kamp/RetroZilla
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/rn10950/RetroZilla.git synced 2024-11-11 02:10:17 +01:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
5f6fb75167
RetroZilla/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl.h
roytam1 49124c5598 NSS: update to 3.15.5
2018-05-19 22:01:21 +08:00

1049 lines
47 KiB
C
Raw Blame History

/*
* This file contains prototypes for the public SSL functions.
*
* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#ifndef __ssl_h_
#define __ssl_h_
#include "prtypes.h"
#include "prerror.h"
#include "prio.h"
#include "seccomon.h"
#include "cert.h"
#include "keyt.h"
#include "sslt.h" /* public ssl data types */
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(IN_LIBSSL) && !defined(NSS_USE_STATIC_LIBS)
#define SSL_IMPORT extern __declspec(dllimport)
#else
#define SSL_IMPORT extern
#endif
SEC_BEGIN_PROTOS
/* constant table enumerating all implemented SSL 2 and 3 cipher suites. */
SSL_IMPORT const PRUint16 SSL_ImplementedCiphers[];
/* the same as the above, but is a function */
SSL_IMPORT const PRUint16 *SSL_GetImplementedCiphers(void);
/* number of entries in the above table. */
SSL_IMPORT const PRUint16 SSL_NumImplementedCiphers;
/* the same as the above, but is a function */
SSL_IMPORT PRUint16 SSL_GetNumImplementedCiphers(void);
/* Macro to tell which ciphers in table are SSL2 vs SSL3/TLS. */
#define SSL_IS_SSL2_CIPHER(which) (((which) & 0xfff0) == 0xff00)
/*
** Imports fd into SSL, returning a new socket. Copies SSL configuration
** from model.
*/
SSL_IMPORT PRFileDesc *SSL_ImportFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd);
/*
** Imports fd into DTLS, returning a new socket. Copies DTLS configuration
** from model.
*/
SSL_IMPORT PRFileDesc *DTLS_ImportFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd);
/*
** Enable/disable an ssl mode
**
** SSL_SECURITY:
** enable/disable use of SSL security protocol before connect
**
** SSL_SOCKS:
** enable/disable use of socks before connect
** (No longer supported).
**
** SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE:
** require a certificate during secure connect
*/
/* options */
#define SSL_SECURITY 1 /* (on by default) */
#define SSL_SOCKS 2 /* (off by default) */
#define SSL_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE 3 /* (off by default) */
#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_CLIENT 5 /* force accept to hs as client */
/* (off by default) */
#define SSL_HANDSHAKE_AS_SERVER 6 /* force connect to hs as server */
/* (off by default) */
/* OBSOLETE: SSL v2 is obsolete and may be removed soon. */
#define SSL_ENABLE_SSL2 7 /* enable ssl v2 (off by default) */
/* OBSOLETE: See "SSL Version Range API" below for the replacement and a
** description of the non-obvious semantics of using SSL_ENABLE_SSL3.
*/
#define SSL_ENABLE_SSL3 8 /* enable ssl v3 (on by default) */
#define SSL_NO_CACHE 9 /* don't use the session cache */
/* (off by default) */
#define SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE 10 /* (SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE */
/* by default) */
#define SSL_ENABLE_FDX 11 /* permit simultaneous read/write */
/* (off by default) */
/* OBSOLETE: SSL v2 compatible hellos are not accepted by some TLS servers
** and cannot negotiate extensions. SSL v2 is obsolete. This option may be
** removed soon.
*/
#define SSL_V2_COMPATIBLE_HELLO 12 /* send v3 client hello in v2 fmt */
/* (off by default) */
/* OBSOLETE: See "SSL Version Range API" below for the replacement and a
** description of the non-obvious semantics of using SSL_ENABLE_TLS.
*/
#define SSL_ENABLE_TLS 13 /* enable TLS (on by default) */
#define SSL_ROLLBACK_DETECTION 14 /* for compatibility, default: on */
#define SSL_NO_STEP_DOWN 15 /* Disable export cipher suites */
/* if step-down keys are needed. */
/* default: off, generate */
/* step-down keys if needed. */
#define SSL_BYPASS_PKCS11 16 /* use PKCS#11 for pub key only */
#define SSL_NO_LOCKS 17 /* Don't use locks for protection */
#define SSL_ENABLE_SESSION_TICKETS 18 /* Enable TLS SessionTicket */
/* extension (off by default) */
#define SSL_ENABLE_DEFLATE 19 /* Enable TLS compression with */
/* DEFLATE (off by default) */
#define SSL_ENABLE_RENEGOTIATION 20 /* Values below (default: never) */
#define SSL_REQUIRE_SAFE_NEGOTIATION 21 /* Peer must send Signaling */
/* Cipher Suite Value (SCSV) or */
/* Renegotiation Info (RI) */
/* extension in ALL handshakes. */
/* default: off */
#define SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START 22 /* Enable SSL false start (off by */
/* default, applies only to */
/* clients). False start is a */
/* mode where an SSL client will start sending application data before
* verifying the server's Finished message. This means that we could end up
* sending data to an imposter. However, the data will be encrypted and
* only the true server can derive the session key. Thus, so long as the
* cipher isn't broken this is safe. The advantage of false start is that
* it saves a round trip for client-speaks-first protocols when performing a
* full handshake.
*
* In addition to enabling this option, the application must register a
* callback using the SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback function.
*/
/* For SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0, by default we prevent chosen plaintext attacks
* on SSL CBC mode cipher suites (see RFC 4346 Section F.3) by splitting
* non-empty application_data records into two records; the first record has
* only the first byte of plaintext, and the second has the rest.
*
* This only prevents the attack in the sending direction; the connection may
* still be vulnerable to such attacks if the peer does not implement a similar
* countermeasure.
*
* This protection mechanism is on by default; the default can be overridden by
* setting NSS_SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV=0 in the environment prior to execution,
* and/or by the application setting the option SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV to PR_FALSE.
*
* The per-record IV in TLS 1.1 and later adds one block of overhead per
* record, whereas this hack will add at least two blocks of overhead per
* record, so TLS 1.1+ will always be more efficient.
*
* Other implementations (e.g. some versions of OpenSSL, in some
* configurations) prevent the same attack by prepending an empty
* application_data record to every application_data record they send; we do
* not do that because some implementations cannot handle empty
* application_data records. Also, we only split application_data records and
* not other types of records, because some implementations will not accept
* fragmented records of some other types (e.g. some versions of NSS do not
* accept fragmented alerts).
*/
#define SSL_CBC_RANDOM_IV 23
#define SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING 24 /* Request OCSP stapling (client) */
/* SSL_ENABLE_NPN controls whether the NPN extension is enabled for the initial
* handshake when application layer protocol negotiation is used.
* SSL_SetNextProtoCallback or SSL_SetNextProtoNego must be used to control the
* application layer protocol negotiation; otherwise, the NPN extension will
* not be negotiated. SSL_ENABLE_NPN is currently enabled by default but this
* may change in future versions.
*/
#define SSL_ENABLE_NPN 25
/* SSL_ENABLE_ALPN controls whether the ALPN extension is enabled for the
* initial handshake when application layer protocol negotiation is used.
* SSL_SetNextProtoNego (not SSL_SetNextProtoCallback) must be used to control
* the application layer protocol negotiation; otherwise, the ALPN extension
* will not be negotiated. ALPN is not negotiated for renegotiation handshakes,
* even though the ALPN specification defines a way to use ALPN during
* renegotiations. SSL_ENABLE_ALPN is currently disabled by default, but this
* may change in future versions.
*/
#define SSL_ENABLE_ALPN 26
#ifdef SSL_DEPRECATED_FUNCTION
/* Old deprecated function names */
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_Enable(PRFileDesc *fd, int option, PRBool on);
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_EnableDefault(int option, PRBool on);
#endif
/* New function names */
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_OptionSet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 option, PRBool on);
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_OptionGet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 option, PRBool *on);
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_OptionSetDefault(PRInt32 option, PRBool on);
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_OptionGetDefault(PRInt32 option, PRBool *on);
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CertDBHandleSet(PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertDBHandle *dbHandle);
/* SSLNextProtoCallback is called during the handshake for the client, when a
* Next Protocol Negotiation (NPN) extension has been received from the server.
* |protos| and |protosLen| define a buffer which contains the server's
* advertisement. This data is guaranteed to be well formed per the NPN spec.
* |protoOut| is a buffer provided by the caller, of length 255 (the maximum
* allowed by the protocol). On successful return, the protocol to be announced
* to the server will be in |protoOut| and its length in |*protoOutLen|.
*
* The callback must return SECFailure or SECSuccess (not SECWouldBlock).
*/
typedef SECStatus (PR_CALLBACK *SSLNextProtoCallback)(
void *arg,
PRFileDesc *fd,
const unsigned char* protos,
unsigned int protosLen,
unsigned char* protoOut,
unsigned int* protoOutLen,
unsigned int protoMaxOut);
/* SSL_SetNextProtoCallback sets a callback function to handle Next Protocol
* Negotiation. It causes a client to advertise NPN. */
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetNextProtoCallback(PRFileDesc *fd,
SSLNextProtoCallback callback,
void *arg);
/* SSL_SetNextProtoNego can be used as an alternative to
* SSL_SetNextProtoCallback. It also causes a client to advertise NPN and
* installs a default callback function which selects the first supported
* protocol in server-preference order. If no matching protocol is found it
* selects the first supported protocol.
*
* Using this function also allows the client to transparently support ALPN.
* The same set of protocols will be advertised via ALPN and, if the server
* uses ALPN to select a protocol, SSL_GetNextProto will return
* SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED as the state.
*
* Since NPN uses the first protocol as the fallback protocol, when sending an
* ALPN extension, the first protocol is moved to the end of the list. This
* indicates that the fallback protocol is the least preferred. The other
* protocols should be in preference order.
*
* The supported protocols are specified in |data| in wire-format (8-bit
* length-prefixed). For example: "\010http/1.1\006spdy/2". */
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetNextProtoNego(PRFileDesc *fd,
const unsigned char *data,
unsigned int length);
typedef enum SSLNextProtoState {
SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_SUPPORT = 0, /* No peer support */
SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED = 1, /* Mutual agreement */
SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NO_OVERLAP = 2, /* No protocol overlap found */
SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED = 3 /* Server selected proto (ALPN) */
} SSLNextProtoState;
/* SSL_GetNextProto can be used in the HandshakeCallback or any time after
* a handshake to retrieve the result of the Next Protocol negotiation.
*
* The length of the negotiated protocol, if any, is written into *bufLen.
* If the negotiated protocol is longer than bufLenMax, then SECFailure is
* returned. Otherwise, the negotiated protocol, if any, is written into buf,
* and SECSuccess is returned. */
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_GetNextProto(PRFileDesc *fd,
SSLNextProtoState *state,
unsigned char *buf,
unsigned int *bufLen,
unsigned int bufLenMax);
/*
** Control ciphers that SSL uses. If on is non-zero then the named cipher
** is enabled, otherwise it is disabled.
** The "cipher" values are defined in sslproto.h (the SSL_EN_* values).
** EnableCipher records user preferences.
** SetPolicy sets the policy according to the policy module.
*/
#ifdef SSL_DEPRECATED_FUNCTION
/* Old deprecated function names */
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_EnableCipher(long which, PRBool enabled);
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetPolicy(long which, int policy);
#endif
/* New function names */
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPrefSet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 cipher, PRBool enabled);
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPrefGet(PRFileDesc *fd, PRInt32 cipher, PRBool *enabled);
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPrefSetDefault(PRInt32 cipher, PRBool enabled);
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPrefGetDefault(PRInt32 cipher, PRBool *enabled);
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPolicySet(PRInt32 cipher, PRInt32 policy);
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CipherPolicyGet(PRInt32 cipher, PRInt32 *policy);
/* SSL Version Range API
**
** This API should be used to control SSL 3.0 & TLS support instead of the
** older SSL_Option* API; however, the SSL_Option* API MUST still be used to
** control SSL 2.0 support. In this version of libssl, SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 are
** enabled by default. Future versions of libssl may change which versions of
** the protocol are enabled by default.
**
** The SSLProtocolVariant enum indicates whether the protocol is of type
** stream or datagram. This must be provided to the functions that do not
** take an fd. Functions which take an fd will get the variant from the fd,
** which is typed.
**
** Using the new version range API in conjunction with the older
** SSL_OptionSet-based API for controlling the enabled protocol versions may
** cause unexpected results. Going forward, we guarantee only the following:
**
** SSL_OptionGet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS) will return PR_TRUE if *ANY* versions of TLS
** are enabled.
**
** SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS, PR_FALSE) will disable *ALL* versions of TLS,
** including TLS 1.0 and later.
**
** The above two properties provide compatibility for applications that use
** SSL_OptionSet to implement the insecure fallback from TLS 1.x to SSL 3.0.
**
** SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS, PR_TRUE) will enable TLS 1.0, and may also
** enable some later versions of TLS, if it is necessary to do so in order to
** keep the set of enabled versions contiguous. For example, if TLS 1.2 is
** enabled, then after SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS, PR_TRUE), TLS 1.0,
** TLS 1.1, and TLS 1.2 will be enabled, and the call will have no effect on
** whether SSL 3.0 is enabled. If no later versions of TLS are enabled at the
** time SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS, PR_TRUE) is called, then no later
** versions of TLS will be enabled by the call.
**
** SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_FALSE) will disable SSL 3.0, and will not
** change the set of TLS versions that are enabled.
**
** SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_SSL3, PR_TRUE) will enable SSL 3.0, and may also
** enable some versions of TLS if TLS 1.1 or later is enabled at the time of
** the call, the same way SSL_OptionSet(SSL_ENABLE_TLS, PR_TRUE) works, in
** order to keep the set of enabled versions contiguous.
*/
/* Returns, in |*vrange|, the range of SSL3/TLS versions supported for the
** given protocol variant by the version of libssl linked-to at runtime.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_VersionRangeGetSupported(
SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, SSLVersionRange *vrange);
/* Returns, in |*vrange|, the range of SSL3/TLS versions enabled by default
** for the given protocol variant.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_VersionRangeGetDefault(
SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, SSLVersionRange *vrange);
/* Sets the range of enabled-by-default SSL3/TLS versions for the given
** protocol variant to |*vrange|.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_VersionRangeSetDefault(
SSLProtocolVariant protocolVariant, const SSLVersionRange *vrange);
/* Returns, in |*vrange|, the range of enabled SSL3/TLS versions for |fd|. */
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_VersionRangeGet(PRFileDesc *fd,
SSLVersionRange *vrange);
/* Sets the range of enabled SSL3/TLS versions for |fd| to |*vrange|. */
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_VersionRangeSet(PRFileDesc *fd,
const SSLVersionRange *vrange);
/* Values for "policy" argument to SSL_CipherPolicySet */
/* Values returned by SSL_CipherPolicyGet. */
#define SSL_NOT_ALLOWED 0 /* or invalid or unimplemented */
#define SSL_ALLOWED 1
#define SSL_RESTRICTED 2 /* only with "Step-Up" certs. */
/* Values for "on" with SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE. */
#define SSL_REQUIRE_NEVER ((PRBool)0)
#define SSL_REQUIRE_ALWAYS ((PRBool)1)
#define SSL_REQUIRE_FIRST_HANDSHAKE ((PRBool)2)
#define SSL_REQUIRE_NO_ERROR ((PRBool)3)
/* Values for "on" with SSL_ENABLE_RENEGOTIATION */
/* Never renegotiate at all. */
#define SSL_RENEGOTIATE_NEVER ((PRBool)0)
/* Renegotiate without restriction, whether or not the peer's client hello */
/* bears the renegotiation info extension. Vulnerable, as in the past. */
#define SSL_RENEGOTIATE_UNRESTRICTED ((PRBool)1)
/* Only renegotiate if the peer's hello bears the TLS renegotiation_info */
/* extension. This is safe renegotiation. */
#define SSL_RENEGOTIATE_REQUIRES_XTN ((PRBool)2)
/* Disallow unsafe renegotiation in server sockets only, but allow clients */
/* to continue to renegotiate with vulnerable servers. */
/* This value should only be used during the transition period when few */
/* servers have been upgraded. */
#define SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TRANSITIONAL ((PRBool)3)
/*
** Reset the handshake state for fd. This will make the complete SSL
** handshake protocol execute from the ground up on the next i/o
** operation.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ResetHandshake(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool asServer);
/*
** Force the handshake for fd to complete immediately. This blocks until
** the complete SSL handshake protocol is finished.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ForceHandshake(PRFileDesc *fd);
/*
** Same as above, but with an I/O timeout.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ForceHandshakeWithTimeout(PRFileDesc *fd,
PRIntervalTime timeout);
/*
** Query security status of socket. *on is set to one if security is
** enabled. *keySize will contain the stream key size used. *issuer will
** contain the RFC1485 verison of the name of the issuer of the
** certificate at the other end of the connection. For a client, this is
** the issuer of the server's certificate; for a server, this is the
** issuer of the client's certificate (if any). Subject is the subject of
** the other end's certificate. The pointers can be zero if the desired
** data is not needed. All strings returned by this function are owned
** by the caller, and need to be freed with PORT_Free.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SecurityStatus(PRFileDesc *fd, int *on, char **cipher,
int *keySize, int *secretKeySize,
char **issuer, char **subject);
/* Values for "on" */
#define SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_NOOPT -1
#define SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_OFF 0
#define SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_ON_HIGH 1
#define SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_ON_LOW 2
#define SSL_SECURITY_STATUS_FORTEZZA 3 /* NO LONGER SUPPORTED */
/*
** Return the certificate for our SSL peer. If the client calls this
** it will always return the server's certificate. If the server calls
** this, it may return NULL if client authentication is not enabled or
** if the client had no certificate when asked.
** "fd" the socket "file" descriptor
*/
SSL_IMPORT CERTCertificate *SSL_PeerCertificate(PRFileDesc *fd);
/*
** Return the certificates presented by the SSL peer. If the SSL peer
** did not present certificates, return NULL with the
** SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE error. On failure, return NULL with an error
** code other than SSL_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE.
** "fd" the socket "file" descriptor
*/
SSL_IMPORT CERTCertList *SSL_PeerCertificateChain(PRFileDesc *fd);
/* SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses returns the OCSP responses that were provided
* by the TLS server. The return value is a pointer to an internal SECItemArray
* that contains the returned OCSP responses; it is only valid until the
* callback function that calls SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses returns.
*
* If no OCSP responses were given by the server then the result will be empty.
* If there was an error, then the result will be NULL.
*
* You must set the SSL_ENABLE_OCSP_STAPLING option to enable OCSP stapling.
* to be provided by a server.
*
* libssl does not do any validation of the OCSP response itself; the
* authenticate certificate hook is responsible for doing so. The default
* authenticate certificate hook, SSL_AuthCertificate, does not implement
* any OCSP stapling funtionality, but this may change in future versions.
*/
SSL_IMPORT const SECItemArray * SSL_PeerStapledOCSPResponses(PRFileDesc *fd);
/* SSL_SetStapledOCSPResponses stores an array of one or multiple OCSP responses
* in the fd's data, which may be sent as part of a server side cert_status
* handshake message. Parameter |responses| is for the server certificate of
* the key exchange type |kea|.
* The function will duplicate the responses array.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus
SSL_SetStapledOCSPResponses(PRFileDesc *fd, const SECItemArray *responses,
SSLKEAType kea);
/*
** Authenticate certificate hook. Called when a certificate comes in
** (because of SSL_REQUIRE_CERTIFICATE in SSL_Enable) to authenticate the
** certificate.
**
** The authenticate certificate hook must return SECSuccess to indicate the
** certificate is valid, SECFailure to indicate the certificate is invalid,
** or SECWouldBlock if the application will authenticate the certificate
** asynchronously. SECWouldBlock is only supported for non-blocking sockets.
**
** If the authenticate certificate hook returns SECFailure, then the bad cert
** hook will be called. The bad cert handler is NEVER called if the
** authenticate certificate hook returns SECWouldBlock. If the application
** needs to handle and/or override a bad cert, it should do so before it
** calls SSL_AuthCertificateComplete (modifying the error it passes to
** SSL_AuthCertificateComplete as needed).
**
** See the documentation for SSL_AuthCertificateComplete for more information
** about the asynchronous behavior that occurs when the authenticate
** certificate hook returns SECWouldBlock.
**
** RFC 6066 says that clients should send the bad_certificate_status_response
** alert when they encounter an error processing the stapled OCSP response.
** libssl does not provide a way for the authenticate certificate hook to
** indicate that an OCSP error (SEC_ERROR_OCSP_*) that it returns is an error
** in the stapled OCSP response or an error in some other OCSP response.
** Further, NSS does not provide a convenient way to control or determine
** which OCSP response(s) were used to validate a certificate chain.
** Consequently, the current version of libssl does not ever send the
** bad_certificate_status_response alert. This may change in future releases.
*/
typedef SECStatus (PR_CALLBACK *SSLAuthCertificate)(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd,
PRBool checkSig,
PRBool isServer);
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_AuthCertificateHook(PRFileDesc *fd,
SSLAuthCertificate f,
void *arg);
/* An implementation of the certificate authentication hook */
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_AuthCertificate(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd,
PRBool checkSig, PRBool isServer);
/*
* Prototype for SSL callback to get client auth data from the application.
* arg - application passed argument
* caNames - pointer to distinguished names of CAs that the server likes
* pRetCert - pointer to pointer to cert, for return of cert
* pRetKey - pointer to key pointer, for return of key
*/
typedef SECStatus (PR_CALLBACK *SSLGetClientAuthData)(void *arg,
PRFileDesc *fd,
CERTDistNames *caNames,
CERTCertificate **pRetCert,/*return */
SECKEYPrivateKey **pRetKey);/* return */
/*
* Set the client side callback for SSL to retrieve user's private key
* and certificate.
* fd - the file descriptor for the connection in question
* f - the application's callback that delivers the key and cert
* a - application specific data
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook(PRFileDesc *fd,
SSLGetClientAuthData f, void *a);
/*
** SNI extension processing callback function.
** It is called when SSL socket receives SNI extension in ClientHello message.
** Upon this callback invocation, application is responsible to reconfigure the
** socket with the data for a particular server name.
** There are three potential outcomes of this function invocation:
** * application does not recognize the name or the type and wants the
** "unrecognized_name" alert be sent to the client. In this case the callback
** function must return SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT status.
** * application does not recognize the name, but wants to continue with
** the handshake using the current socket configuration. In this case,
** no socket reconfiguration is needed and the function should return
** SSL_SNI_CURRENT_CONFIG_IS_USED.
** * application recognizes the name and reconfigures the socket with
** appropriate certs, key, etc. There are many ways to reconfigure. NSS
** provides SSL_ReconfigFD function that can be used to update the socket
** data from model socket. To continue with the rest of the handshake, the
** implementation function should return an index of a name it has chosen.
** LibSSL will ignore any SNI extension received in a ClientHello message
** if application does not register a SSLSNISocketConfig callback.
** Each type field of SECItem indicates the name type.
** NOTE: currently RFC3546 defines only one name type: sni_host_name.
** Client is allowed to send only one name per known type. LibSSL will
** send an "unrecognized_name" alert if SNI extension name list contains more
** then one name of a type.
*/
typedef PRInt32 (PR_CALLBACK *SSLSNISocketConfig)(PRFileDesc *fd,
const SECItem *srvNameArr,
PRUint32 srvNameArrSize,
void *arg);
/*
** SSLSNISocketConfig should return an index within 0 and srvNameArrSize-1
** when it has reconfigured the socket fd to use certs and keys, etc
** for a specific name. There are two other allowed return values. One
** tells libSSL to use the default cert and key. The other tells libSSL
** to send the "unrecognized_name" alert. These values are:
**/
#define SSL_SNI_CURRENT_CONFIG_IS_USED -1
#define SSL_SNI_SEND_ALERT -2
/*
** Set application implemented SNISocketConfig callback.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SNISocketConfigHook(PRFileDesc *fd,
SSLSNISocketConfig f,
void *arg);
/*
** Reconfigure fd SSL socket with model socket parameters. Sets
** server certs and keys, list of trust anchor, socket options
** and all SSL socket call backs and parameters.
*/
SSL_IMPORT PRFileDesc *SSL_ReconfigFD(PRFileDesc *model, PRFileDesc *fd);
/*
* Set the client side argument for SSL to retrieve PKCS #11 pin.
* fd - the file descriptor for the connection in question
* a - pkcs11 application specific data
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetPKCS11PinArg(PRFileDesc *fd, void *a);
/*
** This is a callback for dealing with server certs that are not authenticated
** by the client. The client app can decide that it actually likes the
** cert by some external means and restart the connection.
**
** The bad cert hook must return SECSuccess to override the result of the
** authenticate certificate hook, SECFailure if the certificate should still be
** considered invalid, or SECWouldBlock if the application will authenticate
** the certificate asynchronously. SECWouldBlock is only supported for
** non-blocking sockets.
**
** See the documentation for SSL_AuthCertificateComplete for more information
** about the asynchronous behavior that occurs when the bad cert hook returns
** SECWouldBlock.
*/
typedef SECStatus (PR_CALLBACK *SSLBadCertHandler)(void *arg, PRFileDesc *fd);
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_BadCertHook(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLBadCertHandler f,
void *arg);
/*
** Configure SSL socket for running a secure server. Needs the
** certificate for the server and the servers private key. The arguments
** are copied.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ConfigSecureServer(
PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertificate *cert,
SECKEYPrivateKey *key, SSLKEAType kea);
/*
** Allows SSL socket configuration with caller-supplied certificate chain.
** If certChainOpt is NULL, tries to find one.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus
SSL_ConfigSecureServerWithCertChain(PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertificate *cert,
const CERTCertificateList *certChainOpt,
SECKEYPrivateKey *key, SSLKEAType kea);
/*
** Configure a secure server's session-id cache. Define the maximum number
** of entries in the cache, the longevity of the entires, and the directory
** where the cache files will be placed. These values can be zero, and
** if so, the implementation will choose defaults.
** This version of the function is for use in applications that have only one
** process that uses the cache (even if that process has multiple threads).
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCache(int maxCacheEntries,
PRUint32 timeout,
PRUint32 ssl3_timeout,
const char * directory);
/* Configure a secure server's session-id cache. Depends on value of
* enableMPCache, configures malti-proc or single proc cache. */
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCacheWithOpt(
PRUint32 timeout,
PRUint32 ssl3_timeout,
const char * directory,
int maxCacheEntries,
int maxCertCacheEntries,
int maxSrvNameCacheEntries,
PRBool enableMPCache);
/*
** Like SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCache, with one important difference.
** If the application will run multiple processes (as opposed to, or in
** addition to multiple threads), then it must call this function, instead
** of calling SSL_ConfigServerSessionIDCache().
** This has nothing to do with the number of processORs, only processEs.
** This function sets up a Server Session ID (SID) cache that is safe for
** access by multiple processes on the same system.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache(int maxCacheEntries,
PRUint32 timeout,
PRUint32 ssl3_timeout,
const char * directory);
/* Get and set the configured maximum number of mutexes used for the
** server's store of SSL sessions. This value is used by the server
** session ID cache initialization functions shown above. Note that on
** some platforms, these mutexes are actually implemented with POSIX
** semaphores, or with unnamed pipes. The default value varies by platform.
** An attempt to set a too-low maximum will return an error and the
** configured value will not be changed.
*/
SSL_IMPORT PRUint32 SSL_GetMaxServerCacheLocks(void);
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetMaxServerCacheLocks(PRUint32 maxLocks);
/* environment variable set by SSL_ConfigMPServerSIDCache, and queried by
* SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache when envString is NULL.
*/
#define SSL_ENV_VAR_NAME "SSL_INHERITANCE"
/* called in child to inherit SID Cache variables.
* If envString is NULL, this function will use the value of the environment
* variable "SSL_INHERITANCE", otherwise the string value passed in will be
* used.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_InheritMPServerSIDCache(const char * envString);
/*
** Set the callback that gets called when a TLS handshake is complete. The
** handshake callback is called after verifying the peer's Finished message and
** before processing incoming application data.
**
** For the initial handshake: If the handshake false started (see
** SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START), then application data may already have been sent
** before the handshake callback is called. If we did not false start then the
** callback will get called before any application data is sent.
*/
typedef void (PR_CALLBACK *SSLHandshakeCallback)(PRFileDesc *fd,
void *client_data);
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *fd,
SSLHandshakeCallback cb, void *client_data);
/* Applications that wish to enable TLS false start must set this callback
** function. NSS will invoke the functon to determine if a particular
** connection should use false start or not. SECSuccess indicates that the
** callback completed successfully, and if so *canFalseStart indicates if false
** start can be used. If the callback does not return SECSuccess then the
** handshake will be canceled. NSS's recommended criteria can be evaluated by
** calling SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart.
**
** If no false start callback is registered then false start will never be
** done, even if the SSL_ENABLE_FALSE_START option is enabled.
**/
typedef SECStatus (PR_CALLBACK *SSLCanFalseStartCallback)(
PRFileDesc *fd, void *arg, PRBool *canFalseStart);
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetCanFalseStartCallback(
PRFileDesc *fd, SSLCanFalseStartCallback callback, void *arg);
/* This function sets *canFalseStart according to the recommended criteria for
** false start. These criteria may change from release to release and may depend
** on which handshake features have been negotiated and/or properties of the
** certifciates/keys used on the connection.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_RecommendedCanFalseStart(PRFileDesc *fd,
PRBool *canFalseStart);
/*
** For the server, request a new handshake. For the client, begin a new
** handshake. If flushCache is non-zero, the SSL3 cache entry will be
** flushed first, ensuring that a full SSL handshake will be done.
** If flushCache is zero, and an SSL connection is established, it will
** do the much faster session restart handshake. This will change the
** session keys without doing another private key operation.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ReHandshake(PRFileDesc *fd, PRBool flushCache);
/*
** Same as above, but with an I/O timeout.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ReHandshakeWithTimeout(PRFileDesc *fd,
PRBool flushCache,
PRIntervalTime timeout);
#ifdef SSL_DEPRECATED_FUNCTION
/* deprecated!
** For the server, request a new handshake. For the client, begin a new
** handshake. Flushes SSL3 session cache entry first, ensuring that a
** full handshake will be done.
** This call is equivalent to SSL_ReHandshake(fd, PR_TRUE)
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_RedoHandshake(PRFileDesc *fd);
#endif
/*
* Allow the application to pass a URL or hostname into the SSL library.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetURL(PRFileDesc *fd, const char *url);
/*
* Allow an application to define a set of trust anchors for peer
* cert validation.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetTrustAnchors(PRFileDesc *fd, CERTCertList *list);
/*
** Return the number of bytes that SSL has waiting in internal buffers.
** Return 0 if security is not enabled.
*/
SSL_IMPORT int SSL_DataPending(PRFileDesc *fd);
/*
** Invalidate the SSL session associated with fd.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_InvalidateSession(PRFileDesc *fd);
/*
** Return a SECItem containing the SSL session ID associated with the fd.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECItem *SSL_GetSessionID(PRFileDesc *fd);
/*
** Clear out the client's SSL session cache, not the server's session cache.
*/
SSL_IMPORT void SSL_ClearSessionCache(void);
/*
** Close the server's SSL session cache.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ShutdownServerSessionIDCache(void);
/*
** Set peer information so we can correctly look up SSL session later.
** You only have to do this if you're tunneling through a proxy.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetSockPeerID(PRFileDesc *fd, const char *peerID);
/*
** Reveal the security information for the peer.
*/
SSL_IMPORT CERTCertificate * SSL_RevealCert(PRFileDesc * socket);
SSL_IMPORT void * SSL_RevealPinArg(PRFileDesc * socket);
SSL_IMPORT char * SSL_RevealURL(PRFileDesc * socket);
/* This callback may be passed to the SSL library via a call to
* SSL_GetClientAuthDataHook() for each SSL client socket.
* It will be invoked when SSL needs to know what certificate and private key
* (if any) to use to respond to a request for client authentication.
* If arg is non-NULL, it is a pointer to a NULL-terminated string containing
* the nickname of the cert/key pair to use.
* If arg is NULL, this function will search the cert and key databases for
* a suitable match and send it if one is found.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus
NSS_GetClientAuthData(void * arg,
PRFileDesc * socket,
struct CERTDistNamesStr * caNames,
struct CERTCertificateStr ** pRetCert,
struct SECKEYPrivateKeyStr **pRetKey);
/*
** Configure DTLS-SRTP (RFC 5764) cipher suite preferences.
** Input is a list of ciphers in descending preference order and a length
** of the list. As a side effect, this causes the use_srtp extension to be
** negotiated.
**
** Invalid or unimplemented cipher suites in |ciphers| are ignored. If at
** least one cipher suite in |ciphers| is implemented, returns SECSuccess.
** Otherwise returns SECFailure.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_SetSRTPCiphers(PRFileDesc *fd,
const PRUint16 *ciphers,
unsigned int numCiphers);
/*
** Get the selected DTLS-SRTP cipher suite (if any).
** To be called after the handshake completes.
** Returns SECFailure if not negotiated.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_GetSRTPCipher(PRFileDesc *fd,
PRUint16 *cipher);
/*
* Look to see if any of the signers in the cert chain for "cert" are found
* in the list of caNames.
* Returns SECSuccess if so, SECFailure if not.
* Used by NSS_GetClientAuthData. May be used by other callback functions.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus NSS_CmpCertChainWCANames(CERTCertificate *cert,
CERTDistNames *caNames);
/*
* Returns key exchange type of the keys in an SSL server certificate.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SSLKEAType NSS_FindCertKEAType(CERTCertificate * cert);
/* Set cipher policies to a predefined Domestic (U.S.A.) policy.
* This essentially allows all supported ciphers.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus NSS_SetDomesticPolicy(void);
/* Set cipher policies to a predefined Policy that is exportable from the USA
* according to present U.S. policies as we understand them.
* It is the same as NSS_SetDomesticPolicy now.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus NSS_SetExportPolicy(void);
/* Set cipher policies to a predefined Policy that is exportable from the USA
* according to present U.S. policies as we understand them, and that the
* nation of France will permit to be imported into their country.
* It is the same as NSS_SetDomesticPolicy now.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus NSS_SetFrancePolicy(void);
SSL_IMPORT SSL3Statistics * SSL_GetStatistics(void);
/* Report more information than SSL_SecurityStatus.
** Caller supplies the info struct. Function fills it in.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_GetChannelInfo(PRFileDesc *fd, SSLChannelInfo *info,
PRUintn len);
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(PRUint16 cipherSuite,
SSLCipherSuiteInfo *info, PRUintn len);
/* Returnes negotiated through SNI host info. */
SSL_IMPORT SECItem *SSL_GetNegotiatedHostInfo(PRFileDesc *fd);
/* Export keying material according to RFC 5705.
** fd must correspond to a TLS 1.0 or higher socket and out must
** already be allocated. If hasContext is false, it uses the no-context
** construction from the RFC and ignores the context and contextLen
** arguments.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_ExportKeyingMaterial(PRFileDesc *fd,
const char *label,
unsigned int labelLen,
PRBool hasContext,
const unsigned char *context,
unsigned int contextLen,
unsigned char *out,
unsigned int outLen);
/*
** Return a new reference to the certificate that was most recently sent
** to the peer on this SSL/TLS connection, or NULL if none has been sent.
*/
SSL_IMPORT CERTCertificate * SSL_LocalCertificate(PRFileDesc *fd);
/* Test an SSL configuration to see if SSL_BYPASS_PKCS11 can be turned on.
** Check the key exchange algorithm for each cipher in the list to see if
** a master secret key can be extracted after being derived with the mechanism
** required by the protocolmask argument. If the KEA will use keys from the
** specified cert make sure the extract operation is attempted from the slot
** where the private key resides.
** If MS can be extracted for all ciphers, (*pcanbypass) is set to TRUE and
** SECSuccess is returned. In all other cases but one (*pcanbypass) is
** set to FALSE and SECFailure is returned.
** In that last case Derive() has been called successfully but the MS is null,
** CanBypass sets (*pcanbypass) to FALSE and returns SECSuccess indicating the
** arguments were all valid but the slot cannot be bypassed.
**
** Note: A TRUE return code from CanBypass means "Your configuration will perform
** NO WORSE with the bypass enabled than without"; it does NOT mean that every
** cipher suite listed will work properly with the selected protocols.
**
** Caveat: If export cipher suites are included in the argument list Canbypass
** will return FALSE.
**/
/* protocol mask bits */
#define SSL_CBP_SSL3 0x0001 /* test SSL v3 mechanisms */
#define SSL_CBP_TLS1_0 0x0002 /* test TLS v1.0 mechanisms */
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_CanBypass(CERTCertificate *cert,
SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey,
PRUint32 protocolmask,
PRUint16 *ciphers, int nciphers,
PRBool *pcanbypass, void *pwArg);
/*
** Did the handshake with the peer negotiate the given extension?
** Output parameter valid only if function returns SECSuccess
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(PRFileDesc * socket,
SSLExtensionType extId,
PRBool *yes);
/*
** How long should we wait before retransmitting the next flight of
** the DTLS handshake? Returns SECFailure if not DTLS or not in a
** handshake.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus DTLS_GetHandshakeTimeout(PRFileDesc *socket,
PRIntervalTime *timeout);
/*
* Return a boolean that indicates whether the underlying library
* will perform as the caller expects.
*
* The only argument is a string, which should be the version
* identifier of the NSS library. That string will be compared
* against a string that represents the actual build version of
* the SSL library.
*/
extern PRBool NSSSSL_VersionCheck(const char *importedVersion);
/*
* Returns a const string of the SSL library version.
*/
extern const char *NSSSSL_GetVersion(void);
/* Restart an SSL connection that was paused to do asynchronous certificate
* chain validation (when the auth certificate hook or bad cert handler
* returned SECWouldBlock).
*
* This function only works for non-blocking sockets; Do not use it for
* blocking sockets. Currently, this function works only for the client role of
* a connection; it does not work for the server role.
*
* The application must call SSL_AuthCertificateComplete with 0 as the value of
* the error parameter after it has successfully validated the peer's
* certificate, in order to continue the SSL handshake.
*
* The application may call SSL_AuthCertificateComplete with a non-zero value
* for error (e.g. SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) when certificate validation
* fails, before it closes the connection. If the application does so, an
* alert corresponding to the error (e.g. certificate_revoked) will be sent to
* the peer. See the source code of the internal function
* ssl3_SendAlertForCertError for the current mapping of error to alert. This
* mapping may change in future versions of libssl.
*
* This function will not complete the entire handshake. The application must
* call SSL_ForceHandshake, PR_Recv, PR_Send, etc. after calling this function
* to force the handshake to complete.
*
* On the first handshake of a connection, libssl will wait for the peer's
* certificate to be authenticated before calling the handshake callback,
* sending a client certificate, sending any application data, or returning
* any application data to the application. On subsequent (renegotiation)
* handshakes, libssl will block the handshake unconditionally while the
* certificate is being validated.
*
* libssl may send and receive handshake messages while waiting for the
* application to call SSL_AuthCertificateComplete, and it may call other
* callbacks (e.g, the client auth data hook) before
* SSL_AuthCertificateComplete has been called.
*
* An application that uses this asynchronous mechanism will usually have lower
* handshake latency if it has to do public key operations on the certificate
* chain and/or CRL/OCSP/cert fetching during the authentication, especially if
* it does so in parallel on another thread. However, if the application can
* authenticate the peer's certificate quickly then it may be more efficient
* to use the synchronous mechanism (i.e. returning SECFailure/SECSuccess
* instead of SECWouldBlock from the authenticate certificate hook).
*
* Be careful about converting an application from synchronous cert validation
* to asynchronous certificate validation. A naive conversion is likely to
* result in deadlocks; e.g. the application will wait in PR_Poll for network
* I/O on the connection while all network I/O on the connection is blocked
* waiting for this function to be called.
*
* Returns SECFailure on failure, SECSuccess on success. Never returns
* SECWouldBlock. Note that SSL_AuthCertificateComplete will (usually) return
* SECSuccess; do not interpret the return value of SSL_AuthCertificateComplete
* as an indicator of whether it is OK to continue using the connection. For
* example, SSL_AuthCertificateComplete(fd, SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE) will
* return SECSuccess (normally), but that does not mean that the application
* should continue using the connection. If the application passes a non-zero
* value for second argument (error), or if SSL_AuthCertificateComplete returns
* anything other than SECSuccess, then the application should close the
* connection.
*/
SSL_IMPORT SECStatus SSL_AuthCertificateComplete(PRFileDesc *fd,
PRErrorCode error);
SEC_END_PROTOS
#endif /* __ssl_h_ */
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink