism->pParameter, sourceKey, key); break; default: crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID; } if (att) { sftk_FreeAttribute(att); } sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey); if (crv != CKR_OK) { if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; } /* link the key object into the list */ if (key) { SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key); PORT_Assert(sessKey); /* get the session */ sessKey->wasDerived = PR_TRUE; session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; } crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session); sftk_FreeSession(session); *phKey = key->handle; sftk_FreeObject(key); } return crv; } /* NSC_GetFunctionStatus obtains an updated status of a function running * in parallel with an application. */ CK_RV NSC_GetFunctionStatus(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) { CHECK_FORK(); return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL; } /* NSC_CancelFunction cancels a function running in parallel */ CK_RV NSC_CancelFunction(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession) { CHECK_FORK(); return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL; } /* NSC_GetOperationState saves the state of the cryptographic *operation in a session. * NOTE: This code only works for digest functions for now. eventually need * to add full flatten/resurect to our state stuff so that all types of state * can be saved */ CK_RV NSC_GetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen) { SFTKSessionContext *context; SFTKSession *session; CK_RV crv; CK_ULONG pOSLen = *pulOperationStateLen; CHECK_FORK(); /* make sure we're legal */ crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; *pulOperationStateLen = context->cipherInfoLen + sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE) + sizeof(SFTKContextType); if (pOperationState == NULL) { sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OK; } else { if (pOSLen < *pulOperationStateLen) { return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } } PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,&context->type,sizeof(SFTKContextType)); pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType); PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,&context->currentMech, sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)); pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE); PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,context->cipherInfo,context->cipherInfoLen); sftk_FreeSession(session); return CKR_OK; } #define sftk_Decrement(stateSize,len) \ stateSize = ((stateSize) > (CK_ULONG)(len)) ? \ ((stateSize) - (CK_ULONG)(len)) : 0; /* NSC_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic * operation in a session. This is coded like it can restore lots of * states, but it only works for truly flat cipher structures. */ CK_RV NSC_SetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey) { SFTKSessionContext *context; SFTKSession *session; SFTKContextType type; CK_MECHANISM mech; CK_RV crv = CKR_OK; CHECK_FORK(); while (ulOperationStateLen != 0) { /* get what type of state we're dealing with... */ PORT_Memcpy(&type,pOperationState, sizeof(SFTKContextType)); /* fix up session contexts based on type */ session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session, type); sftk_SetContextByType(session, type, NULL); if (context) { sftk_FreeContext(context); } pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType); sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,sizeof(SFTKContextType)); /* get the mechanism structure */ PORT_Memcpy(&mech.mechanism,pOperationState,sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)); pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE); sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen, sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)); /* should be filled in... but not necessary for hash */ mech.pParameter = NULL; mech.ulParameterLen = 0; switch (type) { case SFTK_HASH: crv = NSC_DigestInit(hSession,&mech); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, NULL); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; PORT_Memcpy(context->cipherInfo,pOperationState, context->cipherInfoLen); pOperationState += context->cipherInfoLen; sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,context->cipherInfoLen); break; default: /* do sign/encrypt/decrypt later */ crv = CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID; } sftk_FreeSession(session); if (crv != CKR_OK) break; } return crv; } /* Dual-function cryptographic operations */ /* NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting and encryption * operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen) { CK_RV crv; CHECK_FORK(); crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart, pulEncryptedPartLen); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen); return crv; } /* NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and * digesting operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen) { CK_RV crv; CHECK_FORK(); crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen, pPart, pulPartLen); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,pPart,*pulPartLen); return crv; } /* NSC_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and * encryption operation. */ CK_RV NSC_SignEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen) { CK_RV crv; CHECK_FORK(); crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart, pulEncryptedPartLen); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen); return crv; } /* NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption * and verify operation. */ CK_RV NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen) { CK_RV crv; CHECK_FORK(); crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen, pData, pulDataLen); if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv; crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, *pulDataLen); return crv; } /* NSC_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting operation, * by digesting the value of a secret key as part of the data already digested. */ CK_RV NSC_DigestKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey) { SFTKSession *session = NULL; SFTKObject *key = NULL; SFTKAttribute *att; CK_RV crv; CHECK_FORK(); session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession); if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID; key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session); sftk_FreeSession(session); if (key == NULL) return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; /* PUT ANY DIGEST KEY RESTRICTION CHECKS HERE */ /* make sure it's a valid key for this operation */ if (key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT; } /* get the key value */ att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE); sftk_FreeObject(key); if (!att) { return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; } crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,(CK_BYTE_PTR)att->attrib.pValue, att->attrib.ulValueLen); sftk_FreeAttribute(att); return crv; }