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49124c5598
RetroZilla/security/nss/lib/freebl/drbg.c
roytam1 49124c5598 NSS: update to 3.15.5
2018-05-19 22:01:21 +08:00

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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
#include "stubs.h"
#endif
#include "prerror.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "prtypes.h"
#include "prinit.h"
#include "blapi.h"
#include "blapii.h"
#include "nssilock.h"
#include "secitem.h"
#include "sha_fast.h"
#include "sha256.h"
#include "secrng.h" /* for RNG_SystemRNG() */
#include "secmpi.h"
/* PRNG_SEEDLEN defined in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1
* for SHA-1, SHA-224, and SHA-256 it's 440 bits.
* for SHA-384 and SHA-512 it's 888 bits */
#define PRNG_SEEDLEN (440/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE)
static const PRInt64 PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES = LL_INIT(0x1, 0x0);
/* 2^35 bits or 2^32 bytes */
#define PRNG_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE 0x10000 /* 2^19 bits or 2^16 bytes */
#define PRNG_ADDITONAL_DATA_CACHE_SIZE (8*1024) /* must be less than
* PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES
*/
/* RESEED_COUNT is how many calls to the prng before we need to reseed
* under normal NIST rules, you must return an error. In the NSS case, we
* self-reseed with RNG_SystemRNG(). Count can be a large number. For code
* simplicity, we specify count with 2 components: RESEED_BYTE (which is
* the same as LOG256(RESEED_COUNT)) and RESEED_VALUE (which is the same as
* RESEED_COUNT / (256 ^ RESEED_BYTE)). Another way to look at this is
* RESEED_COUNT = RESEED_VALUE * (256 ^ RESEED_BYTE). For Hash based DRBG
* we use the maximum count value, 2^48, or RESEED_BYTE=6 and RESEED_VALUE=1
*/
#define RESEED_BYTE 6
#define RESEED_VALUE 1
#define PRNG_RESET_RESEED_COUNT(rng) \
PORT_Memset((rng)->reseed_counter, 0, sizeof (rng)->reseed_counter); \
(rng)->reseed_counter[RESEED_BYTE] = 1;
/*
* The actual values of this enum are specified in SP 800-90, 10.1.1.*
* The spec does not name the types, it only uses bare values
*/
typedef enum {
prngCGenerateType = 0, /* used when creating a new 'C' */
prngReseedType = 1, /* used in reseeding */
prngAdditionalDataType = 2, /* used in mixing additional data */
prngGenerateByteType = 3 /* used when mixing internal state while
* generating bytes */
} prngVTypes;
/*
* Global RNG context
*/
struct RNGContextStr {
PZLock *lock; /* Lock to serialize access to global rng */
/*
* NOTE, a number of steps in the drbg algorithm need to hash
* V_type || V. The code, therefore, depends on the V array following
* immediately after V_type to avoid extra copies. To accomplish this
* in a way that compiliers can't perturb, we declare V_type and V
* as a V_Data array and reference them by macros */
PRUint8 V_Data[PRNG_SEEDLEN+1]; /* internal state variables */
#define V_type V_Data[0]
#define V(rng) (((rng)->V_Data)+1)
#define VSize(rng) ((sizeof (rng)->V_Data) -1)
PRUint8 C[PRNG_SEEDLEN]; /* internal state variables */
PRUint8 oldV[PRNG_SEEDLEN]; /* for continuous rng checking */
/* If we get calls for the PRNG to return less than the length of our
* hash, we extend the request for a full hash (since we'll be doing
* the full hash anyway). Future requests for random numbers are fulfilled
* from the remainder of the bytes we generated. Requests for bytes longer
* than the hash size are fulfilled directly from the HashGen function
* of the random number generator. */
PRUint8 reseed_counter[RESEED_BYTE+1]; /* number of requests since the
* last reseed. Need only be
* big enough to hold the whole
* reseed count */
PRUint8 data[SHA256_LENGTH]; /* when we request less than a block
* save the rest of the rng output for
* another partial block */
PRUint8 dataAvail; /* # bytes of output available in our cache,
* [0...SHA256_LENGTH] */
/* store additional data that has been shovelled off to us by
* RNG_RandomUpdate. */
PRUint8 additionalDataCache[PRNG_ADDITONAL_DATA_CACHE_SIZE];
PRUint32 additionalAvail;
PRBool isValid; /* false if RNG reaches an invalid state */
};
typedef struct RNGContextStr RNGContext;
static RNGContext *globalrng = NULL;
static RNGContext theGlobalRng;
/*
* The next several functions are derived from the NIST SP 800-90
* spec. In these functions, an attempt was made to use names consistent
* with the names in the spec, even if they differ from normal NSS usage.
*/
/*
* Hash Derive function defined in NISP SP 800-90 Section 10.4.1.
* This function is used in the Instantiate and Reseed functions.
*
* NOTE: requested_bytes cannot overlap with input_string_1 or input_string_2.
* input_string_1 and input_string_2 are logically concatentated.
* input_string_1 must be supplied.
* if input_string_2 is not supplied, NULL should be passed for this parameter.
*/
static SECStatus
prng_Hash_df(PRUint8 *requested_bytes, unsigned int no_of_bytes_to_return,
const PRUint8 *input_string_1, unsigned int input_string_1_len,
const PRUint8 *input_string_2, unsigned int input_string_2_len)
{
SHA256Context ctx;
PRUint32 tmp;
PRUint8 counter;
tmp=SHA_HTONL(no_of_bytes_to_return*8);
for (counter = 1 ; no_of_bytes_to_return > 0; counter++) {
unsigned int hash_return_len;
SHA256_Begin(&ctx);
SHA256_Update(&ctx, &counter, 1);
SHA256_Update(&ctx, (unsigned char *)&tmp, sizeof tmp);
SHA256_Update(&ctx, input_string_1, input_string_1_len);
if (input_string_2) {
SHA256_Update(&ctx, input_string_2, input_string_2_len);
}
SHA256_End(&ctx, requested_bytes, &hash_return_len,
no_of_bytes_to_return);
requested_bytes += hash_return_len;
no_of_bytes_to_return -= hash_return_len;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* Hash_DRBG Instantiate NIST SP 800-80 10.1.1.2
*
* NOTE: bytes & len are entropy || nonce || personalization_string. In
* normal operation, NSS calculates them all together in a single call.
*/
static SECStatus
prng_instantiate(RNGContext *rng, const PRUint8 *bytes, unsigned int len)
{
if (len < PRNG_SEEDLEN) {
/* if the seedlen is to small, it's probably because we failed to get
* enough random data */
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
return SECFailure;
}
prng_Hash_df(V(rng), VSize(rng), bytes, len, NULL, 0);
rng->V_type = prngCGenerateType;
prng_Hash_df(rng->C,sizeof rng->C,rng->V_Data,sizeof rng->V_Data,NULL,0);
PRNG_RESET_RESEED_COUNT(rng)
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* Update the global random number generator with more seeding
* material. Use the Hash_DRBG reseed algorithm from NIST SP-800-90
* section 10.1.1.3
*
* If entropy is NULL, it is fetched from the noise generator.
*/
static SECStatus
prng_reseed(RNGContext *rng, const PRUint8 *entropy, unsigned int entropy_len,
const PRUint8 *additional_input, unsigned int additional_input_len)
{
PRUint8 noiseData[(sizeof rng->V_Data)+PRNG_SEEDLEN];
PRUint8 *noise = &noiseData[0];
/* if entropy wasn't supplied, fetch it. (normal operation case) */
if (entropy == NULL) {
entropy_len = (unsigned int) RNG_SystemRNG(
&noiseData[sizeof rng->V_Data], PRNG_SEEDLEN);
} else {
/* NOTE: this code is only available for testing, not to applications */
/* if entropy was too big for the stack variable, get it from malloc */
if (entropy_len > PRNG_SEEDLEN) {
noise = PORT_Alloc(entropy_len + (sizeof rng->V_Data));
if (noise == NULL) {
return SECFailure;
}
}
PORT_Memcpy(&noise[sizeof rng->V_Data],entropy, entropy_len);
}
if (entropy_len < 256/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) {
/* noise == &noiseData[0] at this point, so nothing to free */
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
return SECFailure;
}
rng->V_type = prngReseedType;
PORT_Memcpy(noise, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data);
prng_Hash_df(V(rng), VSize(rng), noise, (sizeof rng->V_Data) + entropy_len,
additional_input, additional_input_len);
/* clear potential CSP */
PORT_Memset(noise, 0, (sizeof rng->V_Data) + entropy_len);
rng->V_type = prngCGenerateType;
prng_Hash_df(rng->C,sizeof rng->C,rng->V_Data,sizeof rng->V_Data,NULL,0);
PRNG_RESET_RESEED_COUNT(rng)
if (noise != &noiseData[0]) {
PORT_Free(noise);
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/*
* SP 800-90 requires we rerun our health tests on reseed
*/
static SECStatus
prng_reseed_test(RNGContext *rng, const PRUint8 *entropy,
unsigned int entropy_len, const PRUint8 *additional_input,
unsigned int additional_input_len)
{
SECStatus rv;
/* do health checks in FIPS mode */
rv = PRNGTEST_RunHealthTests();
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
/* error set by PRNGTEST_RunHealTests() */
rng->isValid = PR_FALSE;
return SECFailure;
}
return prng_reseed(rng, entropy, entropy_len,
additional_input, additional_input_len);
}
/*
* build some fast inline functions for adding.
*/
#define PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(dest, start, cy) \
carry = cy; \
for (k1=start; carry && k1 >=0 ; k1--) { \
carry = !(++dest[k1]); \
}
/*
* NOTE: dest must be an array for the following to work.
*/
#define PRNG_ADD_BITS(dest, dest_len, add, len) \
carry = 0; \
for (k1=dest_len -1, k2=len-1; k2 >= 0; --k1, --k2) { \
carry += dest[k1]+ add[k2]; \
dest[k1] = (PRUint8) carry; \
carry >>= 8; \
}
#define PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(dest, dest_len, add, len) \
PRNG_ADD_BITS(dest, dest_len, add, len) \
PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(dest, k1, carry)
/*
* This function expands the internal state of the prng to fulfill any number
* of bytes we need for this request. We only use this call if we need more
* than can be supplied by a single call to SHA256_HashBuf.
*
* This function is specified in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1.1.4, Hashgen
*/
static void
prng_Hashgen(RNGContext *rng, PRUint8 *returned_bytes,
unsigned int no_of_returned_bytes)
{
PRUint8 data[VSize(rng)];
PORT_Memcpy(data, V(rng), VSize(rng));
while (no_of_returned_bytes) {
SHA256Context ctx;
unsigned int len;
unsigned int carry;
int k1;
SHA256_Begin(&ctx);
SHA256_Update(&ctx, data, sizeof data);
SHA256_End(&ctx, returned_bytes, &len, no_of_returned_bytes);
returned_bytes += len;
no_of_returned_bytes -= len;
/* The carry parameter is a bool (increment or not).
* This increments data if no_of_returned_bytes is not zero */
PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(data, (sizeof data)- 1, no_of_returned_bytes);
}
PORT_Memset(data, 0, sizeof data);
}
/*
* Generates new random bytes and advances the internal prng state.
* additional bytes are only used in algorithm testing.
*
* This function is specified in NIST SP 800-90 section 10.1.1.4
*/
static SECStatus
prng_generateNewBytes(RNGContext *rng,
PRUint8 *returned_bytes, unsigned int no_of_returned_bytes,
const PRUint8 *additional_input,
unsigned int additional_input_len)
{
PRUint8 H[SHA256_LENGTH]; /* both H and w since they
* aren't used concurrently */
unsigned int carry;
int k1, k2;
if (!rng->isValid) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* This code only triggers during tests, normal
* prng operation does not use additional_input */
if (additional_input){
SHA256Context ctx;
/* NIST SP 800-90 defines two temporaries in their calculations,
* w and H. These temporaries are the same lengths, and used
* at different times, so we use the following macro to collapse
* them to the same variable, but keeping their unique names for
* easy comparison to the spec */
#define w H
rng->V_type = prngAdditionalDataType;
SHA256_Begin(&ctx);
SHA256_Update(&ctx, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data);
SHA256_Update(&ctx, additional_input, additional_input_len);
SHA256_End(&ctx, w, NULL, sizeof w);
PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), w, sizeof w)
PORT_Memset(w, 0, sizeof w);
#undef w
}
if (no_of_returned_bytes == SHA256_LENGTH) {
/* short_cut to hashbuf and save a copy and a clear */
SHA256_HashBuf(returned_bytes, V(rng), VSize(rng) );
} else {
prng_Hashgen(rng, returned_bytes, no_of_returned_bytes);
}
/* advance our internal state... */
rng->V_type = prngGenerateByteType;
SHA256_HashBuf(H, rng->V_Data, sizeof rng->V_Data);
PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), H, sizeof H)
PRNG_ADD_BITS(V(rng), VSize(rng), rng->C, sizeof rng->C);
PRNG_ADD_BITS_AND_CARRY(V(rng), VSize(rng), rng->reseed_counter,
sizeof rng->reseed_counter)
PRNG_ADD_CARRY_ONLY(rng->reseed_counter,(sizeof rng->reseed_counter)-1, 1);
/* continuous rng check */
if (memcmp(V(rng), rng->oldV, sizeof rng->oldV) == 0) {
rng->isValid = PR_FALSE;
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Memcpy(rng->oldV, V(rng), sizeof rng->oldV);
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Use NSPR to prevent RNG_RNGInit from being called from separate
* threads, creating a race condition.
*/
static const PRCallOnceType pristineCallOnce;
static PRCallOnceType coRNGInit;
static PRStatus rng_init(void)
{
PRUint8 bytes[PRNG_SEEDLEN*2]; /* entropy + nonce */
unsigned int numBytes;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
if (globalrng == NULL) {
/* bytes needs to have enough space to hold
* a SHA256 hash value. Blow up at compile time if this isn't true */
PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(bytes) >= SHA256_LENGTH);
/* create a new global RNG context */
globalrng = &theGlobalRng;
PORT_Assert(NULL == globalrng->lock);
/* create a lock for it */
globalrng->lock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockOther);
if (globalrng->lock == NULL) {
globalrng = NULL;
PORT_SetError(PR_OUT_OF_MEMORY_ERROR);
return PR_FAILURE;
}
/* Try to get some seed data for the RNG */
numBytes = (unsigned int) RNG_SystemRNG(bytes, sizeof bytes);
PORT_Assert(numBytes == 0 || numBytes == sizeof bytes);
if (numBytes != 0) {
/* if this is our first call, instantiate, otherwise reseed
* prng_instantiate gets a new clean state, we want to mix
* any previous entropy we may have collected */
if (V(globalrng)[0] == 0) {
rv = prng_instantiate(globalrng, bytes, numBytes);
} else {
rv = prng_reseed_test(globalrng, bytes, numBytes, NULL, 0);
}
memset(bytes, 0, numBytes);
} else {
PZ_DestroyLock(globalrng->lock);
globalrng->lock = NULL;
globalrng = NULL;
return PR_FAILURE;
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return PR_FAILURE;
}
/* the RNG is in a valid state */
globalrng->isValid = PR_TRUE;
/* fetch one random value so that we can populate rng->oldV for our
* continous random number test. */
prng_generateNewBytes(globalrng, bytes, SHA256_LENGTH, NULL, 0);
/* Fetch more entropy into the PRNG */
RNG_SystemInfoForRNG();
}
return PR_SUCCESS;
}
/*
* Clean up the global RNG context
*/
static void
prng_freeRNGContext(RNGContext *rng)
{
PRUint8 inputhash[VSize(rng) + (sizeof rng->C)];
/* destroy context lock */
SKIP_AFTER_FORK(PZ_DestroyLock(globalrng->lock));
/* zero global RNG context except for C & V to preserve entropy */
prng_Hash_df(inputhash, sizeof rng->C, rng->C, sizeof rng->C, NULL, 0);
prng_Hash_df(&inputhash[sizeof rng->C], VSize(rng), V(rng), VSize(rng),
NULL, 0);
memset(rng, 0, sizeof *rng);
memcpy(rng->C, inputhash, sizeof rng->C);
memcpy(V(rng), &inputhash[sizeof rng->C], VSize(rng));
memset(inputhash, 0, sizeof inputhash);
}
/*
* Public functions
*/
/*
* Initialize the global RNG context and give it some seed input taken
* from the system. This function is thread-safe and will only allow
* the global context to be initialized once. The seed input is likely
* small, so it is imperative that RNG_RandomUpdate() be called with
* additional seed data before the generator is used. A good way to
* provide the generator with additional entropy is to call
* RNG_SystemInfoForRNG(). Note that C_Initialize() does exactly that.
*/
SECStatus
RNG_RNGInit(void)
{
/* Allow only one call to initialize the context */
PR_CallOnce(&coRNGInit, rng_init);
/* Make sure there is a context */
return (globalrng != NULL) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
}
/*
** Update the global random number generator with more seeding
** material.
*/
SECStatus
RNG_RandomUpdate(const void *data, size_t bytes)
{
SECStatus rv;
/* Make sure our assumption that size_t is unsigned is true */
PR_STATIC_ASSERT(((size_t)-1) > (size_t)1);
#if defined(NS_PTR_GT_32) || (defined(NSS_USE_64) && !defined(NS_PTR_LE_32))
/*
* NIST 800-90 requires us to verify our inputs. This value can
* come from the application, so we need to make sure it's within the
* spec. The spec says it must be less than 2^32 bytes (2^35 bits).
* This can only happen if size_t is greater than 32 bits (i.e. on
* most 64 bit platforms). The 90% case (perhaps 100% case), size_t
* is less than or equal to 32 bits if the platform is not 64 bits, and
* greater than 32 bits if it is a 64 bit platform. The corner
* cases are handled with explicit defines NS_PTR_GT_32 and NS_PTR_LE_32.
*
* In general, neither NS_PTR_GT_32 nor NS_PTR_LE_32 will need to be
* defined. If you trip over the next two size ASSERTS at compile time,
* you will need to define them for your platform.
*
* if 'sizeof(size_t) > 4' is triggered it means that we were expecting
* sizeof(size_t) to be greater than 4, but it wasn't. Setting
* NS_PTR_LE_32 will correct that mistake.
*
* if 'sizeof(size_t) <= 4' is triggered, it means that we were expecting
* sizeof(size_t) to be less than or equal to 4, but it wasn't. Setting
* NS_PTR_GT_32 will correct that mistake.
*/
PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(size_t) > 4);
if (bytes > PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES) {
bytes = PRNG_MAX_ADDITIONAL_BYTES;
}
#else
PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(size_t) <= 4);
#endif
PZ_Lock(globalrng->lock);
/* if we're passed more than our additionalDataCache, simply
* call reseed with that data */
if (bytes > sizeof (globalrng->additionalDataCache)) {
rv = prng_reseed_test(globalrng, NULL, 0, data, (unsigned int) bytes);
/* if we aren't going to fill or overflow the buffer, just cache it */
} else if (bytes < ((sizeof globalrng->additionalDataCache)
- globalrng->additionalAvail)) {
PORT_Memcpy(globalrng->additionalDataCache+globalrng->additionalAvail,
data, bytes);
globalrng->additionalAvail += (PRUint32) bytes;
rv = SECSuccess;
} else {
/* we are going to fill or overflow the buffer. In this case we will
* fill the entropy buffer, reseed with it, start a new buffer with the
* remainder. We know the remainder will fit in the buffer because
* we already handled the case where bytes > the size of the buffer.
*/
size_t bufRemain = (sizeof globalrng->additionalDataCache)
- globalrng->additionalAvail;
/* fill the rest of the buffer */
if (bufRemain) {
PORT_Memcpy(globalrng->additionalDataCache
+globalrng->additionalAvail,
data, bufRemain);
data = ((unsigned char *)data) + bufRemain;
bytes -= bufRemain;
}
/* reseed from buffer */
rv = prng_reseed_test(globalrng, NULL, 0,
globalrng->additionalDataCache,
sizeof globalrng->additionalDataCache);
/* copy the rest into the cache */
PORT_Memcpy(globalrng->additionalDataCache, data, bytes);
globalrng->additionalAvail = (PRUint32) bytes;
}
PZ_Unlock(globalrng->lock);
return rv;
}
/*
** Generate some random bytes, using the global random number generator
** object.
*/
static SECStatus
prng_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(RNGContext *rng,
void *dest, size_t len)
{
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
PRUint8 *output = dest;
/* check for a valid global RNG context */
PORT_Assert(rng != NULL);
if (rng == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
/* FIPS limits the amount of entropy available in a single request */
if (len > PRNG_MAX_REQUEST_SIZE) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
return SECFailure;
}
/* --- LOCKED --- */
PZ_Lock(rng->lock);
/* Check the amount of seed data in the generator. If not enough,
* don't produce any data.
*/
if (rng->reseed_counter[0] >= RESEED_VALUE) {
rv = prng_reseed_test(rng, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
PZ_Unlock(rng->lock);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
RNG_SystemInfoForRNG();
PZ_Lock(rng->lock);
}
/*
* see if we have enough bytes to fulfill the request.
*/
if (len <= rng->dataAvail) {
memcpy(output, rng->data + ((sizeof rng->data) - rng->dataAvail), len);
memset(rng->data + ((sizeof rng->data) - rng->dataAvail), 0, len);
rng->dataAvail -= len;
rv = SECSuccess;
/* if we are asking for a small number of bytes, cache the rest of
* the bytes */
} else if (len < sizeof rng->data) {
rv = prng_generateNewBytes(rng, rng->data, sizeof rng->data,
rng->additionalAvail ? rng->additionalDataCache : NULL,
rng->additionalAvail);
rng->additionalAvail = 0;
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
memcpy(output, rng->data, len);
memset(rng->data, 0, len);
rng->dataAvail = (sizeof rng->data) - len;
}
/* we are asking for lots of bytes, just ask the generator to pass them */
} else {
rv = prng_generateNewBytes(rng, output, len,
rng->additionalAvail ? rng->additionalDataCache : NULL,
rng->additionalAvail);
rng->additionalAvail = 0;
}
PZ_Unlock(rng->lock);
/* --- UNLOCKED --- */
return rv;
}
/*
** Generate some random bytes, using the global random number generator
** object.
*/
SECStatus
RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(void *dest, size_t len)
{
return prng_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(globalrng, dest, len);
}
void
RNG_RNGShutdown(void)
{
/* check for a valid global RNG context */
PORT_Assert(globalrng != NULL);
if (globalrng == NULL) {
/* Should set a "not initialized" error code. */
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
return;
}
/* clear */
prng_freeRNGContext(globalrng);
globalrng = NULL;
/* reset the callonce struct to allow a new call to RNG_RNGInit() */
coRNGInit = pristineCallOnce;
}
/*
* Test case interface. used by fips testing and power on self test
*/
/* make sure the test context is separate from the global context, This
* allows us to test the internal random number generator without losing
* entropy we may have previously collected. */
RNGContext testContext;
/*
* Test vector API. Use NIST SP 800-90 general interface so one of the
* other NIST SP 800-90 algorithms may be used in the future.
*/
SECStatus
PRNGTEST_Instantiate(const PRUint8 *entropy, unsigned int entropy_len,
const PRUint8 *nonce, unsigned int nonce_len,
const PRUint8 *personal_string, unsigned int ps_len)
{
int bytes_len = entropy_len + nonce_len + ps_len;
PRUint8 *bytes = NULL;
SECStatus rv;
if (entropy_len < 256/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
return SECFailure;
}
bytes = PORT_Alloc(bytes_len);
if (bytes == NULL) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
return SECFailure;
}
/* concatenate the various inputs, internally NSS only instantiates with
* a single long string */
PORT_Memcpy(bytes, entropy, entropy_len);
if (nonce) {
PORT_Memcpy(&bytes[entropy_len], nonce, nonce_len);
} else {
PORT_Assert(nonce_len == 0);
}
if (personal_string) {
PORT_Memcpy(&bytes[entropy_len+nonce_len], personal_string, ps_len);
} else {
PORT_Assert(ps_len == 0);
}
rv = prng_instantiate(&testContext, bytes, bytes_len);
PORT_ZFree(bytes, bytes_len);
if (rv == SECFailure) {
return SECFailure;
}
testContext.isValid = PR_TRUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
PRNGTEST_Reseed(const PRUint8 *entropy, unsigned int entropy_len,
const PRUint8 *additional, unsigned int additional_len)
{
if (!testContext.isValid) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* This magic input tells us to set the reseed count to it's max count,
* so we can simulate PRNGTEST_Generate reaching max reseed count */
if ((entropy == NULL) && (entropy_len == 0) &&
(additional == NULL) && (additional_len == 0)) {
testContext.reseed_counter[0] = RESEED_VALUE;
return SECSuccess;
}
return prng_reseed(&testContext, entropy, entropy_len, additional,
additional_len);
}
SECStatus
PRNGTEST_Generate(PRUint8 *bytes, unsigned int bytes_len,
const PRUint8 *additional, unsigned int additional_len)
{
SECStatus rv;
if (!testContext.isValid) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* replicate reseed test from prng_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes */
if (testContext.reseed_counter[0] >= RESEED_VALUE) {
rv = prng_reseed(&testContext, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return rv;
}
}
return prng_generateNewBytes(&testContext, bytes, bytes_len,
additional, additional_len);
}
SECStatus
PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate()
{
if (!testContext.isValid) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
PORT_Memset(&testContext, 0, sizeof testContext);
return SECSuccess;
}
SECStatus
PRNGTEST_RunHealthTests()
{
static const PRUint8 entropy[] = {
0x8e,0x9c,0x0d,0x25,0x75,0x22,0x04,0xf9,
0xc5,0x79,0x10,0x8b,0x23,0x79,0x37,0x14,
0x9f,0x2c,0xc7,0x0b,0x39,0xf8,0xee,0xef,
0x95,0x0c,0x97,0x59,0xfc,0x0a,0x85,0x41,
0x76,0x9d,0x6d,0x67,0x00,0x4e,0x19,0x12,
0x02,0x16,0x53,0xea,0xf2,0x73,0xd7,0xd6,
0x7f,0x7e,0xc8,0xae,0x9c,0x09,0x99,0x7d,
0xbb,0x9e,0x48,0x7f,0xbb,0x96,0x46,0xb3,
0x03,0x75,0xf8,0xc8,0x69,0x45,0x3f,0x97,
0x5e,0x2e,0x48,0xe1,0x5d,0x58,0x97,0x4c };
static const PRUint8 rng_known_result[] = {
0x16,0xe1,0x8c,0x57,0x21,0xd8,0xf1,0x7e,
0x5a,0xa0,0x16,0x0b,0x7e,0xa6,0x25,0xb4,
0x24,0x19,0xdb,0x54,0xfa,0x35,0x13,0x66,
0xbb,0xaa,0x2a,0x1b,0x22,0x33,0x2e,0x4a,
0x14,0x07,0x9d,0x52,0xfc,0x73,0x61,0x48,
0xac,0xc1,0x22,0xfc,0xa4,0xfc,0xac,0xa4,
0xdb,0xda,0x5b,0x27,0x33,0xc4,0xb3 };
static const PRUint8 reseed_entropy[] = {
0xc6,0x0b,0x0a,0x30,0x67,0x07,0xf4,0xe2,
0x24,0xa7,0x51,0x6f,0x5f,0x85,0x3e,0x5d,
0x67,0x97,0xb8,0x3b,0x30,0x9c,0x7a,0xb1,
0x52,0xc6,0x1b,0xc9,0x46,0xa8,0x62,0x79 };
static const PRUint8 additional_input[] = {
0x86,0x82,0x28,0x98,0xe7,0xcb,0x01,0x14,
0xae,0x87,0x4b,0x1d,0x99,0x1b,0xc7,0x41,
0x33,0xff,0x33,0x66,0x40,0x95,0x54,0xc6,
0x67,0x4d,0x40,0x2a,0x1f,0xf9,0xeb,0x65 };
static const PRUint8 rng_reseed_result[] = {
0x02,0x0c,0xc6,0x17,0x86,0x49,0xba,0xc4,
0x7b,0x71,0x35,0x05,0xf0,0xdb,0x4a,0xc2,
0x2c,0x38,0xc1,0xa4,0x42,0xe5,0x46,0x4a,
0x7d,0xf0,0xbe,0x47,0x88,0xb8,0x0e,0xc6,
0x25,0x2b,0x1d,0x13,0xef,0xa6,0x87,0x96,
0xa3,0x7d,0x5b,0x80,0xc2,0x38,0x76,0x61,
0xc7,0x80,0x5d,0x0f,0x05,0x76,0x85 };
static const PRUint8 rng_no_reseed_result[] = {
0xc4,0x40,0x41,0x8c,0xbf,0x2f,0x70,0x23,
0x88,0xf2,0x7b,0x30,0xc3,0xca,0x1e,0xf3,
0xef,0x53,0x81,0x5d,0x30,0xed,0x4c,0xf1,
0xff,0x89,0xa5,0xee,0x92,0xf8,0xc0,0x0f,
0x88,0x53,0xdf,0xb6,0x76,0xf0,0xaa,0xd3,
0x2e,0x1d,0x64,0x37,0x3e,0xe8,0x4a,0x02,
0xff,0x0a,0x7f,0xe5,0xe9,0x2b,0x6d };
SECStatus rng_status = SECSuccess;
PR_STATIC_ASSERT(sizeof(rng_known_result) >= sizeof(rng_reseed_result));
PRUint8 result[sizeof(rng_known_result)];
/********************************************/
/* First test instantiate error path. */
/* In this case we supply enough entropy, */
/* but not enough seed. This will trigger */
/* the code that checks for a entropy */
/* source failure. */
/********************************************/
rng_status = PRNGTEST_Instantiate(entropy, 256/PR_BITS_PER_BYTE,
NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
if (rng_status == SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
if (PORT_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* we failed with the proper error code, we can continue */
/********************************************/
/* Generate random bytes with a known seed. */
/********************************************/
rng_status = PRNGTEST_Instantiate(entropy, sizeof entropy,
NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
if (rng_status != SECSuccess) {
/* Error set by PRNGTEST_Instantiate */
return SECFailure;
}
rng_status = PRNGTEST_Generate(result, sizeof rng_known_result, NULL, 0);
if ( ( rng_status != SECSuccess) ||
( PORT_Memcmp( result, rng_known_result,
sizeof rng_known_result ) != 0 ) ) {
PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
rng_status = PRNGTEST_Reseed(reseed_entropy, sizeof reseed_entropy,
additional_input, sizeof additional_input);
if (rng_status != SECSuccess) {
/* Error set by PRNG_Reseed */
PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
return SECFailure;
}
rng_status = PRNGTEST_Generate(result, sizeof rng_reseed_result, NULL, 0);
if ( ( rng_status != SECSuccess) ||
( PORT_Memcmp( result, rng_reseed_result,
sizeof rng_reseed_result ) != 0 ) ) {
PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* This magic forces the reseed count to it's max count, so we can see if
* PRNGTEST_Generate will actually when it reaches it's count */
rng_status = PRNGTEST_Reseed(NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
if (rng_status != SECSuccess) {
PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
/* Error set by PRNG_Reseed */
return SECFailure;
}
/* This generate should now reseed */
rng_status = PRNGTEST_Generate(result, sizeof rng_reseed_result, NULL, 0);
if ( ( rng_status != SECSuccess) ||
/* NOTE we fail if the result is equal to the no_reseed_result.
* no_reseed_result is the value we would have gotten if we didn't
* do an automatic reseed in PRNGTEST_Generate */
( PORT_Memcmp( result, rng_no_reseed_result,
sizeof rng_no_reseed_result ) == 0 ) ) {
PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
/* make sure reseed fails when we don't supply enough entropy */
rng_status = PRNGTEST_Reseed(reseed_entropy, 4, NULL, 0);
if (rng_status == SECSuccess) {
PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
if (PORT_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM) {
PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
rng_status = PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
if (rng_status != SECSuccess) {
/* Error set by PRNG_Uninstantiate */
return rng_status;
}
/* make sure uninstantiate fails if the contest is not initiated (also tests
* if the context was cleared in the previous Uninstantiate) */
rng_status = PRNGTEST_Uninstantiate();
if (rng_status == SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
return SECFailure;
}
if (PORT_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
return rng_status;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
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