mirror of
https://github.com/rn10950/RetroZilla.git
synced 2024-11-15 04:00:12 +01:00
1c9b432ff7
M1357599, M923089+M1276618+M1278434, M1485864, M1520826, M1558548, #481-X25519, M1586176 with custom changes: - coreconf+makefiles: set NSS_NO_PKCS11_BYPASS by default (to disable, set NSS_PKCS11_BYPASS) and fix logic - curve25519_32: use PRuint32 instead of uint32_t - smime: fix decl on top of block - ssl3con: more VC6 fixes
1098 lines
31 KiB
C
1098 lines
31 KiB
C
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
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* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
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* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
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#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
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#include "stubs.h"
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#endif
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#include "blapi.h"
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#include "prerr.h"
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#include "secerr.h"
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#include "secmpi.h"
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#include "secitem.h"
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#include "mplogic.h"
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#include "ec.h"
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#include "ecl.h"
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#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
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/*
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* Returns true if pointP is the point at infinity, false otherwise
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*/
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PRBool
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ec_point_at_infinity(SECItem *pointP)
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{
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unsigned int i;
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for (i = 1; i < pointP->len; i++) {
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if (pointP->data[i] != 0x00) return PR_FALSE;
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}
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return PR_TRUE;
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}
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/*
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* Computes scalar point multiplication pointQ = k1 * G + k2 * pointP for
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* the curve whose parameters are encoded in params with base point G.
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*/
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SECStatus
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ec_points_mul(const ECParams *params, const mp_int *k1, const mp_int *k2,
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const SECItem *pointP, SECItem *pointQ)
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{
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mp_int Px, Py, Qx, Qy;
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mp_int Gx, Gy, order, irreducible, a, b;
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#if 0 /* currently don't support non-named curves */
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unsigned int irr_arr[5];
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#endif
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ECGroup *group = NULL;
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SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
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mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
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int len;
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#if EC_DEBUG
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int i;
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char mpstr[256];
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printf("ec_points_mul: params [len=%d]:", params->DEREncoding.len);
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for (i = 0; i < params->DEREncoding.len; i++)
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printf("%02x:", params->DEREncoding.data[i]);
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printf("\n");
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if (k1 != NULL) {
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mp_tohex(k1, mpstr);
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printf("ec_points_mul: scalar k1: %s\n", mpstr);
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mp_todecimal(k1, mpstr);
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printf("ec_points_mul: scalar k1: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
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}
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if (k2 != NULL) {
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mp_tohex(k2, mpstr);
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printf("ec_points_mul: scalar k2: %s\n", mpstr);
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mp_todecimal(k2, mpstr);
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printf("ec_points_mul: scalar k2: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
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}
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if (pointP != NULL) {
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printf("ec_points_mul: pointP [len=%d]:", pointP->len);
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for (i = 0; i < pointP->len; i++)
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printf("%02x:", pointP->data[i]);
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printf("\n");
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}
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#endif
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/* NOTE: We only support uncompressed points for now */
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len = (params->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;
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if (pointP != NULL) {
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if ((pointP->data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) ||
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(pointP->len != (2 * len + 1))) {
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PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM);
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return SECFailure;
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};
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}
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MP_DIGITS(&Px) = 0;
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MP_DIGITS(&Py) = 0;
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MP_DIGITS(&Qx) = 0;
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MP_DIGITS(&Qy) = 0;
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MP_DIGITS(&Gx) = 0;
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MP_DIGITS(&Gy) = 0;
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MP_DIGITS(&order) = 0;
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MP_DIGITS(&irreducible) = 0;
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MP_DIGITS(&a) = 0;
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MP_DIGITS(&b) = 0;
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&Px) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&Py) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&Qx) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&Qy) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&Gx) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&Gy) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&order) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&irreducible) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&a) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&b) );
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if ((k2 != NULL) && (pointP != NULL)) {
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/* Initialize Px and Py */
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&Px, pointP->data + 1, (mp_size) len) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&Py, pointP->data + 1 + len, (mp_size) len) );
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}
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/* construct from named params, if possible */
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if (params->name != ECCurve_noName) {
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group = ECGroup_fromName(params->name);
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}
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#if 0 /* currently don't support non-named curves */
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if (group == NULL) {
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/* Set up mp_ints containing the curve coefficients */
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&Gx, params->base.data + 1,
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(mp_size) len) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&Gy, params->base.data + 1 + len,
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(mp_size) len) );
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SECITEM_TO_MPINT( params->order, &order );
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SECITEM_TO_MPINT( params->curve.a, &a );
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SECITEM_TO_MPINT( params->curve.b, &b );
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if (params->fieldID.type == ec_field_GFp) {
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SECITEM_TO_MPINT( params->fieldID.u.prime, &irreducible );
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group = ECGroup_consGFp(&irreducible, &a, &b, &Gx, &Gy, &order, params->cofactor);
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} else {
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SECITEM_TO_MPINT( params->fieldID.u.poly, &irreducible );
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irr_arr[0] = params->fieldID.size;
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irr_arr[1] = params->fieldID.k1;
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irr_arr[2] = params->fieldID.k2;
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irr_arr[3] = params->fieldID.k3;
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irr_arr[4] = 0;
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group = ECGroup_consGF2m(&irreducible, irr_arr, &a, &b, &Gx, &Gy, &order, params->cofactor);
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}
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}
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#endif
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if (group == NULL)
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goto cleanup;
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if ((k2 != NULL) && (pointP != NULL)) {
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CHECK_MPI_OK( ECPoints_mul(group, k1, k2, &Px, &Py, &Qx, &Qy) );
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} else {
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CHECK_MPI_OK( ECPoints_mul(group, k1, NULL, NULL, NULL, &Qx, &Qy) );
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}
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/* Construct the SECItem representation of point Q */
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pointQ->data[0] = EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED;
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_to_fixlen_octets(&Qx, pointQ->data + 1,
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(mp_size) len) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_to_fixlen_octets(&Qy, pointQ->data + 1 + len,
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(mp_size) len) );
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rv = SECSuccess;
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#if EC_DEBUG
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printf("ec_points_mul: pointQ [len=%d]:", pointQ->len);
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for (i = 0; i < pointQ->len; i++)
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printf("%02x:", pointQ->data[i]);
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printf("\n");
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#endif
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cleanup:
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ECGroup_free(group);
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mp_clear(&Px);
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mp_clear(&Py);
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mp_clear(&Qx);
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mp_clear(&Qy);
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mp_clear(&Gx);
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mp_clear(&Gy);
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mp_clear(&order);
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mp_clear(&irreducible);
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mp_clear(&a);
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mp_clear(&b);
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if (err) {
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MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
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rv = SECFailure;
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}
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return rv;
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}
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#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
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/* Generates a new EC key pair. The private key is a supplied
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* value and the public key is the result of performing a scalar
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* point multiplication of that value with the curve's base point.
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*/
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SECStatus
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ec_NewKey(ECParams *ecParams, ECPrivateKey **privKey,
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const unsigned char *privKeyBytes, int privKeyLen)
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{
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SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
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#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
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PLArenaPool *arena;
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ECPrivateKey *key;
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mp_int k;
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mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
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int len;
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#if EC_DEBUG
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printf("ec_NewKey called\n");
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#endif
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MP_DIGITS(&k) = 0;
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if (!ecParams || ecParams->name == ECCurve_noName ||
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!privKey || !privKeyBytes || privKeyLen <= 0) {
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PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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/* Initialize an arena for the EC key. */
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if (!(arena = PORT_NewArena(NSS_FREEBL_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE)))
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return SECFailure;
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key = (ECPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(ECPrivateKey));
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if (!key) {
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PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
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return SECFailure;
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}
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/* Set the version number (SEC 1 section C.4 says it should be 1) */
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SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->version, 1);
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key->version.data[0] = 1;
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/* Copy all of the fields from the ECParams argument to the
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* ECParams structure within the private key.
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*/
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key->ecParams.arena = arena;
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key->ecParams.type = ecParams->type;
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key->ecParams.fieldID.size = ecParams->fieldID.size;
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key->ecParams.fieldID.type = ecParams->fieldID.type;
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if (ecParams->fieldID.type == ec_field_GFp) {
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CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.fieldID.u.prime,
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&ecParams->fieldID.u.prime));
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} else {
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CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.fieldID.u.poly,
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&ecParams->fieldID.u.poly));
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}
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key->ecParams.fieldID.k1 = ecParams->fieldID.k1;
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key->ecParams.fieldID.k2 = ecParams->fieldID.k2;
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key->ecParams.fieldID.k3 = ecParams->fieldID.k3;
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CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.curve.a,
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&ecParams->curve.a));
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CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.curve.b,
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&ecParams->curve.b));
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CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.curve.seed,
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&ecParams->curve.seed));
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CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.base,
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&ecParams->base));
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CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.order,
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&ecParams->order));
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key->ecParams.cofactor = ecParams->cofactor;
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CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.DEREncoding,
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&ecParams->DEREncoding));
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key->ecParams.name = ecParams->name;
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CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.curveOID,
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&ecParams->curveOID));
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len = (ecParams->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;
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SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->publicValue, 2*len + 1);
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len = ecParams->order.len;
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SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->privateValue, len);
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/* Copy private key */
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if (privKeyLen >= len) {
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memcpy(key->privateValue.data, privKeyBytes, len);
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} else {
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memset(key->privateValue.data, 0, (len - privKeyLen));
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memcpy(key->privateValue.data + (len - privKeyLen), privKeyBytes, privKeyLen);
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}
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/* Compute corresponding public key */
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&k) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&k, key->privateValue.data,
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(mp_size) len) );
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rv = ec_points_mul(ecParams, &k, NULL, NULL, &(key->publicValue));
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if (rv != SECSuccess) goto cleanup;
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*privKey = key;
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cleanup:
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mp_clear(&k);
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if (rv)
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PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
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#if EC_DEBUG
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printf("ec_NewKey returning %s\n",
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(rv == SECSuccess) ? "success" : "failure");
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#endif
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#else
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PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
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#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
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return rv;
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}
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/* Generates a new EC key pair. The private key is a supplied
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* random value (in seed) and the public key is the result of
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* performing a scalar point multiplication of that value with
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* the curve's base point.
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*/
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SECStatus
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EC_NewKeyFromSeed(ECParams *ecParams, ECPrivateKey **privKey,
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const unsigned char *seed, int seedlen)
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{
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SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
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#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
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rv = ec_NewKey(ecParams, privKey, seed, seedlen);
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#else
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PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
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#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
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return rv;
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}
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#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
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/* Generate a random private key using the algorithm A.4.1 of ANSI X9.62,
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* modified a la FIPS 186-2 Change Notice 1 to eliminate the bias in the
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* random number generator.
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*
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* Parameters
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* - order: a buffer that holds the curve's group order
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* - len: the length in octets of the order buffer
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*
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* Return Value
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* Returns a buffer of len octets that holds the private key. The caller
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* is responsible for freeing the buffer with PORT_ZFree.
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*/
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static unsigned char *
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ec_GenerateRandomPrivateKey(const unsigned char *order, int len)
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{
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SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
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mp_err err;
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unsigned char *privKeyBytes = NULL;
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mp_int privKeyVal, order_1, one;
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MP_DIGITS(&privKeyVal) = 0;
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MP_DIGITS(&order_1) = 0;
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MP_DIGITS(&one) = 0;
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&privKeyVal) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&order_1) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&one) );
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/* Generates 2*len random bytes using the global random bit generator
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* (which implements Algorithm 1 of FIPS 186-2 Change Notice 1) then
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* reduces modulo the group order.
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*/
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if ((privKeyBytes = PORT_Alloc(2*len)) == NULL) goto cleanup;
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CHECK_SEC_OK( RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(privKeyBytes, 2*len) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&privKeyVal, privKeyBytes, 2*len) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&order_1, order, len) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_set_int(&one, 1) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_sub(&order_1, &one, &order_1) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mod(&privKeyVal, &order_1, &privKeyVal) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_add(&privKeyVal, &one, &privKeyVal) );
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CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_to_fixlen_octets(&privKeyVal, privKeyBytes, len) );
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memset(privKeyBytes+len, 0, len);
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cleanup:
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mp_clear(&privKeyVal);
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mp_clear(&order_1);
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mp_clear(&one);
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if (err < MP_OKAY) {
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MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
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rv = SECFailure;
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}
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if (rv != SECSuccess && privKeyBytes) {
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PORT_Free(privKeyBytes);
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privKeyBytes = NULL;
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}
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return privKeyBytes;
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}
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#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
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|
|
/* Generates a new EC key pair. The private key is a random value and
|
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* the public key is the result of performing a scalar point multiplication
|
|
* of that value with the curve's base point.
|
|
*/
|
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SECStatus
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EC_NewKey(ECParams *ecParams, ECPrivateKey **privKey)
|
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{
|
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SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
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#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
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int len;
|
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unsigned char *privKeyBytes = NULL;
|
|
|
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if (!ecParams || ecParams->name == ECCurve_noName || !privKey) {
|
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PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
|
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return SECFailure;
|
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}
|
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|
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len = ecParams->order.len;
|
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privKeyBytes = ec_GenerateRandomPrivateKey(ecParams->order.data, len);
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if (privKeyBytes == NULL) goto cleanup;
|
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/* generate public key */
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CHECK_SEC_OK( ec_NewKey(ecParams, privKey, privKeyBytes, len) );
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|
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cleanup:
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if (privKeyBytes) {
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PORT_ZFree(privKeyBytes, len);
|
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}
|
|
#if EC_DEBUG
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printf("EC_NewKey returning %s\n",
|
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(rv == SECSuccess) ? "success" : "failure");
|
|
#endif
|
|
#else
|
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PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
|
|
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Validates an EC public key as described in Section 5.2.2 of
|
|
* X9.62. The ECDH primitive when used without the cofactor does
|
|
* not address small subgroup attacks, which may occur when the
|
|
* public key is not valid. These attacks can be prevented by
|
|
* validating the public key before using ECDH.
|
|
*/
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
EC_ValidatePublicKey(ECParams *ecParams, SECItem *publicValue)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
|
mp_int Px, Py;
|
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ECGroup *group = NULL;
|
|
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
|
mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
|
|
int len;
|
|
|
|
if (!ecParams || ecParams->name == ECCurve_noName ||
|
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!publicValue || !publicValue->len) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* NOTE: We only support uncompressed points for now */
|
|
len = (ecParams->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;
|
|
if (publicValue->data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
} else if (publicValue->len != (2 * len + 1)) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&Px) = 0;
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&Py) = 0;
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&Px) );
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&Py) );
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize Px and Py */
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&Px, publicValue->data + 1, (mp_size) len) );
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&Py, publicValue->data + 1 + len, (mp_size) len) );
|
|
|
|
/* construct from named params */
|
|
group = ECGroup_fromName(ecParams->name);
|
|
if (group == NULL) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* ECGroup_fromName fails if ecParams->name is not a valid
|
|
* ECCurveName value, or if we run out of memory, or perhaps
|
|
* for other reasons. Unfortunately if ecParams->name is a
|
|
* valid ECCurveName value, we don't know what the right error
|
|
* code should be because ECGroup_fromName doesn't return an
|
|
* error code to the caller. Set err to MP_UNDEF because
|
|
* that's what ECGroup_fromName uses internally.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((ecParams->name <= ECCurve_noName) ||
|
|
(ecParams->name >= ECCurve_pastLastCurve)) {
|
|
err = MP_BADARG;
|
|
} else {
|
|
err = MP_UNDEF;
|
|
}
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* validate public point */
|
|
if ((err = ECPoint_validate(group, &Px, &Py)) < MP_YES) {
|
|
if (err == MP_NO) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
|
|
rv = SECFailure;
|
|
err = MP_OKAY; /* don't change the error code */
|
|
}
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rv = SECSuccess;
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
ECGroup_free(group);
|
|
mp_clear(&Px);
|
|
mp_clear(&Py);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
|
|
rv = SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
return rv;
|
|
#else
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** Performs an ECDH key derivation by computing the scalar point
|
|
** multiplication of privateValue and publicValue (with or without the
|
|
** cofactor) and returns the x-coordinate of the resulting elliptic
|
|
** curve point in derived secret. If successful, derivedSecret->data
|
|
** is set to the address of the newly allocated buffer containing the
|
|
** derived secret, and derivedSecret->len is the size of the secret
|
|
** produced. It is the caller's responsibility to free the allocated
|
|
** buffer containing the derived secret.
|
|
*/
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
ECDH_Derive(SECItem *publicValue,
|
|
ECParams *ecParams,
|
|
SECItem *privateValue,
|
|
PRBool withCofactor,
|
|
SECItem *derivedSecret)
|
|
{
|
|
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
|
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
|
unsigned int len = 0;
|
|
SECItem pointQ = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
|
|
mp_int k; /* to hold the private value */
|
|
mp_int cofactor;
|
|
mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
|
|
#if EC_DEBUG
|
|
int i;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (!publicValue || !publicValue->len ||
|
|
!ecParams || ecParams->name == ECCurve_noName ||
|
|
!privateValue || !privateValue->len || !derivedSecret) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We fail if the public value is the point at infinity, since
|
|
* this produces predictable results.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ec_point_at_infinity(publicValue)) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&k) = 0;
|
|
memset(derivedSecret, 0, sizeof *derivedSecret);
|
|
len = (ecParams->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;
|
|
pointQ.len = 2*len + 1;
|
|
if ((pointQ.data = PORT_Alloc(2*len + 1)) == NULL) goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&k) );
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&k, privateValue->data,
|
|
(mp_size) privateValue->len) );
|
|
|
|
if (withCofactor && (ecParams->cofactor != 1)) {
|
|
/* multiply k with the cofactor */
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&cofactor) = 0;
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&cofactor) );
|
|
mp_set(&cofactor, ecParams->cofactor);
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mul(&k, &cofactor, &k) );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Multiply our private key and peer's public point */
|
|
if (ec_points_mul(ecParams, NULL, &k, publicValue, &pointQ) != SECSuccess)
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
if (ec_point_at_infinity(&pointQ)) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY); /* XXX better error code? */
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate memory for the derived secret and copy
|
|
* the x co-ordinate of pointQ into it.
|
|
*/
|
|
SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, derivedSecret, len);
|
|
memcpy(derivedSecret->data, pointQ.data + 1, len);
|
|
|
|
rv = SECSuccess;
|
|
|
|
#if EC_DEBUG
|
|
printf("derived_secret:\n");
|
|
for (i = 0; i < derivedSecret->len; i++)
|
|
printf("%02x:", derivedSecret->data[i]);
|
|
printf("\n");
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
mp_clear(&k);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pointQ.data) {
|
|
PORT_ZFree(pointQ.data, 2*len + 1);
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
|
|
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Computes the ECDSA signature (a concatenation of two values r and s)
|
|
* on the digest using the given key and the random value kb (used in
|
|
* computing s).
|
|
*/
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
ECDSA_SignDigestWithSeed(ECPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature,
|
|
const SECItem *digest, const unsigned char *kb, const int kblen)
|
|
{
|
|
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
|
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
|
mp_int x1;
|
|
mp_int d, k; /* private key, random integer */
|
|
mp_int r, s; /* tuple (r, s) is the signature */
|
|
mp_int n;
|
|
mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
|
|
ECParams *ecParams = NULL;
|
|
SECItem kGpoint = { siBuffer, NULL, 0};
|
|
int flen = 0; /* length in bytes of the field size */
|
|
unsigned olen; /* length in bytes of the base point order */
|
|
unsigned obits; /* length in bits of the base point order */
|
|
|
|
#if EC_DEBUG
|
|
char mpstr[256];
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize MPI integers. */
|
|
/* must happen before the first potential call to cleanup */
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&x1) = 0;
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&d) = 0;
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&k) = 0;
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&r) = 0;
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&s) = 0;
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&n) = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Check args */
|
|
if (!key || !signature || !digest || !kb || (kblen < 0)) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ecParams = &(key->ecParams);
|
|
flen = (ecParams->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;
|
|
olen = ecParams->order.len;
|
|
if (signature->data == NULL) {
|
|
/* a call to get the signature length only */
|
|
goto finish;
|
|
}
|
|
if (signature->len < 2*olen) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&x1) );
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&d) );
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&k) );
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&r) );
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&s) );
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&n) );
|
|
|
|
SECITEM_TO_MPINT( ecParams->order, &n );
|
|
SECITEM_TO_MPINT( key->privateValue, &d );
|
|
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&k, kb, kblen) );
|
|
/* Make sure k is in the interval [1, n-1] */
|
|
if ((mp_cmp_z(&k) <= 0) || (mp_cmp(&k, &n) >= 0)) {
|
|
#if EC_DEBUG
|
|
printf("k is outside [1, n-1]\n");
|
|
mp_tohex(&k, mpstr);
|
|
printf("k : %s \n", mpstr);
|
|
mp_tohex(&n, mpstr);
|
|
printf("n : %s \n", mpstr);
|
|
#endif
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
|
|
** so we compute k*G using an equivalent scalar of fixed
|
|
** bit-length.
|
|
** Fix based on patch for ECDSA timing attack in the paper
|
|
** by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri at
|
|
** http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232
|
|
**
|
|
** How do we convert k to a value of a fixed bit-length?
|
|
** k starts off as an integer satisfying 0 <= k < n. Hence,
|
|
** n <= k+n < 2n, which means k+n has either the same number
|
|
** of bits as n or one more bit than n. If k+n has the same
|
|
** number of bits as n, the second addition ensures that the
|
|
** final value has exactly one more bit than n. Thus, we
|
|
** always end up with a value that exactly one more bit than n.
|
|
*/
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_add(&k, &n, &k) );
|
|
if (mpl_significant_bits(&k) <= mpl_significant_bits(&n)) {
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_add(&k, &n, &k) );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.2, Step 2
|
|
**
|
|
** Compute kG
|
|
*/
|
|
kGpoint.len = 2*flen + 1;
|
|
kGpoint.data = PORT_Alloc(2*flen + 1);
|
|
if ((kGpoint.data == NULL) ||
|
|
(ec_points_mul(ecParams, &k, NULL, NULL, &kGpoint)
|
|
!= SECSuccess))
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 1
|
|
**
|
|
** Extract the x co-ordinate of kG into x1
|
|
*/
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&x1, kGpoint.data + 1,
|
|
(mp_size) flen) );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 2
|
|
**
|
|
** r = x1 mod n NOTE: n is the order of the curve
|
|
*/
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mod(&x1, &n, &r) );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 3
|
|
**
|
|
** verify r != 0
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mp_cmp_z(&r) == 0) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 4
|
|
**
|
|
** s = (k**-1 * (HASH(M) + d*r)) mod n
|
|
*/
|
|
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*digest, &s); /* s = HASH(M) */
|
|
|
|
/* In the definition of EC signing, digests are truncated
|
|
* to the length of n in bits.
|
|
* (see SEC 1 "Elliptic Curve Digit Signature Algorithm" section 4.1.*/
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( (obits = mpl_significant_bits(&n)) );
|
|
if (digest->len*8 > obits) {
|
|
mpl_rsh(&s,&s,digest->len*8 - obits);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if EC_DEBUG
|
|
mp_todecimal(&n, mpstr);
|
|
printf("n : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
|
|
mp_todecimal(&d, mpstr);
|
|
printf("d : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
|
|
mp_tohex(&x1, mpstr);
|
|
printf("x1: %s\n", mpstr);
|
|
mp_todecimal(&s, mpstr);
|
|
printf("digest: %s (decimal)\n", mpstr);
|
|
mp_todecimal(&r, mpstr);
|
|
printf("r : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
|
|
mp_tohex(&r, mpstr);
|
|
printf("r : %s\n", mpstr);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_invmod(&k, &n, &k) ); /* k = k**-1 mod n */
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mulmod(&d, &r, &n, &d) ); /* d = d * r mod n */
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_addmod(&s, &d, &n, &s) ); /* s = s + d mod n */
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mulmod(&s, &k, &n, &s) ); /* s = s * k mod n */
|
|
|
|
#if EC_DEBUG
|
|
mp_todecimal(&s, mpstr);
|
|
printf("s : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
|
|
mp_tohex(&s, mpstr);
|
|
printf("s : %s\n", mpstr);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 5
|
|
**
|
|
** verify s != 0
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mp_cmp_z(&s) == 0) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
**
|
|
** Signature is tuple (r, s)
|
|
*/
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_to_fixlen_octets(&r, signature->data, olen) );
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_to_fixlen_octets(&s, signature->data + olen, olen) );
|
|
finish:
|
|
signature->len = 2*olen;
|
|
|
|
rv = SECSuccess;
|
|
err = MP_OKAY;
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
mp_clear(&x1);
|
|
mp_clear(&d);
|
|
mp_clear(&k);
|
|
mp_clear(&r);
|
|
mp_clear(&s);
|
|
mp_clear(&n);
|
|
|
|
if (kGpoint.data) {
|
|
PORT_ZFree(kGpoint.data, 2*flen + 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
|
|
rv = SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if EC_DEBUG
|
|
printf("ECDSA signing with seed %s\n",
|
|
(rv == SECSuccess) ? "succeeded" : "failed");
|
|
#endif
|
|
#else
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
|
|
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** Computes the ECDSA signature on the digest using the given key
|
|
** and a random seed.
|
|
*/
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
ECDSA_SignDigest(ECPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest)
|
|
{
|
|
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
|
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
|
int len;
|
|
unsigned char *kBytes= NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!key) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
|
|
return SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Generate random value k */
|
|
len = key->ecParams.order.len;
|
|
kBytes = ec_GenerateRandomPrivateKey(key->ecParams.order.data, len);
|
|
if (kBytes == NULL) goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
/* Generate ECDSA signature with the specified k value */
|
|
rv = ECDSA_SignDigestWithSeed(key, signature, digest, kBytes, len);
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
if (kBytes) {
|
|
PORT_ZFree(kBytes, len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if EC_DEBUG
|
|
printf("ECDSA signing %s\n",
|
|
(rv == SECSuccess) ? "succeeded" : "failed");
|
|
#endif
|
|
#else
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
|
|
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** Checks the signature on the given digest using the key provided.
|
|
**
|
|
** The key argument must represent a valid EC public key (a point on
|
|
** the relevant curve). If it is not a valid point, then the behavior
|
|
** of this function is undefined. In cases where a public key might
|
|
** not be valid, use EC_ValidatePublicKey to check.
|
|
*/
|
|
SECStatus
|
|
ECDSA_VerifyDigest(ECPublicKey *key, const SECItem *signature,
|
|
const SECItem *digest)
|
|
{
|
|
SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
|
|
#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_ECC
|
|
mp_int r_, s_; /* tuple (r', s') is received signature) */
|
|
mp_int c, u1, u2, v; /* intermediate values used in verification */
|
|
mp_int x1;
|
|
mp_int n;
|
|
mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
|
|
ECParams *ecParams = NULL;
|
|
SECItem pointC = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
|
|
int slen; /* length in bytes of a half signature (r or s) */
|
|
int flen; /* length in bytes of the field size */
|
|
unsigned olen; /* length in bytes of the base point order */
|
|
unsigned obits; /* length in bits of the base point order */
|
|
|
|
#if EC_DEBUG
|
|
char mpstr[256];
|
|
printf("ECDSA verification called\n");
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize MPI integers. */
|
|
/* must happen before the first potential call to cleanup */
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&r_) = 0;
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&s_) = 0;
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&c) = 0;
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&u1) = 0;
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&u2) = 0;
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&x1) = 0;
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&v) = 0;
|
|
MP_DIGITS(&n) = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Check args */
|
|
if (!key || !signature || !digest) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ecParams = &(key->ecParams);
|
|
flen = (ecParams->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;
|
|
olen = ecParams->order.len;
|
|
if (signature->len == 0 || signature->len%2 != 0 ||
|
|
signature->len > 2*olen) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
slen = signature->len/2;
|
|
|
|
SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &pointC, 2*flen + 1);
|
|
if (pointC.data == NULL)
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&r_) );
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&s_) );
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&c) );
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&u1) );
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&u2) );
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&x1) );
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&v) );
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&n) );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** Convert received signature (r', s') into MPI integers.
|
|
*/
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&r_, signature->data, slen) );
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&s_, signature->data + slen, slen) );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.2, Steps 1 and 2
|
|
**
|
|
** Verify that 0 < r' < n and 0 < s' < n
|
|
*/
|
|
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(ecParams->order, &n);
|
|
if (mp_cmp_z(&r_) <= 0 || mp_cmp_z(&s_) <= 0 ||
|
|
mp_cmp(&r_, &n) >= 0 || mp_cmp(&s_, &n) >= 0) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
|
goto cleanup; /* will return rv == SECFailure */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.2, Step 3
|
|
**
|
|
** c = (s')**-1 mod n
|
|
*/
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_invmod(&s_, &n, &c) ); /* c = (s')**-1 mod n */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.2, Step 4
|
|
**
|
|
** u1 = ((HASH(M')) * c) mod n
|
|
*/
|
|
SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*digest, &u1); /* u1 = HASH(M) */
|
|
|
|
/* In the definition of EC signing, digests are truncated
|
|
* to the length of n in bits.
|
|
* (see SEC 1 "Elliptic Curve Digit Signature Algorithm" section 4.1.*/
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( (obits = mpl_significant_bits(&n)) );
|
|
if (digest->len*8 > obits) { /* u1 = HASH(M') */
|
|
mpl_rsh(&u1,&u1,digest->len*8 - obits);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if EC_DEBUG
|
|
mp_todecimal(&r_, mpstr);
|
|
printf("r_: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
|
|
mp_todecimal(&s_, mpstr);
|
|
printf("s_: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
|
|
mp_todecimal(&c, mpstr);
|
|
printf("c : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
|
|
mp_todecimal(&u1, mpstr);
|
|
printf("digest: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mulmod(&u1, &c, &n, &u1) ); /* u1 = u1 * c mod n */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.2, Step 4
|
|
**
|
|
** u2 = ((r') * c) mod n
|
|
*/
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mulmod(&r_, &c, &n, &u2) );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.3, Step 1
|
|
**
|
|
** Compute u1*G + u2*Q
|
|
** Here, A = u1.G B = u2.Q and C = A + B
|
|
** If the result, C, is the point at infinity, reject the signature
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ec_points_mul(ecParams, &u1, &u2, &key->publicValue, &pointC)
|
|
!= SECSuccess) {
|
|
rv = SECFailure;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
if (ec_point_at_infinity(&pointC)) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
|
rv = SECFailure;
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&x1, pointC.data + 1, flen) );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.4, Step 2
|
|
**
|
|
** v = x1 mod n
|
|
*/
|
|
CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mod(&x1, &n, &v) );
|
|
|
|
#if EC_DEBUG
|
|
mp_todecimal(&r_, mpstr);
|
|
printf("r_: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
|
|
mp_todecimal(&v, mpstr);
|
|
printf("v : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.4, Step 3
|
|
**
|
|
** Verification: v == r'
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mp_cmp(&v, &r_)) {
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
|
rv = SECFailure; /* Signature failed to verify. */
|
|
} else {
|
|
rv = SECSuccess; /* Signature verified. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if EC_DEBUG
|
|
mp_todecimal(&u1, mpstr);
|
|
printf("u1: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
|
|
mp_todecimal(&u2, mpstr);
|
|
printf("u2: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
|
|
mp_tohex(&x1, mpstr);
|
|
printf("x1: %s\n", mpstr);
|
|
mp_todecimal(&v, mpstr);
|
|
printf("v : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
mp_clear(&r_);
|
|
mp_clear(&s_);
|
|
mp_clear(&c);
|
|
mp_clear(&u1);
|
|
mp_clear(&u2);
|
|
mp_clear(&x1);
|
|
mp_clear(&v);
|
|
mp_clear(&n);
|
|
|
|
if (pointC.data) SECITEM_FreeItem(&pointC, PR_FALSE);
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
|
|
rv = SECFailure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if EC_DEBUG
|
|
printf("ECDSA verification %s\n",
|
|
(rv == SECSuccess) ? "succeeded" : "failed");
|
|
#endif
|
|
#else
|
|
PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
|
|
#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_ECC */
|
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
}
|
|
|