kamp/RetroZilla
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/rn10950/RetroZilla.git synced 2024-11-16 12:30:13 +01:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
1109ce4d81
RetroZilla/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11cxt.c
Ryan Nematz 2f2ae146c0 first commit
2015-10-20 23:03:22 -04:00

1069 lines
29 KiB
C
Raw Blame History

/* ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK *****
* Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1
*
* The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
* 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
* the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
* http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
*
* Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
* WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
* for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
* License.
*
* The Original Code is the Netscape security libraries.
*
* The Initial Developer of the Original Code is
* Netscape Communications Corporation.
* Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 1994-2000
* the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Contributor(s):
*
* Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of
* either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or
* the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"),
* in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead
* of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only
* under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to
* use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your
* decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice
* and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete
* the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under
* the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL.
*
* ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */
/*
* This file PK11Contexts which are used in multipart hashing,
* encryption/decryption, and signing/verication operations.
*/
#include "seccomon.h"
#include "secmod.h"
#include "nssilock.h"
#include "secmodi.h"
#include "secmodti.h"
#include "pkcs11.h"
#include "pk11func.h"
#include "secitem.h"
#include "secoid.h"
#include "sechash.h"
#include "secerr.h"
static const SECItem pk11_null_params = { 0 };
/**********************************************************************
*
* Now Deal with Crypto Contexts
*
**********************************************************************/
/*
* the monitors...
*/
void
PK11_EnterContextMonitor(PK11Context *cx) {
/* if we own the session and our slot is ThreadSafe, only monitor
* the Context */
if ((cx->ownSession) && (cx->slot->isThreadSafe)) {
/* Should this use monitors instead? */
PZ_Lock(cx->sessionLock);
} else {
PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(cx->slot);
}
}
void
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(PK11Context *cx) {
/* if we own the session and our slot is ThreadSafe, only monitor
* the Context */
if ((cx->ownSession) && (cx->slot->isThreadSafe)) {
/* Should this use monitors instead? */
PZ_Unlock(cx->sessionLock);
} else {
PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(cx->slot);
}
}
/*
* Free up a Cipher Context
*/
void
PK11_DestroyContext(PK11Context *context, PRBool freeit)
{
pk11_CloseSession(context->slot,context->session,context->ownSession);
/* initialize the critical fields of the context */
if (context->savedData != NULL ) PORT_Free(context->savedData);
if (context->key) PK11_FreeSymKey(context->key);
if (context->param && context->param != &pk11_null_params)
SECITEM_FreeItem(context->param, PR_TRUE);
if (context->sessionLock) PZ_DestroyLock(context->sessionLock);
PK11_FreeSlot(context->slot);
if (freeit) PORT_Free(context);
}
/*
* save the current context. Allocate Space if necessary.
*/
static unsigned char *
pk11_saveContextHelper(PK11Context *context, unsigned char *buffer,
unsigned long *savedLength)
{
CK_RV crv;
/* If buffer is NULL, this will get the length */
crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_GetOperationState(context->session,
(CK_BYTE_PTR)buffer,
savedLength);
if (!buffer || (crv == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)) {
/* the given buffer wasn't big enough (or was NULL), but we
* have the length, so try again with a new buffer and the
* correct length
*/
unsigned long bufLen = *savedLength;
buffer = PORT_Alloc(bufLen);
if (buffer == NULL) {
return (unsigned char *)NULL;
}
crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_GetOperationState(
context->session,
(CK_BYTE_PTR)buffer,
savedLength);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_ZFree(buffer, bufLen);
}
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
return (unsigned char *)NULL;
}
return buffer;
}
void *
pk11_saveContext(PK11Context *context, void *space, unsigned long *savedLength)
{
return pk11_saveContextHelper(context,
(unsigned char *)space, savedLength);
}
/*
* restore the current context
*/
SECStatus
pk11_restoreContext(PK11Context *context,void *space, unsigned long savedLength)
{
CK_RV crv;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID = (context->key) ? context->key->objectID:
CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
PORT_Assert(space != NULL);
if (space == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SetOperationState(context->session,
(CK_BYTE_PTR)space, savedLength, objectID, 0);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv));
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus pk11_Finalize(PK11Context *context);
/*
* Context initialization. Used by all flavors of CreateContext
*/
static SECStatus
pk11_context_init(PK11Context *context, CK_MECHANISM *mech_info)
{
CK_RV crv;
PK11SymKey *symKey = context->key;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
switch (context->operation) {
case CKA_ENCRYPT:
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptInit(context->session,
mech_info, symKey->objectID);
break;
case CKA_DECRYPT:
if (context->fortezzaHack) {
CK_ULONG count = 0;;
/* generate the IV for fortezza */
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptInit(context->session,
mech_info, symKey->objectID);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptFinal(context->session,
NULL, &count);
}
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptInit(context->session,
mech_info, symKey->objectID);
break;
case CKA_SIGN:
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignInit(context->session,
mech_info, symKey->objectID);
break;
case CKA_VERIFY:
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignInit(context->session,
mech_info, symKey->objectID);
break;
case CKA_DIGEST:
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestInit(context->session,
mech_info);
break;
default:
crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
return SECFailure;
}
/*
* handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
*/
if (!context->ownSession) {
context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context,context->savedData,
&context->savedLength);
if (context->savedData == NULL) rv = SECFailure;
/* clear out out session for others to use */
pk11_Finalize(context);
}
return rv;
}
/*
* Common Helper Function do come up with a new context.
*/
static PK11Context *pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, PK11SymKey *symKey,
SECItem *param)
{
CK_MECHANISM mech_info;
PK11Context *context;
SECStatus rv;
PORT_Assert(slot != NULL);
if (!slot || (!symKey && operation != CKA_DIGEST)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return NULL;
}
context = (PK11Context *) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(PK11Context));
if (context == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
/* now deal with the fortezza hack... the fortezza hack is an attempt
* to get around the issue of the card not allowing you to do a FORTEZZA
* LoadIV/Encrypt, which was added because such a combination could be
* use to circumvent the key escrow system. Unfortunately SSL needs to
* do this kind of operation, so in SSL we do a loadIV (to verify it),
* Then GenerateIV, and through away the first 8 bytes on either side
* of the connection.*/
context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE;
if (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64) {
if (symKey->origin == PK11_OriginFortezzaHack) {
context->fortezzaHack = PR_TRUE;
}
}
/* initialize the critical fields of the context */
context->operation = operation;
context->key = symKey ? PK11_ReferenceSymKey(symKey) : NULL;
context->slot = PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
context->session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot,&context->ownSession);
context->cx = symKey ? symKey->cx : NULL;
/* get our session */
context->savedData = NULL;
/* save the parameters so that some digesting stuff can do multiple
* begins on a single context */
context->type = type;
if (param) {
if (param->len > 0) {
context->param = SECITEM_DupItem(param);
} else {
context->param = (SECItem *)&pk11_null_params;
}
} else {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
context->param = NULL;
}
context->init = PR_FALSE;
context->sessionLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockPK11cxt);
if ((context->param == NULL) || (context->sessionLock == NULL)) {
PK11_DestroyContext(context,PR_TRUE);
return NULL;
}
mech_info.mechanism = type;
mech_info.pParameter = param->data;
mech_info.ulParameterLen = param->len;
PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
rv = pk11_context_init(context,&mech_info);
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PK11_DestroyContext(context,PR_TRUE);
return NULL;
}
context->init = PR_TRUE;
return context;
}
/*
* put together the various PK11_Create_Context calls used by different
* parts of libsec.
*/
PK11Context *
__PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key,
SECItem *param, void *wincx)
{
PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL;
PK11Context *context = NULL;
/* first get a slot */
if (slot == NULL) {
slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type,wincx);
if (slot == NULL) {
PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE );
goto loser;
}
} else {
PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
}
/* now import the key */
symKey = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot, type, origin, operation, key, wincx);
if (symKey == NULL) goto loser;
context = PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(type, operation, symKey, param);
loser:
if (symKey) {
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
}
if (slot) {
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
}
return context;
}
PK11Context *
PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key,
SECItem *param, void *wincx)
{
return __PK11_CreateContextByRawKey(slot, type, origin, operation,
key, param, wincx);
}
/*
* Create a context from a key. We really should make sure we aren't using
* the same key in multiple session!
*/
PK11Context *
PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
PK11SymKey *symKey, SECItem *param)
{
PK11SymKey *newKey;
PK11Context *context;
/* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */
newKey = pk11_ForceSlot(symKey,type,operation);
if (newKey == NULL) {
PK11_ReferenceSymKey(symKey);
} else {
symKey = newKey;
}
/* Context Adopts the symKey.... */
context = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, symKey->slot, operation, symKey,
param);
PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
return context;
}
/*
* Digest contexts don't need keys, but the do need to find a slot.
* Macing should use PK11_CreateContextBySymKey.
*/
PK11Context *
PK11_CreateDigestContext(SECOidTag hashAlg)
{
/* digesting has to work without authentication to the slot */
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type;
PK11SlotInfo *slot;
PK11Context *context;
SECItem param;
type = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(hashAlg);
slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, NULL);
if (slot == NULL) {
PORT_SetError( SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE );
return NULL;
}
/* maybe should really be PK11_GenerateNewParam?? */
param.data = NULL;
param.len = 0;
param.type = 0;
context = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(type, slot, CKA_DIGEST, NULL, &param);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
return context;
}
/*
* create a new context which is the clone of the state of old context.
*/
PK11Context * PK11_CloneContext(PK11Context *old)
{
PK11Context *newcx;
PRBool needFree = PR_FALSE;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
void *data;
unsigned long len;
newcx = pk11_CreateNewContextInSlot(old->type, old->slot, old->operation,
old->key, old->param);
if (newcx == NULL) return NULL;
/* now clone the save state. First we need to find the save state
* of the old session. If the old context owns it's session,
* the state needs to be saved, otherwise the state is in saveData. */
if (old->ownSession) {
PK11_EnterContextMonitor(old);
data=pk11_saveContext(old,NULL,&len);
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(old);
needFree = PR_TRUE;
} else {
data = old->savedData;
len = old->savedLength;
}
if (data == NULL) {
PK11_DestroyContext(newcx,PR_TRUE);
return NULL;
}
/* now copy that state into our new context. Again we have different
* work if the new context owns it's own session. If it does, we
* restore the state gathered above. If it doesn't, we copy the
* saveData pointer... */
if (newcx->ownSession) {
PK11_EnterContextMonitor(newcx);
rv = pk11_restoreContext(newcx,data,len);
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(newcx);
} else {
PORT_Assert(newcx->savedData != NULL);
if ((newcx->savedData == NULL) || (newcx->savedLength < len)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
} else {
PORT_Memcpy(newcx->savedData,data,len);
newcx->savedLength = len;
}
}
if (needFree) PORT_Free(data);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PK11_DestroyContext(newcx,PR_TRUE);
return NULL;
}
return newcx;
}
/*
* save the current context state into a variable. Required to make FORTEZZA
* work.
*/
SECStatus
PK11_SaveContext(PK11Context *cx,unsigned char *save,int *len, int saveLength)
{
unsigned char * data = NULL;
CK_ULONG length = saveLength;
if (cx->ownSession) {
PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx);
data = pk11_saveContextHelper(cx, save, &length);
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx);
if (data) *len = length;
} else if ((unsigned) saveLength >= cx->savedLength) {
data = (unsigned char*)cx->savedData;
if (cx->savedData) {
PORT_Memcpy(save,cx->savedData,cx->savedLength);
}
*len = cx->savedLength;
}
if (data != NULL) {
if (cx->ownSession) {
PORT_ZFree(data, length);
}
return SECSuccess;
} else {
return SECFailure;
}
}
/* same as above, but may allocate the return buffer. */
unsigned char *
PK11_SaveContextAlloc(PK11Context *cx,
unsigned char *preAllocBuf, unsigned int pabLen,
unsigned int *stateLen)
{
unsigned char *stateBuf = NULL;
unsigned long length = (unsigned long)pabLen;
if (cx->ownSession) {
PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx);
stateBuf = pk11_saveContextHelper(cx, preAllocBuf, &length);
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx);
*stateLen = (stateBuf != NULL) ? length : 0;
} else {
if (pabLen < cx->savedLength) {
stateBuf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(cx->savedLength);
if (!stateBuf) {
return (unsigned char *)NULL;
}
} else {
stateBuf = preAllocBuf;
}
if (cx->savedData) {
PORT_Memcpy(stateBuf, cx->savedData, cx->savedLength);
}
*stateLen = cx->savedLength;
}
return stateBuf;
}
/*
* restore the context state into a new running context. Also required for
* FORTEZZA .
*/
SECStatus
PK11_RestoreContext(PK11Context *cx,unsigned char *save,int len)
{
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
if (cx->ownSession) {
PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx);
pk11_Finalize(cx);
rv = pk11_restoreContext(cx,save,len);
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx);
} else {
PORT_Assert(cx->savedData != NULL);
if ((cx->savedData == NULL) || (cx->savedLength < (unsigned) len)) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
rv = SECFailure;
} else {
PORT_Memcpy(cx->savedData,save,len);
cx->savedLength = len;
}
}
return rv;
}
/*
* This is to get FIPS compliance until we can convert
* libjar to use PK11_ hashing functions. It returns PR_FALSE
* if we can't get a PK11 Context.
*/
PRBool
PK11_HashOK(SECOidTag algID) {
PK11Context *cx;
cx = PK11_CreateDigestContext(algID);
if (cx == NULL) return PR_FALSE;
PK11_DestroyContext(cx, PR_TRUE);
return PR_TRUE;
}
/*
* start a new digesting or Mac'ing operation on this context
*/
SECStatus PK11_DigestBegin(PK11Context *cx)
{
CK_MECHANISM mech_info;
SECStatus rv;
if (cx->init == PR_TRUE) {
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* make sure the old context is clear first
*/
PK11_EnterContextMonitor(cx);
pk11_Finalize(cx);
mech_info.mechanism = cx->type;
mech_info.pParameter = cx->param->data;
mech_info.ulParameterLen = cx->param->len;
rv = pk11_context_init(cx,&mech_info);
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(cx);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return SECFailure;
}
cx->init = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
PK11_HashBuf(SECOidTag hashAlg, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *in,
PRInt32 len) {
PK11Context *context;
unsigned int max_length;
unsigned int out_length;
SECStatus rv;
/* len will be passed to PK11_DigestOp as unsigned. */
if (len < 0) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
context = PK11_CreateDigestContext(hashAlg);
if (context == NULL) return SECFailure;
rv = PK11_DigestBegin(context);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
return rv;
}
rv = PK11_DigestOp(context, in, len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
return rv;
}
/* XXX This really should have been an argument to this function! */
max_length = HASH_ResultLenByOidTag(hashAlg);
PORT_Assert(max_length);
if (!max_length)
max_length = HASH_LENGTH_MAX;
rv = PK11_DigestFinal(context,out,&out_length,max_length);
PK11_DestroyContext(context, PR_TRUE);
return rv;
}
/*
* execute a bulk encryption operation
*/
SECStatus
PK11_CipherOp(PK11Context *context, unsigned char * out, int *outlen,
int maxout, unsigned char *in, int inlen)
{
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
CK_ULONG length = maxout;
CK_ULONG offset =0;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
unsigned char *saveOut = out;
unsigned char *allocOut = NULL;
/* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
* state.
*/
PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
if (!context->ownSession) {
rv = pk11_restoreContext(context,context->savedData,
context->savedLength);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
return rv;
}
}
/*
* The fortezza hack is to send 8 extra bytes on the first encrypted and
* lose them on the first decrypt.
*/
if (context->fortezzaHack) {
unsigned char random[8];
if (context->operation == CKA_ENCRYPT) {
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
rv = PK11_GenerateRandom(random,sizeof(random));
PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
/* since we are offseting the output, we can't encrypt back into
* the same buffer... allocate a temporary buffer just for this
* call. */
allocOut = out = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(maxout);
if (out == NULL) {
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
return SECFailure;
}
crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptUpdate(context->session,
random,sizeof(random),out,&length);
out += length;
maxout -= length;
offset = length;
} else if (context->operation == CKA_DECRYPT) {
length = sizeof(random);
crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptUpdate(context->session,
in,sizeof(random),random,&length);
inlen -= length;
in += length;
context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE;
}
}
switch (context->operation) {
case CKA_ENCRYPT:
length = maxout;
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptUpdate(context->session,
in, inlen, out, &length);
length += offset;
break;
case CKA_DECRYPT:
length = maxout;
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptUpdate(context->session,
in, inlen, out, &length);
break;
default:
crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
*outlen = 0;
rv = SECFailure;
} else {
*outlen = length;
}
if (context->fortezzaHack) {
if (context->operation == CKA_ENCRYPT) {
PORT_Assert(allocOut);
PORT_Memcpy(saveOut, allocOut, length);
PORT_Free(allocOut);
}
context->fortezzaHack = PR_FALSE;
}
/*
* handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
*/
if (!context->ownSession) {
context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context,context->savedData,
&context->savedLength);
if (context->savedData == NULL) rv = SECFailure;
/* clear out out session for others to use */
pk11_Finalize(context);
}
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
return rv;
}
/*
* execute a digest/signature operation
*/
SECStatus
PK11_DigestOp(PK11Context *context, const unsigned char * in, unsigned inLen)
{
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
if (!in) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
/* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
* state.
*/
context->init = PR_FALSE;
PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
if (!context->ownSession) {
rv = pk11_restoreContext(context,context->savedData,
context->savedLength);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
return rv;
}
}
switch (context->operation) {
/* also for MAC'ing */
case CKA_SIGN:
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignUpdate(context->session,
(unsigned char *)in,
inLen);
break;
case CKA_VERIFY:
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyUpdate(context->session,
(unsigned char *)in,
inLen);
break;
case CKA_DIGEST:
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestUpdate(context->session,
(unsigned char *)in,
inLen);
break;
default:
crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
rv = SECFailure;
}
/*
* handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
*/
if (!context->ownSession) {
context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context,context->savedData,
&context->savedLength);
if (context->savedData == NULL) rv = SECFailure;
/* clear out out session for others to use */
pk11_Finalize(context);
}
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
return rv;
}
/*
* Digest a key if possible./
*/
SECStatus
PK11_DigestKey(PK11Context *context, PK11SymKey *key)
{
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL;
if (!context || !key) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
/* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
* state.
*/
if (context->slot != key->slot) {
newKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(context->slot,CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC,CKA_SIGN,key);
} else {
newKey = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(key);
}
context->init = PR_FALSE;
PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
if (!context->ownSession) {
rv = pk11_restoreContext(context,context->savedData,
context->savedLength);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey);
return rv;
}
}
if (newKey == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
if (key->data.data) {
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestUpdate(context->session,
key->data.data,key->data.len);
}
} else {
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestKey(context->session,
newKey->objectID);
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
rv = SECFailure;
}
/*
* handle session starvation case.. use our last session to multiplex
*/
if (!context->ownSession) {
context->savedData = pk11_saveContext(context,context->savedData,
&context->savedLength);
if (context->savedData == NULL) rv = SECFailure;
/* clear out out session for others to use */
pk11_Finalize(context);
}
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
if (newKey) PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey);
return rv;
}
/*
* externally callable version of the lowercase pk11_finalize().
*/
SECStatus
PK11_Finalize(PK11Context *context) {
SECStatus rv;
PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
rv = pk11_Finalize(context);
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
return rv;
}
/*
* clean up a cipher operation, so the session can be used by
* someone new.
*/
SECStatus
pk11_Finalize(PK11Context *context)
{
CK_ULONG count = 0;
CK_RV crv;
unsigned char stackBuf[256];
unsigned char *buffer = NULL;
if (!context->ownSession) {
return SECSuccess;
}
finalize:
switch (context->operation) {
case CKA_ENCRYPT:
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptFinal(context->session,
buffer, &count);
break;
case CKA_DECRYPT:
crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptFinal(context->session,
buffer, &count);
break;
case CKA_SIGN:
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignFinal(context->session,
buffer, &count);
break;
case CKA_VERIFY:
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyFinal(context->session,
buffer, count);
break;
case CKA_DIGEST:
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestFinal(context->session,
buffer, &count);
break;
default:
crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
if (buffer != stackBuf) {
PORT_Free(buffer);
}
if (crv == CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED) {
/* if there's no operation, it is finalized */
return SECSuccess;
}
PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
return SECFailure;
}
/* try to finalize the session with a buffer */
if (buffer == NULL) {
if (count <= sizeof stackBuf) {
buffer = stackBuf;
} else {
buffer = PORT_Alloc(count);
if (buffer == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
return SECFailure;
}
}
goto finalize;
}
if (buffer != stackBuf) {
PORT_Free(buffer);
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* Return the final digested or signed data...
* this routine can either take pre initialized data, or allocate data
* either out of an arena or out of the standard heap.
*/
SECStatus
PK11_DigestFinal(PK11Context *context,unsigned char *data,
unsigned int *outLen, unsigned int length)
{
CK_ULONG len;
CK_RV crv;
SECStatus rv;
/* if we ran out of session, we need to restore our previously stored
* state.
*/
PK11_EnterContextMonitor(context);
if (!context->ownSession) {
rv = pk11_restoreContext(context,context->savedData,
context->savedLength);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
return rv;
}
}
len = length;
switch (context->operation) {
case CKA_SIGN:
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_SignFinal(context->session,
data,&len);
break;
case CKA_VERIFY:
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_VerifyFinal(context->session,
data,len);
break;
case CKA_DIGEST:
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DigestFinal(context->session,
data,&len);
break;
case CKA_ENCRYPT:
crv=PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_EncryptFinal(context->session,
data, &len);
break;
case CKA_DECRYPT:
crv = PK11_GETTAB(context->slot)->C_DecryptFinal(context->session,
data, &len);
break;
default:
crv = CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
break;
}
PK11_ExitContextMonitor(context);
*outLen = (unsigned int) len;
context->init = PR_FALSE; /* allow Begin to start up again */
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_SetError( PK11_MapError(crv) );
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink