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RetroZilla/security/nss/lib/softoken/pkcs11c.c
roytam1 44b7f056d9 cherry-picked mozilla NSS upstream changes (to rev bad5fd065fa1, which is on par with 3.20): 
bug1001332, 56b691c003ad, bug1086145, bug1054069, bug1155922, bug991783, bug1125025, bug1162521, bug1162644, bug1132941, bug1164364, bug1166205, bug1166163, bug1166515, bug1138554, bug1167046, bug1167043, bug1169451, bug1172128, bug1170322, bug102794, bug1128184, bug557830, bug1174648, bug1180244, bug1177784, bug1173413, bug1169174, bug1084669, bug951455, bug1183395, bug1177430, bug1183827, bug1160139, bug1154106, bug1142209, bug1185033, bug1193467, bug1182667(with sha512 changes backed out, which breaks VC6 compilation), bug1158489, bug337796
2018-07-14 21:22:32 +08:00

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/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
/*
* This file implements PKCS 11 on top of our existing security modules
*
* For more information about PKCS 11 See PKCS 11 Token Inteface Standard.
* This implementation has two slots:
* slot 1 is our generic crypto support. It does not require login.
* It supports Public Key ops, and all they bulk ciphers and hashes.
* It can also support Private Key ops for imported Private keys. It does
* not have any token storage.
* slot 2 is our private key support. It requires a login before use. It
* can store Private Keys and Certs as token objects. Currently only private
* keys and their associated Certificates are saved on the token.
*
* In this implementation, session objects are only visible to the session
* that created or generated them.
*/
#include "seccomon.h"
#include "secitem.h"
#include "secport.h"
#include "blapi.h"
#include "pkcs11.h"
#include "pkcs11i.h"
#include "pkcs1sig.h"
#include "lowkeyi.h"
#include "secder.h"
#include "secdig.h"
#include "lowpbe.h" /* We do PBE below */
#include "pkcs11t.h"
#include "secoid.h"
#include "alghmac.h"
#include "softoken.h"
#include "secasn1.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "prprf.h"
#define __PASTE(x,y) x##y
/*
* we renamed all our internal functions, get the correct
* definitions for them...
*/
#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
#define CK_EXTERN extern
#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(func) \
CK_RV __PASTE(NS,func)
#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST 1
#include "pkcs11f.h"
typedef struct {
PRUint8 client_version[2];
PRUint8 random[46];
} SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret;
static void sftk_Null(void *data, PRBool freeit)
{
return;
}
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
#ifdef EC_DEBUG
#define SEC_PRINT(str1, str2, num, sitem) \
printf("pkcs11c.c:%s:%s (keytype=%d) [len=%d]\n", \
str1, str2, num, sitem->len); \
for (i = 0; i < sitem->len; i++) { \
printf("%02x:", sitem->data[i]); \
} \
printf("\n")
#else
#undef EC_DEBUG
#define SEC_PRINT(a, b, c, d)
#endif
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
/*
* free routines.... Free local type allocated data, and convert
* other free routines to the destroy signature.
*/
static void
sftk_FreePrivKey(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, PRBool freeit)
{
nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(key);
}
static void
sftk_Space(void *data, PRBool freeit)
{
PORT_Free(data);
}
/*
* map all the SEC_ERROR_xxx error codes that may be returned by freebl
* functions to CKR_xxx. return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR by default for backward
* compatibility.
*/
static CK_RV
sftk_MapCryptError(int error)
{
switch (error) {
case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS:
case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA: /* MP_RANGE gets mapped to this */
return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
case SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN:
return CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE;
case SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN:
return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
case SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE:
return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
case SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY:
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
case SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE:
return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
case SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY:
return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
case SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY: /* an EC public key that fails validation */
return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE; /* the closest error code */
case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM:
return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
/* EC functions set this error if NSS_DISABLE_ECC is defined */
case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG:
return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
case SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE:
return CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID;
/* key pair generation failed after max number of attempts */
case SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM:
return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
}
return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
/* used by Decrypt and UnwrapKey (indirectly) */
static CK_RV
sftk_MapDecryptError(int error)
{
switch (error) {
case SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA:
return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
default:
return sftk_MapCryptError(error);
}
}
/*
* return CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID instead of CKR_DEVICE_ERROR by default for
* backward compatibilty.
*/
static CK_RV
sftk_MapVerifyError(int error)
{
CK_RV crv = sftk_MapCryptError(error);
if (crv == CKR_DEVICE_ERROR)
crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
return crv;
}
/*
* turn a CDMF key into a des key. CDMF is an old IBM scheme to export DES by
* Deprecating a full des key to 40 bit key strenth.
*/
static CK_RV
sftk_cdmf2des(unsigned char *cdmfkey, unsigned char *deskey)
{
unsigned char key1[8] = { 0xc4, 0x08, 0xb0, 0x54, 0x0b, 0xa1, 0xe0, 0xae };
unsigned char key2[8] = { 0xef, 0x2c, 0x04, 0x1c, 0xe6, 0x38, 0x2f, 0xe6 };
unsigned char enc_src[8];
unsigned char enc_dest[8];
unsigned int leng,i;
DESContext *descx;
SECStatus rv;
/* zero the parity bits */
for (i=0; i < 8; i++) {
enc_src[i] = cdmfkey[i] & 0xfe;
}
/* encrypt with key 1 */
descx = DES_CreateContext(key1, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE);
if (descx == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, enc_dest, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8);
DES_DestroyContext(descx,PR_TRUE);
if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
/* xor source with des, zero the parity bits and deprecate the key*/
for (i=0; i < 8; i++) {
if (i & 1) {
enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0xfe;
} else {
enc_src[i] = (enc_src[i] ^ enc_dest[i]) & 0x0e;
}
}
/* encrypt with key 2 */
descx = DES_CreateContext(key2, NULL, NSS_DES, PR_TRUE);
if (descx == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
rv = DES_Encrypt(descx, deskey, &leng, 8, enc_src, 8);
DES_DestroyContext(descx,PR_TRUE);
if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
/* set the corret parity on our new des key */
sftk_FormatDESKey(deskey, 8);
return CKR_OK;
}
/* NSC_DestroyObject destroys an object. */
CK_RV
NSC_DestroyObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hObject)
{
SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKObject *object;
SFTKFreeStatus status;
CHECK_FORK();
if (slot == NULL) {
return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/*
* This whole block just makes sure we really can destroy the
* requested object.
*/
session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) {
return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
object = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hObject,session);
if (object == NULL) {
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/* don't destroy a private object if we aren't logged in */
if ((!slot->isLoggedIn) && (slot->needLogin) &&
(sftk_isTrue(object,CKA_PRIVATE))) {
sftk_FreeSession(session);
sftk_FreeObject(object);
return CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN;
}
/* don't destroy a token object if we aren't in a rw session */
if (((session->info.flags & CKF_RW_SESSION) == 0) &&
(sftk_isTrue(object,CKA_TOKEN))) {
sftk_FreeSession(session);
sftk_FreeObject(object);
return CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY;
}
sftk_DeleteObject(session,object);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
/*
* get some indication if the object is destroyed. Note: this is not
* 100%. Someone may have an object reference outstanding (though that
* should not be the case by here. Also note that the object is "half"
* destroyed. Our internal representation is destroyed, but it may still
* be in the data base.
*/
status = sftk_FreeObject(object);
return (status != SFTK_DestroyFailure) ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
/*
************** Crypto Functions: Utilities ************************
*/
/*
* Utility function for converting PSS/OAEP parameter types into
* HASH_HashTypes. Note: Only SHA family functions are defined in RFC 3447.
*/
static HASH_HashType
GetHashTypeFromMechanism(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech)
{
switch (mech) {
case CKM_SHA_1:
case CKG_MGF1_SHA1:
return HASH_AlgSHA1;
case CKM_SHA224:
case CKG_MGF1_SHA224:
return HASH_AlgSHA224;
case CKM_SHA256:
case CKG_MGF1_SHA256:
return HASH_AlgSHA256;
case CKM_SHA384:
case CKG_MGF1_SHA384:
return HASH_AlgSHA384;
case CKM_SHA512:
case CKG_MGF1_SHA512:
return HASH_AlgSHA512;
default:
return HASH_AlgNULL;
}
}
/*
* Returns true if "params" contains a valid set of PSS parameters
*/
static PRBool
sftk_ValidatePssParams(const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params)
{
if (!params) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
if (GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL ||
GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
return PR_TRUE;
}
/*
* Returns true if "params" contains a valid set of OAEP parameters
*/
static PRBool
sftk_ValidateOaepParams(const CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS *params)
{
if (!params) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
/* The requirements of ulSourceLen/pSourceData come from PKCS #11, which
* state:
* If the parameter is empty, pSourceData must be NULL and
* ulSourceDataLen must be zero.
*/
if (params->source != CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED ||
(GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg) == HASH_AlgNULL) ||
(GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf) == HASH_AlgNULL) ||
(params->ulSourceDataLen == 0 && params->pSourceData != NULL) ||
(params->ulSourceDataLen != 0 && params->pSourceData == NULL)) {
return PR_FALSE;
}
return PR_TRUE;
}
/*
* return a context based on the SFTKContext type.
*/
SFTKSessionContext *
sftk_ReturnContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type)
{
switch (type) {
case SFTK_ENCRYPT:
case SFTK_DECRYPT:
return session->enc_context;
case SFTK_HASH:
return session->hash_context;
case SFTK_SIGN:
case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER:
case SFTK_VERIFY:
case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER:
return session->hash_context;
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* change a context based on the SFTKContext type.
*/
void
sftk_SetContextByType(SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType type,
SFTKSessionContext *context)
{
switch (type) {
case SFTK_ENCRYPT:
case SFTK_DECRYPT:
session->enc_context = context;
break;
case SFTK_HASH:
session->hash_context = context;
break;
case SFTK_SIGN:
case SFTK_SIGN_RECOVER:
case SFTK_VERIFY:
case SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER:
session->hash_context = context;
break;
}
return;
}
/*
* code to grab the context. Needed by every C_XXXUpdate, C_XXXFinal,
* and C_XXX function. The function takes a session handle, the context type,
* and wether or not the session needs to be multipart. It returns the context,
* and optionally returns the session pointer (if sessionPtr != NULL) if session
* pointer is returned, the caller is responsible for freeing it.
*/
static CK_RV
sftk_GetContext(CK_SESSION_HANDLE handle,SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr,
SFTKContextType type, PRBool needMulti, SFTKSession **sessionPtr)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(handle);
if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session,type);
/* make sure the context is valid */
if((context==NULL)||(context->type!=type)||(needMulti&&!(context->multi))){
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED;
}
*contextPtr = context;
if (sessionPtr != NULL) {
*sessionPtr = session;
} else {
sftk_FreeSession(session);
}
return CKR_OK;
}
/** Terminate operation (in the PKCS#11 spec sense).
* Intuitive name for FreeContext/SetNullContext pair.
*/
static void
sftk_TerminateOp( SFTKSession *session, SFTKContextType ctype,
SFTKSessionContext *context )
{
sftk_FreeContext( context );
sftk_SetContextByType( session, ctype, NULL );
}
/*
************** Crypto Functions: Encrypt ************************
*/
/*
* All the NSC_InitXXX functions have a set of common checks and processing they
* all need to do at the beginning. This is done here.
*/
static CK_RV
sftk_InitGeneric(SFTKSession *session,SFTKSessionContext **contextPtr,
SFTKContextType ctype,SFTKObject **keyPtr,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_KEY_TYPE *keyTypePtr,
CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubKeyType, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation)
{
SFTKObject *key = NULL;
SFTKAttribute *att;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
/* We can only init if there is not current context active */
if (sftk_ReturnContextByType(session,ctype) != NULL) {
return CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE;
}
/* find the key */
if (keyPtr) {
key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session);
if (key == NULL) {
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/* make sure it's a valid key for this operation */
if (((key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) && (key->objclass != pubKeyType))
|| !sftk_isTrue(key,operation)) {
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
}
/* get the key type */
att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
if (att == NULL) {
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
}
PORT_Assert(att->attrib.ulValueLen == sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)) {
sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
}
PORT_Memcpy(keyTypePtr, att->attrib.pValue, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
*keyPtr = key;
}
/* allocate the context structure */
context = (SFTKSessionContext *)PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSessionContext));
if (context == NULL) {
if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
context->type = ctype;
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
context->rsa = PR_FALSE;
context->cipherInfo = NULL;
context->hashInfo = NULL;
context->doPad = PR_FALSE;
context->padDataLength = 0;
context->key = key;
context->blockSize = 0;
context->maxLen = 0;
*contextPtr = context;
return CKR_OK;
}
static int
sftk_aes_mode(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism)
{
switch (mechanism) {
case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
case CKM_AES_CBC:
return NSS_AES_CBC;
case CKM_AES_ECB:
return NSS_AES;
case CKM_AES_CTS:
return NSS_AES_CTS;
case CKM_AES_CTR:
return NSS_AES_CTR;
case CKM_AES_GCM:
return NSS_AES_GCM;
}
return -1;
}
static SECStatus
sftk_RSAEncryptRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *output,
unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
{
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = RSA_EncryptRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
inputLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
}
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
sftk_RSADecryptRaw(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
{
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = RSA_DecryptRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
inputLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
}
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
sftk_RSAEncrypt(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *output,
unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
{
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = RSA_EncryptBlock(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
inputLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
}
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
sftk_RSADecrypt(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
{
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = RSA_DecryptBlock(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxLen, input,
inputLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
}
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
sftk_RSAEncryptOAEP(SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo *info, unsigned char *output,
unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
{
HASH_HashType hashAlg;
HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->hashAlg);
maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->mgf);
return RSA_EncryptOAEP(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
(const unsigned char*)info->params->pSourceData,
info->params->ulSourceDataLen, NULL, 0,
output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen);
}
static SECStatus
sftk_RSADecryptOAEP(SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo *info, unsigned char *output,
unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxLen,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
{
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
HASH_HashType hashAlg;
HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->hashAlg);
maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(info->params->mgf);
rv = RSA_DecryptOAEP(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
(const unsigned char*)info->params->pSourceData,
info->params->ulSourceDataLen,
output, outputLen, maxLen, input, inputLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
}
return rv;
}
/** NSC_CryptInit initializes an encryption/Decryption operation.
*
* Always called by NSC_EncryptInit, NSC_DecryptInit, NSC_WrapKey,NSC_UnwrapKey.
* Called by NSC_SignInit, NSC_VerifyInit (via sftk_InitCBCMac) only for block
* ciphers MAC'ing.
*/
static CK_RV
sftk_CryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE mechUsage, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage,
SFTKContextType contextType, PRBool isEncrypt)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKObject *key;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
SFTKAttribute *att;
CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *rc2_param;
#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *rc5_param;
SECItem rc5Key;
#endif
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
unsigned effectiveKeyLength;
unsigned char newdeskey[24];
PRBool useNewKey=PR_FALSE;
int t;
crv = sftk_MechAllowsOperation(pMechanism->mechanism, mechUsage );
if (crv != CKR_OK)
return crv;
session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,contextType,&key,hKey,&key_type,
isEncrypt ?CKO_PUBLIC_KEY:CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, keyUsage);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
context->doPad = PR_FALSE;
switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
case CKM_RSA_X_509:
if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
context->multi = PR_FALSE;
context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
if (isEncrypt) {
NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
if (pubKey == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(pubKey);
context->cipherInfo = (void *)pubKey;
context->update = (SFTKCipher)
(pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
? sftk_RSAEncryptRaw : sftk_RSAEncrypt);
} else {
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
if (privKey == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey);
context->cipherInfo = (void *)privKey;
context->update = (SFTKCipher)
(pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
? sftk_RSADecryptRaw : sftk_RSADecrypt);
}
context->destroy = sftk_Null;
break;
case CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP:
if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS) ||
!sftk_ValidateOaepParams((CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS*)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
context->multi = PR_FALSE;
context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
if (isEncrypt) {
SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo *info = PORT_New(SFTKOAEPEncryptInfo);
if (info == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
info->key = sftk_GetPubKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
if (info->key == NULL) {
PORT_Free(info);
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSAEncryptOAEP;
context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PublicModulusLen(info->key);
context->cipherInfo = info;
} else {
SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo *info = PORT_New(SFTKOAEPDecryptInfo);
if (info == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
info->key = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, CKK_RSA, &crv);
if (info->key == NULL) {
PORT_Free(info);
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSADecryptOAEP;
context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(info->key);
context->cipherInfo = info;
}
context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
break;
case CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD:
context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
/* fall thru */
case CKM_RC2_ECB:
case CKM_RC2_CBC:
context->blockSize = 8;
if (key_type != CKK_RC2) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (att == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
rc2_param = (CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
effectiveKeyLength = (rc2_param->ulEffectiveBits+7)/8;
context->cipherInfo =
RC2_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen, rc2_param->iv,
pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC2_ECB ? NSS_RC2 :
NSS_RC2_CBC,effectiveKeyLength);
sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC2_Encrypt : RC2_Decrypt);
context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC2_DestroyContext;
break;
#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
case CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD:
context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
/* fall thru */
case CKM_RC5_ECB:
case CKM_RC5_CBC:
if (key_type != CKK_RC5) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (att == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
rc5_param = (CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
context->blockSize = rc5_param->ulWordsize*2;
rc5Key.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue;
rc5Key.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
context->cipherInfo = RC5_CreateContext(&rc5Key,rc5_param->ulRounds,
rc5_param->ulWordsize,rc5_param->pIv,
pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RC5_ECB ? NSS_RC5 : NSS_RC5_CBC);
sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC5_Encrypt : RC5_Decrypt);
context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC5_DestroyContext;
break;
#endif
case CKM_RC4:
if (key_type != CKK_RC4) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (att == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
context->cipherInfo =
RC4_CreateContext((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; /* WRONG !!! */
break;
}
context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? RC4_Encrypt : RC4_Decrypt);
context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) RC4_DestroyContext;
break;
case CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD:
context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
/* fall thru */
case CKM_CDMF_ECB:
case CKM_CDMF_CBC:
if (key_type != CKK_CDMF) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
t = (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_CDMF_ECB) ? NSS_DES : NSS_DES_CBC;
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
goto finish_des;
case CKM_DES_ECB:
if (key_type != CKK_DES) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
t = NSS_DES;
goto finish_des;
case CKM_DES_CBC_PAD:
context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
/* fall thru */
case CKM_DES_CBC:
if (key_type != CKK_DES) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
t = NSS_DES_CBC;
goto finish_des;
case CKM_DES3_ECB:
if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
t = NSS_DES_EDE3;
goto finish_des;
case CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD:
context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
/* fall thru */
case CKM_DES3_CBC:
if ((key_type != CKK_DES2) && (key_type != CKK_DES3)) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
t = NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC;
finish_des:
context->blockSize = 8;
att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (att == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
if (key_type == CKK_DES2 &&
(t == NSS_DES_EDE3_CBC || t == NSS_DES_EDE3)) {
/* extend DES2 key to DES3 key. */
memcpy(newdeskey, att->attrib.pValue, 16);
memcpy(newdeskey + 16, newdeskey, 8);
useNewKey=PR_TRUE;
} else if (key_type == CKK_CDMF) {
crv = sftk_cdmf2des((unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,newdeskey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
break;
}
useNewKey=PR_TRUE;
}
context->cipherInfo = DES_CreateContext(
useNewKey ? newdeskey : (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
(unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,t, isEncrypt);
if (useNewKey)
memset(newdeskey, 0, sizeof newdeskey);
sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? DES_Encrypt : DES_Decrypt);
context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) DES_DestroyContext;
break;
case CKM_SEED_CBC_PAD:
context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
/* fall thru */
case CKM_SEED_CBC:
if (!pMechanism->pParameter ||
pMechanism->ulParameterLen != 16) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
/* fall thru */
case CKM_SEED_ECB:
context->blockSize = 16;
if (key_type != CKK_SEED) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (att == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
context->cipherInfo = SEED_CreateContext(
(unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
(unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,
pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_SEED_ECB ? NSS_SEED : NSS_SEED_CBC,
isEncrypt);
sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
context->update = (SFTKCipher)(isEncrypt ? SEED_Encrypt : SEED_Decrypt);
context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) SEED_DestroyContext;
break;
case CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD:
context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
/* fall thru */
case CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC:
if (!pMechanism->pParameter ||
pMechanism->ulParameterLen != 16) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
/* fall thru */
case CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB:
context->blockSize = 16;
if (key_type != CKK_CAMELLIA) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (att == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
context->cipherInfo = Camellia_CreateContext(
(unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
(unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,
pMechanism->mechanism ==
CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB ? NSS_CAMELLIA : NSS_CAMELLIA_CBC,
isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen);
sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ?
Camellia_Encrypt : Camellia_Decrypt);
context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) Camellia_DestroyContext;
break;
case CKM_AES_CBC_PAD:
context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
/* fall thru */
case CKM_AES_ECB:
case CKM_AES_CBC:
context->blockSize = 16;
case CKM_AES_CTS:
case CKM_AES_CTR:
case CKM_AES_GCM:
if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_AES_GCM) {
context->multi = PR_FALSE;
}
if (key_type != CKK_AES) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (att == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
context->cipherInfo = AES_CreateContext(
(unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
(unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,
sftk_aes_mode(pMechanism->mechanism),
isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen, 16);
sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? AES_Encrypt : AES_Decrypt);
context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) AES_DestroyContext;
break;
case CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD:
context->doPad = PR_TRUE;
/* fall thru */
case CKM_NETSCAPE_AES_KEY_WRAP:
context->multi = PR_FALSE;
context->blockSize = 8;
if (key_type != CKK_AES) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (att == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
context->cipherInfo = AESKeyWrap_CreateContext(
(unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
(unsigned char*)pMechanism->pParameter,
isEncrypt, att->attrib.ulValueLen);
sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
if (context->cipherInfo == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
context->update = (SFTKCipher) (isEncrypt ? AESKeyWrap_Encrypt
: AESKeyWrap_Decrypt);
context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) AESKeyWrap_DestroyContext;
break;
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeContext(context);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
sftk_SetContextByType(session, contextType, context);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
}
/* NSC_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */
CK_RV NSC_EncryptInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
{
CHECK_FORK();
return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_ENCRYPT,
SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
}
/* NSC_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption operation. */
CK_RV NSC_EncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
{
SFTKSessionContext *context;
unsigned int outlen,i;
unsigned int padoutlen = 0;
unsigned int maxout = *pulEncryptedPartLen;
CK_RV crv;
SECStatus rv;
CHECK_FORK();
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_TRUE,NULL);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
if (!pEncryptedPart) {
if (context->doPad) {
CK_ULONG totalDataAvailable = ulPartLen + context->padDataLength;
CK_ULONG blocksToSend = totalDataAvailable/context->blockSize;
*pulEncryptedPartLen = blocksToSend * context->blockSize;
return CKR_OK;
}
*pulEncryptedPartLen = ulPartLen;
return CKR_OK;
}
/* do padding */
if (context->doPad) {
/* deal with previous buffered data */
if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
/* fill in the padded to a full block size */
for (i=context->padDataLength;
(ulPartLen != 0) && i < context->blockSize; i++) {
context->padBuf[i] = *pPart++;
ulPartLen--;
context->padDataLength++;
}
/* not enough data to encrypt yet? then return */
if (context->padDataLength != context->blockSize) {
*pulEncryptedPartLen = 0;
return CKR_OK;
}
/* encrypt the current padded data */
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedPart,
&padoutlen, context->blockSize, context->padBuf,
context->blockSize);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
}
pEncryptedPart += padoutlen;
maxout -= padoutlen;
}
/* save the residual */
context->padDataLength = ulPartLen % context->blockSize;
if (context->padDataLength) {
PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf,
&pPart[ulPartLen-context->padDataLength],
context->padDataLength);
ulPartLen -= context->padDataLength;
}
/* if we've exhausted our new buffer, we're done */
if (ulPartLen == 0) {
*pulEncryptedPartLen = padoutlen;
return CKR_OK;
}
}
/* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pEncryptedPart,
&outlen, maxout, pPart, ulPartLen);
*pulEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG) (outlen + padoutlen);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
}
/* NSC_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption operation. */
CK_RV NSC_EncryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pLastEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastEncryptedPartLen)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
unsigned int outlen,i;
unsigned int maxout = *pulLastEncryptedPartLen;
CK_RV crv;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
PRBool contextFinished = PR_TRUE;
CHECK_FORK();
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_TRUE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
*pulLastEncryptedPartLen = 0;
if (!pLastEncryptedPart) {
/* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */
if (context->blockSize > 0 && context->doPad) {
*pulLastEncryptedPartLen = context->blockSize;
contextFinished = PR_FALSE; /* still have padding to go */
}
goto finish;
}
/* do padding */
if (context->doPad) {
unsigned char padbyte = (unsigned char)
(context->blockSize - context->padDataLength);
/* fill out rest of pad buffer with pad magic*/
for (i=context->padDataLength; i < context->blockSize; i++) {
context->padBuf[i] = padbyte;
}
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pLastEncryptedPart,
&outlen, maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
if (rv == SECSuccess) *pulLastEncryptedPartLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
}
finish:
if (contextFinished)
sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, context );
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
}
/* NSC_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */
CK_RV NSC_Encrypt (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedDataLen)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
unsigned int outlen;
unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulEncryptedDataLen;
CK_RV crv;
CK_RV crv2;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
SECItem pText;
pText.type = siBuffer;
pText.data = pData;
pText.len = ulDataLen;
CHECK_FORK();
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
if (!pEncryptedData) {
*pulEncryptedDataLen = context->rsa ? context->maxLen :
ulDataLen + 2 * context->blockSize;
goto finish;
}
if (context->doPad) {
if (context->multi) {
CK_ULONG finalLen;
/* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final
* code deal with it */
sftk_FreeSession(session);
crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen, pEncryptedData,
pulEncryptedDataLen);
if (crv != CKR_OK)
*pulEncryptedDataLen = 0;
maxoutlen -= *pulEncryptedDataLen;
pEncryptedData += *pulEncryptedDataLen;
finalLen = maxoutlen;
crv2 = NSC_EncryptFinal(hSession, pEncryptedData, &finalLen);
if (crv2 == CKR_OK)
*pulEncryptedDataLen += finalLen;
return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv;
}
/* doPad without multi means that padding must be done on the first
** and only update. There will be no final.
*/
PORT_Assert(context->blockSize > 1);
if (context->blockSize > 1) {
CK_ULONG remainder = ulDataLen % context->blockSize;
CK_ULONG padding = context->blockSize - remainder;
pText.len += padding;
pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len);
if (pText.data) {
memcpy(pText.data, pData, ulDataLen);
memset(pText.data + ulDataLen, padding, padding);
} else {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
goto fail;
}
}
}
/* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size is big enough. */
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pEncryptedData,
&outlen, maxoutlen, pText.data, pText.len);
crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
*pulEncryptedDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
if (pText.data != pData)
PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len);
fail:
sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, context );
finish:
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
/*
************** Crypto Functions: Decrypt ************************
*/
/* NSC_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DecryptInit( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
{
CHECK_FORK();
return sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_DECRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT,
SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE);
}
/* NSC_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DecryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen)
{
SFTKSessionContext *context;
unsigned int padoutlen = 0;
unsigned int outlen;
unsigned int maxout = *pulPartLen;
CK_RV crv;
SECStatus rv;
CHECK_FORK();
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_TRUE,NULL);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
/* this can only happen on an NSS programming error */
PORT_Assert((context->padDataLength == 0)
|| context->padDataLength == context->blockSize);
if (context->doPad) {
/* Check the data length for block ciphers. If we are padding,
* then we must be using a block cipher. In the non-padding case
* the error will be returned by the underlying decryption
* function when we do the actual decrypt. We need to do the
* check here to avoid returning a negative length to the caller
* or reading before the beginning of the pEncryptedPart buffer.
*/
if ((ulEncryptedPartLen == 0) ||
(ulEncryptedPartLen % context->blockSize) != 0) {
return CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE;
}
}
if (!pPart) {
if (context->doPad) {
*pulPartLen =
ulEncryptedPartLen + context->padDataLength - context->blockSize;
return CKR_OK;
}
/* for stream ciphers there is are no constraints on ulEncryptedPartLen.
* for block ciphers, it must be a multiple of blockSize. The error is
* detected when this function is called again do decrypt the output.
*/
*pulPartLen = ulEncryptedPartLen;
return CKR_OK;
}
if (context->doPad) {
/* first decrypt our saved buffer */
if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, &padoutlen,
maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
if (rv != SECSuccess) return sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
pPart += padoutlen;
maxout -= padoutlen;
}
/* now save the final block for the next decrypt or the final */
PORT_Memcpy(context->padBuf,&pEncryptedPart[ulEncryptedPartLen -
context->blockSize], context->blockSize);
context->padDataLength = context->blockSize;
ulEncryptedPartLen -= context->padDataLength;
}
/* do it: NOTE: this assumes buf size in is >= buf size out! */
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo,pPart, &outlen,
maxout, pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen);
*pulPartLen = (CK_ULONG) (outlen + padoutlen);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
}
/* NSC_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DecryptFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pLastPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulLastPartLen)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
unsigned int outlen;
unsigned int maxout = *pulLastPartLen;
CK_RV crv;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
CHECK_FORK();
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_TRUE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
*pulLastPartLen = 0;
if (!pLastPart) {
/* caller is checking the amount of remaining data */
if (context->padDataLength > 0) {
*pulLastPartLen = context->padDataLength;
}
goto finish;
}
if (context->doPad) {
/* decrypt our saved buffer */
if (context->padDataLength != 0) {
/* this assumes that pLastPart is big enough to hold the *whole*
* buffer!!! */
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pLastPart, &outlen,
maxout, context->padBuf, context->blockSize);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
crv = sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
} else {
unsigned int padSize =
(unsigned int) pLastPart[context->blockSize-1];
if ((padSize > context->blockSize) || (padSize == 0)) {
crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
} else {
unsigned int i;
unsigned int badPadding = 0; /* used as a boolean */
for (i = 0; i < padSize; i++) {
badPadding |=
(unsigned int) pLastPart[context->blockSize-1-i] ^
padSize;
}
if (badPadding) {
crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
} else {
*pulLastPartLen = outlen - padSize;
}
}
}
}
}
sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_DECRYPT, context );
finish:
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
/* NSC_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */
CK_RV NSC_Decrypt(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData,CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
unsigned int outlen;
unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen;
CK_RV crv;
CK_RV crv2;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
CHECK_FORK();
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_DECRYPT,PR_FALSE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
if (!pData) {
*pulDataLen = ulEncryptedDataLen + context->blockSize;
goto finish;
}
if (context->doPad && context->multi) {
CK_ULONG finalLen;
/* padding is fairly complicated, have the update and final
* code deal with it */
sftk_FreeSession(session);
crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData,ulEncryptedDataLen,
pData, pulDataLen);
if (crv != CKR_OK)
*pulDataLen = 0;
maxoutlen -= *pulDataLen;
pData += *pulDataLen;
finalLen = maxoutlen;
crv2 = NSC_DecryptFinal(hSession, pData, &finalLen);
if (crv2 == CKR_OK)
*pulDataLen += finalLen;
return crv == CKR_OK ? crv2 : crv;
}
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen,
pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen);
/* XXX need to do MUCH better error mapping than this. */
crv = (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapDecryptError(PORT_GetError());
if (rv == SECSuccess && context->doPad) {
unsigned int padding = pData[outlen - 1];
if (padding > context->blockSize || !padding) {
crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
} else {
unsigned int i;
unsigned int badPadding = 0; /* used as a boolean */
for (i = 0; i < padding; i++) {
badPadding |= (unsigned int) pData[outlen - 1 - i] ^ padding;
}
if (badPadding) {
crv = CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID;
} else {
outlen -= padding;
}
}
}
*pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_DECRYPT, context );
finish:
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
/*
************** Crypto Functions: Digest (HASH) ************************
*/
/* NSC_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DigestInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
CHECK_FORK();
session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL)
return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_HASH,NULL,0,NULL, 0, 0);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
#define INIT_MECH(mech,mmm) \
case mech: { \
mmm ## Context * mmm ## _ctx = mmm ## _NewContext(); \
context->cipherInfo = (void *)mmm ## _ctx; \
context->cipherInfoLen = mmm ## _FlattenSize(mmm ## _ctx); \
context->currentMech = mech; \
context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) mmm ## _Update; \
context->end = (SFTKEnd) mmm ## _End; \
context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) mmm ## _DestroyContext; \
context->maxLen = mmm ## _LENGTH; \
if (mmm ## _ctx) \
mmm ## _Begin(mmm ## _ctx); \
else \
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \
break; \
}
switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
INIT_MECH(CKM_MD2, MD2)
INIT_MECH(CKM_MD5, MD5)
INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA_1, SHA1)
INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA224, SHA224)
INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA256, SHA256)
INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA384, SHA384)
INIT_MECH(CKM_SHA512, SHA512)
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeContext(context);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_HASH, context);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
}
/* NSC_Digest digests data in a single part. */
CK_RV NSC_Digest(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
unsigned int digestLen;
unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen;
CK_RV crv;
CHECK_FORK();
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_HASH,PR_FALSE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
if (pDigest == NULL) {
*pulDigestLen = context->maxLen;
goto finish;
}
/* do it: */
(*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pData, ulDataLen);
/* NOTE: this assumes buf size is bigenough for the algorithm */
(*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen,maxout);
*pulDigestLen = digestLen;
sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_HASH, context );
finish:
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
}
/* NSC_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
{
SFTKSessionContext *context;
CK_RV crv;
CHECK_FORK();
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_HASH,PR_TRUE,NULL);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
/* do it: */
(*context->hashUpdate)(context->cipherInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
return CKR_OK;
}
/* NSC_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DigestFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pDigest,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulDigestLen)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
unsigned int maxout = *pulDigestLen;
unsigned int digestLen;
CK_RV crv;
CHECK_FORK();
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
if (pDigest != NULL) {
(*context->end)(context->cipherInfo, pDigest, &digestLen, maxout);
*pulDigestLen = digestLen;
sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_HASH, context );
} else {
*pulDigestLen = context->maxLen;
}
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
}
/*
* these helper functions are used by Generic Macing and Signing functions
* that use hashes as part of their operations.
*/
#define DOSUB(mmm) \
static CK_RV \
sftk_doSub ## mmm(SFTKSessionContext *context) { \
mmm ## Context * mmm ## _ctx = mmm ## _NewContext(); \
context->hashInfo = (void *) mmm ## _ctx; \
context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) mmm ## _Update; \
context->end = (SFTKEnd) mmm ## _End; \
context->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy) mmm ## _DestroyContext; \
if (!context->hashInfo) { \
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY; \
} \
mmm ## _Begin( mmm ## _ctx ); \
return CKR_OK; \
}
DOSUB(MD2)
DOSUB(MD5)
DOSUB(SHA1)
DOSUB(SHA224)
DOSUB(SHA256)
DOSUB(SHA384)
DOSUB(SHA512)
static SECStatus
sftk_SignCopy(
CK_ULONG *copyLen,
void *out, unsigned int *outLength,
unsigned int maxLength,
const unsigned char *hashResult,
unsigned int hashResultLength)
{
unsigned int toCopy = *copyLen;
if (toCopy > maxLength) {
toCopy = maxLength;
}
if (toCopy > hashResultLength) {
toCopy = hashResultLength;
}
memcpy(out, hashResult, toCopy);
if (outLength) {
*outLength = toCopy;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* Verify is just a compare for HMAC */
static SECStatus
sftk_HMACCmp(CK_ULONG *copyLen,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int sigLen,
unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
{
return (PORT_Memcmp(sig,hash,*copyLen) == 0) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure ;
}
/*
* common HMAC initalization routine
*/
static CK_RV
sftk_doHMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *context,HASH_HashType hash,
SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size)
{
SFTKAttribute *keyval;
HMACContext *HMACcontext;
CK_ULONG *intpointer;
const SECHashObject *hashObj = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hash);
PRBool isFIPS = (key->slot->slotID == FIPS_SLOT_ID);
/* required by FIPS 198 Section 4 */
if (isFIPS && (mac_size < 4 || mac_size < hashObj->length/2)) {
return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (keyval == NULL) return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
HMACcontext = HMAC_Create(hashObj,
(const unsigned char*)keyval->attrib.pValue,
keyval->attrib.ulValueLen, isFIPS);
context->hashInfo = HMACcontext;
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
if (context->hashInfo == NULL) {
if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS) {
return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
}
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
context->hashUpdate = (SFTKHash) HMAC_Update;
context->end = (SFTKEnd) HMAC_Finish;
context->hashdestroy = (SFTKDestroy) HMAC_Destroy;
intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
if (intpointer == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
*intpointer = mac_size;
context->cipherInfo = intpointer;
context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SignCopy;
context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_HMACCmp;
context->maxLen = hashObj->length;
HMAC_Begin(HMACcontext);
return CKR_OK;
}
/*
* SSL Macing support. SSL Macs are inited, then update with the base
* hashing algorithm, then finalized in sign and verify
*/
/*
* FROM SSL:
* 60 bytes is 3 times the maximum length MAC size that is supported.
* We probably should have one copy of this table. We still need this table
* in ssl to 'sign' the handshake hashes.
*/
static unsigned char ssl_pad_1 [60] = {
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36,
0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36
};
static unsigned char ssl_pad_2 [60] = {
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c,
0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c
};
static SECStatus
sftk_SSLMACSign(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int *sigLen,
unsigned int maxLen,unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
{
unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
unsigned int out;
info->begin(info->hashContext);
info->update(info->hashContext,info->key,info->keySize);
info->update(info->hashContext,ssl_pad_2,info->padSize);
info->update(info->hashContext,hash,hashLen);
info->end(info->hashContext,tmpBuf,&out,SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH);
PORT_Memcpy(sig,tmpBuf,info->macSize);
*sigLen = info->macSize;
return SECSuccess;
}
static SECStatus
sftk_SSLMACVerify(SFTKSSLMACInfo *info,unsigned char *sig,unsigned int sigLen,
unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
{
unsigned char tmpBuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
unsigned int out;
info->begin(info->hashContext);
info->update(info->hashContext,info->key,info->keySize);
info->update(info->hashContext,ssl_pad_2,info->padSize);
info->update(info->hashContext,hash,hashLen);
info->end(info->hashContext,tmpBuf,&out,SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH);
return (PORT_Memcmp(sig,tmpBuf,info->macSize) == 0) ?
SECSuccess : SECFailure;
}
/*
* common HMAC initalization routine
*/
static CK_RV
sftk_doSSLMACInit(SFTKSessionContext *context,SECOidTag oid,
SFTKObject *key, CK_ULONG mac_size)
{
SFTKAttribute *keyval;
SFTKBegin begin;
int padSize;
SFTKSSLMACInfo *sslmacinfo;
CK_RV crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
if (oid == SEC_OID_SHA1) {
crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
begin = (SFTKBegin) SHA1_Begin;
padSize = 40;
} else {
crv = sftk_doSubMD5(context);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
begin = (SFTKBegin) MD5_Begin;
padSize = 48;
}
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
keyval = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (keyval == NULL) return CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE;
context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo,keyval->attrib.pValue,
keyval->attrib.ulValueLen);
context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo,ssl_pad_1,padSize);
sslmacinfo = (SFTKSSLMACInfo *) PORT_Alloc(sizeof(SFTKSSLMACInfo));
if (sslmacinfo == NULL) {
sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
sslmacinfo->macSize = mac_size;
sslmacinfo->hashContext = context->hashInfo;
PORT_Memcpy(sslmacinfo->key,keyval->attrib.pValue,
keyval->attrib.ulValueLen);
sslmacinfo->keySize = keyval->attrib.ulValueLen;
sslmacinfo->begin = begin;
sslmacinfo->end = context->end;
sslmacinfo->update = context->hashUpdate;
sslmacinfo->padSize = padSize;
sftk_FreeAttribute(keyval);
context->cipherInfo = (void *) sslmacinfo;
context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SSLMACSign;
context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_SSLMACVerify;
context->maxLen = mac_size;
return CKR_OK;
}
/*
************** Crypto Functions: Sign ************************
*/
/**
* Check if We're using CBCMacing and initialize the session context if we are.
* @param contextType SFTK_SIGN or SFTK_VERIFY
* @param keyUsage check whether key allows this usage
*/
static CK_RV
sftk_InitCBCMac(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE keyUsage,
SFTKContextType contextType)
{
CK_MECHANISM cbc_mechanism;
CK_ULONG mac_bytes = SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE;
CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS rc2_params;
#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS rc5_params;
CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *rc5_mac;
#endif
unsigned char ivBlock[SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
SFTKSessionContext *context;
CK_RV crv;
unsigned int blockSize;
switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL:
mac_bytes =
((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength;
/* fall through */
case CKM_RC2_MAC:
/* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the
* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS */
rc2_params.ulEffectiveBits = ((CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)
pMechanism->pParameter)->ulEffectiveBits;
PORT_Memset(rc2_params.iv,0,sizeof(rc2_params.iv));
cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC2_CBC;
cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc2_params;
cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc2_params);
blockSize = 8;
break;
#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
case CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL:
mac_bytes =
((CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter)->ulMacLength;
/* fall through */
case CKM_RC5_MAC:
/* this works because ulEffectiveBits is in the same place in both the
* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS and CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS */
rc5_mac = (CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
rc5_params.ulWordsize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize;
rc5_params.ulRounds = rc5_mac->ulRounds;
rc5_params.pIv = ivBlock;
if( (blockSize = rc5_mac->ulWordsize*2) > SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE )
return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
rc5_params.ulIvLen = blockSize;
PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_RC5_CBC;
cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &rc5_params;
cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(rc5_params);
break;
#endif
/* add cast and idea later */
case CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL:
mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
/* fall through */
case CKM_DES_MAC:
blockSize = 8;
PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES_CBC;
cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
break;
case CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL:
mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
/* fall through */
case CKM_DES3_MAC:
blockSize = 8;
PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_DES3_CBC;
cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
break;
case CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL:
mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
/* fall through */
case CKM_CDMF_MAC:
blockSize = 8;
PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CDMF_CBC;
cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
break;
case CKM_SEED_MAC_GENERAL:
mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
/* fall through */
case CKM_SEED_MAC:
blockSize = 16;
PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_SEED_CBC;
cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
break;
case CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL:
mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
/* fall through */
case CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC:
blockSize = 16;
PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC;
cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
break;
case CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL:
mac_bytes = *(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter;
/* fall through */
case CKM_AES_MAC:
blockSize = 16;
PORT_Memset(ivBlock,0,blockSize);
cbc_mechanism.mechanism = CKM_AES_CBC;
cbc_mechanism.pParameter = &ivBlock;
cbc_mechanism.ulParameterLen = blockSize;
break;
default:
return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
/* if MAC size is externally supplied, it should be checked.
*/
if (mac_bytes == SFTK_INVALID_MAC_SIZE)
mac_bytes = blockSize >> 1;
else {
if( mac_bytes > blockSize )
return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
}
crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, &cbc_mechanism, hKey,
CKA_ENCRYPT, /* CBC mech is able to ENCRYPT, not SIGN/VERIFY */
keyUsage, contextType, PR_TRUE );
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,contextType,PR_TRUE,NULL);
/* this shouldn't happen! */
PORT_Assert(crv == CKR_OK);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
context->blockSize = blockSize;
context->macSize = mac_bytes;
return CKR_OK;
}
/*
* encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing...
*/
static SECStatus
sftk_RSAHashSign(SFTKHashSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig,
unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
{
PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
return RSA_HashSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, maxLen,
hash, hashLen);
}
/* XXX Old template; want to expunge it eventually. */
static DERTemplate SECAlgorithmIDTemplate[] = {
{ DER_SEQUENCE,
0, NULL, sizeof(SECAlgorithmID) },
{ DER_OBJECT_ID,
offsetof(SECAlgorithmID,algorithm), },
{ DER_OPTIONAL | DER_ANY,
offsetof(SECAlgorithmID,parameters), },
{ 0, }
};
/*
* XXX OLD Template. Once all uses have been switched over to new one,
* remove this.
*/
static DERTemplate SGNDigestInfoTemplate[] = {
{ DER_SEQUENCE,
0, NULL, sizeof(SGNDigestInfo) },
{ DER_INLINE,
offsetof(SGNDigestInfo,digestAlgorithm),
SECAlgorithmIDTemplate, },
{ DER_OCTET_STRING,
offsetof(SGNDigestInfo,digest), },
{ 0, }
};
/*
* encode RSA PKCS #1 Signature data before signing...
*/
SECStatus
RSA_HashSign(SECOidTag hashOid, NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key,
unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
{
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
SECItem digder;
PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
SGNDigestInfo *di = NULL;
digder.data = NULL;
arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
if (!arena) {
goto loser;
}
/* Construct digest info */
di = SGN_CreateDigestInfo(hashOid, hash, hashLen);
if (!di) {
goto loser;
}
/* Der encode the digest as a DigestInfo */
rv = DER_Encode(arena, &digder, SGNDigestInfoTemplate, di);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
/*
** Encrypt signature after constructing appropriate PKCS#1 signature
** block
*/
rv = RSA_Sign(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, maxLen, digder.data,
digder.len);
if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
}
loser:
SGN_DestroyDigestInfo(di);
if (arena != NULL) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
}
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
sftk_RSASign(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
{
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = RSA_Sign(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxOutputLen, input,
inputLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
}
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
sftk_RSASignRaw(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key, unsigned char *output,
unsigned int *outputLen, unsigned int maxOutputLen,
const unsigned char *input, unsigned int inputLen)
{
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
rv = RSA_SignRaw(&key->u.rsa, output, outputLen, maxOutputLen, input,
inputLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
}
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
sftk_RSASignPSS(SFTKHashSignInfo *info, unsigned char *sig,
unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxLen,
const unsigned char *hash, unsigned int hashLen)
{
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
HASH_HashType hashAlg;
HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params = (CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)info->params;
PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg);
maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf);
rv = RSA_SignPSS(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg, NULL,
params->sLen, sig, sigLen, maxLen, hash, hashLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
}
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen,
void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
{
SECItem signature, digest;
NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx;
signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
signature.len = sigLen;
digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
digest.len = dataLen;
return DSA_VerifyDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest);
}
static SECStatus
nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf,
unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen,
void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
{
SECItem signature, digest;
SECStatus rv;
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)ctx;
signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
signature.len = maxSigLen;
digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
digest.len = dataLen;
rv = DSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.dsa), &signature, &digest);
if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
}
*sigLen = signature.len;
return rv;
}
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
static SECStatus
nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf, unsigned int sigLen,
void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
{
SECItem signature, digest;
NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *)ctx;
signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
signature.len = sigLen;
digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
digest.len = dataLen;
return ECDSA_VerifyDigest(&(key->u.ec), &signature, &digest);
}
static SECStatus
nsc_ECDSASignStub(void *ctx, void *sigBuf,
unsigned int *sigLen, unsigned int maxSigLen,
void *dataBuf, unsigned int dataLen)
{
SECItem signature, digest;
SECStatus rv;
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *key = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)ctx;
signature.data = (unsigned char *)sigBuf;
signature.len = maxSigLen;
digest.data = (unsigned char *)dataBuf;
digest.len = dataLen;
rv = ECDSA_SignDigest(&(key->u.ec), &signature, &digest);
if (rv != SECSuccess && PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
}
*sigLen = signature.len;
return rv;
}
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
/* NSC_SignInit setups up the signing operations. There are three basic
* types of signing:
* (1) the tradition single part, where "Raw RSA" or "Raw DSA" is applied
* to data in a single Sign operation (which often looks a lot like an
* encrypt, with data coming in and data going out).
* (2) Hash based signing, where we continually hash the data, then apply
* some sort of signature to the end.
* (3) Block Encryption CBC MAC's, where the Data is encrypted with a key,
* and only the final block is part of the mac.
*
* For case number 3, we initialize a context much like the Encryption Context
* (in fact we share code). We detect case 3 in C_SignUpdate, C_Sign, and
* C_Final by the following method... if it's not multi-part, and it's doesn't
* have a hash context, it must be a block Encryption CBC MAC.
*
* For case number 2, we initialize a hash structure, as well as make it
* multi-part. Updates are simple calls to the hash update function. Final
* calls the hashend, then passes the result to the 'update' function (which
* operates as a final signature function). In some hash based MAC'ing (as
* opposed to hash base signatures), the update function is can be simply a
* copy (as is the case with HMAC).
*/
CK_RV NSC_SignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKObject *key;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
SFTKHashSignInfo *info = NULL;
CHECK_FORK();
/* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/
crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_SIGN, SFTK_SIGN);
if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) return crv;
/* we're not using a block cipher mac */
session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_SIGN,&key,hKey,&key_type,
CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,CKA_SIGN);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
context->multi = PR_FALSE;
#define INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(mmm) \
case CKM_ ## mmm ## _RSA_PKCS: \
context->multi = PR_TRUE; \
crv = sftk_doSub ## mmm (context); \
if (crv != CKR_OK) break; \
context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSAHashSign; \
info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo); \
if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } \
info->hashOid = SEC_OID_ ## mmm ; \
goto finish_rsa;
switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD5)
INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(MD2)
INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA1)
INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA224)
INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA256)
INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA384)
INIT_RSA_SIGN_MECH(SHA512)
case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSASign;
goto finish_rsa;
case CKM_RSA_X_509:
context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSASignRaw;
finish_rsa:
if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
if (privKey == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
/* OK, info is allocated only if we're doing hash and sign mechanism.
* It's necessary to be able to set the correct OID in the final
* signature.
*/
if (info) {
info->key = privKey;
context->cipherInfo = info;
context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Space;
} else {
context->cipherInfo = privKey;
context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy)sftk_Null;
}
context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(privKey);
break;
case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS) ||
!sftk_ValidatePssParams((const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS*)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
info = PORT_New(SFTKHashSignInfo);
if (info == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
info->key = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
if (info->key == NULL) {
PORT_Free(info);
break;
}
context->cipherInfo = info;
context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_RSASignPSS;
context->maxLen = nsslowkey_PrivateModulusLen(info->key);
break;
case CKM_DSA_SHA1:
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
/* fall through */
case CKM_DSA:
if (key_type != CKK_DSA) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_DSA,&crv);
if (privKey == NULL) {
break;
}
context->cipherInfo = privKey;
context->update = (SFTKCipher) nsc_DSA_Sign_Stub;
context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ?
(SFTKDestroy) sftk_Null:(SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey;
context->maxLen = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN;
break;
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1:
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
/* fall through */
case CKM_ECDSA:
if (key_type != CKK_EC) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(key,CKK_EC,&crv);
if (privKey == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
context->cipherInfo = privKey;
context->update = (SFTKCipher) nsc_ECDSASignStub;
context->destroy = (privKey == key->objectInfo) ?
(SFTKDestroy) sftk_Null:(SFTKDestroy)sftk_FreePrivKey;
context->maxLen = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2;
break;
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
#define INIT_HMAC_MECH(mmm) \
case CKM_ ## mmm ## _HMAC_GENERAL: \
crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg ## mmm ,key, \
*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter); \
break; \
case CKM_ ## mmm ## _HMAC: \
crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context, HASH_Alg ## mmm ,key, mmm ## _LENGTH); \
break;
INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2)
INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5)
INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA224)
INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256)
INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384)
INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512)
case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,
*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
break;
case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH);
break;
case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key,
*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
break;
case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key,
*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
break;
case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL:
crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgNULL, 0);
break;
case CKM_TLS_MAC: {
CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS *tls12_mac_params;
HASH_HashType tlsPrfHash;
const char *label;
if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS)) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
tls12_mac_params = (CK_TLS_MAC_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
if (tls12_mac_params->prfMechanism == CKM_TLS_PRF) {
/* The TLS 1.0 and 1.1 PRF */
tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgNULL;
if (tls12_mac_params->ulMacLength != 12) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
} else {
/* The hash function for the TLS 1.2 PRF */
tlsPrfHash =
GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_mac_params->prfMechanism);
if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL ||
tls12_mac_params->ulMacLength < 12) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
}
if (tls12_mac_params->ulServerOrClient == 1) {
label = "server finished";
} else if (tls12_mac_params->ulServerOrClient == 2) {
label = "client finished";
} else {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, tlsPrfHash,
tls12_mac_params->ulMacLength);
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
context->hashUpdate(context->hashInfo, label, 15);
}
break;
}
case CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256:
crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgSHA256, 0);
break;
case CKM_NSS_HMAC_CONSTANT_TIME: {
sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx =
sftk_HMACConstantTime_New(pMechanism,key);
CK_ULONG *intpointer;
if (ctx == NULL) {
crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
break;
}
intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
if (intpointer == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
*intpointer = ctx->hash->length;
context->cipherInfo = intpointer;
context->hashInfo = ctx;
context->currentMech = pMechanism->mechanism;
context->hashUpdate = sftk_HMACConstantTime_Update;
context->hashdestroy = sftk_MACConstantTime_DestroyContext;
context->end = sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash;
context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SignCopy;
context->destroy = sftk_Space;
context->maxLen = 64;
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
break;
}
case CKM_NSS_SSL3_MAC_CONSTANT_TIME: {
sftk_MACConstantTimeCtx *ctx =
sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_New(pMechanism,key);
CK_ULONG *intpointer;
if (ctx == NULL) {
crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
break;
}
intpointer = PORT_New(CK_ULONG);
if (intpointer == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
*intpointer = ctx->hash->length;
context->cipherInfo = intpointer;
context->hashInfo = ctx;
context->currentMech = pMechanism->mechanism;
context->hashUpdate = sftk_SSLv3MACConstantTime_Update;
context->hashdestroy = sftk_MACConstantTime_DestroyContext;
context->end = sftk_MACConstantTime_EndHash;
context->update = (SFTKCipher) sftk_SignCopy;
context->destroy = sftk_Space;
context->maxLen = 64;
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
break;
}
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
if (info) PORT_Free(info);
sftk_FreeContext(context);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_SIGN, context);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
}
/** MAC one block of data by block cipher
*/
static CK_RV
sftk_MACBlock( SFTKSessionContext *ctx, void *blk )
{
unsigned int outlen;
return ( SECSuccess == (ctx->update)( ctx->cipherInfo, ctx->macBuf, &outlen,
SFTK_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, blk, ctx->blockSize ))
? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
}
/** MAC last (incomplete) block of data by block cipher
*
* Call once, then terminate MACing operation.
*/
static CK_RV
sftk_MACFinal( SFTKSessionContext *ctx )
{
unsigned int padLen = ctx->padDataLength;
/* pad and proceed the residual */
if( padLen ) {
/* shd clr ctx->padLen to make sftk_MACFinal idempotent */
PORT_Memset( ctx->padBuf + padLen, 0, ctx->blockSize - padLen );
return sftk_MACBlock( ctx, ctx->padBuf );
} else
return CKR_OK;
}
/** The common implementation for {Sign,Verify}Update. (S/V only vary in their
* setup and final operations).
*
* A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
*/
static CK_RV
sftk_MACUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
CK_ULONG ulPartLen,SFTKContextType type)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
CK_RV crv;
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,type, PR_TRUE, &session );
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
if (context->hashInfo) {
(*context->hashUpdate)(context->hashInfo, pPart, ulPartLen);
} else {
/* must be block cipher MACing */
unsigned int blkSize = context->blockSize;
unsigned char *residual = /* free room in context->padBuf */
context->padBuf + context->padDataLength;
unsigned int minInput = /* min input for MACing at least one block */
blkSize - context->padDataLength;
/* not enough data even for one block */
if( ulPartLen < minInput ) {
PORT_Memcpy( residual, pPart, ulPartLen );
context->padDataLength += ulPartLen;
goto cleanup;
}
/* MACing residual */
if( context->padDataLength ) {
PORT_Memcpy( residual, pPart, minInput );
ulPartLen -= minInput;
pPart += minInput;
if( CKR_OK != (crv = sftk_MACBlock( context, context->padBuf )) )
goto terminate;
}
/* MACing full blocks */
while( ulPartLen >= blkSize )
{
if( CKR_OK != (crv = sftk_MACBlock( context, pPart )) )
goto terminate;
ulPartLen -= blkSize;
pPart += blkSize;
}
/* save the residual */
if( (context->padDataLength = ulPartLen) )
PORT_Memcpy( context->padBuf, pPart, ulPartLen );
} /* blk cipher MACing */
goto cleanup;
terminate:
sftk_TerminateOp( session, type, context );
cleanup:
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
/* NSC_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation,
* where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
* and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature
*
* A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
*/
CK_RV NSC_SignUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
{
CHECK_FORK();
return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_SIGN);
}
/* NSC_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation,
* returning the signature. */
CK_RV NSC_SignFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
unsigned int outlen;
unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen;
CK_RV crv;
CHECK_FORK();
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_SIGN,PR_TRUE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
if (context->hashInfo) {
unsigned int digestLen;
unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
if( !pSignature ) {
outlen = context->maxLen; goto finish;
}
(*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf));
if( SECSuccess != (context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
&outlen, maxoutlen, tmpbuf, digestLen))
crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
/* CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL here isn't continuable, let operation terminate.
* Keeping "too small" CK_RV intact is a standard violation, but allows
* application read EXACT signature length */
} else {
/* must be block cipher MACing */
outlen = context->macSize;
/* null or "too small" buf doesn't terminate operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]*/
if( !pSignature || maxoutlen < outlen ) {
if( pSignature ) crv = CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
goto finish;
}
if( CKR_OK == (crv = sftk_MACFinal( context )) )
PORT_Memcpy(pSignature, context->macBuf, outlen );
}
sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_SIGN, context );
finish:
*pulSignatureLen = outlen;
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
/* NSC_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single part,
* where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data,
* and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */
CK_RV NSC_Sign(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG ulDataLen,CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
CK_RV crv;
CHECK_FORK();
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_SIGN,PR_FALSE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
if (!pSignature) {
/* see also how C_SignUpdate implements this */
*pulSignatureLen = (!context->multi || context->hashInfo)
? context->maxLen
: context->macSize; /* must be block cipher MACing */
goto finish;
}
/* multi part Signing are completely implemented by SignUpdate and
* sign Final */
if (context->multi) {
/* SignFinal can't follow failed SignUpdate */
if( CKR_OK == (crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession,pData,ulDataLen) ))
crv = NSC_SignFinal(hSession, pSignature, pulSignatureLen);
} else {
/* single-part PKC signature (e.g. CKM_ECDSA) */
unsigned int outlen;
unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulSignatureLen;
if( SECSuccess != (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
&outlen, maxoutlen, pData, ulDataLen))
crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
*pulSignatureLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
/* "too small" here is certainly continuable */
if( crv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL )
sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_SIGN, context);
} /* single-part */
finish:
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
/*
************** Crypto Functions: Sign Recover ************************
*/
/* NSC_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation,
* where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature.
* E.g. encryption with the user's private key */
CK_RV NSC_SignRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
{
CHECK_FORK();
switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
case CKM_RSA_X_509:
return NSC_SignInit(hSession,pMechanism,hKey);
default:
break;
}
return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
}
/* NSC_SignRecover signs data in a single operation
* where the (digest) data can be recovered from the signature.
* E.g. encryption with the user's private key */
CK_RV NSC_SignRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG_PTR pulSignatureLen)
{
CHECK_FORK();
return NSC_Sign(hSession,pData,ulDataLen,pSignature,pulSignatureLen);
}
/*
************** Crypto Functions: verify ************************
*/
/* Handle RSA Signature formatting */
static SECStatus
sftk_hashCheckSign(SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info, const unsigned char *sig,
unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
unsigned int digestLen)
{
PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
return RSA_HashCheckSign(info->hashOid, info->key, sig, sigLen, digest,
digestLen);
}
SECStatus
RSA_HashCheckSign(SECOidTag digestOid, NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key,
const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen,
const unsigned char *digestData, unsigned int digestLen)
{
unsigned char *pkcs1DigestInfoData;
SECItem pkcs1DigestInfo;
SECItem digest;
unsigned int bufferSize;
SECStatus rv;
/* pkcs1DigestInfo.data must be less than key->u.rsa.modulus.len */
bufferSize = key->u.rsa.modulus.len;
pkcs1DigestInfoData = PORT_ZAlloc(bufferSize);
if (!pkcs1DigestInfoData) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
return SECFailure;
}
pkcs1DigestInfo.data = pkcs1DigestInfoData;
pkcs1DigestInfo.len = bufferSize;
/* decrypt the block */
rv = RSA_CheckSignRecover(&key->u.rsa, pkcs1DigestInfo.data,
&pkcs1DigestInfo.len, pkcs1DigestInfo.len,
sig, sigLen);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
} else {
digest.data = (PRUint8*) digestData;
digest.len = digestLen;
rv = _SGN_VerifyPKCS1DigestInfo(
digestOid, &digest, &pkcs1DigestInfo,
PR_TRUE /*XXX: unsafeAllowMissingParameters*/);
}
PORT_Free(pkcs1DigestInfoData);
return rv;
}
static SECStatus
sftk_RSACheckSign(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, const unsigned char *sig,
unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
unsigned int digestLen)
{
PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
return RSA_CheckSign(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
}
static SECStatus
sftk_RSACheckSignRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, const unsigned char *sig,
unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
unsigned int digestLen)
{
PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
return RSA_CheckSignRaw(&key->u.rsa, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
}
static SECStatus
sftk_RSACheckSignPSS(SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info, const unsigned char *sig,
unsigned int sigLen, const unsigned char *digest,
unsigned int digestLen)
{
HASH_HashType hashAlg;
HASH_HashType maskHashAlg;
CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *params = (CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *)info->params;
PORT_Assert(info->key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
if (info->key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
hashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->hashAlg);
maskHashAlg = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(params->mgf);
return RSA_CheckSignPSS(&info->key->u.rsa, hashAlg, maskHashAlg,
params->sLen, sig, sigLen, digest, digestLen);
}
/* NSC_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation,
* where the signature is an appendix to the data,
* and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA) */
CK_RV NSC_VerifyInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKObject *key;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
SFTKHashVerifyInfo *info = NULL;
CHECK_FORK();
/* Block Cipher MACing Algorithms use a different Context init method..*/
crv = sftk_InitCBCMac(hSession, pMechanism, hKey, CKA_VERIFY, SFTK_VERIFY);
if (crv != CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED) return crv;
session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,&key,hKey,&key_type,
CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
context->multi = PR_FALSE;
#define INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(mmm) \
case CKM_ ## mmm ## _RSA_PKCS: \
context->multi = PR_TRUE; \
crv = sftk_doSub ## mmm (context); \
if (crv != CKR_OK) break; \
context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_hashCheckSign; \
info = PORT_New(SFTKHashVerifyInfo); \
if (info == NULL) { crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY; break; } \
info->hashOid = SEC_OID_ ## mmm ; \
goto finish_rsa;
switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD5)
INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(MD2)
INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA1)
INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA224)
INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA256)
INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA384)
INIT_RSA_VFY_MECH(SHA512)
case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_RSACheckSign;
goto finish_rsa;
case CKM_RSA_X_509:
context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_RSACheckSignRaw;
finish_rsa:
if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
if (info) PORT_Free(info);
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
if (pubKey == NULL) {
if (info) PORT_Free(info);
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
if (info) {
info->key = pubKey;
context->cipherInfo = info;
context->destroy = sftk_Space;
} else {
context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
context->destroy = sftk_Null;
}
break;
case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS) ||
!sftk_ValidatePssParams((const CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS*)pMechanism->pParameter)) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
info = PORT_New(SFTKHashVerifyInfo);
if (info == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
info->params = pMechanism->pParameter;
info->key = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
if (info->key == NULL) {
PORT_Free(info);
break;
}
context->cipherInfo = info;
context->destroy = (SFTKDestroy) sftk_Space;
context->verify = (SFTKVerify) sftk_RSACheckSignPSS;
break;
case CKM_DSA_SHA1:
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
/* fall through */
case CKM_DSA:
if (key_type != CKK_DSA) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_DSA,&crv);
if (pubKey == NULL) {
break;
}
context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
context->verify = (SFTKVerify) nsc_DSA_Verify_Stub;
context->destroy = sftk_Null;
break;
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
case CKM_ECDSA_SHA1:
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
crv = sftk_doSubSHA1(context);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
/* fall through */
case CKM_ECDSA:
if (key_type != CKK_EC) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_EC,&crv);
if (pubKey == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
context->verify = (SFTKVerify) nsc_ECDSAVerifyStub;
context->destroy = sftk_Null;
break;
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD2)
INIT_HMAC_MECH(MD5)
INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA224)
INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA256)
INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA384)
INIT_HMAC_MECH(SHA512)
case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL:
crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,
*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
break;
case CKM_SHA_1_HMAC:
crv = sftk_doHMACInit(context,HASH_AlgSHA1,key,SHA1_LENGTH);
break;
case CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC:
crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_MD5,key,
*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
break;
case CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC:
crv = sftk_doSSLMACInit(context,SEC_OID_SHA1,key,
*(CK_ULONG *)pMechanism->pParameter);
break;
case CKM_TLS_PRF_GENERAL:
crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgNULL, 0);
break;
case CKM_NSS_TLS_PRF_GENERAL_SHA256:
crv = sftk_TLSPRFInit(context, key, key_type, HASH_AlgSHA256, 0);
break;
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
if (info) PORT_Free(info);
sftk_FreeContext(context);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY, context);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
}
/* NSC_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
* where the signature is an appendix to the data,
* and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature */
CK_RV NSC_Verify(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pData,
CK_ULONG ulDataLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature, CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
CK_RV crv;
CHECK_FORK();
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,PR_FALSE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
/* multi part Verifying are completely implemented by VerifyUpdate and
* VerifyFinal */
if (context->multi) {
/* VerifyFinal can't follow failed VerifyUpdate */
if( CKR_OK == (crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, ulDataLen)))
crv = NSC_VerifyFinal(hSession, pSignature, ulSignatureLen);
} else {
if (SECSuccess != (*context->verify)(context->cipherInfo,pSignature,
ulSignatureLen, pData, ulDataLen))
crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_VERIFY, context );
}
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
/* NSC_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification operation,
* where the signature is an appendix to the data,
* and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature
*
* A call which results in an error terminates the operation [PKCS#11,v2.11]
*/
CK_RV NSC_VerifyUpdate( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
CK_ULONG ulPartLen)
{
CHECK_FORK();
return sftk_MACUpdate(hSession, pPart, ulPartLen, SFTK_VERIFY);
}
/* NSC_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification operation,
* checking the signature. */
CK_RV NSC_VerifyFinal(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
CK_RV crv;
CHECK_FORK();
if (!pSignature)
return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY,PR_TRUE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK)
return crv;
if (context->hashInfo) {
unsigned int digestLen;
unsigned char tmpbuf[SFTK_MAX_MAC_LENGTH];
(*context->end)(context->hashInfo, tmpbuf, &digestLen, sizeof(tmpbuf));
if( SECSuccess != (context->verify)(context->cipherInfo, pSignature,
ulSignatureLen, tmpbuf, digestLen))
crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
} else if (ulSignatureLen != context->macSize) {
/* must be block cipher MACing */
crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE;
} else if (CKR_OK == (crv = sftk_MACFinal(context))) {
if (PORT_Memcmp(pSignature, context->macBuf, ulSignatureLen))
crv = CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
}
sftk_TerminateOp( session, SFTK_VERIFY, context );
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
/*
************** Crypto Functions: Verify Recover ************************
*/
static SECStatus
sftk_RSACheckSignRecover(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *data,
unsigned int *dataLen, unsigned int maxDataLen,
const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen)
{
PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
return RSA_CheckSignRecover(&key->u.rsa, data, dataLen, maxDataLen,
sig, sigLen);
}
static SECStatus
sftk_RSACheckSignRecoverRaw(NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *key, unsigned char *data,
unsigned int *dataLen, unsigned int maxDataLen,
const unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sigLen)
{
PORT_Assert(key->keyType == NSSLOWKEYRSAKey);
if (key->keyType != NSSLOWKEYRSAKey) {
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
return SECFailure;
}
return RSA_CheckSignRecoverRaw(&key->u.rsa, data, dataLen, maxDataLen,
sig, sigLen);
}
/* NSC_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification operation,
* where the data is recovered from the signature.
* E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */
CK_RV NSC_VerifyRecoverInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKObject *key;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
NSSLOWKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
CHECK_FORK();
session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
crv = sftk_InitGeneric(session,&context,SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER,
&key,hKey,&key_type,CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
context->multi = PR_TRUE;
switch(pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_RSA_PKCS:
case CKM_RSA_X_509:
if (key_type != CKK_RSA) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
context->multi = PR_FALSE;
context->rsa = PR_TRUE;
pubKey = sftk_GetPubKey(key,CKK_RSA,&crv);
if (pubKey == NULL) {
break;
}
context->cipherInfo = pubKey;
context->update = (SFTKCipher) (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_RSA_X_509
? sftk_RSACheckSignRecoverRaw : sftk_RSACheckSignRecover);
context->destroy = sftk_Null;
break;
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(context);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return crv;
}
sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, context);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
}
/* NSC_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part operation,
* where the data is recovered from the signature.
* E.g. Decryption with the user's public key */
CK_RV NSC_VerifyRecover(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pSignature,CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pData,CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKSessionContext *context;
unsigned int outlen;
unsigned int maxoutlen = *pulDataLen;
CK_RV crv;
SECStatus rv;
CHECK_FORK();
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER,
PR_FALSE,&session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
if (pData == NULL) {
/* to return the actual size, we need to do the decrypt, just return
* the max size, which is the size of the input signature. */
*pulDataLen = ulSignatureLen;
rv = SECSuccess;
goto finish;
}
rv = (*context->update)(context->cipherInfo, pData, &outlen, maxoutlen,
pSignature, ulSignatureLen);
*pulDataLen = (CK_ULONG) outlen;
sftk_TerminateOp(session, SFTK_VERIFY_RECOVER, context);
finish:
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapVerifyError(PORT_GetError());
}
/*
**************************** Random Functions: ************************
*/
/* NSC_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's random number
* generator. */
CK_RV NSC_SeedRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pSeed,
CK_ULONG ulSeedLen)
{
SECStatus rv;
CHECK_FORK();
rv = RNG_RandomUpdate(pSeed, ulSeedLen);
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
}
/* NSC_GenerateRandom generates random data. */
CK_RV NSC_GenerateRandom(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pRandomData, CK_ULONG ulRandomLen)
{
SECStatus rv;
CHECK_FORK();
rv = RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(pRandomData, ulRandomLen);
/*
* This may fail with SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM, which means the RNG isn't
* seeded with enough entropy.
*/
return (rv == SECSuccess) ? CKR_OK : sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
}
/*
**************************** Key Functions: ************************
*/
/*
* generate a password based encryption key. This code uses
* PKCS5 to do the work.
*/
static CK_RV
nsc_pbe_key_gen(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pkcs5_pbe, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,
void *buf, CK_ULONG *key_length, PRBool faulty3DES)
{
SECItem *pbe_key = NULL, iv, pwitem;
CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkd2_params = NULL;
*key_length = 0;
iv.data = NULL; iv.len = 0;
if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2) {
pbkd2_params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbkd2_params->pPassword;
/* was this a typo in the PKCS #11 spec? */
pwitem.len = *pbkd2_params->ulPasswordLen;
} else {
pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
pwitem.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pPassword;
pwitem.len = pbe_params->ulPasswordLen;
}
pbe_key = nsspkcs5_ComputeKeyAndIV(pkcs5_pbe, &pwitem, &iv, faulty3DES);
if (pbe_key == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
PORT_Memcpy(buf, pbe_key->data, pbe_key->len);
*key_length = pbe_key->len;
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(pbe_key, PR_TRUE);
pbe_key = NULL;
if (iv.data) {
if (pbe_params && pbe_params->pInitVector != NULL) {
PORT_Memcpy(pbe_params->pInitVector, iv.data, iv.len);
}
PORT_Free(iv.data);
}
return CKR_OK;
}
/*
* this is coded for "full" support. These selections will be limitted to
* the official subset by freebl.
*/
static unsigned int
sftk_GetSubPrimeFromPrime(unsigned int primeBits)
{
if (primeBits <= 1024) {
return 160;
} else if (primeBits <= 2048) {
return 224;
} else if (primeBits <= 3072) {
return 256;
} else if (primeBits <= 7680) {
return 384;
} else {
return 512;
}
}
static CK_RV
nsc_parameter_gen(CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, SFTKObject *key)
{
SFTKAttribute *attribute;
CK_ULONG counter;
unsigned int seedBits = 0;
unsigned int subprimeBits = 0;
unsigned int primeBits;
unsigned int j = 8; /* default to 1024 bits */
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
PQGParams *params = NULL;
PQGVerify *vfy = NULL;
SECStatus rv;
attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_PRIME_BITS);
if (attribute == NULL) {
return CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
}
primeBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
if (primeBits < 1024) {
j = PQG_PBITS_TO_INDEX(primeBits);
if (j == (unsigned int)-1) {
return CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
}
}
attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS);
if (attribute != NULL) {
seedBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
}
attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS);
if (attribute != NULL) {
subprimeBits = (unsigned int) *(CK_ULONG *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
}
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_PRIME_BITS);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED_BITS);
/* use the old PQG interface if we have old input data */
if ((primeBits < 1024) || ((primeBits == 1024) && (subprimeBits == 0))) {
if (seedBits == 0) {
rv = PQG_ParamGen(j, &params, &vfy);
} else {
rv = PQG_ParamGenSeedLen(j,seedBits/8, &params, &vfy);
}
} else {
if (subprimeBits == 0) {
subprimeBits = sftk_GetSubPrimeFromPrime(primeBits);
}
if (seedBits == 0) {
seedBits = primeBits;
}
rv = PQG_ParamGenV2(primeBits, subprimeBits, seedBits/8, &params, &vfy);
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
}
return sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
}
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_PRIME,
params->prime.data, params->prime.len);
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_SUBPRIME,
params->subPrime.data, params->subPrime.len);
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_BASE,
params->base.data, params->base.len);
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
counter = vfy->counter;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_COUNTER,
&counter, sizeof(counter));
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_SEED,
vfy->seed.data, vfy->seed.len);
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_NETSCAPE_PQG_H,
vfy->h.data, vfy->h.len);
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
loser:
PQG_DestroyParams(params);
if (vfy) {
PQG_DestroyVerify(vfy);
}
return crv;
}
static CK_RV
nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism, CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type,
CK_ULONG *key_length)
{
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
switch (mechanism) {
case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_RC2;
if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_RC5;
if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
#endif
case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_RC4;
if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_CDMF;
*key_length = 8;
break;
case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_DES;
*key_length = 8;
break;
case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_DES2;
*key_length = 16;
break;
case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_DES3;
*key_length = 24;
break;
case CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_SEED;
*key_length = 16;
break;
case CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_CAMELLIA;
if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
*key_type = CKK_AES;
if (*key_length == 0) crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
default:
PORT_Assert(0);
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
break;
}
return crv;
}
CK_RV
nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe)
{
SECItem salt;
CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params;
PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
SECStatus rv;
*pbe = NULL;
arena = PORT_NewArena(SEC_ASN1_DEFAULT_ARENA_SIZE);
if (arena == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
params = (NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *) PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
sizeof(NSSPKCS5PBEParameter));
if (params == NULL) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE);
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
params->poolp = arena;
params->ivLen = 0;
params->pbeType = NSSPKCS5_PKCS12_V2;
params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
params->encAlg = SEC_OID_SHA1; /* any invalid value */
params->is2KeyDES = PR_FALSE;
params->keyID = pbeBitGenIntegrityKey;
pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
params->iter = pbe_params->ulIteration;
salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt;
salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena,&params->salt,&salt);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE);
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC:
params->hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1;
params->keyLen = 20;
break;
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD5;
params->keyLen = 16;
break;
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
params->hashType = HASH_AlgMD2;
params->keyLen = 16;
break;
default:
PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_TRUE);
return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
}
*pbe = params;
return CKR_OK;
}
/* maybe this should be table driven? */
static CK_RV
nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, NSSPKCS5PBEParameter **pbe,
CK_KEY_TYPE *key_type, CK_ULONG *key_length)
{
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
SECOidData *oid;
CK_PBE_PARAMS *pbe_params = NULL;
NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *params = NULL;
CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *pbkd2_params = NULL;
SECItem salt;
CK_ULONG iteration = 0;
*pbe = NULL;
oid = SECOID_FindOIDByMechanism(pMechanism->mechanism);
if (oid == NULL) {
return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
}
if (pMechanism->mechanism == CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2) {
pbkd2_params = (CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
if (pbkd2_params->saltSource != CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED) {
return CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
}
salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbkd2_params->pSaltSourceData;
salt.len = (unsigned int)pbkd2_params->ulSaltSourceDataLen;
iteration = pbkd2_params->iterations;
} else {
pbe_params = (CK_PBE_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
salt.data = (unsigned char *)pbe_params->pSalt;
salt.len = (unsigned int)pbe_params->ulSaltLen;
iteration = pbe_params->ulIteration;
}
params=nsspkcs5_NewParam(oid->offset, &salt, iteration);
if (params == NULL) {
return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
}
switch (params->encAlg) {
case SEC_OID_DES_CBC:
*key_type = CKK_DES;
*key_length = params->keyLen;
break;
case SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC:
*key_type = params->is2KeyDES ? CKK_DES2 : CKK_DES3;
*key_length = params->keyLen;
break;
case SEC_OID_RC2_CBC:
*key_type = CKK_RC2;
*key_length = params->keyLen;
break;
case SEC_OID_RC4:
*key_type = CKK_RC4;
*key_length = params->keyLen;
break;
case SEC_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2:
/* sigh, PKCS #11 currently only defines SHA1 for the KDF hash type.
* we do the check here because this where we would handle multiple
* hash types in the future */
if (pbkd2_params == NULL ||
pbkd2_params->prf != CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
/* key type must already be set */
if (*key_type == CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
}
/* PBKDF2 needs to calculate the key length from the other parameters
*/
if (*key_length == 0) {
*key_length = sftk_MapKeySize(*key_type);
}
if (*key_length == 0) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
}
params->keyLen = *key_length;
break;
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(params);
break;
}
if (crv == CKR_OK) {
*pbe = params;
}
return crv;
}
/* NSC_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key object. */
CK_RV NSC_GenerateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism,CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate,CK_ULONG ulCount,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
{
SFTKObject *key;
SFTKSession *session;
PRBool checkWeak = PR_FALSE;
CK_ULONG key_length = 0;
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS objclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
int i;
SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
unsigned char buf[MAX_KEY_LEN];
enum {nsc_pbe, nsc_ssl, nsc_bulk, nsc_param, nsc_jpake} key_gen_type;
NSSPKCS5PBEParameter *pbe_param;
SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *rsa_pms;
CK_VERSION *version;
/* in very old versions of NSS, there were implementation errors with key
* generation methods. We want to beable to read these, but not
* produce them any more. The affected algorithm was 3DES.
*/
PRBool faultyPBE3DES = PR_FALSE;
HASH_HashType hashType;
CHECK_FORK();
if (!slot) {
return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/*
* now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
*/
key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
if (key == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
/*
* load the template values into the object
*/
for (i=0; i < (int) ulCount; i++) {
if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
continue;
}
/* some algorithms need keytype specified */
if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) {
key_type = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
continue;
}
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return crv;
}
/* make sure we don't have any class, key_type, or value fields */
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_CLASS);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE);
/* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
key_gen_type = nsc_bulk; /* bulk key by default */
switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN:
checkWeak = PR_TRUE;
/* fall through */
case CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_SEED_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_AES_KEY_GEN:
#if NSS_SOFTOKEN_DOES_RC5
case CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN:
#endif
crv = nsc_SetupBulkKeyGen(pMechanism->mechanism,&key_type,&key_length);
break;
case CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN:
key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
key_length = 48;
key_gen_type = nsc_ssl;
break;
case CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD5_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_MD2_HMAC_KEY_GEN:
key_gen_type = nsc_pbe;
key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
crv = nsc_SetupHMACKeyGen(pMechanism, &pbe_param);
break;
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_FAULTY_3DES_CBC:
faultyPBE3DES = PR_TRUE;
/* fall through */
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_TRIPLE_DES_CBC:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC2_CBC:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC2_CBC:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_40_BIT_RC4:
case CKM_NETSCAPE_PBE_SHA1_128_BIT_RC4:
case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC:
case CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC:
case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC:
case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC:
case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128:
case CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40:
case CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC:
case CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC:
case CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2:
key_gen_type = nsc_pbe;
crv = nsc_SetupPBEKeyGen(pMechanism,&pbe_param, &key_type, &key_length);
break;
case CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN:
key_gen_type = nsc_param;
key_type = CKK_DSA;
objclass = CKO_KG_PARAMETERS;
crv = CKR_OK;
break;
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA1: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; goto jpake1;
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto jpake1;
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto jpake1;
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto jpake1;
jpake1:
key_gen_type = nsc_jpake;
key_type = CKK_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND1;
objclass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params)) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
if (sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_TOKEN)) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
crv = CKR_OK;
break;
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
break;
}
/* make sure we aren't going to overflow the buffer */
if (sizeof(buf) < key_length) {
/* someone is getting pretty optimistic about how big their key can
* be... */
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
/* if there was no error,
* key_type *MUST* be set in the switch statement above */
PORT_Assert( key_type != CKK_INVALID_KEY_TYPE );
/*
* now to the actual key gen.
*/
switch (key_gen_type) {
case nsc_pbe:
crv = nsc_pbe_key_gen(pbe_param, pMechanism, buf, &key_length,
faultyPBE3DES);
nsspkcs5_DestroyPBEParameter(pbe_param);
break;
case nsc_ssl:
rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *)buf;
version = (CK_VERSION *)pMechanism->pParameter;
rsa_pms->client_version[0] = version->major;
rsa_pms->client_version[1] = version->minor;
crv =
NSC_GenerateRandom(0,&rsa_pms->random[0], sizeof(rsa_pms->random));
break;
case nsc_bulk:
/* get the key, check for weak keys and repeat if found */
do {
crv = NSC_GenerateRandom(0, buf, key_length);
} while (crv == CKR_OK && checkWeak && sftk_IsWeakKey(buf,key_type));
break;
case nsc_param:
/* generate parameters */
*buf = 0;
crv = nsc_parameter_gen(key_type,key);
break;
case nsc_jpake:
crv = jpake_Round1(hashType,
(CK_NSS_JPAKERound1Params *) pMechanism->pParameter,
key);
break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
/* Add the class, key_type, and value */
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_CLASS,&objclass,sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
if (key_length != 0) {
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length);
if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
}
/* get the session */
session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) {
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/*
* handle the base object stuff
*/
crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
if (sftk_isTrue(key,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
if (!sftk_isTrue(key,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
*phKey = key->handle;
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return crv;
}
#define PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA1_LENGTH /* 160-bits */
#define PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH 20 /* 160-bits */
/*
* FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check utilized to validate key pair.
*
* This function returns
* CKR_OK if pairwise consistency check passed
* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR if pairwise consistency check failed
* other error codes if paiswise consistency check could not be
* performed, for example, CKR_HOST_MEMORY.
*/
static CK_RV
sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
SFTKObject *publicKey, SFTKObject *privateKey, CK_KEY_TYPE keyType)
{
/*
* Key type Mechanism type
* --------------------------------
* For encrypt/decrypt: CKK_RSA => CKM_RSA_PKCS
* others => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM
*
* For sign/verify: CKK_RSA => CKM_RSA_PKCS
* CKK_DSA => CKM_DSA
* CKK_EC => CKM_ECDSA
* others => CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM
*
* None of these mechanisms has a parameter.
*/
CK_MECHANISM mech = {0, NULL, 0};
CK_ULONG modulusLen;
CK_ULONG subPrimeLen = 0;
PRBool isEncryptable = PR_FALSE;
PRBool canSignVerify = PR_FALSE;
PRBool isDerivable = PR_FALSE;
CK_RV crv;
/* Variables used for Encrypt/Decrypt functions. */
unsigned char *known_message = (unsigned char *)"Known Crypto Message";
unsigned char plaintext[PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH];
CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted;
unsigned char *ciphertext;
unsigned char *text_compared;
CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted;
CK_ULONG bytes_compared;
CK_ULONG pairwise_digest_length = PAIRWISE_DIGEST_LENGTH;
/* Variables used for Signature/Verification functions. */
/* Must be at least 256 bits for DSA2 digest */
unsigned char *known_digest = (unsigned char *)
"Mozilla Rules the World through NSS!";
unsigned char *signature;
CK_ULONG signature_length;
if (keyType == CKK_RSA) {
SFTKAttribute *attribute;
/* Get modulus length of private key. */
attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(privateKey, CKA_MODULUS);
if (attribute == NULL) {
return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
modulusLen = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
if (*(unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue == 0) {
modulusLen--;
}
sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
} else if (keyType == CKK_DSA) {
SFTKAttribute *attribute;
/* Get subprime length of private key. */
attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(privateKey, CKA_SUBPRIME);
if (attribute == NULL) {
return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
subPrimeLen = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
if (subPrimeLen > 1 && *(unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue == 0) {
subPrimeLen--;
}
sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
}
/**************************************************/
/* Pairwise Consistency Check of Encrypt/Decrypt. */
/**************************************************/
isEncryptable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DECRYPT);
/*
* If the decryption attribute is set, attempt to encrypt
* with the public key and decrypt with the private key.
*/
if (isEncryptable) {
if (keyType != CKK_RSA) {
return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
bytes_encrypted = modulusLen;
mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
/* Allocate space for ciphertext. */
ciphertext = (unsigned char *) PORT_ZAlloc(bytes_encrypted);
if (ciphertext == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
/* Prepare for encryption using the public key. */
crv = NSC_EncryptInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(ciphertext);
return crv;
}
/* Encrypt using the public key. */
crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession,
known_message,
PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH,
ciphertext,
&bytes_encrypted);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(ciphertext);
return crv;
}
/* Always use the smaller of these two values . . . */
bytes_compared = PR_MIN(bytes_encrypted, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
/*
* If there was a failure, the plaintext
* goes at the end, therefore . . .
*/
text_compared = ciphertext + bytes_encrypted - bytes_compared;
/*
* Check to ensure that ciphertext does
* NOT EQUAL known input message text
* per FIPS PUB 140-2 directive.
*/
if (PORT_Memcmp(text_compared, known_message,
bytes_compared) == 0) {
/* Set error to Invalid PRIVATE Key. */
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
PORT_Free(ciphertext);
return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
/* Prepare for decryption using the private key. */
crv = NSC_DecryptInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(ciphertext);
return crv;
}
memset(plaintext, 0, PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
/*
* Initialize bytes decrypted to be the
* expected PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH.
*/
bytes_decrypted = PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH;
/*
* Decrypt using the private key.
* NOTE: No need to reset the
* value of bytes_encrypted.
*/
crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession,
ciphertext,
bytes_encrypted,
plaintext,
&bytes_decrypted);
/* Finished with ciphertext; free it. */
PORT_Free(ciphertext);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
return crv;
}
/*
* Check to ensure that the output plaintext
* does EQUAL known input message text.
*/
if ((bytes_decrypted != PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) ||
(PORT_Memcmp(plaintext, known_message,
PAIRWISE_MESSAGE_LENGTH) != 0)) {
/* Set error to Bad PUBLIC Key. */
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
}
/**********************************************/
/* Pairwise Consistency Check of Sign/Verify. */
/**********************************************/
canSignVerify = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_SIGN);
if (canSignVerify) {
/* Determine length of signature. */
switch (keyType) {
case CKK_RSA:
signature_length = modulusLen;
mech.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS;
break;
case CKK_DSA:
signature_length = DSA_MAX_SIGNATURE_LEN;
pairwise_digest_length = subPrimeLen;
mech.mechanism = CKM_DSA;
break;
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
case CKK_EC:
signature_length = MAX_ECKEY_LEN * 2;
mech.mechanism = CKM_ECDSA;
break;
#endif
default:
return CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
/* Allocate space for signature data. */
signature = (unsigned char *) PORT_ZAlloc(signature_length);
if (signature == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
/* Sign the known hash using the private key. */
crv = NSC_SignInit(hSession, &mech, privateKey->handle);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(signature);
return crv;
}
crv = NSC_Sign(hSession,
known_digest,
pairwise_digest_length,
signature,
&signature_length);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(signature);
return crv;
}
/* Verify the known hash using the public key. */
crv = NSC_VerifyInit(hSession, &mech, publicKey->handle);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(signature);
return crv;
}
crv = NSC_Verify(hSession,
known_digest,
pairwise_digest_length,
signature,
signature_length);
/* Free signature data. */
PORT_Free(signature);
if ((crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE) ||
(crv == CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID)) {
return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
return crv;
}
}
/**********************************************/
/* Pairwise Consistency Check for Derivation */
/**********************************************/
isDerivable = sftk_isTrue(privateKey, CKA_DERIVE);
if (isDerivable) {
/*
* We are not doing consistency check for Diffie-Hellman Key -
* otherwise it would be here
* This is also true for Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman keys
* NOTE: EC keys are currently subjected to pairwise
* consistency check for signing/verification.
*/
/*
* FIPS 140-2 had the following pairwise consistency test for
* public and private keys used for key agreement:
* If the keys are used to perform key agreement, then the
* cryptographic module shall create a second, compatible
* key pair. The cryptographic module shall perform both
* sides of the key agreement algorithm and shall compare
* the resulting shared values. If the shared values are
* not equal, the test shall fail.
* This test was removed in Change Notice 3.
*/
}
return CKR_OK;
}
/* NSC_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair,
* creating new key objects. */
CK_RV NSC_GenerateKeyPair (CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPublicKeyTemplate,
CK_ULONG ulPublicKeyAttributeCount, CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pPrivateKeyTemplate,
CK_ULONG ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey)
{
SFTKObject * publicKey,*privateKey;
SFTKSession * session;
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
SECStatus rv;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubClass = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS privClass = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
int i;
SFTKSlot * slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
unsigned int bitSize;
/* RSA */
int public_modulus_bits = 0;
SECItem pubExp;
RSAPrivateKey * rsaPriv;
/* DSA */
PQGParams pqgParam;
DHParams dhParam;
DSAPrivateKey * dsaPriv;
/* Diffie Hellman */
DHPrivateKey * dhPriv;
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
/* Elliptic Curve Cryptography */
SECItem ecEncodedParams; /* DER Encoded parameters */
ECPrivateKey * ecPriv;
ECParams * ecParams;
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
CHECK_FORK();
if (!slot) {
return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/*
* now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
*/
publicKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
if (publicKey == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
/*
* load the template values into the publicKey
*/
for (i=0; i < (int) ulPublicKeyAttributeCount; i++) {
if (pPublicKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_MODULUS_BITS) {
public_modulus_bits = *(CK_ULONG *)pPublicKeyTemplate[i].pValue;
continue;
}
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,
sftk_attr_expand(&pPublicKeyTemplate[i]));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
privateKey = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
if (privateKey == NULL) {
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
/*
* now load the private key template
*/
for (i=0; i < (int) ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount; i++) {
if (pPrivateKeyTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_BITS) {
continue;
}
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,
sftk_attr_expand(&pPrivateKeyTemplate[i]));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_CLASS);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_CLASS);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE);
/* Now Set up the parameters to generate the key (based on mechanism) */
switch (pMechanism->mechanism) {
case CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
/* format the keys */
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_MODULUS);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_MODULUS);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_1);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_2);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_1);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_2);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_COEFFICIENT);
key_type = CKK_RSA;
if (public_modulus_bits == 0) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
}
if (public_modulus_bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
break;
}
if (public_modulus_bits % 2 != 0) {
crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
break;
}
/* extract the exponent */
crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pubExp,publicKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pubExp.data, pubExp.len);
if (bitSize < 2) {
crv = CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID;
break;
}
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
sftk_item_expand(&pubExp));
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(pubExp.data);
break;
}
rsaPriv = RSA_NewKey(public_modulus_bits, &pubExp);
PORT_Free(pubExp.data);
if (rsaPriv == NULL) {
if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
}
crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
break;
}
/* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the public key */
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_MODULUS,
sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
/* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_MODULUS,
sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->modulus));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT,
sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->privateExponent));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_1,
sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime1));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME_2,
sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->prime2));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_1,
sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent1));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EXPONENT_2,
sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->exponent2));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto kpg_done;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_COEFFICIENT,
sftk_item_expand(&rsaPriv->coefficient));
kpg_done:
/* Should zeroize the contents first, since this func doesn't. */
PORT_FreeArena(rsaPriv->arena, PR_TRUE);
break;
case CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_SUBPRIME);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE);
key_type = CKK_DSA;
/* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to the private key */
crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.prime,publicKey,CKA_PRIME);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.subPrime,publicKey,
CKA_SUBPRIME);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
break;
}
crv=sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL,&pqgParam.base,publicKey,CKA_BASE);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
break;
}
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME,
sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.prime));
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
break;
}
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_SUBPRIME,
sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.subPrime));
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
break;
}
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE,
sftk_item_expand(&pqgParam.base));
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
break;
}
/*
* these are checked by DSA_NewKey
*/
bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.subPrime.data,
pqgParam.subPrime.len);
if ((bitSize < DSA_MIN_Q_BITS) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_Q_BITS)) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
break;
}
bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.prime.data,pqgParam.prime.len);
if ((bitSize < DSA_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
break;
}
bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(pqgParam.base.data,pqgParam.base.len);
if ((bitSize < 2) || (bitSize > DSA_MAX_P_BITS)) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
break;
}
/* Generate the key */
rv = DSA_NewKey(&pqgParam, &dsaPriv);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.subPrime.data);
PORT_Free(pqgParam.base.data);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
}
crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
break;
}
/* store the generated key into the attributes */
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_VALUE,
sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done;
/* now fill in the RSA dependent paramenters in the private key */
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->publicValue));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dsagn_done;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE,
sftk_item_expand(&dsaPriv->privateValue));
dsagn_done:
/* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
PORT_FreeArena(dsaPriv->params.arena, PR_TRUE);
break;
case CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_PRIME);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_BASE);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
key_type = CKK_DH;
/* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */
crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.prime, publicKey,
CKA_PRIME);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &dhParam.base, publicKey, CKA_BASE);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
break;
}
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_PRIME,
sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.prime));
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
break;
}
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_BASE,
sftk_item_expand(&dhParam.base));
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
break;
}
bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.prime.data,dhParam.prime.len);
if ((bitSize < DH_MIN_P_BITS) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
break;
}
bitSize = sftk_GetLengthInBits(dhParam.base.data,dhParam.base.len);
if ((bitSize < 1) || (bitSize > DH_MAX_P_BITS)) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
break;
}
rv = DH_NewKey(&dhParam, &dhPriv);
PORT_Free(dhParam.prime.data);
PORT_Free(dhParam.base.data);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
}
crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
break;
}
crv=sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_VALUE,
sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->publicValue));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto dhgn_done;
crv=sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE,
sftk_item_expand(&dhPriv->privateValue));
dhgn_done:
/* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
PORT_FreeArena(dhPriv->arena, PR_TRUE);
break;
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
case CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN:
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_EC_PARAMS);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_VALUE);
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
key_type = CKK_EC;
/* extract the necessary parameters and copy them to private keys */
crv = sftk_Attribute2SSecItem(NULL, &ecEncodedParams, publicKey,
CKA_EC_PARAMS);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
sftk_item_expand(&ecEncodedParams));
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data);
break;
}
/* Decode ec params before calling EC_NewKey */
rv = EC_DecodeParams(&ecEncodedParams, &ecParams);
PORT_Free(ecEncodedParams.data);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
break;
}
rv = EC_NewKey(ecParams, &ecPriv);
PORT_FreeArena(ecParams->arena, PR_TRUE);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE) {
sftk_fatalError = PR_TRUE;
}
crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
break;
}
if (getenv("NSS_USE_DECODED_CKA_EC_POINT")) {
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT,
sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue));
} else {
SECItem *pubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL,
&ecPriv->publicValue,
SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
if (!pubValue) {
crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
goto ecgn_done;
}
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey, CKA_EC_POINT,
sftk_item_expand(pubValue));
SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue, PR_TRUE);
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto ecgn_done;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey, CKA_VALUE,
sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->privateValue));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto ecgn_done;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_NETSCAPE_DB,
sftk_item_expand(&ecPriv->publicValue));
ecgn_done:
/* should zeroize, since this function doesn't. */
PORT_FreeArena(ecPriv->ecParams.arena, PR_TRUE);
break;
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
return crv;
}
/* Add the class, key_type The loop lets us check errors blow out
* on errors and clean up at the bottom */
session = NULL; /* make pedtantic happy... session cannot leave the*/
/* loop below NULL unless an error is set... */
do {
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_CLASS,&privClass,
sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_CLASS,&pubClass,
sizeof(CK_OBJECT_CLASS));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(privateKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,
sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(publicKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&key_type,
sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
} while (0);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
return crv;
}
/*
* handle the base object cleanup for the public Key
*/
crv = sftk_handleObject(privateKey,session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeSession(session);
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
return crv;
}
/*
* handle the base object cleanup for the private Key
* If we have any problems, we destroy the public Key we've
* created and linked.
*/
crv = sftk_handleObject(publicKey,session);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,privateKey->handle);
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
return crv;
}
if (sftk_isTrue(privateKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,
&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
if (sftk_isTrue(publicKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE,
&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
if (!sftk_isTrue(privateKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
sftk_forceAttribute(privateKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
if (!sftk_isTrue(publicKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE)) {
sftk_forceAttribute(publicKey,CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
}
/* Perform FIPS 140-2 pairwise consistency check. */
crv = sftk_PairwiseConsistencyCheck(hSession,
publicKey, privateKey, key_type);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,publicKey->handle);
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
NSC_DestroyObject(hSession,privateKey->handle);
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
if (sftk_audit_enabled) {
char msg[128];
PR_snprintf(msg,sizeof msg,
"C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession=0x%08lX, "
"pMechanism->mechanism=0x%08lX)=0x%08lX "
"self-test: pair-wise consistency test failed",
(PRUint32)hSession,(PRUint32)pMechanism->mechanism,
(PRUint32)crv);
sftk_LogAuditMessage(NSS_AUDIT_ERROR, NSS_AUDIT_SELF_TEST, msg);
}
return crv;
}
*phPrivateKey = privateKey->handle;
*phPublicKey = publicKey->handle;
sftk_FreeObject(publicKey);
sftk_FreeObject(privateKey);
return CKR_OK;
}
static SECItem *sftk_PackagePrivateKey(SFTKObject *key, CK_RV *crvp)
{
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lk = NULL;
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL;
SFTKAttribute *attribute = NULL;
PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
SECOidTag algorithm = SEC_OID_UNKNOWN;
void *dummy, *param = NULL;
SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
SECItem *encodedKey = NULL;
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
#ifdef EC_DEBUG
SECItem *fordebug;
#endif
int savelen;
#endif
if(!key) {
*crvp = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID; /* really can't happen */
return NULL;
}
attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
if(!attribute) {
*crvp = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
return NULL;
}
lk = sftk_GetPrivKey(key, *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)attribute->attrib.pValue, crvp);
sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
if(!lk) {
return NULL;
}
arena = PORT_NewArena(2048); /* XXX different size? */
if(!arena) {
*crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo));
if(!pki) {
*crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
pki->arena = arena;
param = NULL;
switch(lk->keyType) {
case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey:
prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lk);
dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate);
algorithm = SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION;
break;
case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey:
prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lk);
dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate);
prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lk->u.dsa.params);
param = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, &(lk->u.dsa.params),
nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate);
algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE;
break;
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
case NSSLOWKEYECKey:
prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lk);
/* Public value is encoded as a bit string so adjust length
* to be in bits before ASN encoding and readjust
* immediately after.
*
* Since the SECG specification recommends not including the
* parameters as part of ECPrivateKey, we zero out the curveOID
* length before encoding and restore it later.
*/
lk->u.ec.publicValue.len <<= 3;
savelen = lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len;
lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = 0;
dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(arena, &pki->privateKey, lk,
nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate);
lk->u.ec.ecParams.curveOID.len = savelen;
lk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3;
#ifdef EC_DEBUG
fordebug = &pki->privateKey;
SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKey", lk->keyType,
fordebug);
#endif
param = SECITEM_DupItem(&lk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding);
algorithm = SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY;
break;
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
case NSSLOWKEYDHKey:
default:
dummy = NULL;
break;
}
if(!dummy || ((lk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYDSAKey) && !param)) {
*crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
rv = SECOID_SetAlgorithmID(arena, &pki->algorithm, algorithm,
(SECItem*)param);
if(rv != SECSuccess) {
*crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
dummy = SEC_ASN1EncodeInteger(arena, &pki->version,
NSSLOWKEY_PRIVATE_KEY_INFO_VERSION);
if(!dummy) {
*crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR; /* should map NSS SECError */
rv = SECFailure;
goto loser;
}
encodedKey = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL, pki,
nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate);
*crvp = encodedKey ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
#ifdef EC_DEBUG
fordebug = encodedKey;
SEC_PRINT("sftk_PackagePrivateKey()", "PrivateKeyInfo", lk->keyType,
fordebug);
#endif
loser:
if(arena) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
}
if(lk && (lk != key->objectInfo)) {
nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lk);
}
if(param) {
SECITEM_ZfreeItem((SECItem*)param, PR_TRUE);
}
if(rv != SECSuccess) {
return NULL;
}
return encodedKey;
}
/* it doesn't matter yet, since we colapse error conditions in the
* level above, but we really should map those few key error differences */
static CK_RV
sftk_mapWrap(CK_RV crv)
{
switch (crv) {
case CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID: crv = CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID; break;
}
return crv;
}
/* NSC_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */
CK_RV NSC_WrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hWrappingKey,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulWrappedKeyLen)
{
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKAttribute *attribute;
SFTKObject *key;
CK_RV crv;
CHECK_FORK();
session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) {
return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
if (key == NULL) {
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
switch(key->objclass) {
case CKO_SECRET_KEY:
{
SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL;
SECItem pText;
attribute = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
if (attribute == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey,
CKA_WRAP, CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
break;
}
pText.type = siBuffer;
pText.data = (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue;
pText.len = attribute->attrib.ulValueLen;
/* Find out if this is a block cipher. */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL);
if (crv != CKR_OK || !context)
break;
if (context->blockSize > 1) {
unsigned int remainder = pText.len % context->blockSize;
if (!context->doPad && remainder) {
/* When wrapping secret keys with unpadded block ciphers,
** the keys are zero padded, if necessary, to fill out
** a full block.
*/
pText.len += context->blockSize - remainder;
pText.data = PORT_ZAlloc(pText.len);
if (pText.data)
memcpy(pText.data, attribute->attrib.pValue,
attribute->attrib.ulValueLen);
else {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
}
}
crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, (CK_BYTE_PTR)pText.data,
pText.len, pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen);
/* always force a finalize, both on errors and when
* we are just getting the size */
if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) {
CK_RV lcrv ;
lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,
SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL);
sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL);
if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) {
sftk_FreeContext(context);
}
}
if (pText.data != (unsigned char *)attribute->attrib.pValue)
PORT_ZFree(pText.data, pText.len);
sftk_FreeAttribute(attribute);
break;
}
case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY:
{
SECItem *bpki = sftk_PackagePrivateKey(key, &crv);
SFTKSessionContext *context = NULL;
if(!bpki) {
break;
}
crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession, pMechanism, hWrappingKey,
CKA_WRAP, CKA_WRAP, SFTK_ENCRYPT, PR_TRUE);
if(crv != CKR_OK) {
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE);
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
crv = NSC_Encrypt(hSession, bpki->data, bpki->len,
pWrappedKey, pulWrappedKeyLen);
/* always force a finalize */
if (crv != CKR_OK || pWrappedKey == NULL) {
CK_RV lcrv ;
lcrv = sftk_GetContext(hSession,&context,
SFTK_ENCRYPT,PR_FALSE,NULL);
sftk_SetContextByType(session, SFTK_ENCRYPT, NULL);
if (lcrv == CKR_OK && context) {
sftk_FreeContext(context);
}
}
SECITEM_ZfreeItem(bpki, PR_TRUE);
break;
}
default:
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
}
/*
* import a pprivate key info into the desired slot
*/
static SECStatus
sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(SFTKObject *key, SECItem *bpki)
{
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_RSA;
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
const SEC_ASN1Template *keyTemplate, *paramTemplate;
void *paramDest = NULL;
PLArenaPool *arena;
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *lpk = NULL;
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo *pki = NULL;
CK_RV crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
arena = PORT_NewArena(2048);
if(!arena) {
return SECFailure;
}
pki = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo*)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKeyInfo));
if(!pki) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
return SECFailure;
}
if(SEC_ASN1DecodeItem(arena, pki, nsslowkey_PrivateKeyInfoTemplate, bpki)
!= SECSuccess) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
return SECFailure;
}
lpk = (NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena,
sizeof(NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey));
if(lpk == NULL) {
goto loser;
}
lpk->arena = arena;
switch(SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&pki->algorithm)) {
case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
keyTemplate = nsslowkey_RSAPrivateKeyTemplate;
paramTemplate = NULL;
paramDest = NULL;
lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYRSAKey;
prepare_low_rsa_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk);
break;
case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE:
keyTemplate = nsslowkey_DSAPrivateKeyExportTemplate;
paramTemplate = nsslowkey_PQGParamsTemplate;
paramDest = &(lpk->u.dsa.params);
lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYDSAKey;
prepare_low_dsa_priv_key_export_for_asn1(lpk);
prepare_low_pqg_params_for_asn1(&lpk->u.dsa.params);
break;
/* case NSSLOWKEYDHKey: */
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY:
keyTemplate = nsslowkey_ECPrivateKeyTemplate;
paramTemplate = NULL;
paramDest = &(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding);
lpk->keyType = NSSLOWKEYECKey;
prepare_low_ec_priv_key_for_asn1(lpk);
prepare_low_ecparams_for_asn1(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams);
break;
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
default:
keyTemplate = NULL;
paramTemplate = NULL;
paramDest = NULL;
break;
}
if(!keyTemplate) {
goto loser;
}
/* decode the private key and any algorithm parameters */
rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, lpk, keyTemplate, &pki->privateKey);
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
if (lpk->keyType == NSSLOWKEYECKey) {
/* convert length in bits to length in bytes */
lpk->u.ec.publicValue.len >>= 3;
rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(arena,
&(lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding),
&(pki->algorithm.parameters));
if(rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
}
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
if(rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
if(paramDest && paramTemplate) {
rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, paramDest, paramTemplate,
&(pki->algorithm.parameters));
if(rv != SECSuccess) {
goto loser;
}
}
rv = SECFailure;
switch (lpk->keyType) {
case NSSLOWKEYRSAKey:
keyType = CKK_RSA;
if(sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) {
sftk_DeleteAttributeType(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB);
}
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
sizeof(keyType));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_UNWRAP, &cktrue,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DECRYPT, &cktrue,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_MODULUS,
sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.modulus));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT,
sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.publicExponent));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT,
sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.privateExponent));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_1,
sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime1));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME_2,
sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.prime2));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_1,
sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent1));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EXPONENT_2,
sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.exponent2));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_COEFFICIENT,
sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.rsa.coefficient));
break;
case NSSLOWKEYDSAKey:
keyType = CKK_DSA;
crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK :
CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
sizeof(keyType));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_PRIME,
sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.prime));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SUBPRIME,
sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.subPrime));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_BASE,
sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.params.base));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE,
sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.dsa.privateValue));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
break;
#ifdef notdef
case NSSLOWKEYDHKey:
template = dhTemplate;
templateCount = sizeof(dhTemplate)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE);
keyType = CKK_DH;
break;
#endif
/* what about fortezza??? */
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
case NSSLOWKEYECKey:
keyType = CKK_EC;
crv = (sftk_hasAttribute(key, CKA_NETSCAPE_DB)) ? CKR_OK :
CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType,
sizeof(keyType));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &cktrue,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_DERIVE, &cktrue,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_EC_PARAMS,
sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.ecParams.DEREncoding));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key, CKA_VALUE,
sftk_item_expand(&lpk->u.ec.privateValue));
if(crv != CKR_OK) break;
/* XXX Do we need to decode the EC Params here ?? */
break;
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
default:
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
loser:
if(lpk) {
nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(lpk);
}
if(crv != CKR_OK) {
return SECFailure;
}
return SECSuccess;
}
/* NSC_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new key object. */
CK_RV NSC_UnwrapKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hUnwrappingKey,
CK_BYTE_PTR pWrappedKey, CK_ULONG ulWrappedKeyLen,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
{
SFTKObject *key = NULL;
SFTKSession *session;
CK_ULONG key_length = 0;
unsigned char * buf = NULL;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
int i;
CK_ULONG bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen;
SFTKSlot *slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
SECItem bpki;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS target_type = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CHECK_FORK();
if (!slot) {
return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/*
* now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
*/
key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
if (key == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
/*
* load the template values into the object
*/
for (i=0; i < (int) ulAttributeCount; i++) {
if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
key_length = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
continue;
}
if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_CLASS) {
target_type = *(CK_OBJECT_CLASS *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
}
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return crv;
}
crv = sftk_CryptInit(hSession,pMechanism,hUnwrappingKey,CKA_UNWRAP,
CKA_UNWRAP, SFTK_DECRYPT, PR_FALSE);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
}
/* allocate the buffer to decrypt into
* this assumes the unwrapped key is never larger than the
* wrapped key. For all the mechanisms we support this is true */
buf = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc( ulWrappedKeyLen);
bsize = ulWrappedKeyLen;
crv = NSC_Decrypt(hSession, pWrappedKey, ulWrappedKeyLen, buf, &bsize);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeObject(key);
PORT_Free(buf);
return sftk_mapWrap(crv);
}
switch(target_type) {
case CKO_SECRET_KEY:
if (!sftk_hasAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE)) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
}
if (key_length == 0 || key_length > bsize) {
key_length = bsize;
}
if (key_length > MAX_KEY_LEN) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
/* add the value */
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,CKA_VALUE,buf,key_length);
break;
case CKO_PRIVATE_KEY:
bpki.data = (unsigned char *)buf;
bpki.len = bsize;
crv = CKR_OK;
if(sftk_unwrapPrivateKey(key, &bpki) != SECSuccess) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
}
break;
default:
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
PORT_ZFree(buf, bsize);
if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
/* get the session */
session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) {
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/*
* handle the base object stuff
*/
crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session);
*phKey = key->handle;
sftk_FreeSession(session);
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return crv;
}
/*
* The SSL key gen mechanism create's lots of keys. This function handles the
* details of each of these key creation.
*/
static CK_RV
sftk_buildSSLKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, SFTKObject *baseKey,
PRBool isMacKey, unsigned char *keyBlock, unsigned int keySize,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *keyHandle)
{
SFTKObject *key;
SFTKSession *session;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
CK_RV crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
/*
* now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
*/
*keyHandle = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
key = sftk_NewObject(baseKey->slot);
if (key == NULL) return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key)->wasDerived = PR_TRUE;
crv = sftk_CopyObject(key,baseKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
if (isMacKey) {
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_ENCRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DECRYPT,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_WRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_UNWRAP,&ckfalse,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
}
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,keyBlock,keySize);
if (crv != CKR_OK) goto loser;
/* get the session */
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) { goto loser; }
crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
*keyHandle = key->handle;
loser:
if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key);
return crv;
}
/*
* if there is an error, we need to free the keys we already created in SSL
* This is the routine that will do it..
*/
static void
sftk_freeSSLKeys(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT *returnedMaterial )
{
if (returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
NSC_DestroyObject(session,returnedMaterial->hClientMacSecret);
}
if (returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerMacSecret);
}
if (returnedMaterial->hClientKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hClientKey);
}
if (returnedMaterial->hServerKey != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
NSC_DestroyObject(session, returnedMaterial->hServerKey);
}
}
/*
* when deriving from sensitive and extractable keys, we need to preserve some
* of the semantics in the derived key. This helper routine maintains these
* semantics.
*/
static CK_RV
sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(SFTKObject *baseKey,SFTKObject *destKey)
{
PRBool hasSensitive;
PRBool sensitive = PR_FALSE;
PRBool hasExtractable;
PRBool extractable = PR_TRUE;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
SFTKAttribute *att;
hasSensitive = PR_FALSE;
att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey,CKA_SENSITIVE);
if (att) {
hasSensitive = PR_TRUE;
sensitive = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue;
sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
}
hasExtractable = PR_FALSE;
att = sftk_FindAttribute(destKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE);
if (att) {
hasExtractable = PR_TRUE;
extractable = (PRBool) *(CK_BBOOL *)att->attrib.pValue;
sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
}
/* don't make a key more accessible */
if (sftk_isTrue(baseKey,CKA_SENSITIVE) && hasSensitive &&
(sensitive == PR_FALSE)) {
return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
}
if (!sftk_isTrue(baseKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE) && hasExtractable &&
(extractable == PR_TRUE)) {
return CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
}
/* inherit parent's sensitivity */
if (!hasSensitive) {
att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey,CKA_SENSITIVE);
if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib));
sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
}
if (!hasExtractable) {
att = sftk_FindAttribute(baseKey,CKA_EXTRACTABLE);
if (att == NULL) return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
crv = sftk_defaultAttribute(destKey,sftk_attr_expand(&att->attrib));
sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
}
/* we should inherit the parent's always extractable/ never sensitive info,
* but handleObject always forces this attributes, so we would need to do
* something special. */
return CKR_OK;
}
/*
* make known fixed PKCS #11 key types to their sizes in bytes
*/
unsigned long
sftk_MapKeySize(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType)
{
switch (keyType) {
case CKK_CDMF:
return 8;
case CKK_DES:
return 8;
case CKK_DES2:
return 16;
case CKK_DES3:
return 24;
/* IDEA and CAST need to be added */
default:
break;
}
return 0;
}
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
/* Inputs:
* key_len: Length of derived key to be generated.
* SharedSecret: a shared secret that is the output of a key agreement primitive.
* SharedInfo: (Optional) some data shared by the entities computing the secret key.
* SharedInfoLen: the length in octets of SharedInfo
* Hash: The hash function to be used in the KDF
* HashLen: the length in octets of the output of Hash
* Output:
* key: Pointer to a buffer containing derived key, if return value is SECSuccess.
*/
static CK_RV sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(CK_BYTE **key, CK_ULONG key_len, SECItem *SharedSecret,
CK_BYTE_PTR SharedInfo, CK_ULONG SharedInfoLen,
SECStatus Hash(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, PRUint32),
CK_ULONG HashLen)
{
unsigned char *buffer = NULL, *output_buffer = NULL;
PRUint32 buffer_len, max_counter, i;
SECStatus rv;
CK_RV crv;
/* Check that key_len isn't too long. The maximum key length could be
* greatly increased if the code below did not limit the 4-byte counter
* to a maximum value of 255. */
if (key_len > 254 * HashLen)
return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
if (SharedInfo == NULL)
SharedInfoLen = 0;
buffer_len = SharedSecret->len + 4 + SharedInfoLen;
buffer = (CK_BYTE *)PORT_Alloc(buffer_len);
if (buffer == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
goto loser;
}
max_counter = key_len/HashLen;
if (key_len > max_counter * HashLen)
max_counter++;
output_buffer = (CK_BYTE *)PORT_Alloc(max_counter * HashLen);
if (output_buffer == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
goto loser;
}
/* Populate buffer with SharedSecret || Counter || [SharedInfo]
* where Counter is 0x00000001 */
PORT_Memcpy(buffer, SharedSecret->data, SharedSecret->len);
buffer[SharedSecret->len] = 0;
buffer[SharedSecret->len + 1] = 0;
buffer[SharedSecret->len + 2] = 0;
buffer[SharedSecret->len + 3] = 1;
if (SharedInfo) {
PORT_Memcpy(&buffer[SharedSecret->len + 4], SharedInfo, SharedInfoLen);
}
for(i=0; i < max_counter; i++) {
rv = Hash(&output_buffer[i * HashLen], buffer, buffer_len);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
/* 'Hash' should not fail. */
crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
goto loser;
}
/* Increment counter (assumes max_counter < 255) */
buffer[SharedSecret->len + 3]++;
}
PORT_ZFree(buffer, buffer_len);
if (key_len < max_counter * HashLen) {
PORT_Memset(output_buffer + key_len, 0, max_counter * HashLen - key_len);
}
*key = output_buffer;
return CKR_OK;
loser:
if (buffer) {
PORT_ZFree(buffer, buffer_len);
}
if (output_buffer) {
PORT_ZFree(output_buffer, max_counter * HashLen);
}
return crv;
}
static CK_RV sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(CK_BYTE **key, CK_ULONG key_len,
SECItem *SharedSecret,
CK_BYTE_PTR SharedInfo, CK_ULONG SharedInfoLen,
CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf)
{
if (kdf == CKD_SHA1_KDF)
return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
SharedInfoLen, SHA1_HashBuf, SHA1_LENGTH);
else if (kdf == CKD_SHA224_KDF)
return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
SharedInfoLen, SHA224_HashBuf, SHA224_LENGTH);
else if (kdf == CKD_SHA256_KDF)
return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
SharedInfoLen, SHA256_HashBuf, SHA256_LENGTH);
else if (kdf == CKD_SHA384_KDF)
return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
SharedInfoLen, SHA384_HashBuf, SHA384_LENGTH);
else if (kdf == CKD_SHA512_KDF)
return sftk_compute_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(key, key_len, SharedSecret, SharedInfo,
SharedInfoLen, SHA512_HashBuf, SHA512_LENGTH);
else
return CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
}
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
/*
* SSL Key generation given pre master secret
*/
#define NUM_MIXERS 9
static const char * const mixers[NUM_MIXERS] = {
"A",
"BB",
"CCC",
"DDDD",
"EEEEE",
"FFFFFF",
"GGGGGGG",
"HHHHHHHH",
"IIIIIIIII" };
#define SSL3_PMS_LENGTH 48
#define SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH 48
#define SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH 32
/* NSC_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key object. */
CK_RV NSC_DeriveKey( CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechanism, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hBaseKey,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR pTemplate, CK_ULONG ulAttributeCount,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey)
{
SFTKSession * session;
SFTKSlot * slot = sftk_SlotFromSessionHandle(hSession);
SFTKObject * key;
SFTKObject * sourceKey;
SFTKAttribute * att = NULL;
SFTKAttribute * att2 = NULL;
unsigned char * buf;
SHA1Context * sha;
MD5Context * md5;
MD2Context * md2;
CK_ULONG macSize;
CK_ULONG tmpKeySize;
CK_ULONG IVSize;
CK_ULONG keySize = 0;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *stringPtr;
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = pMechanism->mechanism;
PRBool isTLS = PR_FALSE;
PRBool isDH = PR_FALSE;
HASH_HashType tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgNULL;
SECStatus rv;
int i;
unsigned int outLen;
unsigned char sha_out[SHA1_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_block[NUM_MIXERS * MD5_LENGTH];
unsigned char key_block2[MD5_LENGTH];
PRBool isFIPS;
HASH_HashType hashType;
PRBool extractValue = PR_TRUE;
CHECK_FORK();
if (!slot) {
return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
/*
* now lets create an object to hang the attributes off of
*/
if (phKey) *phKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
key = sftk_NewObject(slot); /* fill in the handle later */
if (key == NULL) {
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
isFIPS = (slot->slotID == FIPS_SLOT_ID);
/*
* load the template values into the object
*/
for (i=0; i < (int) ulAttributeCount; i++) {
crv = sftk_AddAttributeType(key,sftk_attr_expand(&pTemplate[i]));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_KEY_TYPE) {
keyType = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
}
if (pTemplate[i].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
keySize = *(CK_ULONG *)pTemplate[i].pValue;
}
}
if (crv != CKR_OK) { sftk_FreeObject(key); return crv; }
if (keySize == 0) {
keySize = sftk_MapKeySize(keyType);
}
switch (mechanism) {
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA1: /* fall through */
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256: /* fall through */
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384: /* fall through */
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512:
extractValue = PR_FALSE;
classType = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
break;
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1: /* fall through */
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256: /* fall through */
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384: /* fall through */
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512:
extractValue = PR_FALSE;
/* fall through */
default:
classType = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
}
crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_CLASS,&classType,sizeof(classType));
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return crv;
}
/* look up the base key we're deriving with */
session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) {
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
sourceKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hBaseKey,session);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
if (sourceKey == NULL) {
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
if (extractValue) {
/* get the value of the base key */
att = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_VALUE);
if (att == NULL) {
sftk_FreeObject(key);
sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey);
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
}
switch (mechanism) {
/*
* generate the master secret
*/
case CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
case CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
case CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256:
case CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256:
case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
case CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE:
case CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH:
{
CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *ssl3_master;
SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret * rsa_pms;
unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
if ((mechanism == CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE) ||
(mechanism == CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) {
CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *tls12_master =
(CK_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter;
tlsPrfHash = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_master->prfHashMechanism);
if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
} else if ((mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_SHA256) ||
(mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256)) {
tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgSHA256;
}
if ((mechanism != CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE) &&
(mechanism != CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) {
isTLS = PR_TRUE;
}
if ((mechanism == CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH) ||
(mechanism == CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH) ||
(mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_SHA256) ||
(mechanism == CKM_TLS12_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH)) {
isDH = PR_TRUE;
}
/* first do the consistancy checks */
if (!isDH && (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_PMS_LENGTH)) {
crv = CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue !=
CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
break;
}
sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
if (keyType != CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) {
crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
break;
}
if ((keySize != 0) && (keySize != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH)) {
crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
break;
}
/* finally do the key gen */
ssl3_master = (CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS *)
pMechanism->pParameter;
PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata,
ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
ssl3_master->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
if (ssl3_master->pVersion) {
SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key);
rsa_pms = (SSL3RSAPreMasterSecret *) att->attrib.pValue;
/* don't leak more key material then necessary for SSL to work */
if ((sessKey == NULL) || sessKey->wasDerived) {
ssl3_master->pVersion->major = 0xff;
ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = 0xff;
} else {
ssl3_master->pVersion->major = rsa_pms->client_version[0];
ssl3_master->pVersion->minor = rsa_pms->client_version[1];
}
}
if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulClientRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
if (ssl3_master->RandomInfo.ulServerRandomLen != SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
if (isTLS) {
SECStatus status;
SECItem crsr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
SECItem pms = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
crsr.data = crsrdata;
crsr.len = sizeof crsrdata;
master.data = key_block;
master.len = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH;
pms.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue;
pms.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
if (tlsPrfHash != HASH_AlgNULL) {
status = TLS_P_hash(tlsPrfHash, &pms, "master secret",
&crsr, &master, isFIPS);
} else {
status = TLS_PRF(&pms, "master secret", &crsr, &master, isFIPS);
}
if (status != SECSuccess) {
crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
break;
}
} else {
/* now allocate the hash contexts */
md5 = MD5_NewContext();
if (md5 == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
sha = SHA1_NewContext();
if (sha == NULL) {
PORT_Free(md5);
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
SHA1_Begin(sha);
SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i]));
SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
SHA1_Update(sha, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata);
SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH);
PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH);
MD5_Begin(md5);
MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen);
MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i*MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH);
}
PORT_Free(md5);
PORT_Free(sha);
}
/* store the results */
crv = sftk_forceAttribute
(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_KEY_TYPE,&keyType,sizeof(keyType));
if (isTLS) {
/* TLS's master secret is used to "sign" finished msgs with PRF. */
/* XXX This seems like a hack. But SFTK_Derive only accepts
* one "operation" argument. */
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_SIGN, &cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VERIFY,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
/* While we're here, we might as well force this, too. */
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_DERIVE,&cktrue,sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
}
break;
}
case CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
case CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256:
case CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
case CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE:
{
CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *ssl3_keys;
CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT * ssl3_keys_out;
CK_ULONG effKeySize;
unsigned int block_needed;
unsigned char srcrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
unsigned char crsrdata[SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH * 2];
if (mechanism == CKM_TLS12_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE) {
CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *tls12_keys =
(CK_TLS12_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter;
tlsPrfHash = GetHashTypeFromMechanism(tls12_keys->prfHashMechanism);
if (tlsPrfHash == HASH_AlgNULL) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
} else if (mechanism == CKM_NSS_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE_SHA256) {
tlsPrfHash = HASH_AlgSHA256;
}
if (mechanism != CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE) {
isTLS = PR_TRUE;
}
crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
if (att->attrib.ulValueLen != SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_LENGTH) {
crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
break;
}
att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(sourceKey,CKA_KEY_TYPE);
if ((att2 == NULL) || (*(CK_KEY_TYPE *)att2->attrib.pValue !=
CKK_GENERIC_SECRET)) {
if (att2) sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
crv = CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED;
break;
}
sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
md5 = MD5_NewContext();
if (md5 == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
sha = SHA1_NewContext();
if (sha == NULL) {
PORT_Free(md5);
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
ssl3_keys = (CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter;
PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
PORT_Memcpy(srcrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pClientRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
PORT_Memcpy(crsrdata + SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH,
ssl3_keys->RandomInfo.pServerRandom, SSL3_RANDOM_LENGTH);
/*
* clear out our returned keys so we can recover on failure
*/
ssl3_keys_out = ssl3_keys->pReturnedKeyMaterial;
ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
/*
* How much key material do we need?
*/
macSize = ssl3_keys->ulMacSizeInBits/8;
effKeySize = ssl3_keys->ulKeySizeInBits/8;
IVSize = ssl3_keys->ulIVSizeInBits/8;
if (keySize == 0) {
effKeySize = keySize;
}
block_needed = 2 * (macSize + effKeySize +
((!ssl3_keys->bIsExport) * IVSize));
PORT_Assert(block_needed <= sizeof key_block);
if (block_needed > sizeof key_block)
block_needed = sizeof key_block;
/*
* generate the key material: This looks amazingly similar to the
* PMS code, and is clearly crying out for a function to provide it.
*/
if (isTLS) {
SECStatus status;
SECItem srcr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
SECItem keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
SECItem master = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
srcr.data = srcrdata;
srcr.len = sizeof srcrdata;
keyblk.data = key_block;
keyblk.len = block_needed;
master.data = (unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue;
master.len = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
if (tlsPrfHash != HASH_AlgNULL) {
status = TLS_P_hash(tlsPrfHash, &master, "key expansion",
&srcr, &keyblk, isFIPS);
} else {
status = TLS_PRF(&master, "key expansion", &srcr, &keyblk,
isFIPS);
}
if (status != SECSuccess) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
} else {
unsigned int block_bytes = 0;
/* key_block =
* MD5(master_secret + SHA('A' + master_secret +
* ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
* MD5(master_secret + SHA('BB' + master_secret +
* ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
* MD5(master_secret + SHA('CCC' + master_secret +
* ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random)) +
* [...];
*/
for (i = 0; i < NUM_MIXERS && block_bytes < block_needed; i++) {
SHA1_Begin(sha);
SHA1_Update(sha, (unsigned char*) mixers[i], strlen(mixers[i]));
SHA1_Update(sha, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
SHA1_Update(sha, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata);
SHA1_End(sha, sha_out, &outLen, SHA1_LENGTH);
PORT_Assert(outLen == SHA1_LENGTH);
MD5_Begin(md5);
MD5_Update(md5, (const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
MD5_Update(md5, sha_out, outLen);
MD5_End(md5, &key_block[i*MD5_LENGTH], &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
PORT_Assert(outLen == MD5_LENGTH);
block_bytes += outLen;
}
}
/*
* Put the key material where it goes.
*/
i = 0; /* now shows how much consumed */
/*
* The key_block is partitioned as follows:
* client_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size]
*/
crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize,
&ssl3_keys_out->hClientMacSecret);
if (crv != CKR_OK)
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
i += macSize;
/*
* server_write_MAC_secret[CipherSpec.hash_size]
*/
crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_TRUE,&key_block[i],macSize,
&ssl3_keys_out->hServerMacSecret);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
i += macSize;
if (keySize) {
if (!ssl3_keys->bIsExport) {
/*
** Generate Domestic write keys and IVs.
** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
*/
crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i],
keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
i += keySize;
/*
** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
*/
crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,&key_block[i],
keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
i += keySize;
/*
** client_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size]
*/
if (IVSize > 0) {
PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient,
&key_block[i], IVSize);
i += IVSize;
}
/*
** server_write_IV[CipherSpec.IV_size]
*/
if (IVSize > 0) {
PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer,
&key_block[i], IVSize);
i += IVSize;
}
PORT_Assert(i <= sizeof key_block);
} else if (!isTLS) {
/*
** Generate SSL3 Export write keys and IVs.
** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
** final_client_write_key = MD5(client_write_key +
** ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random);
*/
MD5_Begin(md5);
MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize);
MD5_Update(md5, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata);
MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
i += effKeySize;
crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2,
keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
/*
** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
** final_server_write_key = MD5(server_write_key +
** ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random);
*/
MD5_Begin(md5);
MD5_Update(md5, &key_block[i], effKeySize);
MD5_Update(md5, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata);
MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
i += effKeySize;
crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession,key,PR_FALSE,key_block2,
keySize,&ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
/*
** client_write_IV =
** MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random);
*/
MD5_Begin(md5);
MD5_Update(md5, crsrdata, sizeof crsrdata);
MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, key_block2, IVSize);
/*
** server_write_IV =
** MD5(ServerHello.random + ClientHello.random);
*/
MD5_Begin(md5);
MD5_Update(md5, srcrdata, sizeof srcrdata);
MD5_End(md5, key_block2, &outLen, MD5_LENGTH);
PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, key_block2, IVSize);
} else {
/*
** Generate TLS 1.0 Export write keys and IVs.
*/
SECStatus status;
SECItem secret = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
SECItem crsr = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
SECItem keyblk = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
/*
** client_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
** final_client_write_key = PRF(client_write_key,
** "client write key",
** client_random + server_random);
*/
secret.data = &key_block[i];
secret.len = effKeySize;
i += effKeySize;
crsr.data = crsrdata;
crsr.len = sizeof crsrdata;
keyblk.data = key_block2;
keyblk.len = sizeof key_block2;
status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "client write key", &crsr, &keyblk,
isFIPS);
if (status != SECSuccess) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2,
keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hClientKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
/*
** server_write_key[CipherSpec.key_material]
** final_server_write_key = PRF(server_write_key,
** "server write key",
** client_random + server_random);
*/
secret.data = &key_block[i];
secret.len = effKeySize;
i += effKeySize;
keyblk.data = key_block2;
keyblk.len = sizeof key_block2;
status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "server write key", &crsr, &keyblk,
isFIPS);
if (status != SECSuccess) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
crv = sftk_buildSSLKey(hSession, key, PR_FALSE, key_block2,
keySize, &ssl3_keys_out->hServerKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
/*
** iv_block = PRF("", "IV block",
** client_random + server_random);
** client_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size]
** server_write_IV[SecurityParameters.IV_size]
*/
if (IVSize) {
secret.data = NULL;
secret.len = 0;
keyblk.data = &key_block[i];
keyblk.len = 2 * IVSize;
status = TLS_PRF(&secret, "IV block", &crsr, &keyblk,
isFIPS);
if (status != SECSuccess) {
goto key_and_mac_derive_fail;
}
PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVClient, keyblk.data, IVSize);
PORT_Memcpy(ssl3_keys_out->pIVServer, keyblk.data + IVSize,
IVSize);
}
}
}
crv = CKR_OK;
if (0) {
key_and_mac_derive_fail:
if (crv == CKR_OK)
crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
sftk_freeSSLKeys(hSession, ssl3_keys_out);
}
MD5_DestroyContext(md5, PR_TRUE);
SHA1_DestroyContext(sha, PR_TRUE);
sftk_FreeObject(key);
key = NULL;
break;
}
case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY:
{
SFTKObject *newKey;
crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) {
crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
newKey = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(*(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *)
pMechanism->pParameter,session);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
if ( newKey == NULL) {
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
if (sftk_isTrue(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE)) {
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(newKey,CKA_SENSITIVE,&cktrue,
sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
break;
}
}
att2 = sftk_FindAttribute(newKey,CKA_VALUE);
if (att2 == NULL) {
sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
crv = CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
break;
}
tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+att2->attrib.ulValueLen;
if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
if (buf == NULL) {
sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen);
PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen,
att2->attrib.pValue,att2->attrib.ulValueLen);
crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize);
sftk_FreeAttribute(att2);
sftk_FreeObject(newKey);
break;
}
case CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA:
crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *) pMechanism->pParameter;
tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen;
if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
if (buf == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,att->attrib.ulValueLen);
PORT_Memcpy(buf+att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->pData,
stringPtr->ulLen);
crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize);
break;
case CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE:
crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter;
tmpKeySize = att->attrib.ulValueLen+stringPtr->ulLen;
if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(tmpKeySize);
if (buf == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
PORT_Memcpy(buf,stringPtr->pData,stringPtr->ulLen);
PORT_Memcpy(buf+stringPtr->ulLen,att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
PORT_ZFree(buf,tmpKeySize);
break;
case CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA:
crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
stringPtr = (CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA *)pMechanism->pParameter;
tmpKeySize = PR_MIN(att->attrib.ulValueLen,stringPtr->ulLen);
if (keySize == 0) keySize = tmpKeySize;
if (keySize > tmpKeySize) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize);
if (buf == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
PORT_Memcpy(buf,att->attrib.pValue,keySize);
for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) {
buf[i] ^= stringPtr->pData[i];
}
crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize);
break;
case CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY:
{
/* the following assumes 8 bits per byte */
CK_ULONG extract = *(CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS *)pMechanism->pParameter;
CK_ULONG shift = extract & 0x7; /* extract mod 8 the fast way */
CK_ULONG offset = extract >> 3; /* extract div 8 the fast way */
crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey,key);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
if (keySize == 0) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE;
break;
}
/* make sure we have enough bits in the original key */
if (att->attrib.ulValueLen <
(offset + keySize + ((shift != 0)? 1 :0)) ) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
buf = (unsigned char*)PORT_Alloc(keySize);
if (buf == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
/* copy the bits we need into the new key */
for (i=0; i < (int)keySize; i++) {
unsigned char *value =
((unsigned char *)att->attrib.pValue)+offset+i;
if (shift) {
buf[i] = (value[0] << (shift)) | (value[1] >> (8 - shift));
} else {
buf[i] = value[0];
}
}
crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,buf,keySize);
PORT_ZFree(buf,keySize);
break;
}
case CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION:
if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD2_LENGTH;
if (keySize > MD2_LENGTH) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
/* now allocate the hash contexts */
md2 = MD2_NewContext();
if (md2 == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
MD2_Begin(md2);
MD2_Update(md2,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
MD2_End(md2,key_block,&outLen,MD2_LENGTH);
MD2_DestroyContext(md2, PR_TRUE);
crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
break;
case CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION:
if (keySize == 0) keySize = MD5_LENGTH;
if (keySize > MD5_LENGTH) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
MD5_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
crv = sftk_forceAttribute (key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
break;
case CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION:
if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA1_LENGTH;
if (keySize > SHA1_LENGTH) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
SHA1_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
break;
case CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION:
if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA224_LENGTH;
if (keySize > SHA224_LENGTH) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
SHA224_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
break;
case CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION:
if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA256_LENGTH;
if (keySize > SHA256_LENGTH) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
SHA256_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
break;
case CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION:
if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA384_LENGTH;
if (keySize > SHA384_LENGTH) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
SHA384_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
break;
case CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION:
if (keySize == 0) keySize = SHA512_LENGTH;
if (keySize > SHA512_LENGTH) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
SHA512_HashBuf(key_block,(const unsigned char*)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE,key_block,keySize);
break;
case CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE:
{
SECItem derived, dhPublic;
SECItem dhPrime, dhValue;
/* sourceKey - values for the local existing low key */
/* get prime and value attributes */
crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhPrime, sourceKey, CKA_PRIME);
if (crv != SECSuccess) break;
crv = sftk_Attribute2SecItem(NULL, &dhValue, sourceKey, CKA_VALUE);
if (crv != SECSuccess) {
PORT_Free(dhPrime.data);
break;
}
dhPublic.data = pMechanism->pParameter;
dhPublic.len = pMechanism->ulParameterLen;
/* calculate private value - oct */
rv = DH_Derive(&dhPublic, &dhPrime, &dhValue, &derived, keySize);
PORT_Free(dhPrime.data);
PORT_Free(dhValue.data);
if (rv == SECSuccess) {
sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, derived.data, derived.len);
PORT_ZFree(derived.data, derived.len);
} else
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
case CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE:
case CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE:
{
SECItem ecScalar, ecPoint;
SECItem tmp;
PRBool withCofactor = PR_FALSE;
unsigned char *secret;
unsigned char *keyData = NULL;
unsigned int secretlen, curveLen, pubKeyLen;
CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *mechParams;
NSSLOWKEYPrivateKey *privKey;
PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
/* Check mechanism parameters */
mechParams = (CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *) pMechanism->pParameter;
if ((pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS)) ||
((mechParams->kdf == CKD_NULL) &&
((mechParams->ulSharedDataLen != 0) ||
(mechParams->pSharedData != NULL)))) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
privKey = sftk_GetPrivKey(sourceKey, CKK_EC, &crv);
if (privKey == NULL) {
break;
}
/* Now we are working with a non-NULL private key */
SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &ecScalar, &privKey->u.ec.privateValue);
ecPoint.data = mechParams->pPublicData;
ecPoint.len = mechParams->ulPublicDataLen;
curveLen = (privKey->u.ec.ecParams.fieldID.size +7)/8;
pubKeyLen = (2*curveLen) + 1;
/* if the len is too small, can't be a valid point */
if (ecPoint.len < pubKeyLen) {
goto ec_loser;
}
/* if the len is too large, must be an encoded point (length is
* equal case just falls through */
if (ecPoint.len > pubKeyLen) {
SECItem newPoint;
arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
if (arena == NULL) {
goto ec_loser;
}
rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(arena, &newPoint,
SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate),
&ecPoint);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
goto ec_loser;
}
ecPoint = newPoint;
}
if (mechanism == CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE) {
withCofactor = PR_TRUE;
} else {
/* When not using cofactor derivation, one should
* validate the public key to avoid small subgroup
* attacks.
*/
if (EC_ValidatePublicKey(&privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecPoint)
!= SECSuccess) {
goto ec_loser;
}
}
rv = ECDH_Derive(&ecPoint, &privKey->u.ec.ecParams, &ecScalar,
withCofactor, &tmp);
PORT_Free(ecScalar.data);
ecScalar.data = NULL;
if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo) {
nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
privKey=NULL;
}
if (arena) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena,PR_FALSE);
arena=NULL;
}
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
crv = sftk_MapCryptError(PORT_GetError());
break;
}
/*
* apply the kdf function.
*/
if (mechParams->kdf == CKD_NULL) {
/*
* tmp is the raw data created by ECDH_Derive,
* secret and secretlen are the values we will
* eventually pass as our generated key.
*/
secret = tmp.data;
secretlen = tmp.len;
} else {
secretlen = keySize;
crv = sftk_ANSI_X9_63_kdf(&secret, keySize,
&tmp, mechParams->pSharedData,
mechParams->ulSharedDataLen, mechParams->kdf);
PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
break;
}
tmp.data = secret;
tmp.len = secretlen;
}
/*
* if keySize is supplied, then we are generating a key of a specific
* length. This is done by taking the least significant 'keySize'
* bytes from the unsigned value calculated by ECDH. Note: this may
* mean padding temp with extra leading zeros from what ECDH_Derive
* already returned (which itself may contain leading zeros).
*/
if (keySize) {
if (secretlen < keySize) {
keyData = PORT_ZAlloc(keySize);
if (!keyData) {
PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
PORT_Memcpy(&keyData[keySize-secretlen],secret,secretlen);
secret = keyData;
} else {
secret += (secretlen - keySize);
}
secretlen = keySize;
}
sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, secret, secretlen);
PORT_ZFree(tmp.data, tmp.len);
if (keyData) {
PORT_ZFree(keyData, keySize);
}
break;
ec_loser:
crv = CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
PORT_Free(ecScalar.data);
if (privKey != sourceKey->objectInfo)
nsslowkey_DestroyPrivateKey(privKey);
if (arena) {
PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
}
break;
}
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
/* See RFC 5869 and CK_NSS_HKDFParams for documentation. */
case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA1: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; goto hkdf;
case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto hkdf;
case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto hkdf;
case CKM_NSS_HKDF_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto hkdf;
hkdf: {
const CK_NSS_HKDFParams * params =
(const CK_NSS_HKDFParams *) pMechanism->pParameter;
const SECHashObject * rawHash;
unsigned hashLen;
CK_BYTE buf[HASH_LENGTH_MAX];
CK_BYTE * prk; /* psuedo-random key */
CK_ULONG prkLen;
CK_BYTE * okm; /* output keying material */
rawHash = HASH_GetRawHashObject(hashType);
if (rawHash == NULL || rawHash->length > sizeof buf) {
crv = CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
break;
}
hashLen = rawHash->length;
if (pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_HKDFParams) ||
!params || (!params->bExpand && !params->bExtract) ||
(params->bExtract && params->ulSaltLen > 0 && !params->pSalt) ||
(params->bExpand && params->ulInfoLen > 0 && !params->pInfo)) {
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
break;
}
if (keySize == 0 || keySize > sizeof key_block ||
(!params->bExpand && keySize > hashLen) ||
(params->bExpand && keySize > 255 * hashLen)) {
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
break;
}
crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key);
if (crv != CKR_OK)
break;
/* HKDF-Extract(salt, base key value) */
if (params->bExtract) {
CK_BYTE * salt;
CK_ULONG saltLen;
HMACContext * hmac;
unsigned int bufLen;
salt = params->pSalt;
saltLen = params->ulSaltLen;
if (salt == NULL) {
saltLen = hashLen;
salt = buf;
memset(salt, 0, saltLen);
}
hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, salt, saltLen, isFIPS);
if (!hmac) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
HMAC_Begin(hmac);
HMAC_Update(hmac, (const unsigned char*) att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
HMAC_Finish(hmac, buf, &bufLen, sizeof(buf));
HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
PORT_Assert(bufLen == rawHash->length);
prk = buf;
prkLen = bufLen;
} else {
/* PRK = base key value */
prk = (CK_BYTE*) att->attrib.pValue;
prkLen = att->attrib.ulValueLen;
}
/* HKDF-Expand */
if (!params->bExpand) {
okm = prk;
} else {
/* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(prk, "" | info | 0x01)
* T(n) = HMAC-Hash(prk, T(n-1) | info | n
* key material = T(1) | ... | T(n)
*/
HMACContext * hmac;
CK_BYTE i;
unsigned iterations = PR_ROUNDUP(keySize, hashLen) / hashLen;
hmac = HMAC_Create(rawHash, prk, prkLen, isFIPS);
if (hmac == NULL) {
crv = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
break;
}
for (i = 1; i <= iterations; ++i) {
unsigned len;
HMAC_Begin(hmac);
if (i > 1) {
HMAC_Update(hmac, key_block + ((i-2) * hashLen), hashLen);
}
if (params->ulInfoLen != 0) {
HMAC_Update(hmac, params->pInfo, params->ulInfoLen);
}
HMAC_Update(hmac, &i, 1);
HMAC_Finish(hmac, key_block + ((i-1) * hashLen), &len,
hashLen);
PORT_Assert(len == hashLen);
}
HMAC_Destroy(hmac, PR_TRUE);
okm = key_block;
}
/* key material = prk */
crv = sftk_forceAttribute(key, CKA_VALUE, okm, keySize);
break;
} /* end of CKM_NSS_HKDF_* */
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA1: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; goto jpake2;
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto jpake2;
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto jpake2;
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_ROUND2_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto jpake2;
jpake2:
if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params))
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
if (crv == CKR_OK && sftk_isTrue(key, CKA_TOKEN))
crv = CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT;
if (crv == CKR_OK)
crv = sftk_DeriveSensitiveCheck(sourceKey, key);
if (crv == CKR_OK)
crv = jpake_Round2(hashType,
(CK_NSS_JPAKERound2Params *) pMechanism->pParameter,
sourceKey, key);
break;
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA1: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA1; goto jpakeFinal;
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA256: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA256; goto jpakeFinal;
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA384: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA384; goto jpakeFinal;
case CKM_NSS_JPAKE_FINAL_SHA512: hashType = HASH_AlgSHA512; goto jpakeFinal;
jpakeFinal:
if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL ||
pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams))
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID;
/* We purposely do not do the derive sensitivity check; we want to be
able to derive non-sensitive keys while allowing the ROUND1 and
ROUND2 keys to be sensitive (which they always are, since they are
in the CKO_PRIVATE_KEY class). The caller must include CKA_SENSITIVE
in the template in order for the resultant keyblock key to be
sensitive.
*/
if (crv == CKR_OK)
crv = jpake_Final(hashType,
(CK_NSS_JPAKEFinalParams *) pMechanism->pParameter,
sourceKey, key);
break;
default:
crv = CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID;
}
if (att) {
sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
}
sftk_FreeObject(sourceKey);
if (crv != CKR_OK) {
if (key) sftk_FreeObject(key);
return crv;
}
/* link the key object into the list */
if (key) {
SFTKSessionObject *sessKey = sftk_narrowToSessionObject(key);
PORT_Assert(sessKey);
/* get the session */
sessKey->wasDerived = PR_TRUE;
session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) {
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
}
crv = sftk_handleObject(key,session);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
*phKey = key->handle;
sftk_FreeObject(key);
}
return crv;
}
/* NSC_GetFunctionStatus obtains an updated status of a function running
* in parallel with an application. */
CK_RV NSC_GetFunctionStatus(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
{
CHECK_FORK();
return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL;
}
/* NSC_CancelFunction cancels a function running in parallel */
CK_RV NSC_CancelFunction(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession)
{
CHECK_FORK();
return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL;
}
/* NSC_GetOperationState saves the state of the cryptographic
*operation in a session.
* NOTE: This code only works for digest functions for now. eventually need
* to add full flatten/resurect to our state stuff so that all types of state
* can be saved */
CK_RV NSC_GetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG_PTR pulOperationStateLen)
{
SFTKSessionContext *context;
SFTKSession *session;
CK_RV crv;
CK_ULONG pOSLen = *pulOperationStateLen;
CHECK_FORK();
/* make sure we're legal */
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE, &session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
*pulOperationStateLen = context->cipherInfoLen + sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE)
+ sizeof(SFTKContextType);
if (pOperationState == NULL) {
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
} else {
if (pOSLen < *pulOperationStateLen) {
return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
}
PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,&context->type,sizeof(SFTKContextType));
pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType);
PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,&context->currentMech,
sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE);
PORT_Memcpy(pOperationState,context->cipherInfo,context->cipherInfoLen);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
return CKR_OK;
}
#define sftk_Decrement(stateSize,len) \
stateSize = ((stateSize) > (CK_ULONG)(len)) ? \
((stateSize) - (CK_ULONG)(len)) : 0;
/* NSC_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic
* operation in a session. This is coded like it can restore lots of
* states, but it only works for truly flat cipher structures. */
CK_RV NSC_SetOperationState(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pOperationState, CK_ULONG ulOperationStateLen,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey)
{
SFTKSessionContext *context;
SFTKSession *session;
SFTKContextType type;
CK_MECHANISM mech;
CK_RV crv = CKR_OK;
CHECK_FORK();
while (ulOperationStateLen != 0) {
/* get what type of state we're dealing with... */
PORT_Memcpy(&type,pOperationState, sizeof(SFTKContextType));
/* fix up session contexts based on type */
session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
context = sftk_ReturnContextByType(session, type);
sftk_SetContextByType(session, type, NULL);
if (context) {
sftk_FreeContext(context);
}
pOperationState += sizeof(SFTKContextType);
sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,sizeof(SFTKContextType));
/* get the mechanism structure */
PORT_Memcpy(&mech.mechanism,pOperationState,sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
pOperationState += sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE);
sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen, sizeof(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE));
/* should be filled in... but not necessary for hash */
mech.pParameter = NULL;
mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
switch (type) {
case SFTK_HASH:
crv = NSC_DigestInit(hSession,&mech);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
crv = sftk_GetContext(hSession, &context, SFTK_HASH, PR_TRUE,
NULL);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
PORT_Memcpy(context->cipherInfo,pOperationState,
context->cipherInfoLen);
pOperationState += context->cipherInfoLen;
sftk_Decrement(ulOperationStateLen,context->cipherInfoLen);
break;
default:
/* do sign/encrypt/decrypt later */
crv = CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID;
}
sftk_FreeSession(session);
if (crv != CKR_OK) break;
}
return crv;
}
/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */
/* NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting and encryption
* operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DigestEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
{
CK_RV crv;
CHECK_FORK();
crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart,
pulEncryptedPartLen);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen);
return crv;
}
/* NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
* digesting operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DecryptDigestUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedPartLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pPart, CK_ULONG_PTR pulPartLen)
{
CK_RV crv;
CHECK_FORK();
crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedPart, ulEncryptedPartLen,
pPart, pulPartLen);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,pPart,*pulPartLen);
return crv;
}
/* NSC_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and
* encryption operation. */
CK_RV NSC_SignEncryptUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BYTE_PTR pPart,
CK_ULONG ulPartLen, CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedPart,
CK_ULONG_PTR pulEncryptedPartLen)
{
CK_RV crv;
CHECK_FORK();
crv = NSC_EncryptUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen, pEncryptedPart,
pulEncryptedPartLen);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
crv = NSC_SignUpdate(hSession,pPart,ulPartLen);
return crv;
}
/* NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption
* and verify operation. */
CK_RV NSC_DecryptVerifyUpdate(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
CK_BYTE_PTR pEncryptedData, CK_ULONG ulEncryptedDataLen,
CK_BYTE_PTR pData, CK_ULONG_PTR pulDataLen)
{
CK_RV crv;
CHECK_FORK();
crv = NSC_DecryptUpdate(hSession,pEncryptedData, ulEncryptedDataLen,
pData, pulDataLen);
if (crv != CKR_OK) return crv;
crv = NSC_VerifyUpdate(hSession, pData, *pulDataLen);
return crv;
}
/* NSC_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting operation,
* by digesting the value of a secret key as part of the data already digested.
*/
CK_RV NSC_DigestKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey)
{
SFTKSession *session = NULL;
SFTKObject *key = NULL;
SFTKAttribute *att;
CK_RV crv;
CHECK_FORK();
session = sftk_SessionFromHandle(hSession);
if (session == NULL) return CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
key = sftk_ObjectFromHandle(hKey,session);
sftk_FreeSession(session);
if (key == NULL) return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
/* PUT ANY DIGEST KEY RESTRICTION CHECKS HERE */
/* make sure it's a valid key for this operation */
if (key->objclass != CKO_SECRET_KEY) {
sftk_FreeObject(key);
return CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT;
}
/* get the key value */
att = sftk_FindAttribute(key,CKA_VALUE);
sftk_FreeObject(key);
if (!att) {
return CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID;
}
crv = NSC_DigestUpdate(hSession,(CK_BYTE_PTR)att->attrib.pValue,
att->attrib.ulValueLen);
sftk_FreeAttribute(att);
return crv;
}
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